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This thesis is a public political biography of Sir Joseph Carruthers. It gives a thorough 
account of his career in the Legislative Assembly while emphasising his role in the 
development of New South Wales and Australian liberalism and the creation of the 
Australian party system. It explores the evolution of nineteenth century liberalism into a 
more modern form, tracing the roots of ideological beliefs and how these were 
pragmatically applied to changing circumstances. It argues that over the course of 
Carruthers’ career liberalism was adapted from a pervasive political culture into a partisan 
agenda and rhetorical philosophic stance which crystallised around anti-socialism. It 
suggests that Carruthers played a central role in this process both as an ambitious politician 
in the early years of party politics and then as a leader in the early post-federal era. The 
thesis argues that his involvement culminated in a deliberate attempt to impose clear ‘lines 
of cleavage’ on the political debate in order to help representative democracy function and 
that this helped to create Australia’s Liberal-Labor political divide. While exploring these 
themes the thesis also traces Carruthers’ role in the organisational developments of his 
time period, situating itself within a wider historiography on the development of the 
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The period from 1887 to 1910 is one of the defining phases of Australian political history. It 
was an era that saw the first true party election, the birth of the Labor Party, the 
accomplishment of federation and the success of women’s suffrage before culminating in 
the fusion of the federal ‘Liberal’ parties and Labor’s first outright election victory. 
Australia entered the period as a group of small and disparate Colonies with localised and 
unorganised politics and ended it as a growing nation united not only by a new Parliament 
and unified military but increasingly by trade and an emerging national media. Intrinsically 
any historical period directly effects what comes after it, but many lasting aspects of 
Australian politics were described in these twenty-four years. The main arena of Australian 
politics was created in this era. Its parameters were hotly debated before being defined in 
the Constitution. The interpretation and limits of that document were then tested in the 
early battles between the Commonwealth Government and the States, which set the tone 
for how the Federation would work in practice. The older arenas of political competition 
were also redefined, as State Parliaments dealt with what increasingly amounted to a 
supersession of prerogatives that went far deeper than almost anyone expected. Not only 
was the legal and practical structure of the political battleground revolutionised, but the 
fighters and their methods also evolved. The great political giants of what Loveday and 
Martin called the faction era slowly died off as the party replaced the individual as the 




cornerstone of a Government.1 Ideological divisions that had remained dormant since the 
early battles over responsible government re-emerged, as politicians debated the 
philosophical as well economic merits of tariffs. The Political Labor Leagues began to 
demand the representation of their section of society in Parliament, while the liberal 
ideology that had long dominated politics virtually unchallenged had to redefine itself in 
the face of rapid change. As a consequence of this upheaval politics became more 
professional and organised as political battles became ever fiercer. The ‘best’ men 
representing their area soon found they had to tie themselves to a platform and even to the 
preselection of a branch of likeminded individuals. Those that did not adapt quickly 
perished and by 1910 a clear two-party divide between Liberals and Labor had established 
itself both in the Federal and New South Wales Parliaments. 
 Because of the undeniable importance of this era it has received considerable 
historical attention. Federation in particular has been the subject of numerous histories, 
though that does not exclude the fact that some aspects of it have still been overlooked. 
Most of the giants of the era have received political biographies to match their impressive 
reputation. W.G. McMinn’s George Reid, A.W. Martin’s Henry Parkes and J.A. La Nauze’s 
Alfred Deakin all stand as monuments to the heights that Australian historiography has 
reached. Even some of the lesser-known players, like Bernhard Wise or Isaac Isaacs, have 
seen the light of the historian’s torch.2 Together these personal stories help to illuminate 
the period, for though the biographical form has its flaws it gives time for deep context and 
a real sense of how events gradually unfolded over time. A multiplicity of biographies also 
allows for a multiplicity of perspectives, something that is difficult to achieve in a more 
                                                          
1 P. Loveday & A. Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties: The First Thirty Years of Responsible 
Government in New South Wales 1856-1889 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1966). 
2 J.A. Ryan, B. R. Wise: An Oxford Liberal in the Freetrade Party of New South Wales (MA Thesis 
University of Sydney 1965) & Zelman Cowen, Sir Isaac Isaacs (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
1979). 




general history. These have also been written, and building on the biographical canon, 
they help to explore trends and organisational developments free from the constraints of a 
personal story. There have been two large studies of this era in the development of the 
Australian party system, the 1977 book The Emergence of the Australian Party System and 
the more recent 2009 volume entitled Confusion: The Making of the Australian Two-Party 
System. The former goes to great lengths to provide an account for each State as well as 
the nation, while the latter provides several perspectives on the fusion and traces the 
ideological legacy of the time period. 
 Both books combine the expertise of numerous talented historians and contribute 
greatly to our understanding of the period, but they both fall in to a similar trap. They 
rarely connect things that are going on at a State level with how they affected federal 
developments, particularly in New South Wales.3 This is detrimental to our historical 
understanding. In the early federal era the previously autonomous States still held the vast 
majority of legislative powers, often had far bigger budgets than their federal counterpart 
and were held in almost as much regard. Because of this, developments within the States 
directly impacted on the Commonwealth Government in a way that has not subsequently 
been the case. Even if there is more historical interest in federal developments because the 
Federal Government ultimately became more powerful, our understanding of these 
developments is at risk of falling victim to an anachronistic view of the relative 
unimportance of the States during the first decade of federation. 
 This ignorance of State concerns goes beyond these two volumes, both of which at 
least try to deal with events at a State level. It is part of a wider trend in Australian 
                                                          
3 Paul Strangio, ‘An intensity of feeling such as I had never witnessed: Fusion in Victoria’, in Paul 
Strangio, & Nick Dyrenfurth, Confusion: The making of the Australian two-party system (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2009) pp.134-61, it connects State and Federal much more than its New 
South Wales equivalent. 




historiography that has generally payed far less attention to provincial history than its 
significance dictates. Certainly the monumental biographies are less common for State 
politicians, excepting maybe Jack Lang who was such a large figure that even Macquarie 
Street could not keep him hidden. Of recent years there have been significant attempts to 
rectify this gap in our knowledge. Most States now have their own history journal, while 
the sesquicentenary of responsible government fuelled a glut of publications, particularly 
on New South Wales. We now have at least a short biography of each of her Premiers and 
a study of each of her elections.4 Nevertheless, there are still gaps to be filled and much 
research to be done. Moreover, this State-based history still frequently falls into the trap of 
treating itself as a completely separate sphere from the federal arena, or perhaps more 
perniciously emphasising a ‘top-down’ influence from the Commonwealth with little 
acknowledgement of its ‘bottom-up’ obverse. 
 One State figure who has received some attention recently is Sir Joseph Carruthers. 
He figures somewhat prominently in the New South Wales sections of the two party 
system books, while the 100th anniversary of his 1904 election victory was met with a 
speech in State Parliament.5 This was delivered by Don Harwin, who wrote Carruthers’ 
entry in the Premiers book previously mentioned, and who has played a key role in 
resurrecting the historical memory of Carruthers. In a rare honour for a State politician, 
Carruthers even received his own stand-alone biography in 2000, Beverley Earnshaw’s One 
Flag, One Hope, One Destiny: Sir Joseph Carruthers and Australian Federation. For all its 
merits this piece has done little to extend our understanding of Carruthers’ role in the 
ideological and organisational developments of the important historical period that his 
                                                          
4 David Clune & Ken Turner, The Premiers of New South Wales 1856-2005 (Sydney: The Federation 
Press, 2006), Michael Hogan & David Clune, The People’s Choice: Electoral Politics in 20th Century 
New South Wales (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007). 
5 NSW Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28/6/2004, 3rd series, pp.10327-8. 




career spanned. In essence Earnshaw’s book is a rewrite of Carruthers’ unfinished 
autobiography supplemented with considerable research on his importance for his local 
Kogarah area. There is some fruitful research beyond this and the book filled a valuable 
historical role when it came out, but much of its content was superseded by the 
publication of that autobiography in 2005. 
 In introducing that book, its editor Michael Hogan suggested that Carruthers was 
deserving of one of the monumental biographies his contemporaries had received.6 There 
is good reason for this. Carruthers’ career in the Legislative Assembly spanned the majority 
of the defining era already described. Elected in the watershed first party election in 1887, 
by the time a heart attack forced his retirement in 1907 he was sitting at the head of a 
united Liberal Party facing off against an official Labor Opposition in a two-party House. 
The shift from the factional era to the modern party system had thus been completed, 
practically from beginning to end, in those twenty-one years. If Carruthers had been a 
passive observer of that process an exploration of his career would still act as a valuable 
case-study into the period, but he was far more than that. He had been actively involved in 
the creation of party organisations, in the adaptation of liberalism into a partisan agenda 
and in the intellectual justification of the party system. He was thus one of the prime 
movers who helped to shape the political innovations of the era. More visibly, he had been 
a Minister under the giants Henry Parkes and George Reid, a delegate to the Federal 
Conventions and the Premier of the largest State in the Commonwealth. In both the 
foreground and the background, Carruthers was one of the main political actors of the 
defining age. 
                                                          
6 Michael Hogan, A Lifetime in Conservative Politics: Political Memoirs of Sir Joseph Carruthers 
(Sydney: UNSW Press Ltd. 2005) p.xiii. 




 The one achievement that what little research there has been into Carruthers often 
acknowledges is that he founded the New South Wales Liberal Party, which despite its 
various name changes is in essence the organisation that still exists today.7 This creation 
alone is significant enough to warrant further research into the figure, his beliefs and his 
political strategies. Because so much of what we know about Carruthers is currently 
limited to his unfinished autobiography our understanding has been constrained by its gaps. 
The most significant of these is between the fall of Parkes and Carruthers’ ascension to the 
premiership, excluding the federation campaign. This thesis intends to fill that gap and give 
a clear and illuminating account of Carruthers’ public political career. The missing period 
was hugely important in the political history of New South Wales for it oversaw the 
redefinition of politics based on a liberal free trade agenda, the presence of the Labor Party 
and the ramifications of federation. It is impossible to understand the origins of the New 
South Wales Liberal Party without an understanding of its founder’s role and experience in 
these upheavals. 
 The research presented in this thesis is thus justified on what little we already know 
about Carruthers. Its aim is also to go beyond this limited scope however, and discover 
what other impacts Carruthers had on the development of the Australian political system 
and the liberal tradition more specifically. There are several aspects to that development in 
this era which will be explored as the key themes of the thesis. These include the growth 
and acceptance of party structures in the face of individualist objections. There is also the 
acceptance of the large variety of views needed to make up a broad based party and the 
determination of which issues liberals should define themselves by and which needed to be 
                                                          
7 E.g. Ian Hancock, The Liberals: The NSW Division 1945-2000 (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007) 
p.10. Beverley Earnshaw, One Flag, One Hope, One Destiny: Sir Joseph Carruthers and Australian 
Federation (Kogarah: Kogarah Historical Society Inc. 2000) p.131. Don Harwin, ‘Joseph(later Sir Joseph) 
Hector Carruthers’ in David Clune & Ken Turner, The Premiers of New South Wales 1856-2005, Volume 
2 1901-2005 (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006) p.45. 




let go for the sake of cohesion. The most important development was the adaptation of 
liberalism from a pervasive political culture into a partisan agenda and rhetorical 
philosophic stance. This culminated in the realignment of liberalism as something that was 
intrinsically opposed to Labor’s ‘sectionalism’ and ‘socialism’ and that, in a two-party 
House, could thus sit comfortably in perpetual opposition to their philosophical 
adversaries. Though not known as an ideologue, Carruthers was at the forefront of the 
argument surrounding these issues. His conclusions would help to shape the conclusions 
reached by the wider liberal movement. 
 Carruthers’ relationship to these developments has never been explored in any 
detail. The current interpretation of Carruthers’ role in the emergence of the party system 
amounts to Michael Hogan’s short assessment that Carruthers helped to reconstruct the 
New South Wales Liberal Party and vanquish the already collapsing Progressive Party 
from the State.8 This thesis does not so much seek to overturn that interpretation but to 
explore it in greater depth and elaborate on it. Hogan’s examination of Carruthers is 
limited by its brevity, its restricted knowledge of Carruthers’ past and a narrow state focus, 
but also by a misapprehension of his ideology. This is most clearly revealed in the 
‘conservative’ label Hogan applied to Carruthers’ autobiography, A Lifetime in 
Conservative Politics. Such a label is inappropriate for a man who explicitly thought of 
himself as a liberal and a democrat, and represents an anachronistic imposition of the 
politics of the present on the past. If Carruthers did play the prominent role in New South 
Wales political history that Hogan briefly suggests then it is important to understand his 
beliefs and how they informed the Liberal Party. This is something that Hogan’s label and 
the assumptions that underpin it inhibit. 
                                                          
8 Michael Hogan, ‘So manifestly unreal  and irrelevant: Confusion in New South Wales’ in Paul Strangio, 
& Nick Dyrenfurth, Confusion: The making of the Australian two-party system (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2009) pp.118-22. 




Hogan’s ‘conservative’ label is part of a wider failing to interpret Carruthers 
according to his own political outlook. Where Carruthers has appeared in the 
historiography it has generally been in the examination of issues that were foreign to him. 
Examples of this include Richard Broome and J.D. Bollen, who have examined the 
Protestant influence within Carruthers’ Liberal Government and how sectarianism played 
a prominent role in New South Wales politics at the time.9 Also John Rickard, who has 
dissected the middle class support behind Carruthers’ Premiership and argued that class 
played a defining role in the political developments of the period.10 While both class and 
sectarianism undoubtedly helped to shape the political climate of the time, they were both 
explicitly rejected by Carruthers. He instead attributed his political beliefs and following to 
his liberal and democratic ideology. It was Carruthers’ ability to translate that ideology into 
rhetoric and a program that resonated with the electorate that underscored most of his 
political successes. Without ignoring the revelations of previous research, this thesis 
intends to re-examine Carruthers’ career and premiership along these ideological lines. He 
saw and sold himself as a Gladstonian liberal intent on keeping taxation low and extending 
equal franchise. There were certainly times when he did not live up to these ideals, but 
they nevertheless defined how he imagined the political divide and how he created his 
Liberal Party. A central theme of the thesis is how Carruthers combined sincere beliefs, 
ideological rhetoric and pragmatism in order to shape the political landscape of the 
emerging party-era. Class and religion may have swelled the ranks of his Liberal Party, but 
                                                          
9 Richard Broome, Treasure in Earthen Vessels: Protestant Christianity in New South Wales Society, 
1900-1914 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980)  & J.D. Bollen, Protestantism and Social 
Reform in New South Wales 1890-1910 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1972). 
10 John Rickard, Class and Politics: New South Wales, Victoria and the Early Commonwealth, 1890-1910 
(Canberra: ANU Press 1976). 




it will be shown that it was ideology, practically adapted and applied, which described and 
justified that organisation.11 
Carruthers’ role in the development of liberal politics and the party system at the 
federal level will be explored through his relationship with George Reid, something that 
has not previously received attention. The two men were long-time friends and political 
allies whose respective careers were inexorably intertwined. Carruthers served under Reid 
in the New South Wales Parliament, and both were involved in the development of the 
New South Wales Free Trade Party. Unlike Carruthers, Reid would go on to the Federal 
Parliament where he would play a central role in the development of liberalism and the 
two-party system.12 It appears that Carruthers continued to influence his former chief even 
after they entered separate political spheres; hence a study of their relationship will help to 
determine how much developments in New South Wales affected federal events even after 
1901. 
 Another gap in the historiography that the thesis hopes to alleviate is that 
surrounding the pre-Menzies origins of the Australian liberal tradition. That is not to say 
that there has been nothing written on this topic, but much of what has centres on 
stereotyping ‘Deakinite’ and ‘Reidite’ traditions then assessing how much each has 
impacted on modern politics. By tracing the development of Carruthers’ political beliefs 
and rhetoric from his university days until his Premiership, this thesis will cover less 
trodden ground.13 Of particular concern will be how ‘British World’ influences like 
                                                          
11 The thesis thus contrasts with Judith Brett’s emphasis on the role of class in Australian liberalism, 
though as she does not discuss Carruthers her work is only dealt with briefly. Judith Brett, Australian 
Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to John Howard (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
12 Zachary Gorman, ‘George Reid’s Anti-Socialist Campaign in the Evolution of Australian Liberalism’ 
in Gregory Melleuish, Liberalism and Conservatism (Ballarat: Connor Court Publishing, 2015) pp.17-38. 
13 Less trodden as opposed to untrodden, see Gregory Melleuish, A Short History of Australian Liberalism 
(St. Leonards: Centre for Independent Studies Ltd. 2001) & Winsome Roberts, ‘Liberalism: the 




William Gladstone, Richard Cobden, Edmund Burke and even American Henry George 
combined with beliefs derived from the colonial period to create the germs of Australia’s 
‘anti-Labor’ liberalism.14 A large part of the story of Carruthers’ career is the adaptation of 
liberal politics into a more modern stance that maintained similar beliefs but had a changed 
emphasis that justified itself within a two-party system. Colonial and Gladstonian liberal 
sentiment was refocused on anti-socialism in a manner that would have a profound effect 
on twentieth century politics. John Ward and others have emphasised the role of a more 
interventionist ‘new liberalism’ in shaping the developments of this time period, but by 
examining how Carruthers and others adapted ‘old’ classical liberal beliefs to changing 
circumstances this thesis hopes to present a clearer explanation of how Australian 
liberalism ended up on the right of the national political divide.15 Though it is often said 
that ideology has played a small role in Australian political history, the practical application 
of philosophy as both rhetoric and political program shaped the delineation between the 
parties and this would have a lasting resonance on Australian political discourse and policy. 
In the words of Maurice Cowling, ‘the language they used, the images they formed, the 
myths they left had a profound effect on the objectives other politicians assumed could be 
achieved through the political system’.16 
 Carruthers played an important role in the federation story and particularly in the 
battles to define the working limits of the Constitution in the early federal period. Any 
                                                                                                                                                                          
nineteenth century legacy’ in J.R. Nethercote, Liberalism and the Australian Federation (Sydney: 
Federation Press, 2001), though this thesis’ emphases are quite different. 
14 The British world was the creation of the cultural integration of Britain and its settler colonies: Carl 
Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, The British World: diaspora, culture, and identity (London: Frank Cass, 
2003), T. Pietsch, Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks and the British Academic World, 1850-
1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), Simon Potter, News and the British World: The 
Emergence of an Imperial Press system 1876-1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
15 John Ward, Colonial Liberalism and its Aftermath 1867-1917 (Sydney: John Ferguson, 1980) & John 
Ward, The State and the People: Australian Federation and Nation Making, 1870-1901 ed. D. Schreuder 
& B. Fletcher (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2001). 
16 Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924: the Beginning of Modern British Politics 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1971) p.4. 




detailed study of him thus needs to engage with the historiography surrounding these 
issues and reassess Carruthers’ role. That role has generally been marginalised, as 
Carruthers has been sidelined as a simple follower of Reid at the Federal Conventions.17 
Such an image ignores both the independent views he expressed on several important 
issues and also what ‘bottom up’ support and influence Carruthers exerted over his leader, 
both of which will be explored in the thesis. At first glance such a line of inquiry may seem 
incongruous with an emphasis on the development of the party system and the Australian 
liberal tradition, but both were inexorably shaped by federation so it would be illogical as 
well as inopportune to leave it out. Carruthers’ attitudes towards federation and how it 
would function were also shaped by his liberal beliefs, so an examination of these further 
adds to our understanding of the political outlook of the founder of the New South Wales 
Liberal Party. His later battles with the Federal Government as Premier would help to 
define a liberal understanding of the role of the States, so these will also be examined. The 
sheer ferocity of these disputes combined with their significance in helping to determine 
the site of the national capital has resulted in them receiving considerable historical 
attention. G.E. Sherington, D.I. Wright and David Headon have all examined Carruthers 
as an early State rights figure, but their studies deal with issues in isolation and do not 
connect his actions to his overarching liberalism.18 
 The question this thesis seeks to answer is ‘What is the significance of Joseph 
Carruthers in the development of Australian and New South Wales liberalism and for the 
                                                          
17 The examples of federation histories which speak little about Carruthers are numerous, e.g. L. F. Crisp, 
Federation Fathers (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1990) & J. A. La Nauze, The Making of the 
Australian Constitution (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1972). 
18 G.E. Sherington, ‘The Politics of “State Rights”: Carruthers and the New South Wales State Election of 
1907’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 62, part3. December 1976, D. I. Wright, 
Shadow of Dispute: Aspects of Commonwealth-State Relations, 1901-1910 (Canberra: ANU Press, 1970) 
& David Headon, ‘Apple of Discord: Joseph Carruthers and his Canberra Story’, Canberra Historical 
Journal, No.61, December 2008. 




creation of the Australian party system?’. The question encapsulates the key themes 
already discussed and the answer, as has already been indicated, takes the form of a public 
political biography. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost it will 
complement the existing histories which have frequently taken a biographical form. While 
it would be far too bold to suggest that the thesis will live up to the monumental 
biographies discussed, it can at least take a spot on the shelf near them and offer a view of 
the time period that is original while still being complementary. Secondly, the nature of 
the issues involved require significant context and the narrative of a life offers structure to 
that context that makes it accessible whilst still fulfilling its necessary informative function. 
The whole idea of a biography is that the events of a life build on each other and this 
framework helps to highlight the gradual and cumulative nature of political change. The 
biographical narrative also allows for the gaps in our overall knowledge of Carruthers’ 
public political career to be filled. At times the narrative is allowed to flow even when it is 
not focused on the key liberalism and party themes, but the severity of the gaps in our 
knowledge requires that occasionally such liberties be taken. Thirdly and perhaps most 
importantly, Carruthers’ significance is deserving of a biography and while this thesis does 
not mean to exaggerate his importance it aims to reassess the peripheral position he has 
been given in the histories of the period. The main historiographical gap this thesis hopes 
to fill is ultimately that surrounding its subject. It is through doing this that the thesis will 
engage with the other historical debates already mentioned. 
 The thesis is a fairly traditional political biography but with some limitations in its 
scope. Carruthers’ personal life is dealt with only very briefly, mainly when that aspect of 
his life affected his political career or his mental state. There are certainly sources to 
provide a more personal story, but in a thesis devoted to the political life of a public figure 




such tangents would distract from the main argument.19 His achievements as a local 
member and active participant in the St George community are also brushed over because 
they are somewhat dispensable to an emphasis on his national significance. Besides this, it 
would be difficult to add to what Earnshaw has already illuminated for the Kogarah 
Historical Society. The most notable limitation is that the thesis ends with Carruthers’ 
retirement from the Legislative Assembly and thus ignores his time in the Legislative 
Council, where he served for more than twenty years. This decision has been made largely 
due to space. Carruthers was certainly an important Councillor, playing a central role in 
the Fuller Government and in leading debates against threats to freedom of speech and 
about Upper House reform. He continued to influence centre-right politics up until his 
death, but by that point he was by no means dictating affairs as he had been earlier. For 
that reason the biography ends in 1907 with the lines of cleavage firmly established and 
only alludes to later developments that continued to shape the party system. 
 The concepts of ‘liberalism’ and ‘socialism’ are essential to this thesis. Liberalism is 
a political philosophy based around individual liberty. Developed by a long line of thinkers 
such as John Locke, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, it emphasises 
the importance of freedom of thought, speech and action for human beings. In its early 
days liberalism was highly critical of the state as an oppressor of liberty, and fought for a 
reduction of its role. As a historical phenomenon it played a central role in the dismantling 
of the feudal state which had protected the power and privileges of the upper classes. 
Through the expansion of democracy and abolition of vested taxation such as the Corn 
Laws, it opened up Britain in particular to the capitalist explosion of the nineteenth century. 
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Australia was an integral part of the ‘British World’ and inherited the political and 
economic consequences of this movement.20 
By Carruthers’ era practising liberal politicians had split into two groups, ‘new 
liberals’ and ‘classical liberals’, or as Eggleston has dubbed them ‘Lloyd George’ liberals 
and ‘Gladstone’ liberals.21 New liberals argued that since the state no longer protected 
privilege, a democratically elected government could use it to alleviate social distress and 
class tensions. Individualism might still be admired, but co-ordination and therefore 
control were required to achieve higher ends. Classical liberals continued to look on the 
state as a potential inhibitor of individual liberty. Parliamentary democracy could be used 
to break down barriers that impeded opportunity, particularly in the field of education, but 
overall people must be allowed to live their lives unmolested by the Government. Even a 
democracy could act tyrannically if given too much power over its citizens; therefore most 
attempts at community co-operation should be enacted by private individuals rather than 
the state. In the Gladstonian tradition taxation and spending should be minimised, and 
budgets should be balanced to ensure long term stability. Both groups rejected class 
representation in Parliament and maintained that politicians must be free to express 
dissenting opinions.22 
 Carruthers fell more into the classical liberal category and frequently emphasised 
his affinity with Gladstone. Though he held sincere liberal beliefs, Carruthers was 
fundamentally a practical politician rather than a political philosopher. His skill lay in 
applying his beliefs to the concerns of the day and making them succeed in the electorate. 
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He was particularly capable of establishing what he and his Party stood for in relation to 
their opponents, and then conveying that message to the voters. An adept and powerful, 
though not brilliant, speaker, he took care to ensure that his ideas would come across well 
in print, be that in newspapers or in the pamphlets he insisted his campaign committees 
focus their attention on. 
‘Socialism’ is an even more difficult concept, for in Carruthers’ era it was a label 
used with great fluidity. The most thorough ‘socialism’ advocated at the time was the 
‘nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange’, which formed the 
core of the ‘socialist objective’.23 Nevertheless, the label ‘socialist’ could be used to describe 
anyone who wanted to extend the functions of the state and supersede private enterprise. 
This was particularly the case with the Labor Party, whose interventionist ideology earned 
it the label socialist long before it adopted broad nationalisations as one of its key planks.24 
Perhaps a better delineation for determining who might be labelled ‘socialist’ at the time 
would be between those who generally wanted to see government expand as opposed to 
those who supported limited government with occasional exceptions. Though fringe 
groups existed on both sides of the spectrum, very few politicians supported Marxist 
revolution or true laissez-faire and beyond these absolute positions there were numerous 
shades of grey.  
The Labor Party was set up to represent working class and trade union interests in 
Parliament, and over time it would become the chief ‘socialist’ opponent of the Liberals. 
Despite being labelled socialist, Labor was generally more concerned with using practical 
forms of government intervention to ameliorate the existing system, rather than setting up 
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a unified socialist state.25 Their proposals centred on industrial arbitration, regulation, rural 
land redistribution, welfare, and state enterprises. These proposals grew bolder with time, 
ensuring that over Carruthers’ career the debate over ‘socialism’ gradually became more 
central to the political discourse. Labor’s interventionism was seen by its opponents as a 
potential threat to individual freedoms and the economy, particularly after the party 
adopted a form of ‘socialist objective’ in 1905. The Labor Party plays an important role in 
the thesis but it is often viewed through the distorting lens of ‘otherness’. This is because 
the thesis is interested in the adaptation of liberalism and consequently it sees Labor 
through liberal eyes. Those wanting a different perspective to balance out this effect should 
refer to one of the several Labor histories of the time period.26 The thesis generally tries to 
avoid judging Carruthers’ ideas and instead attempts to convey them as faithfully as 
possible. The concern is how those beliefs evolved and how they ultimately pervaded the 
political culture of New South Wales and Australia. The reader can judge Carruthers’ 
political and rhetorical outlook for themselves, but the historical importance of his beliefs 
lays not so much in their merit but in their influence and practical effects. 
This thesis has been written after extensive research. Its main primary sources are 
Joseph Carruthers’ substantial papers housed in the Mitchell Library. Those papers contain 
numerous letters, telegrams, postcards, official reports and even dinner menus, and the fact 
that so many were kept reveals something about the man’s character. These sources are far 
scarcer for his early career, but often the scraps that are left from the nineteenth century 
reveal far more than hundreds of formal letters from his Premiership. These primary 
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sources inform many of the more revealing passages of the thesis, but due to their gaps 
they have had to be heavily supplemented by the public account that survives in 
newspapers, parliamentary debates and official reports. Such reliance does not compromise 
the thesis as it is concerned with Carruthers’ rhetorical stance which was elaborated most 
clearly in his public speeches, and also with political organisations which often had their 
meetings and branches catalogued by the press. The other main primary source for the 
thesis is Carruthers’ memoirs which survive in various versions.27 These amount to the 
recollections of an aged and weary mind hence they must be used with caution. Beyond 
anecdotes they are seldom used to inform any substantive point unless they can be 
corroborated by other evidence. Further sources include the papers and accounts of his 
peers as well as contemporary publications. Depending on the issue both of these can be 
highly revealing though again corroboration is sought when necessary. All told it has been 
possible to develop a fairly accurate view of the man and a far clearer image of his political 
beliefs. There have still been limitations that in an ideal world would not exist, particularly 
the practical non-existence of George Reid’s papers which continues to plague historians of 
this era.28 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the thesis contains numerous revelations that 
greatly extend our understanding of the ‘little’ man from Jamberoo who carved out a place 
in Australian history. 
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters which generally follow the narrative 
structure of Carruthers’ life but also mark off significant political developments. Chapter 
One charts Carruthers’ birth and education. Its emphasis is on his intellectual background, 
the various influences that made up his colonial liberalism. Chapter Two focuses on 
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Carruthers’ early years in Parliament. It discusses his early political connections, and how 
the fiscal divide emerged out of the factional era. Chapter Three follows Carruthers’ time 
as Minister for Public Instruction. It describes his early legislative achievements, but its 
main interest is Carruthers’ role in internal party politics and organisation culminating in 
the fall of Parkes. Chapter Four examines Carruthers’ role as Reid’s lieutenant in 
opposition to the Dibbs Government. The focus is his developing animosity towards the 
Labor Party and attempts to enforce unity on the Free Trade Party despite deep personal 
and ideological divides. Chapter Five discusses the early Reid Government and Carruthers 
time as Minister for Lands. It shows how a liberal ideology was put into legislative practice 
while Carruthers became the vehement defender of Party cohesion and vigorously 
attacked the independence of his former colleagues. Chapter Six reassesses Carruthers’ role 
in the federation campaign. It argues that not only was he more important than previously 
acknowledged but that his role in propping up ‘Yes-No’ Reid was crucial in the latter’s 
political survival. Chapter Seven charts the final success of federation and the subsequent 
fall of the Reid Government. It focuses on the deteriorating relationship between liberals 
and the Labor Party and also tries to explain why Carruthers decided not to stand for 
Federal Parliament. Chapter Eight examines the political vacuum of the early federal era. It 
shows that Carruthers’ was more willing to let go of the fiscal issue than many of his 
contemporaries and how he subsequently began justifying a political realignment based on 
underlying philosophical differences. Chapter Nine follows Carruthers’ time as leader of 
the Opposition. The creation of the Liberal and Reform Association is discussed in detail, 
but the main emphasis is how that organisation embodied the desire for clear ‘lines of 
cleavage’ that would facilitate a two-party system and stable governments, and how that 
desire was largely fulfilled by the 1904 election. Chapter Ten looks at the domestic aspects 
of Carruthers’ Premiership. It argues that he was able to utilise the lines of cleavage to end 




longstanding political stagnation, introduce liberal legislation and achieve his financial 
goals. Finally Chapter Eleven examines the national impact of Carruthers’ Premiership. It 
shows how he influenced Reid’s anti-socialist campaign and later federal organisations, and 
also how his bitter clashes with the Federal Government shaped liberal attitudes towards 








C H A P T E R  O N E  
 
 
A Liberal Upbringing 
 
‘The active influences that bear upon the fortunes of a human life reach backwards 
in point of time to a past as mysterious as the most distant future. The mental 
beginnings of each individual life are shrouded in a mystery which no expert in any 
science or art can explain.’1 
 This is how Joseph Carruthers’ close friend and political ally George Reid began his 
reminiscences. The sentiment is certainly apt for Carruthers, whose own unfinished 
autobiography is riddled with the mistakes of an old man recalling his distant past. By the 
time of his death even the year of his birth had become murky, as newspaper obituaries 
contradicted the date given in Carruthers’ autobiography.2 
 Sir Joseph Hector McNeil Carruthers gave his date of birth as 21 December 1856. 
He was born in Kiama, where his father owned a property on the Minnamurra River at 
Jamberoo. Kiama at this time was a comparatively large regional centre, as before the 
building of a train line the town acted as an important port for the transport of South Coast 
goods to the Sydney market.  Despite his spending only a few years on the Jamberoo 
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property, the location had a lasting influence on Carruthers, who was ever after obsessed 
with regional development and land settlement. 
 Joseph’s father was John Carruthers, a Presbyterian Scottish immigrant who had 
come to Australia around 1830.3 John worked not only as a farmer on his Jamberoo 
property, but also as a builder and a contractor. No doubt Joseph would have seen him as a 
heroic ‘self-made man’ of the type he would later encourage children to aspire to be.4 This 
idealised image was reinforced by stories of his father, as a young boy, diving into a ditch 
to save himself from dragoons during the infamous Bonny Muir ‘rising’.5 Joseph 
maintained that the origins of John Carruthers' emigration lay in this political agitation but 
Beverley Earnshaw’s research has shown a concealed convict past that was the real reason 
that he ended up in Australia.6 It is likely that John Carruthers, who was making his way 
successfully in the antipodes, deliberately hid this convict past from his son. Another 
possibility is that Joseph knew about his father’s past and it was he who was trying to hide 
it. At one point in his autobiography Joseph talks sympathetically about a man with a 
convict past but conceals his name.7 While it is clear that in this passage he not was talking 
about his father, it does reveal that Joseph certainly saw a convict past as something that 
needed to be hidden. 
 The convict origin of John’s transportation does not necessarily mean that he did 
not witness the Bonny Muir incident but it does cast doubt over the story. In his 
autobiography Joseph Carruthers’ gives a history of the Bonny Muir episode. He describes 
men who ‘met to talk about the people’s rights, and how they might be obtained through 
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the three reforms of shorter Parliaments, manhood suffrage, and votes by ballot’.8 What 
Carruthers paints as a peaceful political meeting was interpreted by the English as treason, 
because the agitators ‘did two very silly things; they carried one musket and six penny 
worth of powder and six bullets between them; a few sharpened poles, and a number of 
walking sticks’.9 Troops were sent in to put down the ‘rising’ and after a ‘battle’ the men 
were rounded up and arrested. They were subsequently convicted of high treason, their 
leader was executed and the rest were sent to Australia.  
Regardless of the authenticity of his father’s connection to the incident it is clear 
from the attention that Joseph pays to it that it left a distinct impression upon him and 
would have influenced his liberal outlook. Tales of English oppression of the Scots would 
have helped to shape the beliefs in liberty and political autonomy that would later be 
essential to Carruthers’ politics. Scottish identity was an important part of Joseph’s world 
view. From an early age at Jamberoo he was taught by an old Scottish lady, and between 
her and his father Joseph was left to wonder that he had not developed a Scottish accent.10 
Both of them are likely to have conveyed a great deal of Scottish history to him from an 
early age and this would have helped to mould his understanding of historical and political 
development. It is interesting to note that George Reid was born in Scotland and some 
degree of shared identity may help explain their close political relationship. 
 Though Scottish identity was important, Joseph developed a world view that was 
broadly British and colonial. New South Wales started out as a penal colony, but while 
convict transportation continued for several decades, large numbers of free settlers 
attracted by the promise of plentiful land and high wages became the main driver of 
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population increase. 22.6 million people left the British Isles between 1815 and 1914, and 
though New South Wales only attracted a small percentage of that number this was 
enough to create a thriving and expansive community.11 Colonial governments, initially 
concerned primarily with administering convicts, protected the common law property 
rights of the free, and British financial institutions were soon recreated, setting up a 
capitalist system in the Colony. Waves of intense migration fuelled financial booms and 
busts before a process of ‘recolonization’ turned Australia into a major agricultural 
exporter to Britain in particular.12 Australia was subsequently able to attract a large amount 
of British capital, which funded land speculation and public works construction, playing a 
central role in a rapid economic expansion.13  
  The economic integration of New South Wales with Britain and its other settler 
colonies was matched by a cultural integration. New South Wales inherited the political, 
intellectual and religious values of the British countries that provided the vast majority of 
its settler population. Colonial educational institutions taught British history, book shops 
sold British books and newspapers reported extensively on British politics.14 Moreover, 
personal networks connected families, friends and businesses as letters and people travelled 
back and forth between the various parts of a wider British world. This created a sense of 
shared identity that was crucial to Carruthers’ outlook. As most New South Welshmen did 
at the time, Carruthers saw himself as British and felt that he was entitled to the individual 
and political liberties that an idealised ‘Britain’, with its long history of extending and 
defending rights, was meant to embody. This was an overlapping identity that allowed him 
to still identify as ‘Australian’ without any more contradiction than mixing national and 
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state ties.15 To be a ‘Briton’ was to be one of the exclusive inheritors of the liberty of the 
Magna Carta and functioning rather than demagogic democracy.16 The Australian 
Colonies often pre-empted Britain on issues such as the extension of the franchise and the 
introduction of the secret ballot, but these reforms were frequently advocated as a natural 
outgrowth of inherited British rights. In turn, colonial reforms often affected the turn of 
events in the Mother Country.17 
Carruthers was fundamentally an Australian Briton, and this coloured his liberalism. 
He was born into a rural Australian community that valued self-reliance.  His father was 
chairman of the Land Reform League, whose agitation between 1854 and 1864 ‘became 
the motive force behind’ John Robertson’s land laws, which aimed to give individuals the 
opportunity to own their own piece of land.18 These plots were representative of a belief in 
the opportunities of a ‘new’ land and while perhaps not as prevalent as in the United States 
the notion of individual opportunity still shaped the world-view of many colonials. While 
self-reliance and opportunity were important, community was also valued but this 
‘community’ was made up of families and individuals, not the Government. The 
pervasiveness of this idea of a community of individuals can be seen most clearly in the 
rural co-operative movement. These co-operatives were organisations of mutual self-help 
independent from government that, unlike communes, respected the separateness and 
property rights of individual members. By the late nineteenth century these were prevalent 
throughout the Colony, helping to create economies of scale while reinforcing local ties. 
                                                          
15 Gary Magee & Andrew Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: networks of people, goods and capital 
in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p.234. & Gavin Souter, 
Lion and Kangaroo: the Initiation of Australia, 1901-1919 (Sydney: Collins, 1976) p.109. 
16 James Curran, The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers defining the national image (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press, 2004) p.4. 
17 Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, op. cit., p.5. 
18 Joseph Carruthers, Joey Yarns, p.7. 




By the time of Carruthers’ birth the Colony was developing a distinct liberal 
political culture. Many people had tried to set up a conservative system based on the pillars 
of an exclusively established Church of England and a landed gentry but the effort 
ultimately failed.19 New South Wales, though almost exclusively Christian, was too 
religiously diverse to allow the establishment of a single state supported religion, while 
squatters and liberals had undermined efforts to create a land holding aristocracy. Without 
these pillars of Toryism, New South Wales did not end up emulating the political divide of 
Westminster. Instead, battles over democratic government, convict transportation and 
land distribution allowed liberals to develop a political hegemony over the Colony. 
Individualism, rationality, the concept of progress and a belief in self-help; these were the 
central tenets of the cultural faith that gripped New South Wales. The development was 
epitomised by the Sydney Morning Herald, the Colony’s most important newspaper, 
which after a brief period of intense conservatism became a proponent of individual liberty 
and the political economy of Adam Smith.20 
At the apex of colonial liberalism was Henry Parkes, a poor English immigrant who 
had quickly become a leading figure in New South Wales politics. His fame was due 
largely to his prominent role in the fight to end convict transportation and to bring about 
responsible government. Though far from an ideological demagogue, Parkes had clear 
beliefs encapsulating freedom, opportunity, democracy and unfettered commerce which 
helped to define the politics of his age.21 John was a partisan supporter of Parkes and he 
took Joseph to meetings and rallies.22 Joseph, at a very impressionable age, would have 
thus seen Parkes in his prime. It created a feeling of awe towards Sir Henry that Carruthers 
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would maintain, to varying degrees, throughout his life. J. A. Ryan has suggested that 
Parkes may have been a replacement father figure for Carruthers’ future colleague 
Bernhard Wise.23 Carruthers did not need such a role filled, but he still maintained a special 
relationship with Parkes who from boyhood became his political hero. 
 Joseph’s mother was born Charlotte Prince. Unlike her very Scottish husband, she 
was English and an Anglican. This English heritage would have tempered the Scottish 
radicalism Joseph may have been exposed to, helping to make him a liberal rather than a 
radical. Joseph recalled that his mother ‘had an Englishwoman’s sense of the value of 
thrift’.24 It was this thrift and his parent’s sacrifices that would help to pay for their son’s 
education. Any examination of the five meticulously balanced budgets Carruthers’ 
presented as Treasurer clearly show that Charlotte’s values rubbed off on her son.25 As her 
family’s means gradually improved Charlotte also became something of a land speculator, 
and it appears that she inspired Joseph’s later penchant for investment properties. 
From both his parents Joseph inherited a deep religious conviction. He received his 
mother’s Anglican faith, not his father’s Presbyterianism, but from both sides he was 
resolutely a Protestant. His brother James became a prominent reverend. Though a 
Protestant, there is no evidence that he grew up to possess sectarian prejudices. There are 
numerous examples of Joseph having admiration for and friendship with Catholics, and in 
1927 he even made a donation towards the construction and upkeep of St Mary’s Cathedral 
in Sydney.26 The extent to which Carruthers’ Protestantism later manifested itself in 
‘wowser’ beliefs is also highly debatable. He would support ‘local option’ control of the 
liquor trade but this had much to do with his father’s experience as a reformed alcoholic 
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rather than Protestant moralism, and Joseph himself was no teetotaller.27 He was also a 
keen fan of horseracing, even helping to set up Kembla Grange racecourse in the Illawarra, 
something which wowsers would not have supported. 
Though Carruthers developed a deep attachment to the Illawarra-South Coast area, 
he did not spend long in Jamberoo. In 1861 the family moved to Sydney so that John could 
take up a post as clerk of the Sydney markets. After only three years, Joseph moved again, 
this time to the Macleay River area on the North Coast of New South Wales. ‘For some 
good reason, probably to give me a chance to get better health in pure country air’, Joseph 
had been sent north with his elder brother, who along with their brother-in-law had 
selected a 1280 acre property.28 As a small boy who would grow into a rather short man, 
Joseph had a history of ill health, and this would plague him throughout his life. Such was 
his parents’ concern that at less than ten years of age they sent him to live on the practical 
frontier of colonial society. 
As Carruthers’ family were the only non-Indigenous people settled in their 
particular section of the Macleay area, Joseph spent much of his time playing with 
Aboriginal children. He would later recall that in ‘that in those days, when they had not 
been contaminated by the whites, the aborigines, young and old, were outright decent 
people – clean in thought, in words, and in actions’.29 He also maintained that ‘Civilisation 
has much to answer for, in its ruthless indifference to the fate of native races not physically 
or mentally fitted for the first rude shocks of contact with the whites, who have invaded 
their homelands, bringing with them new diseases and vile habits, and sometimes 
unspeakable cruelties that have unnecessarily wiped out millions of so-called inferior and 
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backward peoples’.30 Joseph’s notion that white settlement had been detrimental for 
Indigenous people was comparatively enlightened for the time, though his views were also 
laced with patronising paternalism. He called them Australia’s ‘Peter Pans – boys that 
never grow up’.31 This statement, uncomfortable to modern ears, reflects the fun that 
Joseph had as a seven year old fishing and hunting with his very own nulla nulla. 
Carruthers became immersed in Aboriginal culture, even learning much of the 
native language. His best friend was a young man known as ‘Yellow George’, who used to 
carry the small boy on his back for long journeys. More than fifty years later Carruthers 
would pay another visit to an aged Yellow George, arranging that he be given a small 
pension and a boat. Joseph’s experience as a boy and his friendship with George influenced 
his attitude towards all native peoples. The origins of his later campaign for the rights of 
Samoans can be traced back not just to Carruthers’ liberalism but also his time on the 
Macleay River. Despite holding views that were often patronising, Carruthers’ reflective 
summation of the Indigenous issue is frankly modern; ‘plainly, as an Australian, I feel 
shame for the way we have treated our native blacks’.32 
Having gained some semblance of strength, Joseph returned to Sydney to be 
enrolled at the Model Public School in Fort Street. There he began his education and after 
showing some aptitude for learning he was soon recruited to be a ‘cash boy’ for a leading 
firm of Sydney merchants. The gruelling job took ten and a half hours a day. After 
experiencing a year of its trials the eleven year old’s health broke down once more. 
Though we do not know exactly what illness he suffered, Carruthers would later trace his 
partial deafness to this incident. The family doctor, Sir Arthur Renwick, suggested that 
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Joseph needed to get out of Sydney and hence he was sent to Goulburn to attend George 
Metcalfe’s High School.  
Metcalfe’s operation was one of only a handful of High Schools in the Colony at 
the time, and attendance was a great opportunity for young Joseph. His teacher found him 
‘intelligent, studious and above all anxious to learn’ and soon took an ‘especial interest in 
developing his inherent ability’.33 He showed an initial strength for algebra, but Metcalfe 
took the pains to teach him Latin and introduce him to the writings of Cicero. Soon he was 
also reading Greek and by late 1872 his teacher thought he was ready for university. 
Initially John was reluctant to cut his son’s schooling short, but Metcalfe insisted that he 
‘would work him hard, and save a year of his life’.34 Hence in March 1873 Joseph sat and 
passed the matriculation examination before being enrolled at the University of Sydney. 
It is indicative of the ‘small world’ that colonial New South Wales was at this time 
that at Goulburn Joseph went to school with future Premier Thomas Waddell, after having 
spent much time in Jamberoo in the company of the family of George Fuller. Later at 
University Joseph would play cricket both with and against future Prime Ministers. 
Nineteenth-century liberals had a respect for individual opinions and a distrust of party 
politics, and part of the reason for this was the ‘small world’ these educated men lived in. 
They often maintained personal relationships even with those politicians with whom they 
disagreed. The rapid increase in the size of New South Wales, as well as the introduction of 
the payment of members, which widened the pool of people from which politicians could 
be drawn, would gradually lead to the breakdown of this system of ‘personal’ politics. 
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Founded in 1850 under the instigation of William Charles Wentworth, the 
University of Sydney was a pillar of colonial New South Wales, and a vehicle for the 
transfer of British intellectual culture to the antipodes.35 There Joseph studied classics 
under one of the more remarkable figures in the Colony, Charles Badham. Carruthers 
placed him alongside Sir Henry Parkes and General Booth of the Salvation Army as the 
three greatest men of his time.36 Badham had spent seven years studying in the great 
libraries of Germany, France and Italy and was one of the most qualified people to teach at 
the University in its early days.37 The many prominent students that he taught included not 
only Carruthers but also Edmund Barton. Carruthers would later recall that ‘his value lay 
not alone in his worth as a classical scholar and teacher but in his broad grasp of the public 
duties both of the citizen and the state’.38 
From Badham Carruthers developed a historically aware world view that had 
perhaps been first awakened by his father’s discussion of Scottish history. Badham’s ‘daily 
lectures to the students were studded with brilliant flashes of rhetoric as he applied the 
force of the lessons of the past to the circumstances of today’. 39 He delivered a forceful 
philippic against Kanaka labour and ‘urged his students to devote their talents to the 
service of the public’.40 Badham had a huge influence on Carruthers’ politics, as his 
teachings combined with readings of historians like Macaulay to imbue a Whig idea of a 
historical struggle for liberty that had been going on since the dawn of civilisation itself. 
When he later became a politician, Carruthers would often draw on precedents from 
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Greek, Roman or British history. He had a deep respect for ‘the great empires which laid 
the foundation of our civil laws and nurtured even through the period of their decay, the 
germs of modern civilisation’.41 Later in life he even tried his hand at being a historian 
himself, delivering lectures and publishing a book on Captain Cook.42 
Badham also taught Carruthers ‘that candour which strives to occupy a point of 
view from which an opponent is speaking and that courtesy which seeks to refute without 
insulting or degrading the holders of opposite opinions’.43 This debating technique was 
very important to Carruthers’ success as a politician. Continuing his education in debating, 
Carruthers was involved in the creation of the University of Sydney Union. At the time this 
organisation was essentially a debating club for the benefit of those wishing to enter the 
legal profession, rather than the heavily politicised body it would later become. The 
experience in public speaking would prove invaluable for the diminutive student, and he 
was soon making up in voice what he lacked in height. 
While at University Carruthers would often visit Parliament to listen to the 
political debates in the Legislative Assembly. His favourite speaker was the man his father 
had always supported, Henry Parkes. This was around the time of Parkes’ first Ministry 
when he reduced tariffs and fought for Upper House reform, two issues the impressionable 
young observer would later pick up. Carruthers recalled that ‘it seemed to our young 
minds as if he were physically a product of those classical ages when Cicero and 
Demosthenes swayed the impulse of the people in great affairs of state’.44 This is a good 
example of the historical view of current events Carruthers developed under Badham, 
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though it was not a unique perspective as Ryan has noted that others maintained a biblical 
image of Parkes as a Patriarch.45 One of the difficulties we have in looking at Carruthers’ 
view of Parkes is that most of the opinions we have are written well after Parkes’ death. By 
this time Parkes had been turned into a national hero that Carruthers was keen to associate 
himself with. His views were also coloured by the rose tinted way in which he 
remembered early pre-party politics. Carruthers recalled that ‘rightly or wrongly, I was a 
Parkesite because I felt that his was the master-mind and the master-hand that this state 
needed in those times’.46 Parkes was a very important early influence on Carruthers and his 
example was likely partly responsible for inspiring Carruthers’ entry into politics. Once 
there however, his idealised image of the man was severely battered, only to be rebuilt 
after Parkes’ death and by the passing of time. 
Carruthers’ interest in politics led him to read widely. By the time he became a 
politician he had read John Stuart Mill and some of the other pillars of classical liberalism, 
helping to firm his romanticised notion of individual freedom. Most of his readings were of 
a more practical nature however, be they about past and present politics, as well as broader 
issues. His earliest publication was an 1874 article on agricultural chemistry for The Kiama 
Independent.47 Michael Roe has highlighted the fact that many of the advanced 
‘progressives’ of Carruthers’ era read Nietzsche and other high philosophers, and that this 
partly shaped their beliefs in the extensive use of the state to achieve ideals and quell 
unrest.48 Carruthers’ more grounded reading, particularly of political history, led him to 
the more sober conclusion that ‘the Millennium has to come more from the people 
themselves than from their lawmakers and that all that Parliament can do is strictly limited 
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to removing disabilities and restricting privileges that deny equal opportunities to each 
man to work out his own salvation by his own good efforts’.49 One of his favourite quotes 
was attributed to Goldsmith, though it is said to have come from Samuel Johnson: ‘how 
small, of all that human hearts endure, that part which laws or kings can cause or cure’.50 
Other interests Carruthers pursued while at University were cricket and football. In 
cricket he was a bowler while Edmund Barton, known as Toby, often kept wickets. 
Carruthers would later occupy the presidency of the New South Wales Cricket Association 
for nearly twenty years. His involvement in sporting clubs would continue throughout his 
life, perhaps as a respectable alternative to the rowdy social clubs in which other 
prominent men were involved. In Sydney the best known of these was the Athenaeum 
Club, which followed Barton’s financial policy of trying to ‘drink itself out of debt’.51 
Carruthers was not a teetotaller and would later become an early advocate of Australian 
wine, but revelling in binge drinking was something out of step with his Protestant 
sensibilities. It was while playing cricket that Carruthers would meet the man who would 
be easily as important to his political career as Parkes. He described him as a ‘neat and 
dapper fellow, not so portly as he was in after years, but with his blue eyes, light flaxen hair 
and moustache, and fair complexion, rather a good looking dandy’.52 It was the future 
Premier and Prime Minister, George Houstoun Reid. 
At the time Reid was working as a public servant in the Colonial Treasury, but he 
already had a keen interest in politics and particularly the tariff issue that would lead him 
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enter the Legislative Assembly in 1880. When they met they were opponents, as Reid did 
not play for the University team. During their next meeting they would also be opponents, 
for at the School of Arts Debating Club they argued over the comparative merit of Dickens 
(Reid) and Thackeray (Carruthers). ‘These incidents began a friendship which endured 
until Reid’s death’.53 In his reminiscences written shortly before his death, Reid would 
describe Carruthers as ‘my old friend and ally’.54 Though in their initial meetings they had 
fought against one another, in politics they were almost always to be found on the same 
side. Independent minded nineteenth-century liberals, they did not agree with anyone on 
every single issue, but each man’s politics was arguably closer to the other’s than it was to 
anyone else’s. They shared a classic liberal free-trade ideology that emphasised individual 
freedom and democracy and which was laced with a heavy dose of pragmatism. It was this 
formulation that made them both successful. 
According to Carruthers, ‘Reid was a man of fine qualities, consistent in his liberal 
principles, a great advocate of Free Trade, an upholder of the best features of the system of 
responsible government’.55 In 1918 he would fondly recall Reid’s ‘very noticeable habit of 
going off to sleep at any odd moment, or in any place’.56 During a fishing trip the two men 
went on this habit became the source of much humour. As Reid tried to call over 
Carruthers’ hunting dog Ponto, the former fell asleep. Upon reaching the slumbering man 
the dog then wandered off again. Consequently, when Reid woke up he had to call for 
Ponto only to once again fall asleep before he arrived. The whole process was repeated 
several times and brought the rest of the party to hysterics. On another occasion 
Carruthers recalled, Reid fell asleep and began to snore loudly when an opposition 
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member was speaking in the Legislative Assembly. The member raised a point of order 
over the interruption but the Speaker ruled that there was no order against it. Reading 
Carruthers’ anecdotes one gets a clear sense of the warmth and affection he felt towards 
his friend. 
Given both men’s profession of a close friendship and their respective historical 
importance, it is odd that their relationship has received almost no attention from 
historians. W.G. McMinn only brings up Carruthers in a few passing sentences in his 
biography of Reid and Beverley Earnshaw does the same in her book on Carruthers. While 
there has not been a great deal of surviving correspondence between the two men, 
probably owing to the fact that they are likely to have often met up in person, what has 
survived clearly tells us that they were close friends. Even their wives are likely to have 
been close, as we have evidence that they went out of their way to visit each other when 
sick.57 
To truly understand either man as a political figure, the importance of their 
influence on one another must be taken into account. Michael Hogan has argued that 
‘there is no indication that he (Carruthers) admired Reid as he admired Parkes’.58 This is 
essentially true but it is missing the point. Carruthers had an idealised image of Parkes 
from his father and his time at University. He was the ‘grand old man’ of New South 
Wales politics when Carruthers entered Parliament as quite a young man. Reid on the 
other hand was someone Carruthers had played cricket against and casually debated. 
Despite an age gap of more than ten years they were equals and friends and in that, as will 
be seen later, there lay a relationship where they could reciprocate in the passing of ideas 
and by helping each other to reach prominent positions. 
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Reid never idolised Parkes like Carruthers did, but the two friends did share an 
admiration for another grand old man, William Gladstone. As was the case with Parkes, 
Carruthers’ young adulthood corresponded with the height of Gladstone’s career and the 
young colonial liberal would have followed newspaper accounts of the great British 
political battles over electoral reform, free trade and retrenchment. Reid would even go so 
far as to take a sort of pilgrimage to visit the aged Gladstone in the late 1890s and while 
Carruthers never had that opportunity his frequent quotations offer ample evidence of his 
admiration. Such was Carruthers’ penchant for citing Gladstone that in 1905 an Evening 
News cartoonist would even draw an impression of the short Premier trying to fill the 
great statesman’s famous collar.59 
The importance of Gladstone for Carruthers’ liberal ideology and the New South 
Wales free trade tradition in general is difficult to overstate. The liberalism of Carruthers 
was essentially Gladstonian liberalism with a colonial bent. Some tenets the former 
borrowed from the latter included an emphasis on liberty, a community not defined by 
government, and individual initiative as the driving force of progress.60 ‘Progress’ in this 
sense had a historic undertone, suggesting the improvement of humanity through the 
exercise of individual freedom. True progress could only be achieved by unshackling 
people from the oppressive demands of the government and letting them make their own 
decisions. This had moral and philosophical undertones, both of which tied into 
Gladstone’s strong Protestant beliefs. On a practical level freedom exercised through 
enterprise was seen as the essential source of economic advancement.  Taxation inhibited 
the main vehicle of material progress; therefore spending needed to be kept low for the 
good of all. In this vein free trade and the ‘free breakfast table’ of cheap goods 
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unencumbered by tariffs were meant to benefit poor people most, for they not only had 
the least money to waste on taxes but also the greatest need for the opportunities that 
unencumbered enterprise was supposed to provide.61  
As a Homeric scholar Gladstone like Carruthers had a historical view of politics, 
and saw liberty as being grounded not only in relatively small government but also in the 
long standing institutions of the British system. Both men shared a belief in the extension 
of democracy, but a democracy founded on liberty and which avoided the excesses of mob 
rule. Perhaps most important of all, Gladstone turned classical liberalism into practical 
rhetoric and policies that could win elections and boast legislative achievements. As 
Cowling has argued, ‘limitations are embedded in all human situations’ and because of this 
abstracted ideology is of little value until it is adapted to the political circumstances in 
which it needs to operate.62 It was in this process of pragmatically putting ideology into 
practice tactically, organisationally and legislatively that Carruthers would excel 
throughout his career. 
On the day that Carruthers graduated from the University of Sydney, Charles 
Badham told his former pupil ‘you came here too young’.63 It may have been a fair 
comment.  Carruthers later recalled that he had taken his Bachelor of Arts degree before he 
was eighteen and before he was twenty-one passed the exam for admission as a solicitor. 
Curbing whatever political aspirations he may have had at the time, Carruthers began to 
practise law and tutor pupils for matriculation and other examinations. He ‘had success 
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from the outset, and with a few wise or lucky investments I soon found my feet’.64 These 
investments which generally came in the form of property would be important for his 
political career, as though he would continue to practise law the income from these would 
allow him the freedom to spend less time earning a living and more time attending 
Parliament. 
Though concentrating on his work throughout the late 1870s, Carruthers did take 
the time to get involved in his first political campaign. At the 1877 Sydney City Council 
elections he spoke at election meetings for Samuel Lees. Lees, a prominent Orangeman 
and Freemason, was standing for election in the Macquarie ward. While there is no 
evidence to suggest Carruthers was influenced by sectarian prejudices, some members of 
the circles in which he mixed evidently were. Lees would later become a Free Trade 
politician and would institute a policy of substantial economies when Mayor in 1895.65 
Perhaps it was these political beliefs, rather than sectarian Protestantism, which induced 
Carruthers to campaign for him. The campaign was a failure but it gave Carruthers his first 
taste of electoral public speaking. 
On 10 December 1879 Joseph Carruthers married Louise Marion. That same year 
Carruthers was involved in his second political campaign. He was appointed honorary 
secretary for Sir Arthur Renwick’s election campaign for the University of Sydney seat in 
the Legislative Assembly. Renwick was an old family friend and had been the doctor who 
had recommended Joseph leave Sydney after his year as a ‘cash boy’. The fact that such a 
man was a friend shows the political circles in which the family mixed, for he would go on 
to be twice a Minister. As honorary secretary Carruthers was responsible for the 
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organisational side of the admittedly small campaign. Renwick’s opponent was the young 
Toby Barton who was a heavy favourite to take the seat. This is what eventuated, with 
Barton winning by 58 votes to 38.66 
Both of Carruthers’ early political undertakings had been failures. Even so, they 
would prove to be invaluable experience for the young man. The speeches given in 
support of Lees were a step beyond the relaxed addresses Carruthers would have been able 
to give at the School of Arts Debating Club. At just twenty-one he was learning how to 
sway the crowd. Perhaps even more important was Carruthers’ time as honorary secretary 
for Renwick. This had exposed him to the organisational side of campaigning. Good extra-
parliamentary organisation would be a hallmark of his political career, as Carruthers never 
lost an election when standing as a candidate or even as the leader of a party. These 
experiences would be built upon in his campaigning in Kiama, Woollahra and 
Canterbury.67 In the days before party machines gave a clear path of advancement to 
apparatchiks our young subject would enter politics with a level of experience few of his 
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Carruthers would spend the early half of the 1880s focusing on his legal career and 
on his young family. Meanwhile the political situation in the Colony was undergoing a 
rapid shift. When Joseph had seen Henry Parkes speak in the Legislative Assembly and 
campaigned for Arthur Renwick, New South Wales politics was in its ‘factional era’ which 
had emerged from the early days of responsible government. 1 When a fully elected 
Legislative Assembly had been inaugurated in 1856, passionate liberal and conservative 
groups had fought over the political issues of the day. After the resounding defeat of the 
latter, this ideological division faded away and politicians were left to find a new way to 
form majorities and ultimately governments. The method developed was that of factional 
alignment, as prestige, personal loyalties and common interests were used to cobble 
together votes in the Lower House. This era was characterised by largely independent 
members, who though they may have been loosely connected to factional leaders were not 
bound by party or extra-parliamentary organisations. These members were supposedly 
elected on their merit as the ‘best’ men of their area, and were fiercely defensive of their 
right to individual opinions. Once early conservatism faded, liberalism was left with 
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nothing to define itself against and became less of a clear agenda and more of a pervasive 
political culture reflected in the individualistic way of parliamentary life. Bede Nairn has 
described the presence of a set of ‘traditional social values…derived from an exaggerated 
view of individual freedom’.2 In the middle of the decade the coming of the ‘fiscal issue’ 
heralded the beginning of the end for this system, as ideology subsumed personality as the 
driving force behind politics.3 
The ‘fiscal issue’ was a debate over tariffs between Protectionists and Free Traders. 
Protectionists believed that high tariffs could protect native industries from foreign 
competition and lead to more work and higher wages for the lower classes. Free Traders 
believed that high tariffs artificially raised prices, taxing all of society to help manufacturers 
with the burden being particularly acute for working people. They also argued that the 
high costs of production created by protection hurt the economy by encouraging 
inefficiency and making exports uncompetitive. Underpinning these practical beliefs was a 
moralistic belief in goodwill. In the eyes of many of its devotees free trade was a Christian 
policy for it relied on generous reciprocation rather than the retaliation of protection.4 This 
moralism even stretched to the point of utopianism, for some hoped that by fostering 
international trade relations and co-dependency free trade could help bring an end to war.5  
The intellectual roots of Free Trade ideology stretched back to men like Adam 
Smith, whose intellectual justification for commerce and free enterprise held great value 
for Carruthers and many other liberals. Smith’s idea that trade fuelled the expansion of an 
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economy and ultimately the wealth of a nation, acted as a counterpoint to the protectionist 
argument that local industries needed to be sheltered. Perhaps the greatest hero of the 
philosophy however was Richard Cobden, who had successfully fought against the Corn 
Law tariffs that artificially raised the price of grain in Britain. Because these Corn Laws 
allegedly hurt poor people for the benefit of landowners, Cobden was a popular 
democratic as well as liberal figure. A ‘Cobden Club’ was set up in his honour, an 
organisation that offered honorary membership to those who greatly contributed to the 
propagation of free trade theory. One recipient was George Reid, whose 1875 work Five 
Free Trade Essays offered both a local and international critique of protectionism.6 
Carruthers undoubtedly read this work, which likely strengthened a belief in tariff freedom 
that was already well associated with his liberal political outlook. Traditionally New South 
Wales, while maintaining some tariff duties, had been relatively committed to free trade 
while Victoria had been the bastion of protection. In 1885, Carruthers’ future political 
colleagues William McMillan and Bernard Wise were involved in the setting up of the Free 
Trade Association to promote free trade and counter the perceived protectionist threat 
coming from Victoria.7 
It was a problem of finance that led to the ‘fiscal issue’ becoming front and centre 
of New South Wales political debate. Alexander Stuart won the 1882 election with a 
promise to end the indiscriminate sale of crown lands that was seen as alienating the land 
without settling the people.8 The problem was that the sale of crown lands had become an 
essential part of the Colony’s income that had allowed Governments, Parkes’ in particular, 
to spend lavishly on public works while still amassing budgetary surpluses. When Stuart 
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came to power the effective suspension of crown land sales led to a big drop in revenue 
and the quick accumulation of a large debt. Stuart’s Treasurer George Dibbs was unable to 
solve the dilemma, largely because the Government’s supporters refused to agree to a 
property tax.9 
The situation continued to get worse while a large loan delayed the inevitable. In 
1886 the Jennings Government was forced to bite the bullet. It proposed direct taxation 
and 5% ad valorem duties in order to raise revenue.10 Protectionists outside of Parliament 
hailed it as the ‘thin end of the wedge’ and Free Traders were quick to buy into the 
conspiracy theory put forward by their opponents.11 Adding fuel to the Free Trade fire, the 
direct taxation measures were rejected by the unelected Legislative Council, increasing the 
pressure to make the tariff the main source of revenue. Henry Parkes seized upon the 
discontent as a chance to get back into power, and began to style himself as the Free Trade 
leader. He moved several censure motions in a raucous House but Jennings was able to 
survive the turmoil until a split in Cabinet over a grant of reprieve for those convicted in 
the Mount Rennie rape case finally forced him to resign. The Governor then called upon 
Parkes to form a Government, a call the latter accepted on the condition that the 
Parliament was dissolved. Thus in 1887 New South Wales headed towards a fiscal election, 
as the Protectionists and Free Trade Association began to organise in earnest. With most 
candidates dividing themselves into fiscal groups and extra-parliamentary organisations 
helping to run campaigns, the election would bring about a ‘decisive and permanent break’ 
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with the old factional system, beginning the process of party development that arguably 
culminated in Carruthers’ 1907 election victory.12 
It was in this watershed election that Joseph Carruthers would enter New South 
Wales politics. He had already been approached to represent his native district of Kiama, 
but at the time the young Carruthers had declined. In 1886 his circumstances would 
change. In this year his young daughter Elsie died and in the midst of the family tragedy 
Joseph fell into a deep melancholy. As his depression wore on, Carruthers’ friend Mark 
Hammond chided him ‘on the folly of giving way to misfortune’.13 Hammond suggested 
that Carruthers contest the seat in the four-member electorate of Canterbury that he had 
just vacated: 
‘For a week or more I hesitated, and then one Saturday morning late in January 
1887 I suddenly made up my mind. Within half-an-hour I drafted an announcement 
of my candidature for publication on the following Monday, and walked down to 
the Sydney Morning Herald office, handed it in to the advertising clerk, paid for it, 
and walked back to my office. As soon as I got back, I repented my decision and so 
hurried down to the Herald offices to withdraw my announcement. But the office 
was closed, and would not open again until the Monday, and so the die was cast’.14 
It is difficult to determine whether Carruthers’ profession of reluctance was sincere 
or just a matter of form. Hammond, the man who had suggested the idea, was a devout 
Catholic and ‘defiantly independent of party’.15 He was not the sort of person you would 
                                                          
12  P. Loveday, A.W. Martin & P. Weller, ‘New South Wales’ in The emergence of the Australian party 
system ed. P. Loveday, A.W. Martin, & R.S. Parker (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1977) p.172. 
13 Joseph Carruthers, A Lifetime in Conservative Politics, p.65. 
14 Ibid., p.65. 
15 Ruth Teale, 'Hammond, Mark John (1844–1908)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre 
of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hammond-mark-john-
3705/text5811, published in hardcopy 1972, accessed online 11 February 2014. 




expect to start the political career of a Protestant Parkesite and a good reminder not to 
stereotype Carruthers. 
Carruthers publicly declared that he was a believer in free trade and a supporter of 
Parkes, but he was not preselected in the free trade ‘bunch’ to contest the Canterbury 
electorate.16 Preselection was relatively new in New South Wales, an innovation brought 
about by the ‘fiscal’ election and an early move towards the binding of members to extra-
parliamentary organisations.17 Those receiving endorsement were meant to advocate the 
fiscal principle of the supporting organisation in Parliament, hence their individual actions 
were theoretically constrained and mild though this may have been it was the first step 
towards the modern party system. The Free Trade Association, which originally had not 
been involved in party politics, introduced preselection in a bid to ensure the electoral 
unity that would be needed to defeat their Protectionist opponents. It was Francis Abigail, 
an Orangeman, who was responsible for preselection in Canterbury and he decided to 
leave the young Carruthers out.18 Consequently, while prominent Parkesites would speak 
for the other Free Trade candidates the courtesy would not be extended to the effective 
interloper. His eventual victory is testament to the weakness of the fledgling party system 
at this time. 
Keen to ensure that his supporter base would not be confined to his local St George 
area, Carruthers delivered numerous speeches throughout the electorate. The issues he 
brought up at this early stage show that there was a great deal of continuity in his beliefs 
throughout his career. Carruthers supported free trade as the ‘greatest good for the 
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greatest number’.19 He ‘was a free trader pure and simple, and without any qualification or 
even any reservation’.20 He also argued that reform of the land laws and the introduction 
of a comprehensive system of local government were urgently needed. At this time a 
community needed to voluntarily submit to becoming a municipality, something that 
many people were reluctant to do because it involved levying greater taxation upon 
themselves. Because little of the Colony had been incorporated into municipalities basic 
administrative tasks fell upon the Colonial Government in a manner that was both 
inefficient and unrepresentative. Carruthers, who had played a central role in the 
municipal incorporation of Kogarah, hoped to fix this by extending local government 
across the entirety of the populated areas of New South Wales, thereby spreading local 
democratic representation and eliminating the tax discrepancies. In the midst of the budget 
crisis that had precipitated the coming of the fiscal issue, Carruthers also advocated 
retrenchment by means of public service wage cuts, but in a manner by which higher 
officials were ‘made to give up their luxuries before the poorly-paid class were made to 
give up their daily bread’.21 
While free trade, retrenchment and decentralisation via local government were all 
small government policies, he did support some measures involving government 
intervention. Carruthers argued for the establishment of a national bank to lower interest 
rates and thereby encourage private enterprise.22 He also advocated a scheme of industrial 
conciliation and arbitration that the Sydney Morning Herald supported because it believed 
that strikes were hurting industry as much as protection.23 This formulation whereby 
Carruthers was generally inclined towards keeping government small and out of people’s 
                                                          
19 ‘Nominations Canterbury’, Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 9/2/1887, p.5. 
20  ‘Mr. J. H. Carruthers meetings’, Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 4/2/1887, p.11. 
21 ‘Canterbury Electorate’, Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 2/2/1887, p.7. 
22  ‘Mr. J. H. Carruthers meetings’, Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 4/2/1887, p.11. 
23 Sydney Morning Herald, Monday 7/2/1887, p.7. 




lives, but not dogmatically and with occasional exceptions, would be a hallmark of the 
pragmatic liberal’s career. 
Joseph Carruthers was elected top of the poll for Canterbury, a remarkable feat 
considering his youth and lack of party support. He remained the member for Canterbury 
and later the single member electorate of St George continuously until his retirement in 
1907. He often fought on local issues, sitting for a time as an elected member of Kogarah 
Municipal Council. Though these local issues will not be a focus of this thesis, it is 
important to remember that behind Carruthers’ success as a Minister and Premier there lay 
strong local support that allowed him to have the electoral security to focus on broader 
issues.24 
The Free Trade Association’s attempt to organise for the 1887 election was dogged 
by teething problems, particularly vote splitting which before the introduction of 
preferences would continue to be the bane of liberal parties. Still, with the help of the 
prestige of Henry Parkes, the FTA proved to be much more successful than their 
Protectionist counterparts and the Free Traders won the election in a landslide. The 
political polarisation created by the fiscal issue meant that Parkes would have one of the 
clearest parliamentary majorities since the first days of responsible government. This big 
majority was made up of some of Parkes’ old factional supporters and a large group of 
newly elected and fiercely dedicated Free-Traders. This group included William McMillan, 
Bernhard Wise and Carruthers himself. After the 1889 election they would be joined by 
Bruce Smith. Loveday and Martin describe the group as being ‘associated with and in 
many respects the products of the Freetrade Association’ but given that Carruthers had not 
been endorsed by that organisation it may be more accurate to refer to them simply as 
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Free Trade Young Turks.25 Their politics varied widely but they shared an almost 
insatiable appetite for Free Trade that Parkes would find difficult to satisfy.  
The Young Turks were an incredibly talented group of budding politicians who all 
emerged at roughly the same time. Bruce Smith and Bernhard Wise were ambitious 
political theorists, both having produced books that offered contrasting views of liberal 
politics. Smith was a businessman and barrister who had spent a considerable amount of 
time in Victoria and developed an aversion to the interventionist politics, particularly 
protectionism, that were then gaining prominence in the southern Colony. His 1887 book 
Liberty and Liberalism acted as a protest at what he saw as undue interference with 
individuals, enterprise and property. Central to Smith’s idea of liberalism was the concept 
of liberty, something he defined as ‘the freedom to do as one wishes; freedom from 
restraint – subject to the same or equal freedom in our fellows’.26 He argued that liberty 
should be maintained through limited government, not only because freedom was 
inherently valuable but also because the energy latent in the pursuit of individual goals 
would ultimately benefit society as a whole.  
Wise was a barrister who had been educated in England and was greatly influenced 
by the radical politics he had been exposed to as President of the Oxford Union. In 1884 he 
had produced Free Trade and Wages, a published lecture that sharply contrasted with the 
views of Smith for it embraced paternalism and encouraged government intervention for 
societal and humanitarian ends.  While still advocating free trade, Wise put forward 
‘labour views’ in support of government regulation, common wages, union preference and 
compulsory arbitration, all of which were quite out of tune with traditional liberal views 
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on freedom of contract and association.27 Wise’s views reflected  his interest in the 
philosophy of T.H. Green, an influential Oxford professor who had dismissed the idea that 
individual liberty was an end in itself and advocated the use of government to enforce the 
‘general will’.28 Wise was in this sense a ‘new liberal’ whereas his Young Turk compatriots, 
though they themselves were often innovative, built their beliefs on a more classical base. 
The ideological creativity shown by men like Smith and Wise laid the groundwork for a 
transformation of the pervading liberal consensus into a new agenda, even before the rise 
of protectionism shook that culture from its lofty position.  
The skills of Carruthers and McMillan lay not in abstract political theory but in the 
practical work of political organisation. They were concerned with achievable goals that, 
while they were inspired by classical liberal ideology, were not restricted by utopian 
dogmatism. The group was perhaps too talented for their own good as over the years 
there would be numerous conflicts between them, often based on personality as much as 
policy. Carruthers would be the only one to stay within the Free Trade Party throughout 
the whole of the 1890s. Despite this group’s importance to Parkes’ majority, he effectively 
snubbed them by making a Ministry largely out of old factional supporters with the 
exception of Wise who became Attorney-General only after William Foster resigned.29 
Joseph Carruthers delivered his maiden speech in the Legislative Assembly on 22 
March 1887. It was far from a genteel affair. Protectionist James Fletcher tried to level 
allegations of corruption against the building of a tramway from Kogarah to Sans Souci, 
and Carruthers, who as a private citizen had been involved in lobbying for the tramway’s 
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construction, was forced to defend himself and the others involved. He argued that the 
tramway was necessary as the Sans Souci area had been neglected by the Western route 
chosen for the earlier railway line and dismissed allegations of personal interest by showing 
that he had already sold his property near the route. It may be that Fletcher was trying to 
delay the construction for the financial benefit of a pre-existing tramway, but whatever the 
case Carruthers was able to fight off his political assailant.30 His reaction was swift and firm, 
‘the constant reiteration of charges is never held in any community to be a justification, or 
proof of those charges; the mere insinuation of corruption is never held to warrant the 
assumption of corruption, and prejudice, evidenced by prejudgment of a case, is sufficient 
in all assemblages to debar a person showing that prejudice from sitting in judgment in the 
matter’.31 Drawing on all his legalistic skill, Carruthers’ speech was a tour de force. 
Afterwards he was approached by William Teece, the Government Whip, who told him 
‘the Old Man is wonderfully pleased with the way you fought those Kilkenny cats’.32 
Ironically, the attacks he had been exposed to had helped him place himself above the pack 
and draw the attention of Henry Parkes. 
Carruthers would continue to grab Parkes’ attention, though for less positive 
reasons. During the committee stage for the Custom Duties Bill, he introduced an 
amendment to add a 5% ad valorem duty to the importation of luxuries and jewellery in 
particular. Carruthers was always keen on balanced budgets and he saw this as a form of 
revenue raising that caused as little harm as possible to people and business.33 The 
amendment caused a storm amongst Free Traders, more because an amendment on this 
vital issue had been moved by a Government supporter without prior consultation than 
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because of its content. The young member gave way to the pressure of his colleagues, 
dropping the amendment and learning a valuable lesson on the importance of Party 
unity.34 
Because of incidents like this and Carruthers’ later willingness to drop the fiscal 
issue once it moved from Colonial to Federal Parliament, Michael Hogan has argued that 
‘there was little content in his (free trade) ideology beyond that simple phrase’.35 This is to 
go too far. Carruthers was deeply committed to the principles of free trade. The most 
emotive speeches he gave during this period all revolved around the fiscal issue. It is likely 
more than a simple coincidence that Carruthers entered New South Wales politics during 
the fiscal election after rejecting earlier overtures to do so. Carruthers firmly believed that 
people were better off under free trade than under protection. However, as in all his 
sincerely held political beliefs, Carruthers laced ideology with pragmatism. Duties on 
luxuries that were revenue raising and not protective had none of the negative 
consequences free traders associated with protection. They would not hurt ordinary 
people or increase production costs by raising the price of anything necessary or even 
useful. At the same time, because these duties were not protective, they would not 
eliminate competition for locally produced luxuries and thereby allow their prices to rise 
and thus their products to become un-exportable. All of this was completely compatible 
with free trade beliefs and even small government beliefs that held that some revenue 
raising was a necessary evil and that it should be done in a manner that interfered with 
people as little as possible. 
Though Parkes castigated the young member for his attempted amendment, such 
a rebuke was more about the gall of the action rather than any betrayal of free trade. The 
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Premier arguably had less of attachment to that principle, and his ‘free trade tariff’ was a 
disappointment. While the resumption of land sales had improved the financial situation, 
the reduced revenues of full free trade would require direct taxation and Parkes was not 
prepared to tackle such a difficult issue. Instead he put it off, claiming that local 
government would have to come first. In the meantime Parkes introduced moderate tariff 
reductions, with the aim of achieving free trade in a staggered and therefore economically 
‘safe’ way.36 For the idealistic Young Turks who had been whisked into the political sphere 
by their vehement views on the fiscal issue, such a move was an evasion. The tension thus 
created would simmer behind the scenes a play a significant role in the course of the 
Ministry’s life. 
In June 1887 Carruthers tried to introduce his pet project, the Trades Arbitration 
Bill, but was forced to delay his speech because ‘the refreshment hour had arrived’.37 
Events in the Legislative Assembly took their course and the speech was never given. In 
April 1888 the Bill was read a second time as the Trades Conciliation Bill. Based on a 
French precedent, the Bill was designed as much as possible to eliminate strikes that 
Carruthers felt were harmful to both the business community and working men.38 It 
proposed to create an ‘impartial’ board that could deliberate over trade disputes, resolving 
them in as timely a manner as possible. After Carruthers gave a forceful speech advocating 
the Bill, it was moved to the select committee for consideration where it was eventually 
dropped. 
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It has been suggested that Carruthers became increasingly conservative throughout 
his life.39 At first glance his early push for a system of industrial conciliation and arbitration 
would support that view, as he would later denounce it for herding people into unions and 
damaging freedom of contract.40 The Bill Carruthers introduced in 1887 however was 
fundamentally different to the system that became a central pillar of the ‘Australian 
settlement’ and that he later denounced. There were two main differences between 
Carruthers’ Bill and the later system. Firstly, arbitration would not be compulsory; ‘I 
recognise this fact – I think its recognition will be found imprinted in this bill – that you 
cannot and dare not make arbitration compulsory – that if you attempt in any way to 
forcibly interfere in the relations existing between labour and capital, and endeavour to 
force the parties to go before a tribunal, you interfere in an improper manner between 
labour and capital’.41 Instead of directly forcing parties to abide by arbitration, Carruthers 
looked to ‘the court of public opinion – that court which will show the masters that if the 
verdict of the board of arbitration is against them, the public will not assist them in 
resisting the verdict of the tribunal’.42 
The second way in which Carruthers’ Bill was different was that individual workers 
could go before the tribunal. There would be no forcing men to join unions in order to 
appear, and therefore no impetus for forced association. These two differences meant that 
the Bill respected the old liberal ideal of the freedom of contract, something that 
Carruthers would later describe as ‘just as essential to mankind as freedom of conscience, 
freedom of speech and free exercise of the franchise’.43 The time and effort Carruthers 
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dedicated to his Bill shows that he was genuinely concerned about the negative 
consequences of strikes. His attempt to alleviate this evil, though mildly interventionist, 
was still influenced by his classical liberal beliefs that generally held that individual freedom 
should be maintained where possible. 
During his first term as a member Carruthers kept up his campaign for the 
extension of local government. He went to numerous municipality meetings throughout 
his electorate in order to gauge local issues, and never failed to express his views on the 
urgency of the issue. While efforts to introduce an extended system of local government 
were frustrated, Carruthers was keen to protect existing municipalities. When a Land Tax 
Bill was proposed in the House, he objected that by taxing those who paid council rates 
and those who did not equally, the Bill would effectively double tax those who lived in 
municipalities.44 He was also concerned that existing municipalities would have enough 
funding, hence Carruthers lobbied for larger municipal endowments. Parkes was left to 
remark that ‘the honourable member excelled every honourable member in finding ways 
to the public treasury’.45 It was not that Carruthers was inclined towards greater public 
spending, but as someone who had served on a Council himself he was not willing to leave 
municipalities to bear the negative consequences of the Parliament’s own lack of fiscal 
initiative. Rather than being inclined to lavishness, the young member held an almost self-
righteous belief that the spending of other people’s money was not something that should 
be taken lightly. When a Bill establishing the payment of members was introduced to the 
Assembly, he gave an impassioned speech that argued that such a move should not be 
taken without a referendum.46 Though the case for direct democratic approval was based 
on the specific circumstance of members of Parliament appropriating public funds for 
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themselves, the reluctance to abuse the public purse foreshadowed his later diatribes 
against ‘extravagance’.  
At this early stage in Carruthers’ political career it is difficult to chart the personal 
relationships he was developing. The collection we have of his correspondence does not 
really begin until 1889, and even then what has survived has been sporadic. Worse still for 
the historian, his early career corresponds with the rise of the telephone and this quickly 
became a central means of communication for younger members.47 Carruthers had a 
phone by 1893 at the latest and probably much earlier.48 This meant that many important 
conversations that would have survived as letters have been lost. Despite the deficiencies 
of the sources, it is possible to ascertain by events that at this time Carruthers was 
developing a personal relationship with William McMillan. McMillan was a successful 
merchant with a personal interest in free trade and a reputation for conservatism that was 
only partially warranted. He had entered Parliament at the same time as Carruthers; 
however he did so as a founder of the Free Trade Association and had been given the 
honour of moving the address in reply as his maiden speech. These auspicious 
circumstances meant that he and not Carruthers appeared to be the coming light in New 
South Wales politics. Although Carruthers had won his seat without the backing of the 
FTA, he soon became a prominent member of McMillan’s organisation. 
A prominent organisational role was not the only thing Carruthers received from 
McMillan. When the Parkes Government first introduced its version of ‘free trade’ that left 
over thirty tariff duties, Carruthers had seen little awry and had even tried to introduce a 
duty on luxuries. By late 1888 however he began speaking in increasingly ideological terms 
about free trade, suggesting that he had gone over to that group of Free Trade members, 
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including McMillan, who were growing increasingly frustrated at Parkes for not using his 
majority to institute ‘real’ free trade. In response to a motion put by Henry Copeland in 
favour of protection, Carruthers gave a long and vitriolic speech. He attacked protection as 
‘at the very best…the policy of the producer versus consumer’, whereby despite the fact 
that ‘every man is a consumer’ the Government weighs in on the side of the numerically 
inferior producers to the detriment of the majority.49 He then, as he would do many times 
afterwards, began a long and detailed comparison between protectionist Victoria and 
America against free trade New South Wales and Great Britain. Using official records 
Carruthers tried to show that wages were actually far lower in America, and that the 
benefits of the protectionist taxation flowed not to the working man but to ‘monopolists’.50 
He even went so far as to label protection ‘slavery’ for trying to dictate to people who they 
could trade with, noting that ‘the last country to give up dragging the souls out of human 
beings by slavery was Protectionist America’.51 Finally, he summed up by arguing that 
‘with our vast mining, pastoral, and other resources, we have here avenues of employment 
sufficient to give employment to ten times the population that we have at present, and that 
without having recourse to this artificial policy of scarcity, this barrier against trade which 
will give employment only by fostering maudlin industries to compete with those which 
are sound and natural to the country’.52 
The speech marked Carruthers’ political coming of age. No longer was he just 
another backbencher pursuing pet projects. He was now a prominent supporter of the 
Government delivering the main speech on the most important issue of the day. It is no 
coincidence that Carruthers’ break out speech was also his most rhetorically-loaded up to 
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that point. At this time New South Wales politics was becoming increasingly ideological as 
it moved away from the old faction system into the new party era. Indeed with the 
writings of Reid, Bruce Smith, and Wise it was arguably a golden age for free trade and 
liberal theorising.53 Carruthers was not particularly theoretical, but he possessed the ability 
to maintain sincere beliefs without being too doctrinaire, and to translate those beliefs into 
emotive yet rational language which would resonate with the electorate. It was this that 
made him a success. 
Not long after Carruthers’ break out speech, an event was to occur that would be a 
crucial turning point in the development of party politics. A debate was held over press 
accusations against Parkes’ appointments to the Railway Commission. This resulted in an 
impromptu division in a thin House where eight nominal Free Traders crossed the floor in 
protest at what was seen as Parkes’ ‘high-handedness’.54 Carruthers did not cross the floor 
but Parkes was defeated in the vote and resigned. Opposition leader Dibbs formed a new 
Government, but when it introduced a Supply Bill McMillan, who had also stayed put 
during the division, proposed an amendment telling the Governor that the Ministry did 
not have the confidence of the House.55 In the debate that followed McMillan went on to 
argue that the earlier vote ‘was to a certain extent a vote against the personal actions of the 
Premier, and not against the broad policy of the Government’.56 Essentially he was arguing 
that the Government was not the Premier but the Party with a majority in the Legislative 
Assembly. Perhaps wisely, Carruthers did not participate in the contentious debate except 
to defend himself when he was accused by Ninian Melville of having effectively been a 
slave to the Government’s wishes after an initial showing of independence over the duty 
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on luxuries.57 Carruthers voted with McMillan and most of the other Free Traders for the 
amendment, which passed despite the fact that Parkes voted with the Protectionists against 
it. Although the Free Trade Party had thus demonstrated that they had control of the 
Assembly even without Parkes, after seeing two Governments fall in a very short space of 
time the Governor decided to dissolve Parliament. 
The Free Traders went to the election as a party without a clear leader, a situation 
that had been almost unthinkable previously as during the factional era the leader had 
effectively been the party. It was untrodden ground for the Free Traders who had achieved 
so much success at the last election because they had been able to combine their new 
organisation with Parkes’ prestige and old factional support. Although he staked no claim 
to the Party leadership, as founder of the FTA McMillan would be de facto leader for the 
election. In his task he would need assistance from men like Bruce Smith, George Reid and 
Carruthers. The latter, who had only recently come to the Free Trade foreground, would 
thus be heavily involved in the campaign and cement his position within the Party. 
At this time in New South Wales history elections were held over an extended 
period of time with different electorates going to the polls on different days. Carruthers’ 
Canterbury poll was relatively early in the schedule and would help set the tone for the 
wider election. This time Carruthers would be campaigning not just for himself but for a 
Free Trade ‘bunch’ of four candidates, of whom he was the most prominent. He began a 
vigorous speaking tour, reiterating his strong support for free trade along with direct 
taxation and the extension of local government. The stagnation in Parliament over issues 
like local government and land reform meant that over his career many of Carruthers’ 
election speeches were almost monotonously repetitive, as issues from previous elections 
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refused to resolve themselves. This tendency was exacerbated by the new ideological party 
division in Parliament. Every election for the foreseeable future would be a fiscal election, 
as even if Carruthers had felt that ‘free trade’ had been achieved under Parkes, that 
achievement would need to be perpetually defended against Protectionist opposition that 
showed little sign of disappearing. 
One of the few innovations was given in a speech at St Peters where Carruthers 
proposed an extensive program of decentralisation that went beyond just the extension of 
local government. He brainstormed that ‘the colony be divided into five provinces’, with 
subservient local boards and a parliament to deal with national issues.58 Carruthers had a 
long standing interest in decentralisation; something he believed would both reduce 
spending and facilitate democratic autonomy. This was one of the more radical expressions 
of those beliefs, which would later re-emerge in his fight for States’ rights. Ironically the 
provincial proposal was meant to ‘act as a forerunner of a united Australia’, which would 
have had these smaller provinces in lieu of States.59 He would soon give up this radical 
proposal in favour of the more popular federation cause, but it is interesting to note that he 
was already juggling a national outlook and a view towards local independence. 
During the Canterbury campaign Carruthers’ old friend George Reid came to the 
electorate to speak in favour of Free Trade.60 Reid had held an anomalous position in the 
late Parliament. Although his views generally mirrored those of Free Trade Young Turks 
like Carruthers, Reid had refused to be a part of Parkes’ Ministry when offered a position. 
McMinn explains this decision by saying ‘he was sceptical of Parkes’ sincerity; and he 
recognised the danger to his future career of subordinating himself to so dominating a 
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leader’.61 Reid had remained relatively independent throughout the Parliament, a staunch 
Free Trader but no clear supporter of the Government. The fact that Parkes was not the 
official leader of the Free Trade Party at the 1889 election gave Reid greater room to 
campaign outside his electorate. Nevertheless, his relations with some Government 
supporters were strained and the fact that he campaigned for Carruthers and the 
Canterbury Free Trade ‘bunch’ suggests the two were still close, particularly as Reid spoke 
in Canterbury the night before his own East Sydney poll. Carruthers recalled that while 
Reid was a fine speaker in the House, ‘outside he was the darling of the gods, as he could 
sway a political meeting by his oratory and make it roar with laughter by his quips and 
sallies of wit’.62 
The Canterbury poll was held on Saturday 2 February. The Sydney Moring 
Herald’s vivid description of the day offers a unique insight into electoral organisation at 
the time: 
‘In the early morning the organisations of each party were brought into action, and 
throughout the day they did yeoman’s service. Voters indolent required to be 
incited, voters recalcitrant needed to be brought back to the fold and voters 
irresolute had to be cajoled into decision. That was the work in which the various 
committees, assisted by a host of individual partisans, were engaged during the day. 
The candidates themselves showed no lukewarmness in the cause to which they 
were aligned. Had they been gifted the power of ubiquity they could scarce have 
more visits; they were everywhere and nowhere. The Canterbury electorate is one 
of the most extensive in the Colony, and the 17 polling places where separated by 
considerable distances. As the afternoon advanced excitement at the various 
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centres increased. At Ashfield especially, as the headquarters, was the interest 
magnified and intensified. Many were the outward and visible signs of the battle 
which was being so earnestly waged. Walls and fences were botched with mural 
literature, cabs and carts and vehicles of hybrid descriptions were about in all 
directions, and at the polling places gathered many hundreds of persons. These 
were some of the signs of activity’.63 
 What is remarkable about all this is how closely it mirrors the chaos of modern 
elections. The fledgling Party organisations had to do all the work that their better funded 
modern counterparts have to. The passage shows what a feat it was for Carruthers to 
come top of the poll in 1887 without the help of the Free Trade Association and how 
invaluable his experience campaigning for people like Arthur Renwick must have been. It 
also explains why so many politicians in this era saw the creation of a permanent extra-
parliamentary organisation as imperative. The Free Traders won all four Canterbury seats 
in the 1889 poll, with all four men attracting more than double the votes of their 
Protectionist opponents.64 It was a victory not just for Carruthers and the Free Trade 
‘bunch’, but for the numerous volunteers who had made the success possible. 
 Despite the tremendous success achieved in Canterbury, Colony-wide it was clear 
that the 1889 election would be much closer than that of two years previous. No doubt the 
loss of Parkes as Party leader and the internal divisions thus revealed had taken their toll. 
With the country electorates that polled later than their city counterparts likely to favour 
protection, Joseph Carruthers was sent out to preach the free trade gospel. He addressed 
electors in the Illawarra, attacking Protectionist opposition to his Trade Conciliation Bill in 
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a bid to appeal to working men.65 In the Hawkesbury electorate Carruthers not only gave 
speeches but also stayed to help out on election day, no doubt offering his experience at 
organisation. Free trade supporters in Hawkesbury gave the Sydneysider a pair of carved 
emu eggs to thank him for his help.66 Carruthers’ efforts paid off, the Free Traders won all 
the seats in these two electorates, despite an overall swing to Protection that was more 
pronounced in rural areas. 
The Free Traders managed to win the 1889 election with a reduced majority. They 
now had only 71 seats to the Protectionists’ 66.67 Notably Bernhard Wise had lost his South 
Sydney seat. In spite of the narrow result, the Free Traders celebrated in lavish style with a 
cruise around Sydney Harbour. Although the Free Traders had won the election largely 
without Parkes (who had campaigned outside his electorate so could claim some credit for 
the victory), they held a meeting where they elected him as their Party leader. The young 
Free Trade members still looked up to Parkes and given their electoral setbacks it was 
difficult to imagine governing stably without his experience and prestige. Even McMillan, 
who had so recently argued that the Government was the Party and not the man, was at 
heart a Parkesite. 
Although Parkes remained as leader, his biographer notes that ‘his position had 
nevertheless, subtly changed’.68 He had been elected by the Party, at a meeting that he did 
not attend. The balance of power had shifted ever so slightly towards the Party apparatus 
and away from Parkes. After the Free Traders used their majority to get rid of the Dibbs 
Government, it was clear that Parkes would have to construct a Ministry that gave due 
representation to the men to whom he at least partially owed his leadership. Now the 
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Young Turks would utilise their new political leverage. Rather than allow one or two of 
themselves to be promoted to lesser Ministries while the others were left in the wilderness 
of the back bench, Carruthers, McMillan and Bruce Smith put their heads together and 
‘agreed that we should each work for the same purpose, that the three of us were to be 
included, otherwise we would not join’.69 Parkes, who needed at least McMillan in his 
Ministry, quietly acquiesced. In what was a major coup for the Young Turks, McMillan 
was made Treasurer, Bruce Smith became Secretary of Public Works and Carruthers was 
made Minister for Public Instruction. It is noteworthy that Carruthers made his alliance 
with Smith and McMillan, not Wise. Wise was not in Parliament at this time but even so 
the fact that Carruthers made deals with these men suggests that, contrary to J. A. Ryan’s 
assessment that Carruthers was on the relative left of the Party, he was in fact completely 
comfortable with these supposed ‘conservatives’.70 Though a pragmatist who was thought 
of as being somewhat sympathetic to labour, even at this early stage of his career 
Carruthers’ liberalism had more in common with these ‘right’ small government 
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
 
 
Minister for Public Instruction 
 
Before the new Ministry could get down to business some organisational issues brought up 
by the recent election had to be dealt with. McMillan had been disturbed by the recent 
near-defeat and decided that for the Party to succeed it could no longer be based on a 
‘single issue’. Hence in March 1889 meetings were held to form a Liberal Political 
Association. The name encapsulated a desire to turn liberalism into a broad agenda that 
contained free trade but was not limited to it. This would then both inform and inspire a 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary Free Trade Liberal Party. The fact was tacitly 
accepted that in an age of party liberalism would have to be the property of a party and the 
Free Traders were trying to take ownership of what they felt was their political inheritance. 
Ideology was important in shaping beliefs, but it was also a rhetorical tool which could be 
used to justify and sell the acquisition of power. The popularity of a loose concept of 
‘liberalism’ in colonial New South Wales made the title ‘liberal’ a grand prize for those 
who could take possession it. The pervading liberal consensus in the Colony had long 
accepted free trade, hence the Free Traders felt justified in their claim to both the ideology 
and the past.1 
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The task for the LPA meetings was to solidify the Free Traders’ claim to the title 
‘liberal’, and construct a liberal agenda suited the concerns of the day. Carruthers, along 
McMillan, James Brunker and others formed a six member committee which wrote the 
confidential platform for New South Wales first comprehensive ‘Liberal Party’. On 26 
March the platform was revealed for consideration at a meeting that Parkes did not attend. 
Its points included freedom of trade, direct taxation including a tax on the unimproved 
value of land, economy in public expenditure, efficient and economical control of the 
public services, reforms to the land laws, local self-government, the establishment of 
agricultural schools, the extension of technical education, electoral and parliamentary 
reform, and the ‘encouragement of local industries by any legitimate means not imposing a 
tax upon the many to benefit the few’.2 Several of these points were intertwined as the 
direct taxation would make up for lost tariff revenue while the economies in expenditure 
would ensure that overall taxation remained low. The platform clearly reflected 
Carruthers’ ideology but it also represented beliefs common to many Free Trade liberals. A 
point in favour of federation was originally included but was removed as it was not part of 
the Government’s policy at this time.3  
It is noteworthy that the LPA platform was the product of McMillan and 
Carruthers rather than Wise or Smith. Because of this it was more practical. It defended 
individualism and limited government, but not in the absolutes of Liberty and Liberalism. 
It allowed for some small government intervention, but not in the extensive and fetishized 
‘new liberal’ way of Free Trade and Wages. Through pragmatic minds liberalism was 
adapted into a broad agenda which took it out of the abstract and gave it a clarity that in 
the factional era the pervasive ideal had often lacked. A philosophy was being distilled into 
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a set and sellable program, a process that was inherently restrictive and put limits on 
interpretations that many might disagree with. Nevertheless, the role of liberalism in New 
South Wales politics was being revolutionised. In an emerging age of party liberalism 
would no longer be a property of the pervading culture, it would be the inspiration for a 
partisan legislative agenda.  
In order for liberalism to be truly partisan it required opposition, something that is 
difficult to establish considering the Protectionists were not far removed from the 
erstwhile reigning political culture. However, the attempts of the Protectionists to restrict 
‘commercial freedom’ and the vestigial elements of rural conservatism prominent in the 
Legislative Council were sufficiently removed from classical liberalism to allow for a 
rhetorical differentiation between them and the Free Trade Liberals. Over the next few 
years Carruthers and others would exploit this, facilitating a potential crystallisation of 
‘liberal’ views in the minds of the electorate. This was a process in its infancy that would 
not mature until the Labor Party was firmly established, but the LPA can still be seen as an 
important step in the creation of party-liberalism. 
Though the LPA reflected liberal beliefs, its broad scope required a greater sacrifice 
of absolute individualism than the FTA had.  In this sense the LPA was a far greater step 
away from the old factional era than the fiscal organisations that came before it. Many of 
its structural elements remained similar. The organisation would be made up of branches, 
and these would be involved in the election of delegates to a central conference. There was 
also to be a central association with half-yearly meetings and members would be required 
to pay an annual membership fee which would fund campaigning. The radical change was 
that members would have to pledge to support the far-reaching platform.4 This would not 
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be enforced in the rigid way that the later Labor caucus pledge would and the liberal roots 
of the organisation meant that it still held its members’ right to individual opinions in high 
regard. Even so, this still represented a significant innovation in the way MLAs were 
envisaged increasingly as party members as well as individuals. 
This complex new organisation did not last long until it merged with the Free 
Trade Association to form the Free Trade and Liberal Political Association. This retained 
the innovations of the new organisation while absorbing the extensive membership of its 
predecessor. In late August the FTLA held a week long convention to promote the 
association and iron out any issues with the platform that it had inherited from the LPA. 
Carruthers was to be one of the main speakers along with George Reid and a less than 
enthusiastic Henry Parkes. It is testimony to how far Carruthers had climbed that he was 
given such a prominent place in proceedings. During his speech he argued that ‘by the 
policy of free trade a Government does not interfere with taxation except to carry on the 
Government, and protect the lives and property of the people’.5 He also suggested that free 
trade was a ‘divine policy’ as it worked with ‘goodwill amongst all men’ rather than 
through the selfishness of retaliatory protection.6 
During the debates at the conference Carruthers positioned himself alongside Reid 
in opposition to the demagogic followers of Henry George.7 George was an American 
social reformer whose 1879 book Progress and Poverty offered a utopian solution to the 
unequal distribution of wealth through the implementation of a ‘single tax’ on the 
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unimproved value of land.8 This tax was meant to replace all other forms of taxation, and 
would attack the institutionalised wealth of property owners while leaving others free 
from the burden of the costs of government. The fact that the tax was on the ‘unimproved’ 
value was meant to encourage people to continue to develop their land while punishing 
those who lived off the unearned increment that was derived through ownership and 
inflation rather than work. The tax was therefore meant to curb speculation and tax city 
properties, whose value was derived from their location, more than rural farm properties 
whose value was derived from what was produced on them. George wanted to use the tax 
to ‘appropriate rent’; hence land taxation was a roundabout way of achieving a pseudo 
nationalisation of land.9 
George’s beliefs were influential in the early Australian Labor movement, and 
despite their socialist undertones they were also picked up by many Free Traders.10 There 
were several reasons for this. The fact that the ‘single tax’ would replace all other forms of 
taxation meant that it could be used as a method of achieving Free Trade. The tax on the 
unimproved value tapped into a hatred of the inherited wealth land owners, while leaving 
most forms of commerce relatively free from taxation in a manner conducive to capitalism. 
George’s implication that a lack of taxation would go a long way to improving the 
situation for poor people also echoed arguments about the ‘free breakfast table’. 
Meanwhile the fact that the nationalisation of land was implicit rather than real meant that, 
to some extent at least, property rights would be preserved. Most Free Traders picked up 
the notion that a tax on the unimproved value of land was a relatively harmless way of 
achieving necessary taxation, without accepting George’s theory as a whole. 
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This was the way Carruthers treated it. He had often quoted George in support of 
his attacks on Protectionist America, but he felt that ‘in New South Wales the application 
of his theory was impracticable’.11 Above all the ‘single tax’ was an absolute policy that the 
pragmatism of Carruthers could not accept. To embrace the single tax would have meant 
abandoning the flexibility that had seen him to try to introduce a revenue raising tariff on 
luxuries. There were a significant number of more doctrinaire ‘single taxers’ at the FTLA 
meeting, and they maintained that the platform should require absolute free trade and also 
that ‘no local government measure should be countenanced if it did not involve rates on 
unimproved land values’.12 Although Carruthers believed in those rates, he was not 
prepared to put up artificial barriers in the way of a local government bill he felt had 
already been delayed far too long. Carruthers and Reid made their views clear to the 
meeting, and the two friends won the day. The conference gave unconditional support to 
local government, while also agreeing to revise but not arbitrarily abolish the tariff.13 The 
coming together of Carruthers and Reid in the important internal Party debate marked a 
crucial point in their burgeoning political relationship. 
The FTLA conference marked the zenith of early attempts to create a permanent 
Free Trade Liberal Party with external organisation. Peter Gunnar has argued that ‘it 
already had the “model party” structure soon to be “invented” by Labor’.14 It did not live 
up to this early promise however and after a poor showing in the 1891 election it faded out 
of existence. Joseph Carruthers had played an important role in the creation of the first 
New South Wales comprehensive Liberal Party. He learnt much from its early success and 
even more from its ultimate failure. The main reason the FTLA failed was that it never 
                                                          
11 ‘Marrickville Free Trade & Liberal Association’, Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 25/4/1890, p.7. 
12 W.G. McMinn, George Reid, p.56. 
13 Ibid., p.56. 
14 Peter Gunnar, op. cit., p.43. 




managed to unite liberals in a period of deep division. Parkes, who yearned for the faction 
system in which he had greater power and independence, never fully got behind 
McMillan’s experiment. This meant that not only was the organisation robbed of Sir 
Henry’s prestige, but the Premier actually tried to undermine it.15 Despite early attempts 
to create broad support for the FTLA, it was ultimately seen as McMillan’s organisation. 
After Reid and Carruthers defeated the single taxers at the conference, many of the more 
devout followers of Henry George decided to invest their energy in the Single Tax League. 
The federation issue would also see many members drift away from the FTLA. Behind this 
division there was bad timing. While the FTLA pushed the envelope for political parties, it 
was always going to struggle while Parkes, who embodied the faction system, was still 
around. The organisation also came into existence when the Free Traders had already been 
in office for two years and there were already cracks showing. It is much harder to get a 
party united behind bold policies in a period of stagnation than it is to unite them in 
ideological opposition to something. Parkes had seen this when he skilfully used the fiscal 
issue to catapult himself back into power. Despite this overall tendency in favour of 
opposing policies, the FTLA’s platform was innovative enough to have received broad 
liberal support had it not been torn asunder by the Premier, single-taxers and the 
federation issue. 
Carruthers played a central role in the policy positioning and structural formation 
of the FTLA, but throughout this period he was also playing a more practical 
organisational role. This was as the Party’s main by-election campaigner. In his memoirs 
Carruthers vividly recalled a contest in the Manning River district where he was given the 
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responsibility of finding a suitable candidate as well as campaigning.16 At another by-
election in Monaro, he gave addresses alongside Reid and O’Connor.17 In 1890 Carruthers 
campaigned against John Norton in the Lithgow area, earning himself the eternal enmity 
of the infamous Truth editor. Carruthers’ electoral experience became self-perpetuating as 
he was given new tasks and responsibilities because of the knowledge he already possessed. 
While all this was happening Carruthers was getting used to his new elevated 
position as Minister for Public Instruction. He had already set out the main points of his 
educational agenda when helping to write the platform of the LPA. Since this platform was 
written without Parkes, it appears that Carruthers was given at least some autonomy by 
the Premier who was notoriously overbearing with his Ministers. Carruthers recalled that 
when he was a Minister Parkes ‘insisted on being consulted’ but ‘rarely interfered with 
me’.18 Carruthers was probably lucky that when he ‘consulted’ Parkes about education 
policy, the Premier did not find anything he needed to interfere with. When dealing with 
the more controversial tariff issue, the Treasurer was interfered with and eventually 
resigned after Parkes frustrated his efforts to institute a more ‘free’ trade.19  
As Minister Carruthers’ first significant act was the creation of a Women’s College 
for the University of Sydney. It was to be a non-sectarian establishment to ‘give the same 
advantages to women who desire university education as are now possessed by the male 
portion of the community’.20 In the Assembly Carruthers pointed out that ‘in England, 
France, Italy, Switzerland and many other countries every possible facility was provided 
for the higher education of women, and they would only be adopting the right course by 
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profiting by the experience of older countries’.21 The college was given a £5,000 
Government grant to be matched by private donors, ‘a very small expenditure of public 
money’.22 Like many nineteenth century liberals the young Minister saw education as one 
of the few areas in which increased government spending could be justified 
Carruthers’ main Ministerial focus was the extension of technical education 
dictated by the LPA platform. His method of achieving this was to abolish the Board of 
Technical Education and transfer its responsibilities to his Ministry. With direct control he 
was then able to dictate to those below him to ensure that technical subjects were given a 
greater role in the system of public education, and that new schools were built with that in 
mind. Connected to the extension of technical education was the establishment of 
agricultural colleges, which were meant to ensure that rural development was encouraged 
just as much as industrial development. There was a nation building motive behind both 
these moves, as Carruthers believed that education might be justified as ‘State enterprise’ 
because it could be used to increase ‘the efficiency of labour, the economy of its production, 
and the power of its people to compete with the labour of other countries’.23 Hence the 
policy fell under the category of the ‘encouragement of local industries by any legitimate 
means not imposing a tax upon the many to benefit the few’ set out in the platform. 
Carruthers believed that education was a worthy vehicle for industrial development as it 
encouraged individual effort while protection was not as it essentially worked through 
compulsion. 
Carruthers’ emphasis on technical education brought him closer to Reid, as he was 
extending on the system that the latter had established as Minister under Stuart. In his 
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reminiscences Reid would acknowledge Carruthers’ role in building on his achievements.24 
Impressed by Carruthers’ efforts, in July 1890 Reid approached him with the suggestion 
that he introduce a Bill to prevent cruelty to children. Reid had been contemplating 
introducing such a Bill himself, but having heard Carruthers was thinking about it felt that 
such an important piece of legislation should be introduced by a Minister.25 It is testament 
to Reid’s humility that he was more concerned about the Bill getting the greatest possible 
support than receiving credit for it. Carruthers was unable to draft such a Bill before he left 
office, but shortly thereafter an Infants Protection Bill was introduced and passed by fellow 
Free Trader John Neild. 
As Minister for Public Instruction Carruthers was building on the achievements of 
not only Reid but Parkes, whose signature achievement had been setting up the system of 
public education in New South Wales. Interestingly, Carruthers fiercely denied that Parkes’ 
system was secular, insisting that it was simply non-sectarian. He paid little attention to 
Catholic concerns about how ‘non-sectarian’ the system really was. These concerns 
centred on a desire to control what Catholics felt to be the pervasively-religious education 
of their children and they had led to a Catholic boycott of the public education system.26 In 
light of their refusal to utilise public education, many Catholics objected to being taxed to 
pay for it and this animosity had frequently flared up in the political sphere. Parkes’ 
defence of a single public education system which did not fund separate religious schools 
had put him offside with mainstream Catholic opinion and in an age of deep religious 
divisions this in turn had strengthened Protestant connections to his ‘liberal’ following. 
Carruthers defended a single non-secular public education system, arguing that ‘religion, 
being as it is interwoven with our political, social and family life is a thing which cannot be 
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left out of account; that to profess to ignore it is absurd’.27 Such opinion was controversial, 
but on the whole sectarian disputes seem to have remained relatively dormant during his 
time as Minister. 
To build on Parkes’ system of education, Carruthers overhauled the training of 
teachers to ensure that education standards were lifted. Against ‘bureaucratic resistance’ he 
increased the length and scope of teacher training.28 He also pushed for the erection of a 
Teachers’ College at the University of Sydney. Prior to this, teachers had been trained at 
the Model Public School at Fort Street, and while they already attended some lectures at 
the University Carruthers was directly linking teaching with a University education in a 
new and ambitious way. This meant a broader education for teachers, who would now 
study not just pedagogy, but also physics, mathematics and the classics.29 Knowledge of the 
classics is not something that would now be seen as essential for a teacher, but for 
nineteenth century liberals and particularly for Carruthers as a pupil of Badham, it was not 
something that could be left out. Long before the birth of historical relativism, the lessons 
of the distant past were seen as tangibly beneficial knowledge for future generations to 
possess. Around this time Carruthers was sending copies of Badham’s lectures as gifts to 
McMillan and Bruce Smith, thus his old teacher clearly still had an intellectual hold over 
him.30 Unfortunately due to circumstances beyond Carruthers’ control the erection of a 
Sydney University Teacher’s College would be long delayed, but his vision for University 
educated teachers would eventually be realised. 
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The young Minister also overhauled the ‘training’ of students by reinvigorating the 
Public School cadets corps. The corps already existed, but its numbers had fallen as low as 
1400 participating students.31 Carruthers reorganised the force and held large military 
reviews to increase the cadets’ prestige and encourage participation. At one review, 1100 
country cadets were brought into the city and camped at Moore Park. With so many boys 
away from their parents for the first time, Carruthers had to issue a memorandum to 
ensure that no ‘intoxicating beverages’ were available on the grounds.32 The cadets 
reviewed in front of Lord and Lady Carrington, and at a toast with the officers Carruthers 
boasted that: 
‘to train the youth of the Colony in the habits of obedience and respect to those set 
over them, to discipline them, to accustom them to the use of arms and military 
drill, would be the broadest and safest basis upon which to build up our Australian 
standing army of civilians. Please God, the day would never come when the citizen 
soldiers of Australia would be called upon to fire a shot at the enemy; but if 
unhappily that evil day should come, Australia’s best defence would be that army 
of sturdy sons which she was now rearing’.33  
It is significant that when speaking about defence Carruthers refers to Australia and 
not New South Wales. He was clearly connecting the cadets with the militarily-justified 
federation campaign. 
Carruthers’ other innovation in public schooling was the introduction of Arbor 
Day. Based on a South Australian public holiday, this was to be a day for the planting of 
trees and shrubs in Public Schools. In a circular issued to head teachers throughout the 
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Colony Carruthers explained that it was hoped that ‘an interest in nature will be stimulated 
and a love for the beautiful encouraged among the pupils’.34 He also felt that the trees 
would help improve the climate of schools by providing shade for the students. It is likely 
that in this enterprise Carruthers was motivated by his own experience at the Model Public 
School and at Goulburn. One of Carruthers’ more quirky policies, Arbor Day would go on 
to become an institution in New South Wales schools for decades. 
Carruthers’ achievements during his first stint as a Minister are all the more 
remarkable because he was working in an Assembly that was largely stagnant. Loveday, 
Martin and Weller observe that ‘the parliament elected in 1889 was noted for its relatively 
small legislative output’.35 Admittedly one of the reasons Carruthers was able to achieve so 
much was that, provided he did not stir up sectarian animosity, he had a relatively 
uncontroversial portfolio. Michael Hogan and Ken Turner have argued that during this 
period ‘Carruthers was to be significant, not so much in government, but rather as a 
political tactician and electoral manager for the party’.36 While Carruthers’ organisational 
role was vital, it is unfair to dismiss the achievements of one of the most productive 
Ministers in Parkes’ last Government. It was only really in education that the ambitious 
LPA platform received enactment. Meanwhile the rest of the innovative liberal agenda was 
allowed to stagnate as a reluctant Premier stood in the way of any radical reform. 
One of Carruthers’ duties as Minister was to deliver addresses to numerous 
schoolchildren and other youths throughout the Colony. At one such lecture to a group of 
disadvantaged youths known as the Boys’ Brigade, Carruthers outlined his belief in 
individual opportunity that was central to his liberal outlook: 
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‘Poverty arose from different sources, and much resulted from the vices of 
mankind; but its origin, no matter what it might be, should not stand in the way of 
alleviating suffering, and the people should never think of visiting on the heads of 
children any misfortunes brought about by the faults of parents. In spite of all 
difficulties, it was at the will of every boy and girl, no matter how poor, to achieve 
some meed of fame in the world, for the Almighty had designed it so that its good 
things could be shared by those who in early life had been deprived of their fair 
share of it. One in this country could combine words of hope with practical 
encouragement, for in our system of education, and under our form of 
government and social life, no great barriers were offered to any lad, no matter 
how humble, from going step by step from the lowest to the highest place in the 
community. In this country there were scores of instances of men who had risen by 
their own industry and perseverance to high, honourable, and dignified 
positions….In conclusion he told them not to be ashamed of poverty – it was a 
noble sign they would bear in after successes – but to take advantage of the great 
educational facilities at their command, and never to forget the grand principles of 
self-respect, self-reliance and self-help’.37 
This belief was fundamental to Carruthers’ politics. His own heroes whether they 
were Sir Henry Parkes or Captain Cook were all self-made men and Carruthers listed to 
the Boys’ Brigade examples as diverse as Homer, Abraham Lincoln and Lord Nelson. As 
the son of a convict he was arguably a shining example for this cult of opportunity. He had 
been privileged enough to go to University but only through the hard work and large 
sacrifices of his parents and as Minister he increased the number of merit-based 
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scholarships to try to ensure that those with the ability and the drive to climb the ladder 
were not denied access to it.38 To understand his politics one must understand that the 
principles of opportunity and freedom underpinned almost everything Carruthers did. 
While he saw that there were certainly problems that needed alleviation, Carruthers 
believed that New South Wales political, social and economic system was fundamentally 
sound because it had allowed him and others to achieve so much. His belief in the existing 
system was actually stronger because he had to climb to the top rather than be born there 
and hence felt that with hard work and perseverance others could do the same. 
Throughout his career Carruthers would reject highly interventionist policies of both 
protectionist and socialist inspiration because they were a threat to the individual freedom 
and opportunity that he saw as not only the source of progress and prosperity but also as 
essential to human existence. 
In 1890 an event was to take place that would have lasting ramifications for the 
political and economic system that Carruthers believed in. This was the great maritime 
strike that acted as the catalyst for the birth of the Labor Party. Of the three Young Turks 
who had leveraged their way into Parkes’ last Ministry, Carruthers was the only one to get 
through this incident politically unscathed. During the strike Carruthers was sent by Parkes 
to investigate a gathering at Millers Point that looked like it could escalate into a riot. On 
arrival he was led safely through the crowd by the strike committee, who complained to 
him that hoodlums who were not representative of the strikers were threatening to 
escalate the situation.39 After a discussion with the committee, Carruthers returned 
peaceably, content that the situation had not got out of hand. Reflecting on the strike, 
Carruthers believed that: 
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‘No man has a greater hatred of strikes than I. My experience has shown me that 
not only do they bring suffering to all classes and especially to women and children, 
but above all they strain the whole machinery of government almost to breaking 
point. On the one hand you have an infuriated section of men sacrificing their 
livelihood for a cause which rightly or wrongly they feel bound to stand by; on the 
other hand you have the employers and the public who are anxious for work to be 
resumed, clamouring for the Government to act with a strong hand and to put 
down the strikers and their methods. Speaking as one who has held responsibility, I 
can only say that in a big strike, it is essential not only that a Government should be 
firm, but that it must keep its cool’.40 
Rightly or wrongly, McMillan and Bruce Smith were viewed as not having kept 
their cool during the maritime strike. It was alleged by some that during the strike Bruce 
Smith had said that the Government would ‘shoot down’ the strikers ‘like bloody dogs’, a 
hearsay allegation that he vigorously denied but which nevertheless stuck.41 Carruthers 
defended his colleague, describing the allegations in uncharacteristic language as being ‘as 
false as hell’.42 Though infuriating, the accusations levelled against Bruce Smith mattered 
little as his doctrinaire small government beliefs, admirable to many, meant that he was 
unlikely to ever reach the position of Party leader. McMillan on the other hand was the 
Treasurer and the founder of the extra-parliamentary organisation of the Party. It looked 
like he would definitely be a future leader before the events of the strike cast a shadow 
over his career. 
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At the height of the strike Parkes was resting at home having recently been ill, 
when a deputation from the chamber of commerce came to Parliament House. As the 
leading representative of the Government, McMillan received the deputation. After 
hearing reports of ‘acts of violence and disorder’ and being shown a driver with a bleeding 
head, McMillan denounced the Labour Defence Committee as a ‘semi-revolutionary 
government’ that threatened to create ‘disorder and anarchy’.43 He then spoke for ‘the 
whole of the government’ and threatened to take ‘steps to secure the liberty of the subjects 
of the country’.44 When Parkes was approached for comment he publicly rebuked his 
Treasurer’s bold statements. McMillan was inclined to resign before his Ministerial 
colleagues pushed for reconciliation between the Premier and the Treasurer and Parkes 
gave McMillan a qualified public apology.45 
Whether McMillan’s actions were justified and who was at fault are questions that 
are open to debate. What matters here is not whether the incident should have damaged 
McMillan’s career but that it did damage it. Although he had always been seen as a 
representative of the mercantile interest, after the strike McMillan became the unions’ 
number one enemy. There would be violent demonstrations at his 1891 election meetings 
disrupting his ability to campaign, and when the Labor Party was born its members would 
be openly hostile towards him.46 His public rebuke and near resignation had also greatly 
dented McMillan’s prestige, hurting him in circles that paid no heed to the attitude of the 
union movement. He would remain an important figure within the Government, 
debatably second only to Parkes, but he was no longer head and shoulders above 
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Carruthers as he once was. The strike thus propelled the stocks of the Free Traders’ 
youngest Minister, for he had demonstrated a propensity to avoid political land mines. 
Carruthers believed that the maritime strike and subsequent rise of the Labor Party 
ultimately destroyed the last Parkes Ministry.47 While this is partly true, the divisive 
federation issue also played a central role in the fall of Parkes. Federation was an idea that 
had lingered in the background of colonial politics for years, but in October 1889 Parkes 
breathed new life into the project by delivering a famous oration at Tenterfield near the 
Queensland border. Parkes had several reasons for doing this, not least of which was the 
desire to cap off a long career with the crowning achievement of the birth of a new nation, 
but he may also have been trying to offer a diversion for a Cabinet that was growing 
increasingly frustrated by his lack of action on free trade. Federation was not the liberal 
agenda of the LPA; it was a distraction from it. It thus acted as a brake on the partisan 
evolution of politics as Parkes tried to find a new disposable issue through which to hold 
onto power in what was an old factional manner. The various Ministries that preceded the 
party era generally had a stock cause to unite them, and this is what Parkes may have been 
trying to replicate. He was initially able to hoodwink the Young Turks into allowing this to 
happen, but over time federation would become a source of frustration within the Party. 
Parkes’ abrupt manner of bringing up the federation issue was enough to cause 
some early furore. Members of the Cabinet were angry that they had not been consulted 
before the Tenterfield speech, and they were even more furious that the Premier had 
discussed the issue with members of the Opposition including Edmund Barton.48 McMillan, 
Bruce Smith and James Brunker had a tense meeting with Parkes, but this time they were 
unable to assert their will. It is noteworthy that Carruthers was not in this group that 
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angrily approached the Premier. His place in the Young Turk triumvirate had been taken 
by the ‘Old Turk’ Brunker. This signified a slight drift away from McMillan that would 
have far-reaching consequences. It has been said that after placing themselves in Parkes’ 
shadow McMillan, Wise and Carruthers ‘never really recovered to redeem the promise 
that some contemporary observers and some later historians detected in them’.49 This is 
certainly not true for Carruthers, whose later achievements should not be underestimated 
simply because they took place in a State Parliament that had not yet been robbed of many 
of its constitutional powers. One of the reasons that Carruthers would go on to succeed 
was that during this crucial period when the Free Trade Party was increasingly divided, he 
did not attach himself too closely to anyone. McMillan and Bruce Smith were practically 
joined at the hip during this period and they maintained a strong sentimental attachment 
to Parkes despite their frequent run-ins with him. Carruthers on the other hand kept close 
to Parkes, McMillan and the Free Trade dark horse George Reid, without growing too 
reliant on any of them. Despite his Parkesite upbringing, when the time came to jump ship 
from Sir Henry, Carruthers would be more willing than McMillan or Bruce Smith to take a 
leap into the unknown. Ironically, after Carruthers took that leap he would be more loyal 
to Reid than he had been to his hero. 
A couple of days before Parkes had even given his Tenterfield speech; Carruthers 
gave an address at Burwood on federation and nationalism. After a long diatribe against 
Protection, he insisted that freedom of trade must be the basis of any union and that ‘they 
would never shake hands with an enemy’.50 That enemy was Protectionist Victoria, and 
though Carruthers praised federation as ‘the true theory of Australian nationalism 
accomplished’, he warned his audience not to ‘allow the dark trail of protection to be 
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drawn across the path to a great fame which was ours’.51All national sentiment aside, 
Carruthers seemingly wanted his neighbours to convert to his fiscal faith before any union 
would be acceptable.  All of this echoed McMillan who at the time was insisting that 
federation would be intolerable without free trade.52 
Just a couple of weeks later, Carruthers had noticeably softened his attitude to 
Protectionists in the federation movement. In November 1889, he appeared on a platform 
with Parkes and the Protectionist Barton to speak in favour of federation under the 
auspices of the Australian Natives Association. Practically rubbing salt into the wounds of 
those who were concerned about what federation would mean for free trade, Carruthers 
lauded the attendance of ‘men of all shades of political influence’.53 He went on to say that: 
‘One of the best and most noble things was the spirit of patriotism. He hoped that 
there would be a common feeling throughout the colonies, and amongst all 
political parties, and that they would realise the words of Macaulay, “that men 
would show themselves that none were for the party and all were for the state”. 
However they might differ there was a common love of Australia which animated 
nearly all public men, and that common love in the face of a common aspiration 
would rouse the Australians to stand shoulder to shoulder and to help Sir Henry 
Parkes to realise federation; and that there would yet arise a greater Britain in a 
new land’.54 
 Carruthers’ inconsistency is disconcerting. At first glance it may appear that he was 
simply falling into line behind Parkes. While Parkes’ actions no doubt influenced him, a 
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slavish reaction was uncharacteristic of a man who had been quite independent as a 
backbencher and had asserted his power in negotiations surrounding the formation of the 
Ministry. Perhaps he was just trying to brush over the internal divisions within the Party 
by standing behind the Premier. Another reason may be that he simply did not buy into 
the idea that federation was a threat to free trade. While at Burwood he was eager to use 
federation to attack Protectionists, Carruthers would later be one of the few Free Traders 
who did not see the Braddon clause as something that would necessitate high tariffs.55 He 
felt that the free traders could win the fiscal fight in a federal parliament as they had done 
in New South Wales so while federation with international as well as internal free trade 
would be ideal it was not a point worth wrecking the whole project over. Carruthers was 
not alone in his change of heart. McMillan would follow Carruthers’ lead in softening his 
attitude to the fiscal aspects of federation. 
Parkes’ Federation campaign quickly gained momentum. A meeting of Premiers 
was held in Melbourne in 1890 to discuss the idea before a National Australasian 
Convention was organised to take place in Sydney in March 1891. At the first of these 
meetings Parkes and McMillan represented New South Wales. For the convention a much 
larger delegation was sent that again included McMillan but excluded Carruthers. The fact 
that McMillan was chosen for both these conventions points to his continued prominence 
in the Free Trade Party even after the maritime strike. Despite coming over to Parkes’ 
campaign much faster than the Treasurer, Carruthers was still not quite important enough 
to warrant inclusion in the delegation. 
The convention agreed to a draft Constitution Bill that would need to be approved 
by the Colonial Parliaments before it could be sent to London for approval. As the Mother 
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Colony, New South Wales was expected to take the lead in passing the Bill. The Bill was 
controversial as it proposed a Senate with equal representation for the States regardless of 
population that for the largest Colony seemed like a threat to both their sovereignty and to 
the principles of democracy. The newspapers were rife with rumours about a split in 
Cabinet over it. George Reid, still a relatively independent member and under no 
obligations to defend Parkes, came out as one of the leading opponents of the Bill. He 
attacked the Senate compromise that did not completely exclude that House from 
touching money-bills and he also criticised the failure to prescribe the responsibility of the 
Executive.56 He also personally attacked the New South Wales delegates, in particular 
Parkes and McMillan, for giving up so much. While Parkes had often crossed swords with 
Reid, the remarks deeply hurt McMillan who consequently had a falling out with his East 
Sydney counterpart.57 
While reaffirming his support for federation, Carruthers initially publicly reserved 
his judgment on the details of the Bill. One paper reported him to be taking Parkes’ side in 
a Parkes-McMillan Cabinet split over it and its place in the Government’s program, while 
another had him taking the opposite course.58 On 22 April Parkes wrote in his diary that 
Carruthers and Gould ‘seemed to think that they could improve the bill’.59 It is likely that 
Carruthers would have also been perturbed that the Federation Bill had pushed the Local 
Government Bill to a lower place in the Government’s agenda, but it does not seem that 
his reservations were grave enough to cause a split with Sir Henry. At a speech at Burwood 
on ‘Union or Disunion’ Carruthers argued that ‘each state was entitled to equal 
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representation’ but also that New South Wales should be given the capital.60 Even here he 
appeared to be side-stepping the crucial issue of what powers a Senate with equal 
representation should have.  His main concern seems to have been not to alienate himself 
from any section of the Party. He firmly believed in federation, but he also shared some of 
his colleagues’ concerns that other important legislation was being sidelined in pursuit of 
union. 
After a long adjournment Parliament resumed on 19 May. In an attempt to 
accommodate his Cabinet dissidents, Parkes intimated that Parliament would have the 
right to amend the Federation Bill, not simply to pass it. Not content with this compromise, 
Reid moved an amendment attacking the Bill on the grounds previously described but also 
as a threat to free trade. The amendment failed but Parkes was pressured into dropping the 
Bill to third place in the Government’s legislative agenda. Dibbs then moved a censure 
motion which only failed on the Speaker’s vote and Parliament was dissolved a week later. 
Carruthers once again kept his head down, voting with Parkes but not speaking in the 
debate. 
With a divided Free Trade Party preparing to face an election effectively on the 
federation issue, organisation was thrown into disarray. The FTLA had already intimated 
that it still believed that free trade should come before federation.61 Since the organisation 
would not buy into Parkes’ federation dream, the Premier declared it ‘moribund’ and 
formed a new ‘Free Trade and Federation Committee’, much to the consternation of 
McMillan.62 It is likely that in making this move Parkes was concerned not only about 
federation but also about narrowing the Party organisation so that he could control it more 
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directly. Since the Party’s main organiser McMillan was still closely associated with the 
FTLA, Parkes chose Carruthers, who up until that point had still been active within the old 
organisation, to chair the usurping committee. It appears that Carruthers was not 
purposefully abandoning the FTLA but since that organisation had candidly critiqued the 
Government it became difficult for a Minister to defend it, particularly against the urgings 
of the Premier. 
Carruthers was left with the almost impossible task of running a winning election 
campaign with a divided Party that had little to show for the past two years in Government. 
To make matters worse the power of the free trade cry, generally a winner in New South 
Wales, had been greatly reduced by Parkes’ emphasis on federation above all else. 
Economic conditions had also declined, with strikes and depression deeply hurting the 
Government. Carruthers had started organising before the new committee had even been 
formed. In March he had written to Parkes advising him on candidates for several rural 
seats.63 The local knowledge that would have been required to make good preselection 
recommendations for distant seats hints at the amount of work that Carruthers put into 
running the campaign. 
Connected to these meticulous preselections was an overall campaign strategy to 
focus on rural seats. Carruthers had written not only to Parkes but also to Bruce Smith on 
this issue.64 The country had become the bastion of Protectionist support in New South 
Wales. This was largely because border territories and large farmsteads had felt the sting of 
their neighbour’s tariffs more acutely than their city counterparts, as they were denied 
access to logical export markets whilst facing free competition from imports. This made 
many rural colonials support tariff reciprocation. In spite of this sentiment Carruthers 
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clearly felt that the Free Traders could make inroads in the bush. His own rural upbringing 
had shown him that country people were not automatically inclined towards protection. 
The Illawarra-Kiama district in which he had been born showed more support for free 
trade than many other rural areas. Winning seats in the country could help make up for 
the swing against the Government Carruthers predicted would take place in the city. It was 
a strategy that he would use repeatedly throughout his career. Later on it would be a 
logical step as the Labor Party won more and more seats in Sydney, but in 1891 when few 
predicted the rapid success of the Labour Electoral Leagues, his tactic was particularly 
prescient. 
Carruthers’ first speech for the campaign was delivered in rural West Maitland. In a 
telling sign he declared that ‘the great question to be put before the people of this Colony 
was federation’.65 He spoke at length on the fiscal question, but it was federation that was 
given pride of place at the top of the speech. Understanding that the details of the 
Federation Bill were unpopular, he used the little leeway Parkes had given him by stating 
that ‘the Government did not ask them to swallow holus-bolus the bill passed by the 
Convention, but to suggest amendments in it as would carry out their desire for the 
federation of these grand Australian colonies and to make the whole of the colonies into a 
grand federated nation’.66 It was an awkward compromise. Carruthers was asking the 
people to vote for federation but not for the Convention’s Bill, an option he seems to have 
wished he had himself. 
The Government agenda Carruthers outlined also included electoral reform, water 
conservation, coal mines regulation and local government. To complement coal mines 
regulation, Carruthers proposed to reintroduce a Conciliation Bill to deal with industrial 
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disputes.67 The maritime strike was still fresh in everyone’s mind, and Carruthers was 
trying to use his record to capitalise on the issue. He blamed Protectionists Melville and 
Dibbs for his earlier Bill’s failure to get through the committee stage. His proposition to 
reintroduce it, delivered more as a private member than as a representative of the 
Government fell on deaf ears. People concerned about the strike were more likely to vote 
for the new Labor candidates than for the Government that had been in power when the 
whole mess occurred. 
Vote splitting would be a particularly difficult problem for the Free Traders at the 
1891 election. Before a more rigid Party structure evolved this issue would always be the 
bane of Liberal Parties, but in 1891 internal divisions made the situation much worse. 
While Carruthers was trying to organise preselections for the FTFC, the FTLA and Single 
Tax League all threatened to undermine his work. In Canterbury alone there were 
rumoured to be seven men who wished to run as Free Traders in addition to the four 
sitting members. The situation was so bad that it was even suggested that Carruthers run 
in the Redfern electorate to free up space in Canterbury.68 In Camden, telegrams between 
Carruthers and the local committee were published in the local paper, with candidates 
refusing to withdraw after Carruthers’ adjudication.69 The FTLA council had been meant 
to act as an arbiter in preselection disputes, but without a well-developed local branch 
system Carruthers’ FTFC selections were often resented or ignored. Despite Carruthers’ 
best efforts, Parkes’ decision to abandon the innovative FTLA was coming back to bite the 
Free Traders. 
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After the first round of elections were held the Free Traders had a lead over their 
Protectionist opponents of 28 seats to 7.70 These numbers were deceptive however, as the 
polls for the Protectionist-dominated country electorates were yet to come. The great 
shock was the election of 18 so-called ‘independent’ candidates that included Reid and 17 
Labor men. The Free Traders could take solace from the fact that Dibbs had been defeated 
and would now have to seek re-election in a safer rural seat. Carruthers, who had been re-
elected with more votes than any other candidate in the Colony, went to the country in a 
last ditch effort to save the Government.71 His itinerary included visits to Marulan, 
Braidwood, Bungendore, Bulli, Wollongong, Raymond Terrace, Dungog, Clarencetown, 
Stroud and Bourke.72 Other Ministers were sent to all corners of the Colony. 
When the dust had settled, the Free Traders had won 47 seats, Protectionists 51, 
Labor 36, with 7 independents.73 These are somewhat rough estimations, as party 
affiliations were still relatively loose. Carruthers’ efforts had made the best of a bad 
situation. Despite holding the most seats, the Protectionists had actually gone backwards at 
the election, their having secured 66 seats in 1889.74 Most of the seats the Free Traders lost 
went to the new and therefore ‘clean’ Labor Party, many of whom had declared that they 
believed in free trade on the hustings. This points to strong continuing support for the 
policy of free trade within New South Wales, despite the fact that a Protectionist 
government would soon hold power. One may argue that Labor’s great victory was due in 
large part to the weakness and divisions of the Free Trade Party. In 1894, under a leader far 
more dedicated to fiscal principles, the Free Traders would win back some of the seats they 
lost to Labor in 1891. Carruthers would again play a central organisational role in that 
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victory, so his running of the campaign should not be blamed for this defeat. His focus on 
country areas had paid little dividends. An election fought on federation was not the time 
to convince rural Protectionists of the merits of free trade, while the Federation Bill itself 
was too unpopular to be a vote winner. Although he did not manage to win many new 
country seats, the retention of 47 seats represented a reasonably successful sandbagging 
effort given the circumstances. 
When the election was over McMillan urged Parkes to resign rather than face the 
ignominy of trying to continue only to be defeated.75 Parkes declined the suggestion and 
decided to carry on as Premier for as long as he could. A frustrated McMillan, who was 
also concerned about the time he was spending away from his business interests, resigned 
his post as Treasurer to be replaced by Bruce Smith. Carruthers did not follow McMillan’s 
course of action but it is likely that he too was frustrated. His father had passed away a few 
weeks before the election and he had been forced to soldier on in spite of the emotional 
burden. By abandoning the FTLA and focusing on an unpopular Federation Bill, Parkes 
had made Carruthers’ thankless task even more difficult. In the new Parliament he may 
have looked forward to the passing of a long awaited Local Government Bill, but the 
political situation made success on this front seem further away than ever. 
Carruthers hinted at this frustration in a letter he wrote to Lord Carrington in 
September. In it he confessed that he felt that Parkes’ federation seed had been ‘planted out 
of season’ and was ‘destined ere long to be the downfall of his ministry’.76 Carruthers 
sympathised with Sir Henry because ‘he has his heart set on this scheme’, but the letter 
gives the impression that he was growing disillusioned with his chief.77 This growing 
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disillusionment with Parkes and his policy priorities marked a crucial turning point in 
Carruthers’ career. Parkes had been his political hero ever since his father took him to 
rallies as a boy. He believed in Parkes’ federation dream, but was not prepared to see him 
wreck the Free Trade Government over it. Divisions between Parkes, McMillan, Reid and 
others that had badly hurt the Party at the 1891 election showed no sign abating while the 
flawed Federation Bill remained in the Government’s program. Meanwhile free trade and 
the direct taxation it required remained unrealised, while local government seemed to go 
up and down the agenda at the political whims of the Premier. Carruthers had not yet 
abandoned the Premier, but doubts over Parkes’ waning leadership abilities festered in his 
mind. He wrote to Carrington that Parkes was tired, his health was failing and that 
‘feebleness is supervening his usual vigour’.78 
While the letter to Carrington shows Carruthers slowly drifting away from Parkes, 
it also suggests that he may have been moving closer to George Reid. The 1889 election 
campaign, FTLA debates and his time as Minister for Public instruction had all drawn him 
closer to his old cricket and debating chum. The only thing they really disagreed on at this 
point was the campaign for federation.79 With Carruthers now believing that federation 
needed to be put on the back burner, the way was open for these two skilled politicians to 
unite. Political circumstances had prevented them from campaigning together in 1891, but 
Carruthers noticeably refrained from criticising Reid very frequently during the campaign. 
This was in contrast to Parkes and McMillan, who both attacked the man whose actions 
had precipitated the election. All of this suggests that not only were Reid and Carruthers 
rekindling their friendship, but that the latter may have already started considering the 
former a future leadership option. 
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Though the party system had been developing for several years, the coming of the 
Labor Party represented a new and sharp turn. There had been Assembly members 
associated with business interests and less frequently the unions before but most of those, 
outwardly at least, professed to govern for the whole community. The new Labor Party 
unashamedly represented one section of the community and so was quite foreign to the 
liberal political culture that reigned in New South Wales. In the 1850s liberals had fought 
off conservative attempts to create a hierarchical society based on class and sectional 
interests and this historical legacy made them sceptical of anyone who viewed society 
through this lens.80 It was a matter of perspective as to what section of society Labor 
represented, whether the working class or the unions alone, but any such representation 
went against beliefs in individualism and governing for all. A rejection of class 
representation is one of the unifying traits of Australian liberalism that has crossed both 
time periods and provincial divides, hence Labor’s very raison d'être immediately placed it 
outside the individualist philosophic boundaries of its future enemy.81  
This foreignness would grow over the next few years as the Party developed its 
caucus pledge that restricted the ability of individual members to express their own 
opinions. At this point its platform was still relatively mild. It had much that Carruthers 
already supported like local government and electoral reform, but its overall tone stressed 
government intervention.82 Nairn has described early Labor as accepting ‘the best of 
socialism’ while rejecting ‘a policy of organising a socialist state’.83 Later the adoption of 
the socialist objective would suggest that Labor may have prepared to organise such a state, 
but as the Party intended on pushing its agenda through parliamentary means 
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revolutionary socialists were always ostracised from it. Labor fundamentally accepted 
much of the pre-existing political and social system, but it wanted to use government to 
reshape it at the edges. It aimed at ‘civilising’ capitalism, but in doing so its enemies feared 
that it would restrict freedom, and destroy the economic system that had allowed the 
prosperous colony to expand so rapidly. Carruthers later recalled that the early Labor 
members thought that they could fix anything with an act of Parliament and this rash 
interventionism did not endear them to him.84 
Shortly before Parliament resumed Parkes mulled over the upcoming problems of 
a three-party House in his diary, writing that ‘with the exception of Carruthers I don’t 
think any of the Ministers comprehend the difficulties before the Government, and 
whenever they express themselves their views are so puny that they provoke me to inward 
laughter’.85 Clearly the young Minister had a great deal of political realism, if not a 
lingering melancholy as well. When Parliament resumed on 14 July, Parkes proposed a 
program that was sufficiently ‘reformist’ to grant him a temporary stay of execution from 
the Labor Party.86 The controversial Federation Bill was not to be dealt with until late 
October. The Government would not last that long, Parkes having resigned by mid-way 
through the month. This left Carruthers with little time to build on his achievements as 
Minister for Public Instruction.  
His main contribution before the Government’s fall was his attempt to guide the 
hotly debated Representation of the People Bill through the divided House. At one point in 
the debate on the various electoral reforms contained within the Bill, the issue of 
Aboriginal franchise was brought up. Protectionist William Traill, who wanted to remove 
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the right of indigenous people to vote, claimed that ‘there is no conceivable possibility that 
he [an Aborigine] can ever rise to that scope of perception that will enable him to have any 
idea of what his vote actually means’.87 At this Carruthers rose up to defend the people 
who had partially raised him on the Macleay River: 
‘I have a better opportunity than most members of the house to see the state in 
which the Aborigines are, and the state to which they can be brought. We have 
established schools for the Aboriginal children, and we have learnt by the 
experience of these schools that the Aborigines are not devoid of perception to any 
greater extent than the white population of the colony….It is not of their own 
choice that blackfellows are in a country where they are liable to be denied the 
privileges enjoyed by other people. Considering the manner in which the 
Aborigines of the colony were treated in days gone by, it would have been a good 
thing if they had not only had a vote, but if one of their number had been here to 
voice their sufferings and their wrongs. I am sure the Committee will not deprive 
the Aborigines of the vote which they have had in the past. Nothing has been 
shown to indicate that the vote has been abused in any way, and it is consonance 
with the principle of one man one vote to allow these persons to possess the 
privilege which they have enjoyed in the past’.88 
 It was a heartfelt and truly liberal speech. Dibbs responded by claiming that 
Europeans of the Colony would be insulted at being compared with Aborigines, and that 
Indigenous people should not possess the vote ‘on account of their low type of brain 
power’.89 While Carruthers would betray his liberal principles by taking up a populist line 
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on issues like Chinese immigration, he would stand strong when it came to Aborigines. As 
far as he was concerned immigrants were at liberty to come to the country, but Indigenous 
people had not been given a choice and hence he was more willing to stick his neck out to 
have their freedom preserved. In this instance he won the day. The Bill being debated had 
not intended to disenfranchise Aboriginals and the debate moved on swiftly to other issues. 
It was the Coal Mines Regulation Bill, one of the legislative acts that had been 
intended to woo Labor support, which finally brought down the Parkes Government. 
McMillan tried to recommit the Bill in order to get an eight hour maximum workday 
clause removed. It was late in the night, so Barton moved that the debate be adjourned. 
Parkes agreed but the Labor Party, excepting Joseph Cook who voted for adjournment, 
managed to defeat the motion. Parkes took the vote as a defeat of the Government and 
resigned from the Premiership. Utterly exhausted, he also resigned from the leadership of 
the Free Trade Party and moved to the crossbenches. The Party was left to find a new 
leader; Sir Henry privately assuming that either McMillan or James Brunker would take his 
place.90 
Shortly after Parkes’ resignation Carruthers wrote him a letter thanking him for his 
leadership over the past few years. In it he gave the earliest glimpse we have of his real 
opinion of the Labor Party. He prophesied that ‘an awakening must come from this dream 
of socialism which has frenzied the people and a little hardship will restore common 
sense’.91 Interestingly the letter seems to be quite accepting of the fact that Parkes had 
resigned and, though hopeful of an eventual return to the public sphere, Carruthers did not 
implore him to take up the leadership once more. It appears that unlike many of his 
                                                          
90 A. W. Martin, Henry Parkes: A Biography, p.407. 
91 Carruthers to Parkes, 26/10/1891, Parkes Papers, ML A877, p.494. 




colleagues he had accepted the fact that the Party needed new blood in order for new 
successes to be achieved. 
What happened next is a matter of some controversy. A meeting to discuss the 
leadership was held on 17 November. A letter from Parkes was read in which he intimated 
that he was retiring from public life, and so the meeting was left to find a new candidate. 
Prior to the meeting McMillan and Bruce Smith had been warned by Wise not to stand 
because they were unpopular with Labor.92 After some discussion it was put forward that 
George Reid should become leader. ‘A rather awkward silence’ ensued before Bruce Smith 
suggested that a deputation be sent to Parkes to ascertain his views.93 Wise believed that 
Bruce Smith was trying to buy time to sound out members on their support for 
McMillan.94 Parkes felt that the deputation led by Wise and Smith showed ‘an anxiety not 
to succeed in their mission’.95 He responded to it by reiterating his disinclination to take up 
‘any position that would cast upon me any responsibility other than that of a simple 
member of Parliament’.96 Wise later claimed that Parkes’ response would have been 
different if the deputation had been sent with a clear offer of leadership.97 
The account just presented is that of Wise, but it is somewhat contradicted by John 
Neild. He maintained that Smith’s suggestion was a genuine offer to get Parkes to take up 
the leadership but in response: 
‘Mr. Carruthers made an almost violent speech in opposition to Sir Henry, and as 
a result the committee that had been all but appointed, to wait on the ex-Premier 
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to invite him to retain the leadership was altered into a committee to ascertain his 
views on the political situation, which of course was and was intended to be, a 
more or less polite way of shunting the aged statesman’.98  
At first glance Carruthers’ action seems hard to believe, but given the concerns he 
had voiced to Lord Carrington and even the tone of his correspondence with Parkes, 
Neild’s account is arguably well-corroborated by contemporary evidence. Both Wise and 
Neild agree that the wording of the deputation’s task was the decisive factor in 
determining Parkes’ response; hence Carruthers played the key role in dispatching Parkes 
so that there could be an injection of new blood into the leadership of the Party. Wise may 
have left out Carruthers’ actions on purpose, as in his account he tries to claim 
responsibility for Reid’s ascension and such an inclusion would have fundamentally 
weakened that claim. It may also be that Wise felt duty bound not to reveal Carruthers’ 
betrayal of Parkes, for he would later suggest he knew a secret about Carruthers but never 
revealed it.99  
Given that Reid’s name had already been mentioned before the Member for 
Canterbury made his attack, the latter was clearly acting in support of Reid’s candidacy. By 
choosing Reid over Parkes Carruthers was essentially pushing for free trade and the 
partisan liberal agenda to take precedence over federation. Though not a Young Turk 
himself, Reid embodied many of their ideals and could be expected to push the ideological 
line they supported. Under Reid the transformation of liberalism could be expected to 
accelerate in a way that Parkes would never allow. Parkes’ federation distraction had failed 
and this had ultimately proved his downfall. Whether Carruthers’ fateful speech was a 
predetermined set-piece is difficult to gauge, though both Neild’s account and Parkes’ diary 
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seem to suggest that the campaign for Reid’s election began before the first meeting. 100 In 
this scenario the deputation’s ‘anxiety not to succeed in their mission’ noted by Parkes was 
probably symptomatic of the fact that Carruthers had intentionally turned it into a 
toothless tiger. 
With Parkes ruled out, a second meeting to determine the leadership was held on 
19 November. Unfortunately for the historian, everyone who attended this meeting seems 
to have recollected its events differently. Carruthers recalled that he was nominated by 
McMillan to oppose Reid. He declined the nomination due to his young age and partial 
deafness but also because ‘I personally favoured Reid, as I had a great liking for him and 
much admiration for his great abilities as a politician’.101 Consequently Reid was elected 
unopposed. Wise gives two contradictory accounts of the meeting. In The Making of The 
Australian Commonwealth he recollected that he nominated Reid, James Inglis nominated 
Bruce Smith and Jacob Garrard nominated Wise, but the latter two declined to stand and 
once again Reid was duly elected.102 Inglis was a merchant on the right of the Party; hence 
his nomination of Bruce Smith likely reflected the wishes of the more powerful McMillan. 
In an earlier article in The Catholic Press Wise claimed that Varney Parkes nominated Reid 
and he seconded the motion, while James Brunker not Bruce Smith was also nominated 
and declined.103 Wise did not specify who nominated Brunker and said that Wise was 
nominated by Inglis, though this seems unlikely and may just be Wise trying to show that 
he had the broad support that would have been required to win if he had run. Here Wise 
also claimed that Carruthers mistakenly thought that the nomination of Brunker was 
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actually directed at him and so declined despite never being nominated.104 Other accounts 
have McMillan and Want also being nominated but refusing to stand.105 
When the contradictory and confusing accounts are compared it appears that 
McMillan may have been making a last-ditch attempt to find an alternative to Reid. This 
was less of an ideological dispute and more of a clash of personalities. Earlier in the month 
Parkes had had a conversation with McMillan and noted that ‘he was very strong in 
repudiating the suggested leadership of G.H. Reid’.106 Reid and McMillan fought the 1891 
East Sydney election on different tickets and when the former won the leadership the latter 
would refuse to serve under him. In the meeting McMillan, who had been warned not to 
stand and remained concerned about his business interests, tried to get either Carruthers, 
Bruce Smith or Brunker to run in his place. Brunker seems the most likely candidate and if 
Wise’s story about Carruthers’ error is true then McMillan, who Carruthers believed had 
nominated him, would have actually nominated Brunker. When this failed McMillan may 
have been tempted to stand himself in spite of everything, as Bruce Smith was urging him 
to, but instead he gave up the fight, possibly because Carruthers had come out strongly in 
favour of Reid.107 Correspondence surrounding the next leadership contest certainly seems 
to imply that Reid owed Carruthers above his other supporters, possibly for what 
happened during this and the previous meetings.108  
The likelihood of the Reid-McMillan divide scenario put forward here is reinforced 
by the fact that it was Wise, who afterwards was no big fan of the new Opposition Leader, 
who nominated or seconded the nomination of Reid. The left-leaning Wise saw Reid as the 
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only real alternative to the supposed ‘Tories’ McMillan and Bruce Smith and was under the 
impression that Labor would support a censure motion if moved by Reid.109 Wise later 
claimed that he was responsible for Reid’s election as he refused his own nomination and 
lobbied in favour of the successful candidate.110 His actions mattered less than he claims 
however. Wise was already on the leftward fringes of a Party that he would leave in a few 
years. Carruthers on the other hand represented the bulk of the Party. He was not 
interventionist like Wise, not doctrinaire like Bruce Smith and had not yet antagonised 
Labor like McMillan. Importantly he also had the organisational expertise that would 
otherwise be lost without McMillan and this helped to reinforce the influence of his 
support.  
The voting in the leadership contest makes it clear how important Carruthers’ 
support for Reid was. According to Wise, Reid received 14 votes in favour and 8 against 
with 18 abstaining, though again Wise contradicts himself in The Catholic Press where he 
claims Reid received 16 votes in favour with everyone else leaving the room.111 Reid, who 
had spent his whole career in opposition to Parkes, was clearly not a popular choice. With 
Carruthers onside McMillan would have been able to get whatever candidate he wanted 
elected, the evidence suggests that Carruthers’ support was the determining factor in the 
election. His support would prove even more important over the coming years as 
Carruthers stuck by his friend through Parkes’ numerous attempts to destabilise Reid’s 
leadership. Meanwhile McMillan, Bruce Smith and Wise would all abandon their new 
leader. 
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W.G. McMinn argues that Reid’s election to the leadership marked a clear break 
from Parkes, as Reid would remain leader of the New South Wales then Commonwealth 
Free Trade Party until his retirement seventeen years later.112 The irony McMinn does not 
acknowledge is that it was Joseph Carruthers, someone who was quite literally born a 
Parkesite who played the central role in enabling this to happen. Though he had been 
involved with the FTLA and had been widely acknowledged as a leader of the free trade 
movement, Reid remained aloof from the Parliamentary Party who, despite internal 
conflict, generally stayed loyal to Parkes. Reid could easily captivate an audience with his 
wit and speaking ability but personal relationships were his political Achilles heel. 
Throughout his career he managed to antagonise Parkes, Deakin, Wise, McMillan and 
Bruce Smith to name just a few. His relationship with Deakin in particular was so bad that 
it delayed the fusion of the federal non-Labor Parties until after Reid’s retirement. At this 
crucial moment however, his friendship with Carruthers gave him an opening into the 
heart of the Free Trade Parliamentary Party, allowing Reid to achieve the position of 
leader that his political skill deserved. By supporting Parkes’ enemy, Carruthers was 
effectively choosing his friend over his old hero, a decision that irrevocably changed New 
South Wales and indeed Australian history. Parkes was indignant at this perceived betrayal: 
‘Poor little Carruthers, the injury I did in making him a Minister! He says he will 
fight under Reid right gladly. It is to be hoped he will be more loyal to his new 
Leader than he was to his old’.113 
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 ‘Ever after that Reid and I were close friends and in agreement in most matters 
except federation. Moreover, I may claim to have been his closest friend, acting as 
his legal adviser in his affairs and as his lieutenant in his political campaigns’.1 
 This is how Carruthers described his relationship with Reid after the latter had 
been elected Free Trade Party leader. Though he had clearly won Carruthers’ support, 
Reid did not have long to consolidate his new position before facing Parliament. When the 
members filed into the Assembly, Reid, Bruce Smith, Sydney Smith, Brunker, Gould, 
Young, Wise and Carruthers occupied the Opposition front bench. Parkes was noticeably 
absent and McMillan took up a conspicuous position below the gangway on the 
Opposition side.2 Though he did not follow McMillan’s lead in sitting on the crossbenches, 
Bruce Smith would have a markedly poor attendance record throughout the rest of the 
session.3 With three of the most prominent members of the late Government thus 
abandoning Reid, Carruthers was left to pick up the slack and take on a more central role 
than ever before. J. A. Ryan has argued that, initially at least, the Free Trade Party was a 
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hastily assembled group that was only able to stay together through Parkes’ leadership.4 
With Parkes now gone, only the loyalty and dedication of men like Carruthers could keep 
the Free Trade ship afloat. 
His first act in his new prominent role was to implore the Government to take up 
the electoral reforms he had been guiding through Parliament. These were meant to end 
plural voting, redistribute the seats of the Colony on a single member basis and greatly 
reduce the discrepancy between the high number of votes required to elect a city member 
and the comparatively low number of votes that were required to elect a country member. 
They embodied the oft professed ‘one man, one vote’ principle and Carruthers would later 
cite their introduction as Parkes’ last great liberal act. Dibbs, whose Protectionist Party 
benefitted greatly from the rural electoral bias, declined his appeal to pass the reforms as 
they currently stood. Instead a motion moved by Barton to reconsider the whole issue in 
committee was passed and Carruthers was left to fight for as democratic a Bill as possible 
clause by clause. It was a long and tedious process. The frustrated member for Canterbury 
maintained that by the time the Parkes Government fell the old  Bill had reached the stage 
where it could ‘be passed through the Assembly in one night’ but instead it had been 
replaced by an ‘abortion of the system of one man one vote’ that allowed existing 
inequalities to continue.5 
It was not long before the new Protectionist Government brought up the fiscal 
issue that would inevitably lead to a make or break division. On 1 December the new 
Treasurer John See moved a motion to introduce some ‘revenue’ duties, citing a large 
public debt as the justification. These were inevitably seen by the Free Traders as 
protection and two days later Reid moved a censure motion. According to Wise’s 
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testimony, one of the main reasons Reid had been elected was because it was believed that 
the Labor Party would support a censure motion if it was moved by him.6 This belief 
turned out to be mistaken. Reid’s motion did not attack protection per se, but it censured 
the Government for bringing up the contentious fiscal issue when there were ‘a large 
number of pressing subjects’ which were ‘ripe for settlement’.7 In doing this he may have 
been trying to ensure he did not divide the Labor Party by making it about the fiscal issue 
and the ‘pressing subjects’ he cited in his speech were those ‘reformist’ measures that that 
Party was meant to be concerned with. He argued that the Colony’s fiscal policy should 
not be changed until the people’s views had been ascertained on the basis of ‘one man, one 
vote’.  
The debate was a long one, and it was not until 9 December that Carruthers gave 
his main speech on the censure motion. He followed Reid’s line, arguing that ‘whilst these 
fiscal proposals might be made and fairly receive consideration in an ordinary session, it is 
preposterous for the Government to ask the House, in so short a space of time as nineteen 
days, to alter the fiscal and financial constitution under which the colony existed’.8 With an 
eye to Labor support, he also attacked the attitude of Dibbs and even McMillan to the 
Coal-Mines Regulation Bill.9 Carruthers was particularly scathing when it came to the 
budgetary justification for the duties, suggesting that the Government had effectively 
cooked the books: 
‘This deficit is entitled to be called, fairly and truly, a bogus deficit. It has been 
shown that moneys have been charged to the revenue of 1891 that are fairly 
chargeable to the trust account. It has been shown too, that moneys have been 
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charged to the expenditure of 1891, not one penny of which has been, or will be, 
expended in that year. And the strongest and best argument against this proposed 
alteration is that almost the whole of the deficit is created by supplementary 
estimates, which cannot be justified as proper estimates to be placed before the 
country…the supplementary estimates of the Department of Public Instruction are 
not mine at all, although they are submitted by the Government as the estimates of 
their predecessors. I repudiate that statement’.10 
 It was one of Carruthers’ first financial speeches, a watershed moment for a man 
whose Premiership would be centred on sound finance. Debt was a touchy subject for 
Carruthers. He was not willing to sit back and let the Dibbs Government charge his 
administration of the Department of Public Instruction with expenses that it had not made. 
He did not take the spending of public money lightly, as his speech on the Payment of 
Members Bill had shown.11 By making their justification for protection a personal attack on 
the members of the previous Government, the Dibbs Government had provided solidarity 
to a Party that had been largely divided since the loss of Parkes. Even the crossbencher 
McMillan, on having his administration of the Treasury abused, was forced to vote with 
the rest of his former colleagues. 
This new Free Trade solidarity would not be enough. The Labor leader McGowen 
tried to have a plebiscite on the fiscal issue inserted into the motion but was ruled out of 
order. After this amendment failed the Labor Party was left with the difficult decision of 
picking a side in a fiscal debate they had wanted to avoid. Labor historian Bede Nairn notes 
that since it was the Government who had raised the contentious tariff issue the ‘probable 
correct choice was to vote for the [censure] motion’ but the Party split and except for 
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McGowen ‘they voted as their fiscal faith guided them’.12 The final division was 63 ayes, 71 
noes. The vote would be a turning point in the history of the Labor Party but it would also 
mark a clear break in Carruthers’ career. His actions in the meetings to determine the 
leadership had remained largely obscure, but he now firmly and publicly broke with Parkes. 
His former chief had conspicuously abstained from voting in the crucial division when his 
support had been sorely needed. Perhaps worse than this, Sir Henry’s main speech on the 
censure had ‘virtually ignored the motion and launched into a diatribe against Reid’s 
behaviour over federation and against the Party which after he himself had been forced to 
retire as master of the ship had elected a “pirate” in his place’.13 
Carruthers responded to Parkes’ actions in an address he gave to his Canterbury 
constituents in January. In it he claimed that ‘Sir Henry Parkes had run away from the 
leadership of the Free Trade Party’ and that he was now ‘right glad to fight under his 
[Reid’s] leadership’.14 He criticised Reid’s actions in undermining the late Parkes 
Government, but maintained that Parkes’ reciprocation in the present circumstances was 
even more reprehensible. Urging the Party to stand united behind their new leader, 
Carruthers argued that ‘once Mr. Reid was elected leader of the Opposition no man could 
attack him without attacking the Party’.15 This was a crucial statement considering the 
whole idea of an elected Free Trade leader had only existed since 1889, and shows 
Carruthers’ developing sense of party loyalty. He also described Reid as ‘the man who 
came forward in a crisis, and had volunteered and taken up the leadership which had for 
some time been sacrificed by Sir Henry Parkes’.16 He was clearly rebuking his former 
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leader and positioning himself firmly behind Reid. It was this speech that prompted Parkes’ 
‘poor little Carruthers’ response quoted in the last chapter. 
As a clear repudiation by one of Parkes’ former Ministers and close allies, the 
speech caused a stir in the newspapers. The Newcastle Morning Herald and Miner’s 
Advocate was particularly virulent in its response. It printed that ‘Joseph’s political coat is 
of many colours, and, like the chameleon, he changes his hue according to his company’.17 
It also published a ‘parable’ of Joseph, a man who forsook Parkes and started worshipping 
Reid. This Joseph went preaching to the Georgites (followers of Henry George) and after a 
run in with the Protectionists, all that remained of Reid was his glass eye and ‘Joseph was 
seen and heard no more in the land, and all was happiness and peace’.18 It was not the last 
time that Carruthers’ biblical first name would be utilised by the pressmen. Accusations of 
disloyalty levelled against him had some merit. After all the man he had shunted was not 
only his childhood hero but also the person who gave him his first Ministerial position at a 
very young age. Shortly before he died Parkes is said to have described Carruthers as 
exceedingly talented but also untrustworthy and Machiavellian.19 The latter was probably 
a fair description, at least in this case, for he had been willing to do what he felt necessary 
with little regard for sentimentality. Nevertheless there was a silver lining. Carruthers had 
been loyal, not so much to his chief but to the principles of free trade and the wider liberal 
agenda. Time would demonstrate that Reid would be a much stronger advocate of the 
new partisan incarnation of liberal politics than Sir Henry had been. Even if Carruthers’ 
switch to Reid was motivated by purely personal considerations, it was the right decision. 
Reid would go on to win the next election and hold power for the longest consecutive 
period of time up to that point in New South Wales history, while the aging Parkes would 
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languish as his political skill eluded him. Ironically Reid’s success was due in part to 
Carruthers’ continuing loyalty and it appears that a combination of practical, ideological 
and sentimental considerations endeared him to his new leader in a manner that had no 
parallel in his career. 
Personally at least, Carruthers’ break with Parkes would not be permanent. Within 
a few months the two men were writing letters to each other once more, though 
Carruthers still seems to have been more distant from his old chief than either Wise or 
McMillan were. In contrast to Reid who had a habit of rubbing people the wrong way, 
Carruthers appears to have been quite amenable. His only personality conflict as Minister 
of Public Instruction was a brief disagreement with McMillan but even that seems to have 
sorted itself out rather quickly.20 Though he stuck closely to Reid, he remained friends 
with Parkes, Wise, McMillan and Bruce Smith despite the fact that they were often drifting 
apart politically. 
Having lost the censure division, Carruthers and the Free Trade Party refocused 
their efforts on disrupting the implementation of Dibbs’ tariff. At the end of his speech on 
the censure motion Carruthers had boldly proclaimed that ‘any attempt to sneak that tariff 
in…any such attempt, I say, would be an ignominious failure even if there were only “the 
last of the Mohicans,” the last Free Trader, to stand up in this house and fight until the very 
end.’21 The Free Traders tried to give effect to that proclamation using a tactic known as 
‘stonewalling’, effectively a filibuster whereby they would try to force a vote on every item 
in the Customs Duties Bill to ensure it took as long as possible to get through the House. 
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Carruthers would play a central role in implementing this tactic, delivering numerous 
speeches in sessions that lasted up to 37 hours.22  
He took particular delight in quoting to the House the Attorney-General Edmund 
Barton as having said that the implementation of protection would be an obstacle in the 
way of federation.23 Federation was a stick with which Carruthers could beat the 
Government that Reid would have found difficult to wield without him. He also turned 
the argument that a fledgling nation’s industries required protection on its head, pointing 
out that production required consumers and therefore a large population and ‘the more 
you attempt to force production in the face of a want of consumers, you will have 
production on unprofitable lines, and you will hinder people in other industries’.24 Mixing 
parochialism with emotive language, he maintained that since the Protectionists did not 
possess a majority in the House the people should be consulted before the fiscal policy was 
altered; ‘when the people are called upon to give their verdict I am sure they will be in 
favour of that policy of freedom under which New South Wales has progressed and 
become, not merely the oldest, but the strongest and most prosperous of the Australian 
colonies’.25 
His other main action during the session was to contribute heavily to the debate 
surrounding the Trades Disputes Conciliation and Arbitration Bill. As with electoral 
reform, the late Parkes Government had introduced a Bill on this issue that was dropped 
by Dibbs only for a very similar Bill to be introduced in its place. One of its few differences 
was that the president of the board was to be appointed by the Governor for a period of 
ten years instead of elected by the board’s members without a fixed term. Carruthers felt 
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this would prejudice the ability of that person to fulfil their role, as there was a public 
presumption that the Executive Council that advised the Governor favoured the big end of 
town and even though that may not be the case the suspicion would be enough to 
undermine public confidence in the board.26 Though he may have been playing up to the 
Labor Party, Carruthers’ system would have allowed the board to be more flexible in 
electing a different president for different disputes. He clearly had a personal interest in the 
success of a Bill that was still largely the same as the one he had first introduced. 
After a marathon sitting the House finally divided on 1 April. As Dibbs was taking a 
controversial trip to England Parliament would not sit again until August. The Free 
Traders would try to use this time to consolidate their organisation. Hence an organising 
committee made up of Carruthers, Reid, Wise, Neild, Brunker and Sydney Smith was 
formed. Though the Party was trying to ensure that they were prepared in advance for the 
next election, the organising committee was still a huge step backwards from the FTLA. It 
was arranged that Reid would deliver a manifesto and that committee members would use 
the break to campaign in regional centres.27 
While country areas would again be a focus, it appears that Carruthers was also 
making a conscious effort to ingratiate himself with some of the more moderate Labor 
Party members. In March he had visited Lithgow and delivered a lecture in the School of 
Arts alongside Joseph Cook. Then in May he delivered a supposedly non-political address 
on ‘Industrial Evolution’ under the auspices of the Ashfield branch of the Labour Electoral 
League. In it he traced the history of machinery from ancient Rome and Egypt up until the 
present day. It was an anti-luddite speech that argued that ‘those countries destitute of 
                                                          
26 NSW Parliamentary Debates, 15/3/1892, Vol. 57, p.6464. 
27 Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 17/6/1892, p.4. 




machinery are the most impoverished’.28 Carruthers maintained that in ‘New South Wales 
it could be seen that science and invention, applied to certain industries, were developing 
them to the increased wealth of the community, and to the advantage of the workers 
engaged in them’.29 He cited examples such as dairying, meat exporting and mining to 
show that technology created many jobs while it made few redundant. Finally, he shook 
off his non-political garb and proclaimed that ‘we should encourage commerce in its freest 
sense’.30 In essence Carruthers’ speech was a defence of capitalistic growth and efficiency, a 
surprising topic to present to the LEL.  Perhaps he still felt that he could influence the 
economic views of individual Labor Party members, whereas when he was dealing more 
directly with Joseph Cook he had played up interventionist policies that he only partly 
believed in.31 The irony was that Cook would soon come over to Carruthers’ liberal 
economic view, while Ashfield would grow into a Labor Party stronghold. 
Carruthers was involved in some more by-election campaigning before Parliament 
resumed on 30 August. The situation was not bright for the Government. The depression 
that had begun under Parkes had got much worse under Dibbs, a boon for Free Traders 
who immediately blamed the tariff for the deterioration. Adding to the problems of an 
exceedingly high unemployment rate, a long and bitter strike had broken out in Broken 
Hill. Given the situation one may have expected the Labor Party to side with the 
Opposition but since that Party had split over the fiscal issue Reid would have a difficult 
time in convincing its Protectionist members to vote with him. Nevertheless, he and his 
Free Traders would leave no stone unturned in trying to unseat the Government. 
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As was traditional, the fight began in the debate over the address in reply to the 
Governor’s speech. Censuring Dibbs’ long absence, Carruthers attacked it as ‘the speech of 
a cabinet without its head’.32 He defended the stonewalling tactics used in the last session 
as fair debate and consideration of measures. He also suggested that the Government was 
using its supporters in the Legislative Council to block electoral reform. It was a valuable if 
hardly original contribution to the Opposition’s attack on a still Dibbs-less Government. 
The main motion of censure came once Dibbs finally returned. It was not over the address 
in reply but over the Government’s handling of the Broken Hill strike. Carruthers 
delivered another valuable speech contrasting the attitude of the Protectionists during the 
maritime strike with the present. While defending the Government’s firm defence of law 
and order he castigated it for not having formed boards of conciliation and arbitration to 
prevent such strikes in the six months since that Act had been passed. In the end the 
censure motion was defeated by four votes. 
Though the whole purpose of the censure debate for the Free Traders had been to 
try to move members of the Labor Party to come over to their side, Carruthers took 
exception to a statement by the member for Balmain William Murphy, which implied that 
Labor were the only friends of the masses. In response he gave an honest rebuke of Labor’s 
self-righteousness and paid tribute to his former chief: 
‘The records show that, after an existence of 100 years, the people of this country 
possess a degree of liberty and freedom which is not excelled by that of any other 
nation. We have amongst us on my left an hon. member who, although men may 
differ with his political principles, has been a hero of many a fight on behalf of the 
masses of this country; who has earned for himself a reputation amongst the 
                                                          
32 NSW Parliamentary Debates, 31/8/1892, Vol. 59, p.87. 




people of this country for having fought and won nearly every liberty they possess. 
When this colony was a convict settlement, when an attempt was subsequently 
made to land crowds of undesirable persons on these shores, he was the man who 
raised his voice successfully against the reintroduction of that system; he saved the 
colony from that blight. When the battle was fought for responsible government, 
when Wentworth fought within these walls the battle which won the Constitution 
under which we exist, the hon. member stood side by side with him, and fought 
the battle, not only here, but all through this country. The battle of manhood 
suffrage – the privilege which we prize so dearly, and which we are seeking still 
more to purify – was fought by the hon. member and by many other men who 
occupy today eminent positions in the community. These privileges were fought 
and won long before the hon. member for Balmain was heard of, long before his 
party came into existence, and the people of this country are not yet so forgetful of 
past history that they cannot speak with some respect and gratitude of those who, 
in days gone by, earned for themselves honourably and truly the title of friends of 
the people’.33  
 He went on to cite public education as another of Parkes many liberal and 
democratic achievements. Coming shortly after his public break with Sir Henry, the speech 
is probably our most accurate picture of Carruthers’ image of Parkes. It shows that he was 
still his hero, even if in recent years he had failed to live up to his own legend. It also shows 
that the historically-minded Carruthers felt a connection to what he saw as a liberal 
tradition that was as old as New South Wales politics itself. 
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The speech was a refreshing dose of honesty in a time when some Free Trade 
members, including Carruthers, manipulated some of their views in order to appease the 
Labor Party. This was a delicate balancing act as many Free Traders disliked Labor more 
than they did the Government. The impression we get of Carruthers is that he was 
probably one of them, but he hoped that Labor could be utilised to achieve free trade 
policy goals. On the occasions that he tried to woo them he manipulated his emphasis 
rather than compromise his beliefs. For example when speaking on a platform with Cook 
Carruthers stressed his belief in state-owned railways, a view that he had always held but 
that would not normally appear prominently in his addresses.34 He was still his own man, 
however and in that same address he dismissed socialism while on other occasions he put 
forward his liberal economic views without regard for Labor reactions. The relationship 
with Labor was a difficult issue for a Party that still contained men with views as diverse as 
Wise’s and Bruce Smith’s, and McMinn notes that Reid ‘was careful to avoid giving the 
impression that he was courting it’.35 
 After the disappointment of the failed censure motion it was the victory of Grover 
Cleveland in the American Presidential election that brought the Free Traders together. 
Cleveland was a free trade Democrat and a fiscal victory in America, that bastion of 
protection, was a great boon to local Free Traders. Carruthers had always paid close 
attention to the political happenings in what might today be termed the ‘anglosphere’. 
Back in 1889 he had delivered a speech in which he proudly proclaimed that the Free 
Traders ‘would work side by side with the Democrats of America and the Liberals of 
England until the time should arrive when “peace on earth and goodwill among men” 
                                                          
34 ‘Mr. J. H. Carruthers M.L.A. on Social and Labour Problems’, Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 
16/3/1892, p.7. 
35 W.G. McMinn, George Reid, p.87. 




should rule over the whole of the British dominions’.36 America’s Democratic Party has 
greatly evolved since 1892, so one should avoid drawing allusions to the present day 
particularly as the 1892 election had a third party known as the Populists or People’s Party 
that took up what might be dubbed the ‘left’ position. Cleveland was known as a classical 
liberal but in 1896 the Democrats would take a sharp turn to the left when they adopted 
the Populists’ presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan. After Cleveland’s victory a 
large demonstration was organised where Parkes, Reid, McMillan, Wise and Carruthers 
would all appear on the same platform. Reid delivered a speech where he announced that 
the triumph of American free trade had silenced any doubts in his mind that federation 
would lead to protection.37 Carruthers’ address bellowed that it had been a victory not just 
for free trade but for good government throughout the world. 
The Free Traders would need this new found unity as Parliament produced yet 
another censure attempt. In December the Government delivered a financial statement in 
which it revealed that there was a deficit of £1,152,772.38 At this Reid rose up and charged 
the Treasurer See with ‘leaving the country practically in the dark as to the fact of the 
deficit which they were to wipe off being almost doubled’.39 Carruthers, who was ever to 
be the custodian of a balanced budget, raised his voice in the debate far earlier than in the 
other censures. The normally restrained member for Canterbury declared the financial 
statement ‘a disgrace to the honourable and learned member who uttered it’ and was 
promptly ruled out of order.40 In the long and frequently interrupted speech that followed 
he attacked the Government for its neglect of Local Government and Coal Mines 
Regulation legislation and urged an election on the grounds that ‘until confidence is 
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restored the British investor will not invest his money in this country, that business here 
will not revive’.41 In a newspaper interview given a couple of days later Carruthers 
revealed that he believed the Government would be defeated in the division since the vote 
was over the estimates, which had directly paid Dibbs and two other members, hence 
those three would not be able to vote.42 His predictions proved wrong. Dibbs was able to 
vote and the Government held on by a majority of 7. 
Another adverse motion relating to the Colony’s finances was moved by Parkes in 
February. Although it began with the preface that ‘I have not the slightest desire or 
intention to interfere with the honourable and learned member at the head of the 
opposition’, Sir Henry may have been making his first moves in an attempt to recapture 
the Party leadership.43 Reid does not seem to have seen it as a threat, as he voted for the 
motion that failed by only three votes. With all these censures the Parliament was 
struggling to do its job. Under the strain of a depression and a three-party Parliament, the 
system of responsible government was cracking. It is testament to the ability of those who 
had fleshed out Wentworth’s bare-bones constitution that it managed to hold together, but 
the situation was far from ideal. 
Though when See had initially given his disastrous financial statement he had 
proposed no new taxation, by February the Government had introduced an Income-Tax 
Bill. Carruthers was not opposed to the proposition of an income tax but he censured the 
Government for introducing this Bill before a land tax. In doing so he gave a revealing 
address, which shows that his motivations for supporting direct taxation as the source of 
necessary revenue were based on liberal economic principles: 
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‘I do not consider that wealth is a detriment to the community, or that a person 
who possesses wealth should be treated as an outcast. The man who has wealth, 
and puts that wealth to good use, so as to get the greatest amount of production, 
and the greatest income, is not altogether an enemy to his fellows. He employs 
labour, and benefits the community by an increase in production, and an increase 
of the goods of the community. But the man who possesses the sources of wealth, 
and who buries them as the man of old buried talents in the ground – the man who 
possesses those sources of wealth and yet refuses to make income by them, who 
locks up his land against production, who locks up the wealth he owns against toil 
and against industry, and who looks not to a return in the shape of interest, but to 
an increase in his capital – such a man is an enemy, and a hindrance to the progress 
of the community.’44 
This sentiment must be kept in mind through all that was to happen in the 
subsequent Reid Government that could easily be misconstrued as left-wing simply 
because it received the support of Labor. Direct taxation was not to be introduced for 
revolutionary or redistributive purposes. For Carruthers taxation was a necessary evil. 
Since Free Trade ideology restricted the use of tariffs as a source of income and land sales 
and debt were neither preferable nor sustainable options, direct taxation had to be used to 
pay for the running of government. The running of government was meant in a somewhat 
minimalist sense. Government was to be relatively small, not laissez-faire as there was to 
be a role for the state but people were still generally best left to their own devices. This 
small government had to be paid for in the least intrusive way possible. People should be 
encouraged not discouraged to work and engage in enterprise hence a high income tax was 
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not the preferred option. The ideal option was a tax on the unimproved value of land that 
would encourage people to improve their land and discourage people from leaving it idle. 
One of the main functions of government was to protect property under the law, thus 
those with property had a responsibility to pay some of the costs of government. This 
meant that for Carruthers there was a social justice motivation partly behind the move 
towards direct taxation but given that there would be no increase in the size of 
Government there was a huge difference between making the rich bear a large portion of 
the burdens of taxation and using taxation as a means of redistributing wealth. Though a 
land tax was to be the main form of taxation Carruthers was pragmatic enough to realise 
that other sources of government income would be necessary, particularly as too high a 
land tax would have its own negative consequences. The more the Government spent the 
more revenue would need to be drawn from other sources which were seen as being more 
disruptive to individuals and commerce, hence expenditure should be kept low, but again 
under certain circumstances Carruthers’ pragmatism prevailed. Notable exceptions to 
limited government spending were public works, but only those works that were meant to 
recoup their costs, and education, which was essential to liberal progress. 
Reid would display his pragmatism in April when the banking crisis hit. Since Dibbs 
had come into power the depression had worsened to the point where a number of banks 
had collapsed and others were in serious danger of collapsing. In order to prevent a full 
scale implosion of the New South Wales economy, Dibbs moved a Bank Issue Bill ‘to make 
bank-notes a first charge on bank assets; and to temporarily enable the Governor to 
authorise in certain cases an increased issue and circulation of the notes of any bank; and to 
declare bank-notes to be a legal tender’.45 Essentially the Government was proposing to 
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guarantee bank-notes in order to prevent a panic that would see everyone withdraw their 
money and the banks collapse. The emergency Bill had been prepared in consultation with 
Reid and McMillan but it was highly controversial. Men with as diverse opinions as Wise, 
Parkes, Paddy Crick and Edward O’Sullivan all came out in opposition to it. Despite this 
opposition, the Bill was passed with the help of Reid and the majority of the Free Trade 
Party. 
Carruthers appears to have had reservations about it. He was initially in favour of 
the Government’s course of action and voted for the standing orders to be suspended in 
order that the measure could be rushed through the House but he was also critical of the 
Government’s methods in trying to avoid debate and implored the Assembly to give due 
consideration to Wise’s critiques of the Bill.46 The latter amounted to a defence of pure 
currency and a warning against the dangers of paper money. When the vote on the Bill 
itself was taken Carruthers was conspicuously absent. It may be that he was simply 
protesting at the Government’s attempts to stifle debate. It does not seem that he would 
have been opposed ideologically to interfering with the banking system as he had already 
proposed the establishment of a state bank to make credit more easily available. Perhaps he 
was not prepared to accept the costs of the Bill when the budget was already so far in 
deficit. Whatever his possible objections, the fact that he absented himself from the vote 
rather than going against his leader on such an important issue shows that he displayed 
more loyalty to Reid than either Wise or Parkes. In the next session when a Bank Notes 
Bill was introduced he would vote for it despite having some ‘misgivings’ about relieving 
one class of the community and not the rest.47 
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Despite the coming together of the two leaders over the Bank Issue Bill, the session 
had still been a dismal failure with very little in the way of meaningful legislation being 
passed. One of the drawbacks of the party system, particularly a three-party system, was 
that it created deep divisions that made even practical legislation difficult to pass. The 
Labor Party’s class-based ideology made these divisions more acute and though the Party’s 
members were flexible in their voting compared with how they were to be after the 
introduction of the caucus pledge, they could still be doctrinaire on many issues. These 
circumstances had largely crippled the Parliament. Emotionally the session had wrecked 
Carruthers. In September he wrote candidly to McMillan that:  
‘I feel horrible things towards these socialistic roughs for their ruffianism and not 
less contempt for the so called respectable class who elect a man to represent them 
and then quietly stay at home whilst their representative is being crucified by the 
minority of roughs…Altho’ I am a native of this country I have no pride left in me 
for her people and if I had my own way and the means I should leave it tomorrow 
rather than let my children face the misery which is surely coming upon their 
country’.48  
The latter sentence was in reference to the economic as well as the political 
situation. This early sentiment against the influence of a ‘minority of roughs’ is the acorn 
from which the oak of his later belief in the necessity of ‘clear lines of division’ for the 
functioning of parliamentary democracy would grow. Much of the historiography 
surrounding the fusion between the Free Traders and the Protectionists focuses on the 
three-party House of the early federal period, but it is important to note that the three-
party confusion began in New South Wales much earlier. Carruthers was already 
                                                          
48 Carruthers to McMillan, 21/9/1893, McMillan Papers, ML MSS1884/2-4, CY1502, p.271. 




beginning to come round to the view that it was Labor and not the Protectionists who 
were the greater threat to his classical liberal views and this would ultimately lead him to 
the conclusion that Labor and Liberal were the logical sides of what, in order to function, 
needed to be a two-party system. 
While the state of affairs had taken a personal toll on him, it had also taken a toll on 
his Free Trade Party. Dealings with the Labor Party were creating new divisions in a Party 
that was already split over the Parkes-Reid leadership question. A partially-dated letter 
from Wise appears to be from this time period. In it Wise warned Carruthers to beware of 
supposed ‘Tories’ within the Free Trade Party who would be willing to support 
Protectionists out of a fear of Labor.49 Little did Wise know that Carruthers, given his 
private opinions of Labor, was probably sympathetic to the views of these men. The 
warning was surely about the fate of the Government, as Party members were still 
independent enough to be able to vote as they liked on Bills and Free Traders had voted 
with Protectionists on many occasions. Despite his developing misgivings about Labor, 
with socialism far beyond the horizon and free trade a seemingly achievable goal 
Carruthers was not yet willing to shake hands with the fiscal enemy. 
Continuing to add to these internal Party divisions was the federation issue. It was 
customary by now that the break between sessions would be used for political organisation 
and in 1893 this included federation organisation as well as party organisation. Despite 
having Barton in a prominent position as Attorney General, the Dibbs Government had 
largely neglected federation. In response to this stagnation, Barton formed a Federation 
League to push the issue. Initially the Free Traders (apart from McMillan) stood aloof from 
this organisation which they felt had Protectionist Party goals, but after radical republicans 
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tried to take it over Carruthers and Bruce Smith joined and were appointed to its council 
along with people like Barton and O’Sullivan. Barton’s biographer Geoffrey Bolton has 
suggested these Free Traders joined the League in order to ensure that the movement was 
not radicalised.50 
The fact that Reid did not join the League led some newspapers to speculate that 
Carruthers’ actions showed that he did not have much confidence in the Opposition 
leader.51 The speculation was unwarranted as Reid’s main rivals Parkes and Wise both 
stood aloof from the new organisation as well. Subsequent events would prove Carruthers 
was not being disloyal as he would stick by Reid when Barton later attempted to make a 
federation party. It may well be that Reid, who Bolton describes as a ‘critical friend’ of the 
League, wanted Carruthers in it to help to control its direction.52 A couple of weeks earlier 
Carruthers had written to McMillan to warn him not to associate himself with Barton and 
the new League, hence he must have had a sudden change of approach after this that may 
have been tactically motivated.53 Carruthers would later claim that if the ‘unificationists’ 
had been in control of the federation movement the whole scheme would have been 
wrecked, perhaps a nod to an earlier attempt to keep the movement going down a 
practical path.54 
On the party front, Wise had set up a Free Trade and Land Reform Electoral 
Committee. Having learnt the power that an organisation could give its chief organiser, 
Wise had himself appointed chairman. Reid was to be involved in the organisation but it 
was Wise’s beast and it also gave a prominent role to Sir Henry Parkes. At a much 
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publicised meeting of the FTLRC Carruthers moved a motion to establish branches 
throughout the Colony, but the organisation would never be successful enough for this to 
really eventuate.55 Its main problem was that it had too doctrinaire an approach to the land 
tax issue. The Committee’s manifesto left little room for flexibility on either tariffs or an 
income tax and largely embodied the hard line stance that Carruthers and Reid had fought 
off within the FTLA. In the Canterbury electorate and elsewhere there was a lot of tension 
surrounding attempts to establish branches of the new organisation. Some branches of the 
FTLA still existed and were reluctant to associate themselves with what they saw as an 
organisation of ‘single taxers’. Carruthers managed to get the two organisations to unite in 
his electorate and agreed that Free Trade candidates for the next election should agree to a 
tax on land, but he was also somewhat reluctant to commit himself to an FTLRC 
platform.56 
Though he initially gave it his full support, Reid would slowly distance himself 
from Wise’s organisation and in a split between doctrinism and pragmatism Carruthers 
naturally took Reid’s side again. Wise seems to have been at the heart of all the Party 
divisions and factional scheming that was going on behind the scenes during this difficult 
period. An intriguer but not a subtle one, he earned H.V. Evatt’s summation that ‘Wise, 
though never quite succeeding in getting what he wanted, always seemed to be detected in 
trying to do so’.57 Carruthers would later describe him as having ‘every good quality except 
consistency to party and to principle’.58 Through the years of the Dibbs Government Wise 
would gradually try to usurp his leader, either personally or as king maker. His motivation 
for doing so is somewhat obscure. There was certainly an element of the Machiavellian in 
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Wise, and after his prediction that Labor would immediately support Reid proved false he 
had no intention of sticking by a leader that he had supported on a misapprehension. In 
policy terms his main frustration with Reid over the coming years would be his leader’s 
refusal to be drawn towards a more doctrinaire position on the land tax. This is in spite of 
the fact that Wise would have known Reid’s pragmatic attitude before he had played such 
a prominent role in getting him elected Opposition leader. Bizarrely, through 1893-4 he 
started to treat Parkes and even McMillan as potential alternatives to Reid, despite the fact 
that they were arguably both less committed to a land tax than the current leader.59 This 
suggests that he may have been motivated more by personal jealousy and animosity than 
any political principle.60 
It is unfortunate that in their memoirs neither Carruthers nor Reid reveal much 
about what was going on within the Party during this time. Carruthers’ incomplete 
memoirs do not say much at all about the period between his early career under Parkes 
and his election to the Premiership except for matters concerning federation, while Reid’s 
memoirs were written with a hazy memory when many of his former colleagues were still 
alive, hence even if he had remembered something worthy of revelation he may have been 
reluctant to commit it to paper. Reid does however hint at the difficulties that he faced 
during this and other periods as leader. In defending his conduct when Parkes was Premier, 
he wrote that ‘imperium in imperio is never so objectionable in any form, I think, as in the 
ranks of a Parliamentary Party. It is very suggestive of divided counsels, unacknowledged 
ambitions, and internal dangers’.61 In another part of his memoirs Reid described 
Carruthers as not just his friend but his ‘ally’ as well.62 Such a term may simply refer to 
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their allegiance during the public political battles of the day, but given the circumstances of 
backroom intrigue it does seem that the label had a deeper meaning. Our greatest sources 
of information for the intrigues are the papers of Henry Parkes. It is these that reveal 
Wise’s attempts to replace Reid and if Carruthers had any doubts about his leader he 
would likely have relayed them to his former chief. Rather than hint at intrigue however, 
all of Carruthers’ letters to Parkes from this time stress the need for unity and lament the 
damage internal fragmentation was doing to the Party’s reputation.63 The evidence, 
however limited, thus suggests that Carruthers was fighting on Reid’s side within the Party, 
as we might expect him to have done considering his role in Reid’s ascension. 
With an election looming under the new electoral laws, Carruthers had to decide 
which of the new single-member seats he would stand for. He had initially been highly 
critical of the appointment of a commission to conduct the redistribution of seats but in the 
end the Free Traders were not overly upset with its outcome. Canterbury had been one of 
the safest Sydney electorates for the Free Trade Party under the old system, and as in 1891 
there were many people urging the personally popular Carruthers to stand for a more 
difficult seat. When he ignored these suggestions nobody was going to push him. Hence in 
October, with no clear election date yet known, he announced that he would be running 
for his local St George seat. The move was as shrewd as it was safe. He was able to boast 
that at the 1891 election, with a general swing against the Free Traders, only twenty people 
had voted against him at the Kogarah polling station.64 The decision was shrewd because 
the safeness of his seat would allow him to play the central organisational role that his 
Party needed from him. He had always been a good local member, attending council 
meetings and bringing up local issues in Parliament and the goodwill he had built up over 
                                                          
63 Carruthers to Parkes, 15/1/1894 & 15/6/1894, Parkes Papers, ML A877, pp.511-4. 
64 ‘Political Address’, Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday 3/10/1893, p.5. 




his six years in office meant that if he stayed in St George he could spend most of his time 
campaigning outside his electorate for the Party rather than simply for himself. Carruthers 
used the occasion of his announcement to reject attempts to sink the fiscal issue that was 
‘like a cork, always bobbing up’ and to condemn ‘the direct representation of any particular 
class, either labour, squatters, selectors, capitalists or any others’.65 The latter statement 
was a clear dig at the very premise of the Labor Party, the first of many times that 
Carruthers would make this a campaign issue. 
His already negative view of the Labor Party would deteriorate still further when it 
held its unity conference in November. A response to the tumultuous split that had saved 
Dibbs, the conference committed Party members to voting as a solid block ‘on all the 
planks of the labour platform and on all questions affecting the life of the government’.66 
Commitment to the platform was nothing new; it had been included in the Liberal 
Political Association rules though in practice it probably would not have been 
implemented strictly. It was the commitment to voting together on matters affecting the 
life of the Government which was the shocking turn. Platforms were made in advance and 
committed to on the hustings, but decisions affecting the fate of the Government had to be 
made as they cropped up. The only way a uniform vote could be enforced was by 
spontaneous decisions of caucus. This meant the removal of the parliamentary conscience 
of individual members, an aberration to nineteenth century liberals. It also meant that 
Labor members would be held to account by their Party as much as their electors, a 
practice also seen as a threat by liberals. In response to the unity conference Carruthers’ 
friend Joseph Cook left the Party, and much of what respect Carruthers had for that 
organisation left with him.  
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Labor’s collectivist outlook had already seen it represent a specific group in 
Parliament, now it was used to justify the restriction of the liberty of that group’s 
representatives and eventually it would reach its logical conclusion with the proposal for 
collective group control of much of the economy via extensive state enterprises and the 
theoretical goal of the socialist objective. All three points sat in philosophical obverse to 
Carruthers’ liberalism and its emphasis on individualism. It is in this fundamental divide 
that the origins of Carruthers’ antipathy towards the Labor Party lay. The fact that the 
three points developed over time helps explain why Carruthers’ animosity evolved and 
became a more prominent part of his rhetoric over the years. There were other objections 
to Labor policy which helped to supplement his distaste, including Carruthers’ belief in the 
necessity of a pragmatism that he felt early Labor members lacked. He also believed in the 
benefits of free enterprise, though in essence that was the economic outgrowth of 
individualism, it still emanated from the underlying philosophical divide. 
Parliament resumed on 26 September and Carruthers not Reid led the Opposition’s 
response to the address in reply. It was quite mild, saying that while the Opposition would 
fulfil their duty in holding the Government to account in this short session they would 
‘endeavour to do all those things necessary to be done by this dying Parliament so as to 
prepare the way at the earliest date possible for an appeal to the people under the new 
electoral system’.67 His hopes were not realised and Parliament was prorogued on 8 
December to resume on 17 January. When it returned the prospect of a more conciliatory 
attitude raised at the beginning of the last session was quickly dashed. The reason 
Parliament had been prorogued was because Dibbs had been defeated in a snap vote, 
refused to take it as the will of the Parliament and quickly rushed through a prorogation to 
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stifle debate. When Parliament resumed Reid tried to censure Dibbs for his action but was 
defeated by one vote. Carruthers wryly remarked that the Government ‘had been strong 
only in the tenacity with which they clung to office’.68 
McMinn notes that during the prorogation Parkes and Wise had been lobbying for 
support to replace Reid, and he interprets a letter Carruthers sent to Parkes in January to 
urge a public coming together with Reid as evidence that ‘Carruthers was not by any 
means deeply committed’ to his leader.69 This is simply not true. Carruthers had been and 
would continue to be Reid’s most loyal ally throughout this testing time and politically 
Reid would probably not have survived it without him. It was Carruthers and Wise who 
had helped Reid become leader and we have no evidence that the former shared the 
latter’s regret about the move. Carruthers’ suggestion about the coming together of Parkes 
and Reid was based on concerns about the fate of the Party. As its main organiser, he had 
his finger on the pulse of the electorate and knew that the Party’s less than secret intrigues 
had hurt the public’s opinion of it. He believed that the public saw it as divided into Reid, 
Parkes and Wise factions and that a show of unity was needed in order to make successful 
organisation possible.70 The letter made no mention of the leadership and when it later 
became a choice between having Reid or Parkes as leader Carruthers unflinchingly chose 
Reid. It is notable that the proposed show of unity would not involve Wise, the main 
intriguer and the person with the most unfulfilled ambitions. This suggests that Carruthers, 
however naively, may have hoped that he could get Parkes to lend the gravitas of his 
support to Reid without ever bringing up the leadership question. 
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On 9 May the Opposition met to establish a Free Trade Council to act as a court of 
appeal for preselection disputes for the coming elections.71 It was essentially a 
reincarnation of the FTLA council but without the clear branch mandate. Reid was to chair 
the council, and Carruthers, Parkes, McMillan and several other members of Parliament 
were to sit on it as well as an equal number of other prominent Free Traders to be elected 
at a later date. Wise was noticeably absent from the council, a sign that the FTLRC had 
split off from the main body of Free Traders. A few weeks after the meeting Reid, as head 
of the council, sent a letter to Free Traders explaining the process of preselection 
arbitration. Firstly candidates were to meet together and settle their differences amongst 
themselves. Secondly if that failed they should try to get mutual friends or local arbiters to 
arbitrate for them. Thirdly the council offered its services. ‘Failing the acceptance and 
successful operation of one of these three courses, we see no alternative, in the interests of 
the party as a whole, but that of taking independent steps to ascertain in each case the 
name of the freetrade candidate who commands the best prospect of success: and to 
publish the result of our inquiries for the information of all those by whom, at this serious 
juncture of our history, the cause of freetrade and good government is more esteemed 
than  individual rivalries and personal ambition’.72 The last phrase was the most telling; 
‘individual rivalries and personal ambition’ were and are essential to politics itself yet they 
were ever to be detrimental to political parties. 
With this organisational framework in place, Parliament was dissolved in June. 
Although Reid was the president of the council, Carruthers would play the central role in 
running the campaign and dealing with preselection disputes. He was not optimistic about 
the Party’s prospects. He wrote to Parkes that ‘we are in greater trouble than ever before 
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and I will require all the skill, all the hard work and all the power of the party to pull 
through’.73 Reid, perhaps in anticipation of the important role Carruthers was about to 
play, wrote to him to stress the importance he attached to his support.74 It was rare for 
Reid to write to Carruthers as the two men generally communicated in person or on the 
telephone, so the fact that Reid wanted to put this in writing ads weight to his sentiment. 
McMinn cites this letter as evidence of a change of heart by Carruthers ‘who earlier in the 
year had been prepared to consider Parkes’ reinstatement’.75 However, as has already been 
shown, there is no evidence that Carruthers actually contemplated reinstating Parkes and it 
is more likely that Reid was actually acknowledging the importance of both his present and 
prior support. 
Carruthers’ lack of optimism was somewhat understandable. The internal Party 
divisions that had distressed him during the year had not gone away, though at least the 
FTLRC and FTC usually agreed on endorsements despite issuing separate lists.76 
Nevertheless preselection arbitration proved extremely difficult. The situation in the new 
single member Canterbury electorate was fairly typical of the problem. Varney Parkes and 
a Mr. T. W. Taylor had both wanted to run for the seat. Carruthers tried to negotiate the 
latter’s withdrawal, writing him a letter where he said that he ‘would earn the gratitude 
and the esteem of the freetrade party if he came to some arrangement whereby only one 
member should be nominated’.77 Initially it seemed the intervention had worked but bad 
blood between the two candidates spilled over into a very public dispute that hurt the 
Party’s reputation. Carruthers felt that ‘an arbiter’s lot is not a happy one’ and that he had 
never before ‘realised the selfishness which rules many aspirants for parliamentary 
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honours’.78 His task was not entirely thankless however and he managed to get his 
decisions abided by in several electorates. In some ways the Free Trade Council held so 
many inquiries and meetings that it detracted from the Party’s ability to campaign. The 
fact that they were willing to do this shows the high importance they placed on split vote 
prevention. 
One prominent feature of the new electoral system was that elections were now to 
be held on the same day for all electorates. This limited the ability of leading members to 
campaign in the country electorates that used to have elections several days after they had 
secured their city seats. Despite this, Carruthers managed to give several addresses outside 
St George in places like Bathurst and West Maitland. The Opposition’s policy rested on the 
anchors of ‘true’ free trade and a land tax. J. A. Ryan has argued that in 1894 the direct 
taxation proposals represented the influence of Wise’s liberalism.79 This is difficult to 
maintain considering they were in the LPA platform written without Wise and the FTC’s 
interpretation of them maintained the flexibility characteristic of both Reid and Carruthers. 
In reality direct taxation still represented necessary taxation and was not inherently tied to 
interventionist ‘new liberal’ views. Adding to free trade and direct taxation were issues 
such as land reform, a throwback to the debate over free selections that was as old as New 
South Wales politics itself. Finances were also an important issue and in January 
Carruthers had declared that ‘the time had come when borrowing had to cease and when 
[extravagant] public expenditure had to cease’.80  
It was an agenda that was likely to win some Labor support but it was 
fundamentally a liberal free trade agenda with main planks that could be found in the LPA 
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platform. By salvaging that innovative platform the Free Traders were continuing the 
adaptation of liberalism from a pervasive culture into something both crystallised and 
partisan. On the organisational front the Party no doubt had gone backwards, but by 
utilising some of the political creativity of 1889 Reid was able to gain an advantage over his 
Protectionist opponents. That advantage was not just the breadth of the Free Trade 
program but also the fact that its disparate points were tied together by an underlying 
liberal ideology and that this lent itself to electoral rhetoric. The ultimate success of this 
agenda, even when unsupported by the structure of the FTLA, is testament to the value of 
the document that Carruthers had played a central role in writing. Though the FTLA’s 
legacy would thus be consolidated, innovations remained gradual and after 1895 a liberal 
electoral platform of the same scope would not be repeated until Carruthers himself took 
the reins. 
The election was held on Tuesday 17 July. It was a great victory for the Free 
Traders. They had effectively won 62 seats (12 of those being independent free traders) out 
of an Assembly of 125.81 This meant that Reid would need only one vote from the 8 
independent Labor members that included people like Joseph Cook to get a majority, 
though the inconsistencies of the Free Traders meant that in practice he would need more. 
What is crucial is that he did not have to rely on the votes of the caucus-committed Labor 
members. These members would often vote with Reid but the fact that the new Ministry 
did not have to rely on them would allow it to keep its integrity and allow Reid some 
degree of independence. The controversial decision to elect Reid Party leader, which 
Carruthers had firmly backed, had paid off immensely. Loveday, Martin and Weller argue 
that the election ‘confirmed the strength of the party’s moderate “centre” under Reid’s 
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leadership’.82 They position this ‘centre’ between radicals like Wise who fetishized a land 
tax and conservatives who disliked direct taxation. This formulation is a fairly accurate 
representation of some (though not all) of the ideological divisions within the Party that 
stood hand in hand with the personality divisions, hence the election was as much a 
victory for Carruthers’ pragmatic liberal beliefs as it was a vindication of his support for 
Reid’s leadership. 
Before the new Government could get down to business, the leadership question 
would rear its head one last time. In what was a sad indignity for Parkes, he had spent 
election day travelling round Sydney in a carriage desperately trying to claim credit for the 
victory.83 The attempt failed. When Dibbs resigned the Governor called on Reid to form a 
Ministry. Wise would later argue that the Governor’s commission had unfairly removed 
the Party’s chance to decide on the leadership but given Reid had clearly led the Party at 
the election the decision was entirely justifiable.84 With the Governor already calling for 
Reid, a Party meeting was held during which the members unanimously endorsed his 
leadership. The motion was put forward by McMillan, who had now somewhat reconciled 
himself with the leader. Carruthers needed no reconciliation. He had stood solidly behind 
his leader during the difficulties of the late Parliament and now, as Reid’s lieutenant, he 
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C H A P T E R  F I V E  
 
 
Minister for Lands 
 
The extent to which the Free Trade Party had been divided in the preceding period may be 
partly a reflection of the teething pains of the party system. Wise’s plotting would perhaps 
have been considered less insidious during the factional era, particularly considering he 
was in opposition. The same could be said of those, occasionally including Wise, who 
wanted to reinstate Parkes to the top job. In earlier days scheming and forming alliances 
was one of the main ways to get out of opposition. Now in the emerging party era, 
permanent groupings meant that unity was required even when out of government.  
Allegiance to a leader was also necessary, even when that leader was not the Premier. At 
this early stage Carruthers seems to have accepted these facts to a greater extent than 
many of his colleagues. Shortly before the election he had declared that the ‘recognised 
leader of the party, who occupies that position by virtue of an election made in the only 
recognised fashion, that is, at a caucus of the members of the party during the last 
parliament, is G.H. Reid’.1 Such a statement was not just an endorsement of Reid, but also 
of the Party’s ability to elect a leader and the members’ obligation to respect that election. 
In the upcoming Government Carruthers would continue to be a force for unity. In doing 
so he would seek to protect the Free Traders’ liberal legislative program, even if that 
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meant making further sacrifices of the independence of MLAs. The old liberal way of 
Parliamentary life was slowly dying off, but our pragmatic subject was more concerned 
with results than mourning the loss of a culture which long predated him.  
With internal Party divisions still raw, Reid faced the hard task of constructing a 
stable Cabinet to undertake his ambitious agenda. Carruthers was to be heavily involved in 
the confidential discussions which would precede any announcement by the Premier. 
Initially it was widely speculated that the new Ministry would be a reconstruction of the 
old Parkes Ministry minus the former leader, with McMillan as Treasurer, Wise as 
Attorney-General, Brunker as Minister for Lands and Carruthers as Minister for Public 
Instruction. It soon became clear however that this would not be the case. While 
promising to fully support the Government, McMillan declined to accept a ministerial 
position because of his business commitments. Less convincingly Wise, who had been 
reported as having said that Parkes was the ‘natural leader’ of the Free Trade Party, also 
declined to serve under Reid on the pretext of needing to focus on his profession.2 Bruce 
Smith, who also had a difficult relationship with Reid, was not considered for a position as 
he had retired from politics and had not contested the recent election. It was rumoured 
that he would be nominated for the Legislative Council, but this did not eventuate. All of 
this meant that the new Ministry would be robbed of several of the most prominent 
members of Parkes’ last Cabinet. This was to ultimately be a blessing in disguise, as their 
exclusion would allow Reid to have a more united if less experienced team. 
 Having failed to recruit either McMillan or Wise, Reid put in a strong effort to 
convince James Brunker to join him. A ‘good grandmotherly administrator’ with the 
‘confidence of the public’, Brunker was needed to add a veneer of experience to what 
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would be a relatively green Ministry.3 Reid eventually succeeded by offering Brunker his 
choice of positions. He chose Colonial Secretary, traditionally the post of the leader since 
Premier was not yet a paid ministerial position. This left Brunker’s old post as Minister for 
Lands vacant. Given the Government’s agenda it was reported that the strength of the 
Ministry would be determined by who were its Treasurer and Minister for Lands.4 In the 
absence of Brunker it was thought that James Young would be given the latter position, 
but Reid left him as Secretary of Public Works and gave the important lands portfolio to 
his ally Carruthers. It was essentially a promotion, perhaps a reward for his support during 
the tumultuous last session. Newspapers voiced concerns that Carruthers ‘had never 
shown any aptitude for administering the crown lands of the colony’ but tempered their 
consternation at his appointment by pointing to his good record as a Minister.5 
Carruthers’ promotion was not the only surprising Ministerial choice. With the 
experienced McMillan declining to serve, Reid had appointed himself Treasurer. This 
involved a £500 pay cut compared to the Premier’s traditional position of Colonial 
Secretary, but it would allow him to directly oversee the financial proposals that were 
central to a free trade land tax program. Since the roles of Premier and Treasurer had been 
combined, this left Carruthers as arguably the second most important member of Cabinet. 
The other surprise appointment was Joseph Cook as Postmaster General. Given that he 
and Carruthers had got along well in the last Parliament, the latter Joseph would have 
probably been pleased with this decision and may have even helped to convince Reid to 
choose Cook over other possible independent Labor inclusions. Cook’s appointment 
seems to suggest that Reid was more concerned about the support of these independent 
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Labor members rather than caucus Labor, as the latter were antagonised by the move to 
include a ‘rat’, though it may be that he simply misread what their reaction would be. 
The LEL promised to contest Cook’s electorate, as well as those of several other 
Ministers. At this time an archaic law, which was a remnant of a time when the Crown 
directly chose Ministers, required those accepting office to seek re-election before taking 
up their posts. Reid had lost one of these elections when appointed Minister under Stuart, 
and in 1894 several Free Trade Ministry seats were marginal enough to be of concern. 
Carruthers’ was not one of them. He was to be one of only two Ministers whose re-
election was not contested. The Sydney Morning Herald wrote that ‘the ridiculous 
minority in which his [Carruthers’] opponent found himself as the result of the last election 
is regarded as indicating the hopelessness of any opposition, and even the most sanguine 
officers of the LEL seem inclined to allow the honourable member an uncontested 
return’.6 
 After his unopposed re-election Carruthers delivered a speech to his constituents at 
Kogarah. He claimed that he would have preferred to have remained Minister for Public 
Instruction but that his colleagues unanimously pressured him into taking up the lands 
position. Responding to the leadership speculation that had surrounded the election result, 
he defended his support for Reid over Parkes. Carruthers professed that Reid ‘having been 
pressed into the service, or having volunteered into it, had led the Party nobly and well in 
circumstances of adversity’ and that in supporting him ‘I must be forgiven if I desired to be 
loyal rather than chivalrous, and to be just rather than to be generous’.7 He went on to 
compliment the new Premier, citing his refusal of offices under Parkes as evidence that he 
was not hungry for power.  
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Reid returned the compliment a month later in a banquet given in Carruthers’ 
honour. Reid and Carruthers were the only two to receive such banquets after the election, 
perhaps an acknowledgement of the latter’s growing importance. Reid said that Carruthers 
‘has fought his way from humble beginnings, and elevation after elevation, instead of 
contracting, has added warmth and breadth to the humanity of his sympathy’.8 These 
sickly panegyrics show that the new Government was trying to project an air of unity and 
positivity in response to the negativity of Parkes, who had published a letter that he had 
sent to McMillan in which he had relentlessly attacked the Premier. Later in a newspaper 
interview Parkes, with a probable eye towards Carruthers, had also claimed that members 
of the Ministry ‘have acted towards me in a most treacherous way on many occasions’.9 
 Reid was as keen to distance himself from Parkes’ overbearing leadership style as 
he was to distance himself from these attacks. As was discussed earlier, Parkes had had 
several conflicts with his Ministers and his Party when he was last Premier. In order to 
avoid these divisions and perhaps in acknowledgement of the fact that the new party 
system had changed the nature of political leadership, Reid stressed his equality with his 
colleagues and his intention to consult with them before making decisions. It was a long-
term strategy since Reid had written to Carruthers before the election promising him 
earnest consultation.10 The evidence we have is that Reid fulfilled his promise, for 
Carruthers’ papers contain a folder of information on subjects outside his portfolio 
forwarded to him during the Reid Ministry that has no equivalent from his time under 
Parkes.11 Reid’s change of approach is an important development in the fledgling party 
system that has received little attention from historians. In terms that Carruthers would 
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have no doubt appreciated, Parkes the rex had been replaced by Reid the princeps. It 
appears that the approach worked as there were less obvious rifts in Cabinet during Reid’s 
Premiership than there had been before. 
 Land reform was to be one of the first of the Government’s main election promises 
to be implemented. The land question had been at the heart of New South Wales politics 
since its inception. Arguably the main difference between nineteenth century Australian 
liberalism and its twentieth century counterpart was the importance of this land issue. 
Liberals had two concurrent concerns; that the land was to be settled and improved but 
also that a rural aristocracy be prevented from forming. They had learnt from their 
European counterparts that large estates were the antithesis of liberalism as they 
symbolised inherited rather than created wealth and they threatened the principle of 
equality of opportunity. At the same time, liberals also believed that small free-holdings 
could be a vehicle for national development based on individual initiative. For these 
reasons liberals had opposed the emergence of large estates, whether they had been 
created through squatting, land grants or auction sales. The land question was bigger than 
these basic liberal concerns and also encompassed issues of freehold versus leasehold and 
pastoralist versus free selector. 
 The greatest liberal land reform had been the introduction of John Robertson’s 
Land Bills in 1861. These hoped to open up the land by introducing the principle of ‘free 
selection before survey’ on the conditions of residence and cultivation. These selections 
were to be freehold purchases at £1 per acre given out in 320 acre lots.12 Initially these 
reforms were hailed but gradually their deficiencies became apparent. Through a process 
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known as ‘dummying’ the 320 acre lots were being combined to create the large estates 
that the legislation had explicitly tried to avoid. Dummying involved the use of false 
selectors to claim multiple lots or reserve prime land, which was then consolidated into a 
larger holding. This abuse of the system had allegedly grown widespread, undermining the 
democratisation of land ownership. Moreover the residency qualification, which had not 
required perpetual residency anyway, was largely being ignored and many people were 
living in the city while reaping the profits of their large estates. Part of the problem was 
that geographically and climatically Australia was more suited to large pastoral estates than 
the agricultural freeholds preferred by liberals. Adding to all these difficulties, the land was 
badly administered and there were frequently disputes between squatters and free selectors 
over leases. 
There had been many adjustments to the land laws between 1861 and 1894, but 
Carruthers would still have to deal with these same basic issues. One advantage he did 
possess was that as someone who had lived their whole adult live in the city he did not 
have any personal attachment to the various disputes beyond his liberal beliefs. Before he 
could get down to business and draft his land reforms, Carruthers had some legal 
technicalities to sort out. A number of leases given in the central division of New South 
Wales were due to expire in 1895. According to the Land Act of 1884 if these leases were 
not to be extended the tenants were required to be notified two years prior to expiration. 
They had been notified in time by the Gazette, but the lease holders had argued that the 
Land Act of 1889 had implicitly repealed the 1884 Act. A test case was brought before the 
Supreme Court which ultimately decided in favour of the lease holders. The legally 
minded Carruthers respected the decision of the court and framed his land laws so that 




they would not overturn existing leases. Though the Freeman’s Journal was to compare 
him rather unfavourably to the younger Gracchus, he was anything but a revolutionary.13  
On 28 August the new Assembly sat and the Governor’s speech declared that ‘the 
most pressing subject of legislation is an amendment of the land laws’.14 Two weeks later 
Carruthers introduced his Crown Lands Bill. He began by citing figures showing that since 
the introduction of Robertson’s land laws the proportion of the population in the city had 
actually increased and hence he argued the attempt to settle the land had failed. He also 
showed that the amount of alienated land per head of population and therefore the average 
size of a holding had also increased since 1861. He connected the failure of the land laws to 
the depression in the city as ‘thousands of idle hands’ were wanting work while the Colony 
had ‘a sparsely settled country with lands waiting and pining for willing workers, large 
producing interests languishing from want of justice, for want of proper methods with 
dealing with the soil, and the very foundation of the national prosperity sapped because of 
the absence of a recognition of that sound principle which should regulate the acquisition 
of and occupation of lands by the people’.15  
It is noteworthy that Carruthers spoke of regulation, since H.V. Evatt has 
connected liberalism’s response to the land question with the downfall of ‘laissez-faire’ 
beliefs.16 While regulation of the acquisition of crown lands might be contrary to an 
absolute interpretation of laissez-faire, for generally small government liberals like 
Carruthers state involvement in the parcelling out of state lands was necessary by 
definition rather than being an overtly interventionist act. Australia’s youth gave liberals a 
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chance to create a more ideal spread of land ownership without disrupting property rights 
that were seen as essential to the smooth running of society and Government; they were 
not being left wing, they were taking advantage of a unique opportunity.17 It is important 
to stress that this more ideal spread of land ownership had more to do with increasing 
production and opportunities for enterprising people and also avoiding land being left idle, 
than it did with any notions of ‘social justice’. As John Ward has remarked, the liberalism 
embodied in the various land reforms was essentially ‘right-wing’ as it aimed at increasing 
the number and prosperity of property owners.18 
 The urgency of Carruthers’ criticisms of the current system of crown land 
distribution shows that he felt that this opportunity was being lost. His solutions to the 
problems he had outlined were multi-faceted. Free selection before survey was to be 
replaced with extensive survey and classification to try to ensure that land was put to its 
best possible use, and flexibility was introduced to allow for the great variance of land 
quality throughout the Colony. Poor quality land could be given out in larger 
improvement leaseholds, while good land was reserved for individual plots. The latter 
were given out as homestead selections. Based on precedents that Carruthers alleged had 
built up the greatness of America and Canada, a man would be able to acquire a 
homestead ‘on terms which will not cripple his resources in his early stages’.19 In order to 
encourage small primary producers already in occupation of crown lands, security of 
tenure would be granted with perpetual leasehold in perpetual rent. For these leaseholders 
rent was to be kept low but permanent residence would be a strict requirement. To free up 
good land that had already been partially alienated for settlement, those pastoralists with 
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large leaseholds were liable to have up to half their property confiscated, but they were to 
be fully compensated with an extended lease on the rest of their property. These 
leaseholders also had a right to the improvements they had made on their confiscated land. 
Most radically of all, the Government was proposing to buy back large freehold estates for 
the purpose of land settlement. Even this radical move recognised the property rights of 
the owners, though Carruthers was keen to stress in his legalistic way that the Crown was 
effectively a landlord even for those who owned freehold.  
In the debate that followed Carruthers’ speech, the main critique came from Wise. 
He did not have any real problems with the Bill itself but he was critical of the fact that it 
had been put to the Assembly before the fiscal and direct taxation proposals. He warned 
the Ministry that members of the Opposition were pushing the Land Bill in order that they 
might later censure the Government for pushing back other legislation.20 Wise’s thinly 
veiled attack overlooked the fact that during the last Parliament the Free Traders had 
criticised the Government for bringing up the fiscal question when other less contentious 
pieces of legislation were waiting to be passed, so they were only being true to that 
sentiment in putting the Land Bill first. The great divisions that were about to be stirred up 
over Reid’s main proposals show that it was a practical move. Practicality did not hold 
much importance for Wise, whose ‘scheming’ would not end just because the Free Traders 
now held office.  
In introducing his Bill, Carruthers had appealed to the members of the Assembly to 
look beyond party differences. For once the appeal seems to have worked, at least to some 
degree. A large majority were in favour of it, with some members of the Opposition more 
concerned about claiming credit for what the previous Government had done to facilitate 
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the land reforms than debating the proposals themselves. Some criticisms inevitably came 
however. Copeland, the previous Minister for Lands, argued that the Bill would encourage 
dummying in spite of the strict permanent residency requirements and finality of selection 
that had been designed to prevent such an eventuality.21 Most critiques came from the 
various interested parties, who were quick to allege that the Bill favoured new homestead 
selectors over pastoralists and even old free selectors, ignoring the fact that the security of 
tenure that both of these groups had been pining for was to be granted. Despite these 
criticisms, most still agreed that Carruthers had done a good job of balancing competing 
interests. After lengthy discussions in committee, the Bill eventually passed with a 
reasonable majority. It was a great start for the Reid Government and suggested that it 
might be able to end the parliamentary stagnation that had dogged the two previous 
administrations. Bede Nairn has also noted that to some degree the Bill helped show poor 
rural people that the Free Traders were not necessarily just a city party.22 
In a very short space of time Carruthers’ land reforms proved to be successful, with 
land settlement historian Stephen Roberts suggesting that cultivation increased 35% within 
two years of the Bill being passed.23 This is quite an astounding outcome, though the rate 
of land settlement would have been increased by the depression in the city. This was 
intentional, as Carruthers had cited the depression as a motivation for introducing the Bill; 
hence the figure suggests he was somewhat successful in achieving this socially 
ameliorative goal. Despite this success, the population discrepancy between the country 
and the city that he had cited to suggest the failure of the previous system ultimately 
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continued largely unabated. Like most historical processes, this was not something that 
could be overturned by an Act of Parliament. 
One of Carruthers’ responsibilities as Minister for Lands was to oversee the 
administration of labour settlements. These were a form of relief for people struggling to 
find work that had been introduced by the previous Government. They involved placing 
people in state-run work camps along with their families. Carruthers was not entirely sold 
on the idea but with the depression still in effect, he tried to increase the money that was 
allocated to these camps so that the experiment could be carried out to its conclusion 
whether that be a success or failure. In moving this he argued that it was not a large risk as 
the value of the improvements to the land created by the workers would outstrip the costs 
of running the camps.24 This was about as far as Carruthers would go with Government 
intervention and the notion that this form of welfare, provided it was carried out on a 
limited scale, would be remunerative was a central part of the reason he was willing to 
support it. He proposed that any new settlements should be built on coastal areas so with 
fishing and agriculture they could be as self-sustaining as possible. Carruthers’ insistence on 
keeping costs low was not born out of callousness. He appears to have been genuinely 
concerned about the welfare of the unemployed and his Crown Lands Act had been 
designed with the specific intention of making land available to those with little money. 
However, small scale examples of Municipalities who had spent money they did not have 
in order to create employment had suggested to him that the debt involved could do more 
harm than good.25 
In November Reid made his first financial statement as Treasurer. He proposed 
some rather radical measures to adjust the Government’s bookkeeping on account of the 
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three million pound deficit that Dibbs had left him with, but on the important measures of 
direct taxation he acted with caution.26 These were to be delayed until he could get a 
clearer view of the financial situation. The Free Trade proposals which they were to fund 
were to be delayed also, with local government to effectively leapfrog both on the agenda. 
This was necessary as the success or failure of local government would essentially 
determine how much money the Government would need to raise from direct taxation. At 
the end of Reid’s speech Wise rose up to attack him for postponing the fulfilment of his 
main election promises. Carruthers, who by now was fast becoming Reid’s right hand man, 
jumped to the defence of the Premier. He began by declaring his hope ‘that before this 
debate closes the Government will know its friends from its foes’.27 He attacked Wise for 
never having supported the Government after he had promised Reid he would do so, and 
quoted a speech in which Wise had advocated the course of action Reid was taking. 
Carruthers claimed that ‘there is only one Government which it is possible for him [Wise] 
to support, and that is a government led by himself’.28 He also labelled Wise ignorant for 
arguing that a land tax should be rushed through before the land and income assessment 
that the Government was proposing had ascertained the value of the properties that were 
to be taxed. Carruthers was more concerned that the machinery be in place to ensure that 
direct taxation ran smoothly than with any loss of face caused by a slight delay in its 
introduction. 
The debate on the financial statement continued intermittently over the next 
couple of weeks. On 21 November Henry Parkes took his opportunity to lay into Reid and 
once again it was Carruthers who gave the Government’s reply to an acrimonious speech. 
He regretted ‘that the grand old man of Australia today – I do not know why, no one can 
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tell why – after having left his party, to be driven as it were to the four corners of the earth 
by the winds of Heaven, now when this party has to some extent concentrated its forces, 
and when it has to some extent got the capacity and the power to give the country what it 
is crying for, should do his utmost to thwart it in the accomplishment of its purpose’.29 He 
went on to censure Parkes for not having passed a local government bill when he had the 
chance and for having tried to sink the fiscal question at the election only to attack the 
Government for being slow to introduce free trade. He also pointed out how Parkes had 
done little to achieve free trade in his own time in office. 
At one point Wise began interjecting, threatening Carruthers ‘not to encourage me 
to say what I know of him’, a threat that in the context of a debate on party loyalty appears 
to refer to the shunting of Parkes. The member for St George implored Wise to ‘get all 
those things off his political chest which are weighing him down’, but the latter fell silent.30 
If Wise’s threatened secret was indeed about the shunting of Parkes, the fact that he bit his 
tongue even when tempers were frayed explains why he would omit it from his later 
accounts of the leadership election. Though Carruthers and Wise frequently clashed 
politically they maintained a personal friendship, and whatever the secret was, he was 
clearly unwilling to betray his friend’s trust. 
The speeches showed Carruthers’ deep sense of loyalty to Party, something that 
perhaps could not have been present in any member elected before 1887 who had not 
politically grown up in the party system. Even his betrayal of Parkes, probably the most 
‘disloyal’ act of his career, had ultimately been about the success of the Party to which he 
remained faithful. Carruthers argued that ‘party government is only possible by a 
combination of men who are prepared to sink to some extent their strong individual 
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opinion in order that some common purpose may be achieved’ and he attacked the 
‘faddists’ and ‘extremists’ who could not accept that.31 It was this understanding of the 
need for compromise and unity that would allow Carruthers to go on to found the more 
permanent New South Wales Liberal Party. For now however he was acting as Reid’s 
attack dog, more important than any Government whip, tearing to shreds anyone who 
openly tried to undermine the Party in order to ensure that others were warned off doing 
the same. His motivation for doing this was largely altruistic, as he honestly believed that it 
was necessary in order to pass legislation for the benefit of the Colony. This echoed his 
later justification of a two-party system and given that disunity on all sides had led to a 
highly stagnated Parliament for most of his time in office, it is easy to understand why he 
felt this way. The unity that Carruthers desired was certainly not as strict as caucus Labor 
and left liberal room for individual opinions. It was more concerned with the scheming 
that had been going on behind the scenes and in Parliament than imposing uniform views, 
but it still represented an important evolution in liberal politics. The debate left both 
Parkes and to a greater extent Wise isolated within Free Trade circles, hence Carruthers 
achieved his purpose.32 
As was to be expected, Carruthers was involved in the committee debates 
surrounding Reid’s Local Government Bill. He spoke fiercely against a proposal to increase 
the amount that municipalities could borrow particularly in light of recent attempts to use 
borrowed money to relieve the unemployed. He argued that even productive works, if 
paid for by debt, could ultimately cripple a municipality’s ability to function. He cited 
Penrith Council’s recent financial difficulties caused by debt that had forced them to 
practically suspend payments before coming begging ‘cap in hand to the Government’ as 
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evidence for his claim.33 The Bill was ultimately scuttled when the Protectionists and 
Labor combined over an amendment to remove plural voting; an amendment that the 
pragmatic Reid and Carruthers opposed because it would mean the Bill had no hope of 
getting through the Legislative Council.34 Carruthers condemned the ‘unholy combination’ 
that had destroyed the Bill, and in particular the Protectionists who did not even believe in 
the amendment but had used it to thwart the Government.35 Attacking Labor’s dogmatism, 
he claimed that: 
‘no government can attempt to pass legislation if at every point it is met, first of all 
by those who in a hundred points desire to see their conscientious scruples 
respected, who desire to have the whole of their principles affirmed, sacrificing 
ninety-nine points gained for the sake of one they cannot gain, and who, at the 
same time, are so unsuspecting and inexperienced as to allow themselves to be 
used as plastic material in the hands of a skilful Opposition’.36  
The incident was to be a turning point in the souring of relations between the Free 
Traders and Labor. For Carruthers, who privately had been one of the first to turn against 
that Party, had been the strongest advocate of local government and for whom 
pragmatism was a guiding political principle, the experience was particularly galling. 
The failure threw out the Government’s carefully thought out financial proposals 
which had been predicated on the passing of the Local Government Bill. Reid delivered 
another financial statement in May, proposing a land tax of a penny in the pound above 
£475 and an income tax of sixpence in the pound above £300, as well as the introduction of 
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the shortest tariff schedule in the world.37 Henry Parkes, who had made a secret alliance 
with Dibbs, used the occasion to move a motion of censure against the Government for 
delaying federation in favour of its radical financial proposals.38 Wise joined in to make 
what was essentially the opposite attack on Reid, criticising the long delay in introducing 
direct taxation. Predictably Carruthers interjected to point out that the Government had 
introduced the legislative machinery to lay the groundwork for direct taxation six months 
earlier.39 As the debate wore on Wise’s contrary support for a censure that went against 
the grain of his critique became something of an embarrassment. In the end he lost his 
nerve and was paired against the motion with the censure ultimately failing by a huge 
majority of 28 votes. This put a premature end to the Parkes-Dibbs combination and killed 
off what little influence Wise had left in the Party. It was a sad day for Carruthers, who had 
to see his old hero Parkes go through yet another indignity as he struggled to wrest back 
power. In a newspaper interview during the prolonged censure debate he had lamented 
that ‘having always regarded him [Parkes] as a staunch opponent of the restrictionists, I am 
not only surprised, but very much pained to find that he is about to throw himself into the 
arms of those who will use him as a tool – strong man as he is – and throw him away as 
soon as they have done with him’.40 Sir Henry’s response was bitter; ‘that gentleman 
[Carruthers] is also pleased to say he very much admires my character! In reply to that, I 
say that I admire very little in his’.41 
The Government was now safe but it would still have to face the obstructionist 
tactics of its opponents as it tried to get its financial reforms passed. With his opinions in 
favour of direct taxation and free trade a matter of considerable public record, Carruthers 
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spoke little in these debates except occasionally to use his legal skills to debate points of 
order. He also spoke against a Conditional Purchases Bill that aimed at meddling with his 
recent reforms, which was introduced by Protectionist Thomas Rose partly to delay debate 
on the financial proposals. If anything Government supporters were encouraged to speak 
as little as possible as the Opposition was attempting to filibuster by giving long and largely 
pointless speeches in order to hinder the passing of measures. When pushed, the 
Government occasionally resorted to using controversial powers to gag the debate. In 
these difficult circumstances, the direct taxation reforms slowly made their way through 
the Legislative Assembly. 
With opposition to the Government’s financial program quelled in the Assembly, 
all eyes turned towards the Legislative Council as the last obstacle in the way of reform. 
Though Carruthers’ changes to the Labour Settlements Act had been thrown out, the 
Council had acted with restraint when dealing with his Crown Lands Bill, sending down 
just three mild amendments. After a brief period of negotiation one of these amendments 
was accepted and the Bill was finally passed shortly before the failure of the local 
government reforms. There was little hope of such a conciliatory approach when it came 
to the direct taxation measures that would personally affect the members of the Council. 
In June their opposition to these measures came to a head when they threw out Reid’s 
Income Tax Assessment Bill. Reid painted the rejection as a constitutional issue since 
parliamentary tradition theoretically gave the elected House exclusive control over finance 
and he managed to convince the Governor to dissolve Parliament and call an election. 
Along with the constitutional issue, Reid raised the prospect of Upper House 
reform. He proposed to replace lifelong appointments with five year terms and to 
emasculate the Council’s powers, freeing it from the control of anything to do with 




finances and introducing plebiscites that could overturn the Council’s rejection of ordinary 
bills if at least 100,000 votes were cast.42 Carruthers, who again would play an important 
part in the campaign, was more than happy to pick up the issue of Council reform that he 
had been advocating since 1887. He was also happy to pick up the popular rhetoric that 
this constitutional election gave him as a weapon. He painted the contest as a question of 
‘who was to rule?’ and a choice between ‘government by the people and for the people 
misgovernment by a body out of touch with the people and defying the people’.43 He 
attacked the nominee Council as a product of Parkes and Dibbs that was still obeying its 
masters. He also claimed that in the negotiations over the Crown Lands Bill Councillors 
had openly referred to ‘our runs’, ‘our leases’ and ‘our rights’.44  
While Carruthers certainly held some sincere beliefs when it came to Legislative 
Council reform, he was being at least partly opportunistic in utilising language that was 
more radical than his long held position on the issue. His statement that the Government 
was doing all it could ‘to save this colony from the turmoil and distress of a bloodless 
revolution fomented by the usurpers of power who represented wealth and property alone’ 
may have been informed by his knowledge of history, but it probably went too far.45 It is 
likely that this hyperbole was a deliberate tactic meant to pressure the Council more than 
it was meant to win votes and once the election was over Carruthers, like Reid, would 
throw off his radical garb and remain the pragmatic liberal he had always been. Indeed, 
since the Free Traders already had a workable majority in the Assembly, the whole 
election had been designed to put pressure on the Council and the campaign’s ideological 
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eccentricities should be seen in the context of these hard fought ‘negotiations’ rather than 
as a regular poll. 
While the election objective was to influence the Council, the best way of doing 
this was to pick up seats so regular electioneering would be required. Any new seats the 
Free Traders won would have to come from the Protectionists or lapsed Free Traders as 
the Government Party had decided not to contest seats of Labor members. Labor only 
sporadically returned the favour.46 The LEL would not contest St George, but this had as 
much to do with the futility of such an effort as any sympathy for the member. Carruthers 
saw the election as an opportunity to ‘purify’ the Free Trade Party and so it was decided by 
the Free Trade Council to contest the seats of those like Wise who had been causing so 
much trouble during the last Parliament.47 The decision to oppose Parkes was taken out of 
the Party’s hands as he decided to square off directly against George Reid in the Sydney-
King electorate. Since the Free Trade Party was too loose an entity to really enforce 
expulsion, contesting elections was the Party leader’s main weapon in enforcing discipline 
and giving practical effect to Carruthers’ attempts to isolate internal foes during the last 
session. Free Trade ‘discipline’ was still more about loyalty than removing a liberal’s 
freedom of thought, hence while the disloyal land taxer Wise was opposed, the largely 
loyal Philip Morton, who was denied Party endorsement because he did not support a land 
tax, was not opposed by the Party in the Shoalhaven. 
During the election Carruthers took up his usual role as travelling salesman for 
Free Trade. He visited Albury, Kiama, Jamberoo, Robertson, Campbelltown, Darlington 
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and Paddington. He made great publicity out of receiving a deputation of Victorians at 
Albury who were preparing to move to New South Wales to take advantage of the new 
Land Act. Carruthers was keen to stress that the Act was not his alone but that ‘it was 
owing to the loyalty of Mr. Reid and his colleagues that the bill was now law, and also the 
loyalty of their supporters’.48 This stress on loyalty was a clear swipe at the ‘disloyal’ Free 
Traders whom the Party was now trying to unseat. Carruthers attacked the ‘variety troupe’ 
combination of Dibbs, Parkes, Wise and Labor-cum-Protectionist member William 
Schey.49 Responding to Parkes’ use of federation as an election issue, he also claimed that 
federation was ‘as dead as Julius Caesar’ as long as it was in ‘the hands of those who put it 
to the base use of stifling the honest aspirations of democracy for domestic reforms’.50 
Most of the areas he visited had sitting Protectionist members hence Carruthers’ 
campaigning was offensive rather than defensive. Considering he was attempting the 
difficult task of unseating people he was quite successful. In Camden where he had been 
involved in the selection of the candidate the Free Traders stole a narrow victory while 
they did the same more convincingly in Albury. In Darlington they were only defeated 
because the Labor Party split the reform vote allowing the Protectionist to scrape through. 
Much to Carruthers’ consternation the Protectionist held on in his ‘native district’ of Kiama 
as was also the case in Robertson. 
The election resulted in several personal victories for the Free Traders. Dibbs lost 
his seat and Parkes’ grand struggle against Reid ended in failure. Both were never to return. 
Wise too lost Sydney-Flinders, though the split in Free Trade support caused by the 
contest allowed a Protectionist member to take his place. Of Carruthers’ ‘variety troupe’ 
only William Schey, by far the least important member, would remain in Parliament. 
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Copeland, the ex-Minister for Lands who had been one of Carruthers’ leading opponents 
was also defeated. Overall the Party Free Traders won 59 seats by modern counts, a 
significant improvement from the year before; though both Carruthers and Reid claimed 
there was an absolute majority of 63 Free Traders based on their interpretation of Party 
loyalties.51 This result certainly put pressure on the Legislative Council, but within the 
Assembly the Free Traders’ true position may have actually worsened. The fiercely 
partisan election had seen the defeat of many independents who had previously shown 
themselves willing to work with the Government. These losses outweighed the Free Trade 
Party gains; hence the Government was now more reliant on the support of caucus Labor. 
Bede Nairn has suggested that ‘in 1894 Reid was not completely dependent on the Labor 
Party’ but ‘in 1895 he was virtually dependent on it’.52 This statement is only partially true. 
Provided the Free Trade Party stayed solid which following its ‘purification’ it was now far 
more likely to do, the Government (again according to modern figures) needed only four 
votes from the seven remaining independent Labor and Free Trade members to have a 
majority.53 The statement also ignores the fact that the Protectionists were not yet in any 
position to try to call on the support of Labor, so for now Reid could still act independently 
in pursuing his liberal free trade program. 
Carruthers spent election night riding around the city with Reid and Want, as 
crowds of people ‘in pure playfulness’ threw flour on them.54 The party then retired to the 
Oxford Hotel to thank their volunteers. To Carruthers’ delight, the election had been a 
victory for ‘Party’ Free Traders, but there was one last act of ‘purification’ necessary before 
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the Government could get down to business. McMillan had been over in England when 
the Parliament was dissolved and returned with his pre-existing grudge against Reid 
inflamed by being forced to seek re-election in absentia. When Parliament reconvened he 
delivered an attack on the details of the Government’s Land and Income Tax Assessment 
Bill, arguing against the proposed exemptions for people owning or earning under £475 
and £300 respectively. Their removal would broaden the base of the tax and reduce the 
level of taxation needed, and it was the course favoured by Henry George himself. 
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of exemptions would also have removed the idea of making 
those with property pay a large proportion of the costs of running a relatively small 
government whose main role was to protect property, and thus have hurt the populist 
aspect of the Free Traders’ appeal.  
In advocating this McMillan pointed out that he was speaking as an ‘independent 
member’ as Reid had done when Parkes was Premier.55 Times had changed since then 
however and the Free Trade Party had learnt its lesson from the damage that absolute 
independence had wrought. When McMillan sat down Carruthers got up and proceeded to 
accuse his former colleague of either having gone through a ‘Rip Van Winkle sleep’ or 
having spent too much time mixing with Tories in the old country.56 McMillan protested 
that he supported the Government’s policy entirely apart from the exemptions to which 
Carruthers replied that ‘if anything were needed…to assure the honourable member that 
he was on the wrong track, it would be the cheers with which he was greeted from the 
Opposition benches’.57 
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This was the crux of the matter. It was not just that McMillan’s proposals would 
have fundamentally changed the Bill; it was that he delivered a public attack on the 
Government’s main policy that might threaten its whole existence. A clear parallel could 
be drawn with Carruthers’ own amendment to Parkes’ Custom Duties Bill that did him 
‘good to learn party methods so early’.58 The lesson he learnt was that a liberal’s right to 
their own opinion, which would continue to be a self-defining difference between them 
and Labor members, had to be constrained to some extent in order for Party Government 
to work. Most of the problems the Free Traders had in the first half of the 1890s revolved 
around learning that lesson and putting it into practice. It was a lesson learned relatively 
independently of Labor, as the Free Traders’ divisions stretched back before that Party 
existed, and their solution to the problem still allowed more freedom than caucus. By late 
1895, with Parkes and Wise gone and McMillan now an ‘independent’ Free Trader, the 
goal had largely been achieved. Carruthers and Reid had reshaped the Party in their own 
image. It still contained a wide difference of opinions, as Australian Liberal Parties always 
would, but some small measure of pragmatism, practicality and above all loyalty was now 
a prerequisite for those who wanted to hold important positions within it. None of this 
was yet fully set in stone and party discipline would remain a problem, but arguably a 
much smaller problem. The reward Carruthers and Reid got for undertaking the painful 
task of introducing party discipline would be an unparalleled legislative success rate and 
the ability easily to survive censure motions even when much of caucus Labor abstained 
from voting.59 
As an aside it is worth mentioning that McMillan and Bruce Smith were eventually 
reconciled with the Free Trade Party when they entered federal politics. For them it was 
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the demand for stricter loyalty combined with personality disputes that was the problem. 
For Wise, who never re-joined the Free Traders, the problem ran deeper. His 
interventionist beliefs, though he certainly had his followers within the Party, were 
fundamentally out of step with the views of most of its members. This tendency would be 
exaggerated over time as the rise of Labor slowly made the Free Traders shed their 
leftward fringe. If one were to tentatively place Carruthers in the ‘centre’ of the Free Trade 
Party, then it was still a relatively small government ‘centre-right’, even when allowing for 
the Coal Mines Regulation Bill and the Factories and Shops Bill that the Reid Government 
attempted to pass during this period. Too much emphasis is often placed on these and 
other ancillary policies, particularly by John Ward who labels Carruthers, Reid and Wise 
‘new liberals’ in juxtaposition to the ‘conservatives’ McMillan and Bruce Smith.60 The term 
‘new liberals’ has been used by Ward and others to imply a belief in Government 
intervention similar to that of Alfred Deakin, but the label is inappropriate for the more 
Gladstonian liberalism of Carruthers and Reid. One need only read the latter’s My 
Reminiscences to see that he placed far greater importance on the classical liberal 
achievements of free trade, land reform and sound public finance than the small instances 
of practical intervention brought about by the social circumstances of the depression. By 
the mid-1890s New South Wales liberalism had evolved, but the germ of that evolution lay 
in the broad policy of the LPA and not some sudden push for intervention which for these 
limited-government liberals, who still emphasised freedom as the hallmark of their beliefs, 
remained the exception and not the rule.  
Pragmatism would be essential as the Government prepared to negotiate with the 
Legislative Council. After the election Reid had requested nine nominees be appointed to 
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the Council. It was a moderate number given the circumstances and the Governor obliged. 
Nine new members were not nearly enough to change the balance of power, and when the 
Government sent up its Land and Income Tax Assessment Bill the Council amended most 
of its clauses. The two most crucial of these amendments were to the exemptions, with the 
income tax exemption to be reduced to £160 and the land tax exemption to be removed 
entirely. These changes were too much for even those as pragmatic as Carruthers and Reid 
to take. It was arranged that a conference between the two Houses would take place in 
order to break the deadlock and Carruthers was elected as one of the representatives of the 
Legislative Assembly. Initially the Council’s representatives proved to be as stubborn as 
ever but after Reid had a less than secret chat with the acting Governor that hinted that the 
Council might be swamped with new members, they began to give ground. The fact that 
this threat of swamping was taken seriously was one of the main advantages the 
Government had gained from going to an election to strengthen its mandate. An 
agreement was reached that the exemption levels would be £200 for income tax and £240 
for the land tax. The Government had achieved the essence of what it wanted in what was 
one of the most remarkable political victories in New South Wales history. With the 
Colony’s finances now sorted out the Government was also able to pass the free trade tariff 
that had been the motivation behind its whole campaign for direct taxation. 
 It is testament to how small government was in 1895 that someone with an income 
of £400 a year was liable to pay just £5 tax, while a person owning £5000 worth of land (on 
unimproved values) owed the Government less than £20 a year.61 One of the measures 
Reid introduced to make Government even smaller was the creation of an independent 
Public Service Board. This board was designed to increase efficiency by introducing 
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competitive examinations and merit based promotions to replace the patronage that had 
long dogged the appointment of Government employees. This significant reform was the 
forerunner of Carruthers’ later efforts to ensure public service efficiency and reduce costs 
while refraining from indulging in arbitrary retrenchments. 
 The victory over the financial reforms had essentially proved that the present 
Constitution, whatever its flaws, was still workable. Consequently when the proposed 
changes to the Legislative Council were rejected by that body the pragmatic Reid and 
Carruthers were willing to let them die. McMinn argues that Reid was ‘satisfied with the 
substance of victory’ and was ‘not prepared to disrupt public business for the sake of 
winning a theoretical point’.62 Carruthers did not speak on the proposed changes when 
they were introduced in the Assembly and while in an ideal world he still desired to see a 
more democratic Upper House he appears to have shared Reid’s practical position. The 
fact that the Government was able to get away with letting these distracting and less than 
urgent reforms go by the wayside is clear evidence that Reid was not being dictated to by 
the Labor Party to any great extent, despite frequent speculation to the contrary. 
 With the Government’s main policies now in the statute books, Carruthers’ 
concerns returned to his Lands portfolio. In September he had introduced a Selectors’ 
Relief Bill to reduce the annual payments and rate of interest to be paid by those who had 
conditionally purchased or conditionally leased land from the Crown. This mainly affected 
those who had selected land before the introduction of homestead selections, many of 
whom were struggling to pay the Government the money they owed. Failure to make 
these payments and the consequent loss of the selection was a major obstacle to Carruthers’ 
overall goal of promoting closer settlement. He believed that the ‘best way to solve the 
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unemployed difficulty was to make more men their own employers’ by settling them on 
the land and thus he felt that kicking out those who had already settled on the land was a 
step backwards.63 He also argued that settlement was a much better solution to 
unemployment than public works because the latter only provided temporary 
employment. The fact that he was able to offer this relief was predicated on the success of 
the financial reforms that had freed the Government from needing land sales and rent as a 
major source of revenue. The Selector’s Relief Bill was eventually defeated in the Council 
which still represented squatter interests in the residual squatter-selector conflict. 
One of the stranger responsibilities Carruthers had as Minister for Lands was given 
to him not by Reid but by the Governor Lord Hampden. This was the commission to 
oversee the administration of Norfolk Island; a small community largely descended from 
the offspring of white sailors and Tahitians. It had been a convict settlement but after the 
ending of transportation its Governance had decayed. Carruthers was informed of one 
particular incident when a man had been given just a £4 fine after indecently assaulting a 
girl. He embarked on the task of improving the Island’s justice system, finances and land 
laws as well as writing up a draft constitution. It was a delicate task as thorough 
consultation with the populace and the Imperial Government was required. The new 
Constitution placed the administration of the Island in the hands of a Government 
appointed Chief Magistrate and an elected twelve member Council. In 1930 Carruthers 
boasted that it had stood the test of time and compared the relatively liberal administration 
of Norfolk Island favourably with the maladministration of Samoa under the New Zealand 
Government.64 As with his liberal views on Aborigines, there was nothing overtly racist 
about Carruthers’ dealings with the ethnic Norfolk Islanders. He felt that they were 
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worthy of the rights and freedoms of any British subject and set up their Constitution 
accordingly. It appears that his support for the anti-Chinese legislation pursued by both 
Parkes and Reid was due to concerns about the threat of racial tensions that had revealed 
themselves of the goldfields and not a Social Darwinism that saw non-white races as 
inferior. 
Late in 1895 Joseph Carruthers divorced Louise Marion. At the time the divorce 
case which was heard behind closed doors received little media attention. He was granted 
custody of the children as it was later revealed that she had committed adultery. The 
lifestyle of a nineteenth-century politician took its toll on marriages and Carruthers was 
not the only one to get divorced. For men who were not yet full time politicians long 
hours at work were followed by long nights in Parliament. For someone in Carruthers’ 
position these difficulties were added to by frequent regional tours, particularly after he 
became Minister for Lands. The evidence we have for Carruthers suggests that he was a 
devoted family man who spent as much time as possible with his children. Unlike many of 
his colleagues he was not a frequenter of social clubs and in his correspondence with 
Parkes he frequently excused himself from Cabinet meetings because of prior family 
commitments.65 Despite these efforts, he was evidently unable to keep Louise happy and 
his divorce was a personal tragedy eclipsed only by the deaths of his children. 
Emotionally wrecked, Carruthers went on a fishing trip during the Parliamentary 
recess in order to re-gather himself. This did not prove enough and his health gave way 
forcing him to cancel a proposed trip to Broken Hill in January. There could be no long 
break for someone in his position and he was soon back at work administering the huge 
Lands portfolio. He spent April touring the Riverina district advocating the Government’s 
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policy and gathering information on irrigation. It was only a couple of days after 
Carruthers returned from this trip when his old hero Parkes passed away. He solemnly 
attended the funeral along with many former and current colleagues. When in June a Bill 
was introduced to offer a grant to Parkes’ family who had been left in poverty the normally 
spending-averse member for St George spoke out strongly in favour of it against the 
opposition of the Labor Party. After castigating that Party for being so irreverent to the 
man who he believed had done more than any other for the cause of working people he 
reflected that ‘we had in him a man who stood pre-eminent in the history of the colony; he 
rose from the ranks, never forgetting the source from which he sprang; he was always in 
touch with the people, and was always working for them by leading in the path of 
legislation tending to make our institutions more free and our lives more liberal’.66 
In 1889 The Bulletin had described Carruthers’ relationship with Parkes thus: 
‘never having seen the sun, he worships the biggest light which has dazzled his 
eyes, just as the puppy in the fable, having while in the blind stage of existence, 
been entertained by stories of elephants, on emerging to daylight turned its 
stomach upwards and its legs in the air, as a slight expression of its awe and 
admiration of the mighty beast, on meeting a porker’.67  
To a ‘native’ born New South Welshman and a colonial liberal Sir Henry Parkes 
was the sun. His gravitas was such that he inevitably drew young talent like Carruthers, 
Wise, McMillan and Bruce Smith into his orbit. One of the shrewdest moves of Carruthers’ 
career was to break free of Parkes’ pull, but he never lost sight of the light of the fading sun 
even after he had hitched his fortunes to a new and rising political star. In his 
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autobiography Carruthers maintained that Reid and Parkes had had a poignant 
reconciliation shortly before the latter passed away. Like all deathbed anecdotes this is 
difficult to verify, though A. B. Piddington presents the same story with Parkes’ fateful line 
said to have been ‘I have very much misunderstood him’.68 Whether or not the two giants 
did patch up their differences matters less here than the fact that Carruthers wanted them 
to have done so. For a man who was no political theorist there was no ‘Parkesite’ 
liberalism or ‘Reidite’ liberalism there was just liberalism, a political tradition that 
connected the struggles of the 1840s with the battles of the 1890s. Accordingly he felt it was 
only right and proper that these two great liberal leaders should put aside their personal 
differences and come together. Carruthers had a belief that, despite a great deal of 
evolution which as a Young Turk he had been a part of, there was a more or less 
continuous tradition of liberalism that spanned the political history of the Colony of New 
South Wales. His Liberal and Reform Association would later substantiate this by 
consciously connecting itself to the political triumphs of the past and thus bridging the gap 
between nineteenth and twentieth century New South Wales liberalism. 
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When Parkes passed away his federation dream had yet to be realised. The momentum 
created by the Tenterfield speech practically ground to a halt when the first Draft 
Constitution Bill was critically examined by Reid and others. That Bill was already largely 
dead in the water by the time the Parkes Government fell. Despite the presence of Barton, 
much of the Dibbs Government was lukewarm on federation and progress stagnated 
during its existence. Nevertheless, the Federation League made slow but steady progress in 
drumming up support. As a member of the League’s Council, Carruthers continued to 
advocate federation, though it appeared to be low on his list of priorities. Shortly before 
Reid’s election the movement had been given a new breath of life when at a conference in 
Corowa John Quick had moved a motion for a convention of elected delegates to consider 
and adopt a new Federal Constitution. This democratic idea allowed the movement to 
somewhat distance itself from the unpopular 1891 draft and was passed unanimously by 
the conference. 
 Joseph Carruthers’ important role in federation has been almost universally under-
estimated. Even Beverley Earnshaw, who wrote a book called One Flag, One Hope, One 
Destiny: Sir Joseph Carruthers and Australian Federation, has failed to acknowledge his 




deepest significance as an invaluable ally for George Reid. That book was published by the 
Kogarah Historical Society and focuses more on connecting that locality to the formation 
of a nation, rather than reinterpreting the limited existing historiography surrounding 
Carruthers’ federal role. A large part of the reason why he is overlooked is because he is 
given little attention in the seminal accounts of federation written by Bernhard Wise and 
more importantly Alfred Deakin. Both of these men sought to portray Reid as a traitor to 
the federal cause, hence they had little time for his right hand man. Deakin was particularly 
dismissive of Carruthers, describing him as ‘a little man with a great voice, [who] was 
overshadowed by his chief with whom he was not always in harmony’.1 Deakin’s voice has 
arguably been the most imposing in the narrative of federation, hence historians have 
tended to regurgitate his opinion of Carruthers as a man of ‘little figure’ in the federation 
debates.2 While the work of W.G. McMinn and L.F. Crisp has managed to salvage the 
significance of Reid from the condemnation of Deakin and Wise, Carruthers has yet to be 
offered similar redemption. He deserves to be given the same historiographical treatment 
as his chief, for few of Reid’s much hailed federation successes would have been possible 
without the help, advice and loyalty of the member for St George. The story of Carruthers’ 
role in the federation campaign is also indispensable context for his later actions in shaping 
the realignment in Australian politics after the establishment of the Commonwealth. 
 In his autobiography, Carruthers maintained that after the Free Traders had won 
the 1894 election he had made it a condition of his joining Cabinet that the federation issue 
be pursued by the Government.3 If he did indeed insist on this to Reid, it is unlikely that his 
insistence was of any consequence. Reid had already committed himself to federation after 
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Cleveland’s presidential victory had supposedly convinced him that it would not be a 
threat to free trade. On the other side of the coin, Carruthers agreed with Reid’s policy 
prioritisation which put the liberal agenda and domestic concerns ahead of federation 
against the criticisms of the movement’s most ardent supporters. Once most of the central 
tenets of that agenda had been fulfilled however, Carruthers’ support was important in 
helping Reid pursue federation against the concerns of some of his other Cabinet 
colleagues. Those concerns, most of which Reid himself had previously elaborated, were 
very real and opinion in Sydney was far from universally in favour of a union. 
At a Premiers’ conference held in Hobart in 1895, Reid was able to convince most 
of his inter-colonial counterparts to agree to a new series of federal conventions to be made 
up of elected delegates along the lines of Quick’s proposals. In October 1895 the 
Australasian Federation Enabling Bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly to 
facilitate this end. As a federalist who was unhappy with the 1891 draft, Carruthers came 
out firmly in favour of the new Bill. He implored his Parliamentary colleagues to treat it as 
a non-party issue and praised the elected nature of the proposed convention for trusting 
the people.4 Carruthers’ speech was frequently interrupted by William Lyne, who had 
taken over as Opposition Leader after Dibbs’ electoral defeat. Lyne was a large-scale sheep 
grazier who had been lured into supporting protection by a desire to reciprocate border 
duties. He held a hesitant attitude towards federation that had seen him keep his distance 
from Dibbs’ attempt to combine with Parkes, and following Lyne’s ascension Carruthers 
was quick to exploit this.5 
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The Enabling Act passed the Legislative Assembly with relative ease. Despite this 
success, Reid did not call the convention as soon as was possible. Instead he delayed, 
hoping to use the extra time to convince Queensland to join in. McMinn argues that this 
was a matter of ‘hard-headed calculation’ as Queensland’s presence would be essential not 
only to a successful federation, but also to New South Wales’ prospects of winning out in 
the coming negotiations.6 Another calculation of Reid’s was his decision to try to bring 
Henry Parkes on board. By early 1896 Reid saw the aged statesman as little political threat 
and he was keen to utilise Parkes’ gravitas to reinforce the legitimacy of the new 
convention. Cabinet agreed that Parkes be approached, and Carruthers was sent to 
convince his old leader. Two or three months before Parkes passed away, the two men 
dined together and Carruthers asked his host if he would consent to being put forward as a 
delegate for the federal convention with a view towards making him the convention’s 
president.7 Parkes was gratified at the request, and left the matter in Carruthers’ hands. 
Carruthers also approached Barton with the suggestion and was able to win his acceptance. 
Parkes’ death meant the whole idea fell through, but it is still an important incident in 
showing how Carruthers was used by Reid as a go between in negotiations. 
With Parkes gone, the Government had to decide who they would put up for the 
election of delegates. There was a widespread insistence that the process should be free 
from partisan taint and that the best men be chosen regardless of their political affiliations. 
Consequently only three members of Cabinet were nominated, despite the fact that there 
were ten New South Wales positions up for grabs. This Free Trade team would have the 
Government Whip help organise their nominations, and was made up of Reid, Carruthers 
and the ever present James Brunker. It was a well selected group. Reid’s presence was 
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clearly necessary and requires no comment. The inclusion of Carruthers, who had the best 
federalist credentials in the Government, gave the group a connection to Parkes and the 
Federation League. He was pragmatic enough to be useful in negotiations but principled 
enough not to agree to federation at any cost. Brunker was the most senior member of 
Cabinet and gave the grouping some of the weight it had lost without Parkes. He had a 
reputation for being somewhat tentative towards federation, and when balanced with Reid 
and Carruthers he appeared a safe option for those who were in favour of federation but 
were not willing to make too many sacrifices for it. Though Brunker would not be very 
active at the conventions, this skilful team would prove incredibly successful in winning 
amendments disproportionate to their voting strength. 
Carruthers was the first of these three men to deliver an election oration, 
effectively opening the ministerial campaign early in February 1897. He appealed for 
‘caution and cool judgement’ against the ‘sanguine and almost reckless enthusiasm of the 
ardent federalists’ who were willing to sacrifice all for federation.8 Some sacrifices would 
be necessary, as federation was a worthwhile goal which would help make a stronger 
Australia. The benefit on which Carruthers laid the greatest emphasis was internal free 
trade and the economic benefits that would be derived from that. He insisted that Federal 
Parliament should be limited to well defined areas of expenditure in order to prevent 
extravagance. He also maintained that federation would be unpopular if it meant an 
‘increase in the burdens of the people’.9 This point is crucial. For a man whose political 
career oversaw the evolution of Government from one tier to three, none of these new 
levels were meant to increase the overall level of taxation or the size of government. If 
anything, through efficiency (federal) and proximity (local) it was hoped that spending 
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could actually be decreased. Carruthers’ later small government beliefs that some have 
suggested were partly borrowed from the Kyabram movement were clearly already 
present at this early and pivotal juncture.10 
While Carruthers was essentially running as a member of Reid’s team, he put 
forward his own distinct opinions on several of the more contentious issues the convention 
would have to deal with. He opposed the ending of appeals to the Privy Council, at least 
until a greater population allowed a choice of jurors completely free from vested interests. 
Though Carruthers generally insisted that the Federal Government be given as few powers 
as necessary, he supported a federal takeover of State railways against many of his peers. 
This was because he feared that preferential railway rates would keep up the costly 
provincial trade disputes even after internal free trade had been established. He supported 
the Norwegian principle of joint sittings to determine deadlocks between the Houses. He 
also insisted that the capital should be in New South Wales, preferably in Sydney, grandly 
claiming that ‘the records of the earliest achievement here of the Anglo-Saxon race are 
engraved on every hand in our midst, and it will be but fitting that she who was the first 
capital of Australia shall not be dethroned by one of her children’.11 
Sectarianism was prominently brought into the campaign when Cardinal Moran 
sought election as one of the delegates, provoking bitter reaction from Orangemen and the 
more militant Protestants. Carruthers steered clear of sectarianism in his speeches, 
lamenting its entry into the campaign. Despite this, the Orange institution nominated him 
as one of its bunch along with Reid, Barton, Lyne and just about every other non-Catholic 
leading man. When a group of Protestant Ministers came together to discuss their reaction 
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to the Cardinal’s campaign, Joseph’s brother the Reverend J. E. Carruthers strongly 
opposed Moran’s candidature but insisted that the group should not support anyone else in 
particular.12 The group ignored his advice and put forward a bunch which included 
Carruthers and even Catholic R. E. O’Connor. O’Connor repudiated the honour. 
Carruthers also rejected the nominations of the two groups. Though he 
acknowledged that he was closely associated with Reid and Brunker, Carruthers denied 
being part of any bunch. He fiercely attacked the Labor Party for nominating a full bunch 
of ten against the prevailing liberal ideal that the contest should be non-party. He described 
the nomination of this bunch as ‘the greatest blunder of the campaign so far’ as it tried to 
suggest to the Colony that ‘wisdom and intelligence and patriotism’ were centred entirely 
within the Labour Leagues.13 Giving force to his professed indignation, he claimed that he 
would gladly vote for William Lyne and anyone else who possessed ability. These anti-
partisan concerns echoed the sentiment of the old factional era, and while Carruthers and 
Reid had done much to consolidate a united Free Trade Party, it is important to note that 
the transition towards modern party politics was far from complete. The ideology and 
youth of the Labor Party meant that they were unencumbered by the concerns of the past, 
but the Free Traders who accepted a liberal inheritance still had to accommodate older 
individualist ideals. These ideals appear to have resonated with the electorate, as not a 
single Labor member was elected for the conventions. By insisting on a full bunch, the 
Labor Party probably cost itself the votes of the more radical supporters of both the Free 
Traders and the Protectionists while at the same time it appears that Reid and Carruthers 
were still able to pick up votes from moderate Labor men who ignored the rigid 
instructions of their Party. 
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 The notion that the ‘best men’ should be chosen regardless of political affiliation 
brought some interesting candidates into the field. McMillan, who by now could have little 
authority in a regular election, was one of the first to put his hand up. Wise and Bruce 
Smith, who were both out of Parliament at the time, also stood for election. These 
candidates suggest that although the Party had nominated only three men, there was still a 
possibility that there could be a Free Trade majority among the New South Wales 
delegates. Whether Reid or Carruthers wanted their former colleagues to get up is another 
matter. Politically, the radical Wise was poles apart from these pragmatic liberals on many 
issues and he was even starting to lose his attachment to free trade itself. McMillan’s sense 
of independence had become self-righteous by this point and his animosity to Reid did not 
bode well as far as support in the upcoming negotiations was concerned. In the event, 
neither man would be of much help to Reid or Carruthers. Both Alfred Deakin’s account 
and statistical voting analysis concur that during the conventions McMillan and Wise were 
more likely to vote with the Protectionist Barton than with the Free Trade Ministers.14 
  Welcome or unwelcome, McMillan and Wise were both successful in their election 
bids. McMillan came a respectable fourth whilst Wise sneaked in in tenth position. Bruce 
Smith was the only former Free Trade Young Turk to miss out, but even he polled higher 
than Labor Leader McGowen. Carruthers came third after Barton and Reid, a remarkable 
feat for someone who was still one of the youngest candidates in the field. Gratifyingly 
Brunker, who many predicted would not be elected because of his dubious support for 
federation came sixth, highlighting the overall strength of the Free Trade Party team. 
Protectionists Lyne, O’Connor and Abbott filled up three more spots while banker James 
Walker was the only non-politician to be elected. 
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 The elected delegates met in Adelaide for what was dubbed the National 
Australasian Convention. Carruthers’ performance at Adelaide would be disappointing. It 
was not his eloquence or ideas that let him down, but an uncharacteristic lack of tact. His 
first action was to attack the appointment of select committees who would carry out their 
functions in ‘secret’, insisting that transparency was key to the conference’s success.15 Such 
committees were largely necessary for the efficient running of the convention; hence 
Carruthers’ contrary objection did not make the best first impression on his inter-colonial 
counterparts. Impressions got worse when on more than one occasion Carruthers 
patronisingly described New South Wales’ desire to gather up its ‘wandering brood that 
once owed allegiance to and formed part of the colony’.16 Later when discussing financial 
proposals he launched into an attack on American protectionism with little regard for the 
fiscal beliefs of his fellow delegates. So many toes were stepped on that one wonders if 
Carruthers was performing a set piece intended to make Reid look reasonable by contrast. 
 Whether the offence Carruthers caused was intentional or not, it undercut his 
important contribution to the debates. This contribution was felt most in the debates 
surrounding the deadlock provisions and powers of the Senate. In light of their recent 
conflict with the Legislative Council, both Carruthers and Reid were acutely interested in 
the powers that this non-population representative and therefore undemocratic House 
would have. Carruthers insisted that a Senate that gave equal representation to each State 
could not claim any right to interfere with money bills unless each of those States made an 
equal financial contribution to the Commonwealth regardless of population. Since this was 
impracticable, he fought hard to keep the Senate from having the power to either amend 
or veto money bills. On another topic, Carruthers argued that if the States were not to be 
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given the right of secession, the Constitution needed to be amendable so that 
disagreements would not escalate into a civil war. Citing Australasia’s soon to be seven 
governments and multiplicity of officials, he also advocated that federation be used as an 
opportunity to decrease the machinery of government. He proposed a reduction in the 
number of Agents-General from seven to one as a small measure to help achieve this.17 
Carruthers returned from Adelaide disappointed. In a newspaper interview he 
lamented that the powers of the proposed Federal Government had been ‘unnecessarily 
enlarged’ and that an increase in the powers of the Senate meant that the Bill was even less 
liberal than that of 1891.18 Perhaps because Carruthers shared many of his cautious 
misgivings about the proposed constitution yet retained a desire to see federation achieved, 
Reid left him in charge of steering the draft constitution through the Assembly while the 
Premier visited England to take part in celebrations marking Queen Victoria’s long reign. 
Following Reid’s instructions, Carruthers was not to force through the draft constitution as 
it currently stood but to allow amendments that would be considered by another 
convention. 
The member for St George introduced the Bill on 12 May, 1897. In a long and 
occasionally interrupted speech, he detailed the history of the federation movement and 
defended most of the provisions of the Constitution. He advocated the grafting of the 
principles of responsible government ‘which we, as members of the British Empire know 
and understand’ onto federation, rather than utilising an American system of executive 
government largely independent of the legislature.19 He also justified a bicameral 
Parliament as integral to a federation rather than a unification of States. Nevertheless, he 
                                                          
17 Joseph Carruthers, Ibid., 25/3/1897, p.89. 
18 ‘The Impressions of Mr. Carruthers’, Sydney Morning Herald, Saturday 24/4/1897, p.67. 
19 Joseph Carruthers, Commonwealth of Australia (Draft Constitution Bill): Report of Debates in the 
Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council, 15/5/1897 (Sydney: Government Printer, 1897) p.8. 




insisted upon a ‘supreme recognition of the rights of the people once they come in conflict 
with the states’, and thereby flagged a fight for Lower House supremacy.20 Carruthers felt 
this was particularly important as, against his wishes, the proposed constitution gave the 
Federal Government powers not only over what he saw as State concerns such as defence 
and inter-colonial trade but also over individual concerns like taxation, marriage and 
parental rights. It followed logically that for every power that was taken away from the 
States, those States became less able to give full representation their individual citizens and 
therefore the Federal Government needed to be made more democratic so that individuals’ 
rights were not diminished. 
Many of the amendments made by the Assembly to the proposed constitution 
followed Carruthers’ line of weakening and democratising the Senate. In his introductory 
speech Carruthers had argued that the Senate’s six year terms and inability to be dissolved 
by the Governor meant that it was destined to be ‘the strong house of the 
commonwealth’.21 Labor member J. C. Watson picked up these points and moved 
amendments that reduced Senator’s terms to three years and allowed the Governor-
General to dissolve it. The former amendment failed as Carruthers abandoned it, but the 
latter succeeded. Watson also successfully introduced a procedure whereby a referendum 
could be used to pass a law that had succeeded in one House but had been blocked by the 
other, something that Carruthers had advocated at the Adelaide Convention. More 
controversial than Watson’s amendments was the removal of the principle of equal State 
representation in the Senate. This was replaced with a system of proportional 
representation with the provision that each State was to have no fewer than three Senators. 
Sensing the overwhelming view of the House, Carruthers somewhat reluctantly voted for 
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the removal of equal representation, though he still maintained that in matters of State 
concern it should be ceded.22 
Carruthers knew that most of these amendments were highly unlikely to succeed 
at the next convention, but he voted for them because he felt that ‘the convention could 
make no radical amendments unless it was suggested by the various legislatures or one of 
them’.23 He was thus giving himself and Reid the ammunition with which to fight for a 
more democratic constitution. If even one of the amendments succeeded at the next 
convention, both men would find it easier to recommend the Constitution to their electors. 
The yes-no balance of how many grievances could be accepted was already being weighed 
up, and Carruthers was hopeful of tipping the scales. 
Reid returned in late August, shortly before the Sydney Convention. The 
Government had endured a rough time in his absence. Brunker, who had been left as 
acting Premier, did not prove to be a great leader and received considerable newspaper 
criticism. Bogged down with his responsibilities as Minister for Lands and pilot of the Draft 
Constitution Bill, Carruthers had been able to offer little help to his temporary chief. Still 
out of Parliament, Wise had also been up to his old tricks in launching an attack on the 
Government’s administration of the land tax. Despite these difficulties the Government’s 
majority had held firm against a disruptive censure motion, and the administration had 
been able to pass a number of non-contentious Bills in Reid’s absence. 
The Sydney Convention would prove to be the arena in which Carruthers would 
firmly imprint his mark upon the Constitution. He entered the convention determined to 
fight for the amendments moved by the New South Wales Parliament. This went against 
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the grain of New South Wales delegate opinion, as many of the State’s delegates were 
dismissive of even those amendments that had received overwhelming support in both 
Houses. Bernhard Wise’s opinion was typical when he intimated that those amendments 
had been made by the enemies of federation.24 Carruthers did not agree and even fought 
for the highly contentious removal of equal State representation in the Senate. In one of his 
first speeches at the Sydney Convention he argued that Australian history had revolved 
around a long ‘struggle for equal manhood suffrage’ and that the Senate’s composition 
required the people ‘to give up that which they have been successfully battling for years 
and years past, and to adopt the retrograde stage of distinguishing between the voting 
power of the various individual members of the states’.25 He insisted that he would only 
support equal representation if there were adequate safety valves in the Constitution, and 
since the vote on the Senate clauses came before the vote on the deadlock provisions, 
Carruthers was one of only five members to vote against the six members clause. 
Having established the democratic line he would maintain throughout the 
convention, Carruthers went on to fight for the referendum deadlock provision introduced 
by the Legislative Assembly. Though he believed that ideology and not geography would 
inevitably prove to be the dividing line of Australian politics, and also that a Senate elected 
by an entire State as one electorate would likely prove the more radical chamber, 
Carruthers argued that deadlock provisions were required to ensure that the will of the 
majority was felt no matter what divided the Houses. He was dismissive of a Victorian 
proposal for a ‘dual referendum’ that required a majority of States as well as of people, but 
as the convention wore on he became convinced that his chances of passing an 
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amendment allowing for a ‘mass referendum’ were negligible.26 This realisation led him to 
make a pragmatic change of approach. He introduced an amendment that, on the failure of 
a double dissolution to resolve a deadlock, allowed for a joint sitting of both Houses where 
a vote with a three fifths majority would succeed. He also introduced provisions that 
allowed the defeated party in the joint sitting to petition the Governor-General for a 
referendum on the disputed piece of legislation and also for a simple majority in the joint 
sitting to be able to force its own referendum. These latter democratic additions failed, but 
the crux of Carruthers’ amendment was carried, forever changing the Australian 
Constitution. 
The successful fight for democratic constitutional provisions like the joint sitting is 
something that is often attributed to George Reid. L.F. Crisp, who barely mentions 
Carruthers, is typical when he argues that ‘it is to Reid in particular that Australia owes the 
more democratic, and also in some ways the more truly national and more viable 
constitution of 1900’.27 It is true that in September 1897 the battle over the Constitution 
still had a while to go and that Carruthers’ contribution may have reached its high-water 
mark, nevertheless his role in tandem with Reid is something that deserves greater 
acknowledgement. The ‘Norwegian principle’ of joint sittings was something that 
Carruthers had proposed when he first sought election as a convention delegate, and while 
this foreign transplant was by definition not an entirely original idea, Carruthers still 
deserves the credit for wording the amendment and helping to win its approval. Though 
seldom mentioned in modern histories, Carruthers’ important role in framing this aspect of 
the Constitution is something that has not always been overlooked. Quick and Garran’s 
definitive 1901 work described the deadlock provisions that emerged from Sydney as the 
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‘Wise-Carruthers scheme’ because Carruthers’ joint sitting amendment ‘came to the 
rescue’ of an earlier proposal by Wise for a simultaneous double dissolution that would 
have otherwise failed.28 It is noteworthy that in this and other instances Carruthers’ role in 
the federal story, already minimalised by Deakin, has decreased in prominence over time. 
This is not because of a reappraisal of history that has proven him to be less important, but 
rather it is symptomatic of the fact that he is not a relative household name like Reid and 
Barton and is therefore less ‘interesting’ to the casual and even the academic observer. 
After the Sydney Convention, there was to be an extended break before the federal 
delegates concluded their work in Melbourne. In the meantime Carruthers was to undergo 
considerable personal and political turmoil. The cause of this turmoil was two letters 
published in the notorious Truth newspaper that made scandalous accusations about the 
Minister for Lands. He was accused of taking part in a dubious land exchange, whereby 220 
good acres of land were swapped for the same quantity of less fertile farmland. It was 
alleged that this was done as a favour for Carruthers’ friend but though the swap was 
controversial the Local Survey Department had approved it and no evidence was ever 
found of corruption. Combined with this political accusation, Truth also printed a personal 
attack which accused the Minister of engaging in some morally questionable actions with 
women. This prompted Carruthers to launch a criminal libel suit against those responsible 
for the unfounded allegations, the dedicated Protectionist George Lonsdale and the 
newspaper’s proprietor John Norton. Norton, who used a ‘sensational formula of abuse’ to 
sell his papers, was also a Protectionist and a former associate of Carruthers’ long-time 
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adversary Paddy Crick.29 It seems that these commercial and personal considerations lay 
behind his attack. 
The libel case was heard at Armidale near the site of the contested exchange and 
dragged on for weeks. Its events were given considerable newspaper coverage from which 
an understanding of the sensational farce can be garnered.30 Norton, who was no stranger 
to having libel cases hurled against him, used innuendo and character witnesses in a bid to 
undermine Carruthers’ case. Norton accused the Minister of having engaged in illicit 
behaviour with a woman on the Goulburn railway in 1891, and while no evidence was 
produced and a quick denial ensued the idea was nevertheless placed in the Jury’s minds. 
After this Susan Blackburn, a prostitute, was brought to the stand to testify that she had 
pursued an affair with Carruthers, though again no corroborating evidence was found. In 
the end the numerous allegations forced him to reveal the details of his in camera divorce. 
This publicly exposed his ex-wife’s infidelity, and a letter was read to the court in which 
Louise supported her former husband but declared that she could not bear to appear in 
person. Carruthers brought forth his own character witnesses, including George Reid, in 
order to defend his good name but in the end Norton’s tactic of focusing on Carruthers’ 
character, rather than the unprovable allegations of corruption worked. The jury returned 
divided and the defendants were thus discharged.  
The circus at Armidale ended not long before the final convention in Melbourne 
began. During the delegate elections Carruthers had opposed the removal of appeals to the 
Privy Council on the grounds that the distant court would be freer from local bias, and it is 
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likely that his experience at the regional courthouse strengthened his resolve on this issue. 
In Melbourne he combined with Joseph Abbott to pass an amendment that, following a 
Canadian precedent, allowed appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council based on 
‘any right that Her Majesty may be pleased to exercise by virtue of her Royal 
Prerogative’.31 Though successful, this amendment prompted a negative reaction from 
some quarters and opposition to appeals to the Privy Council shifted focus from private 
cases to the interpretation of the Constitution. Carruthers fiercely defended the right of 
appeal in constitutional cases. He envisaged the Privy Council as the ‘bulwark of the 
constitution’, free from local influences and able to give decisions based on evidence 
alone.32 He dismissed the sentimental argument that an Australian court should interpret 
the Constitution on the grounds of self-reliance, pointing out that the convention had 
already accepted that legislation passed by the proposed Federal Parliament would need to 
receive Royal Assent before it became law. 
Carruthers’ spirited defence was unsuccessful. The Constitution Bill that emerged 
from Melbourne stated that ‘no appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council in any 
matter involving the interpretation of this Constitution or the Constitution of a State, 
unless the public interests of some part of Her Majesty’s Dominions, other than the 
Commonwealth or State, are involved’.33 As Premier, Carruthers would feel the wire 
netting affair justified his argument about the effect of local influences on decisions of the 
High Court. As was the case in the wire netting decision the Federal High Court, with 
judges nominated on the advice of the Federal Government, has often found in favour of 
the Federal Government over the States when interpreting the Constitution. The 
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autonomous powers of the States, which Carruthers fought so hard to protect, have thus 
arguably been eroded. Whether Privy Council appeals would have prevented this 
imbalance is impossible to tell. The prestige of the Federal Government may still have 
given it more influence over constitutional decisions even when those decisions were 
made in England. Regardless of the viability of Carruthers’ argument, the fact that the 
debate over Privy Council appeals involved more issues than a simple choice between 
greater independence and strong attachment to Britain is important, and it is something 
that is often overlooked by historians who are more concerned with the debates of their 
own times. 
In his fight for Privy Council appeals Carruthers did not receive the support of his 
chief but in the fight over control of inland rivers the two men worked hand in hand. La 
Nauze has suggested that Reid led the battle over this issue but Carruthers, whose whole 
closer settlement scheme that he had been pursuing as Minister for Lands required a 
reliable water supply, was equally important.34 The battle involved a conflict between New 
South Wales, who wanted to defend its existing right to the water on which their pastoral 
industry relied, and South Australia, who sought a guarantee that the navigability of rivers 
would be protected from what was happening upstream. Carruthers argued that the value 
of New South Wales western lands would be greatly reduced without a guaranteed water 
supply, and that placing the issue in the hands of the Federal Government left too much 
uncertainty which would drive settlers away. Acknowledging the treacherous climate of 
the lands in question, he supported water conservation, by which he meant making the 
water available for pastoralists, over wasteful irrigation. Asserting that this right of water 
conservation was greater than the right of navigation, Carruthers questioned ‘what is the 
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use of having a splendid water-way for ships to ply upon if the people alongside that water-
way are deprived of the means of using their land to the best purposes – of employing it for 
the production of that which the ships are intended to carry?’35 To reinforce his argument 
that New South Wales had a right to her waters, he even procured a large map that 
showed the watershed of the Murray-Darling system and hung it in the vestibule of the 
convention.36 
Having established his case, Carruthers moved an amendment giving water 
conservation precedence over navigation. A division on the amendment was not 
immediately taken and after some private discussions Carruthers dropped it in order to 
allow a compromise amendment that gave the Federal Government control over the 
Murray-Darling system with the provision that no State would be denied use of the waters 
for conservation or irrigation. Josiah Symon inserted the word ‘reasonable’ before use, 
which for Reid was not a compromise but an ‘absolute surrender’ as it left the whole issue 
open to the discretion of the High Court.37 While he was undoubtedly also frustrated with 
Symon’s amendment, Carruthers was willing to concede the point and would not make an 
issue of it in the upcoming referendum campaign. 
After the Melbourne Convention, Carruthers returned to Sydney as the campaign 
over the referendum to adopt or reject the Federal Constitution began in earnest. Despite 
the numerous objections to various clauses Carruthers had made during the conventions, 
he came out strongly in favour of a yes vote. Given his track record this was not surprising. 
After all, despite private misgivings revealed in Parkes’ diary, Carruthers had come out in 
favour of the 1891 Bill which addressed far fewer of his concerns than its 1898 
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counterpart.38 While the shape of the Constitution was still malleable he had been 
prepared to fight tooth and nail for the amendments he desired, but once it became a yes-
or-no question he firmly backed a document that, crucially, contained his joint sitting 
provision. 
Though this provision represented a compromise rather than Carruthers’ 
democratic ideal, he still used it as his main weapon in arguing the yes case. He was careful 
to point out to concerned voters that in the event of a joint sitting the combined 
representatives of New South Wales and Victoria would possess two votes more than 
necessary for a three-fifths majority.39 This meant that despite equal representation in the 
Senate the will of the democratic majority could bring itself to bear on any important issue 
if it either had universal support in the two large States, or majority support in the large 
states and minority support in the smaller States. Carruthers’ calculations were based on 
Queensland not being a part of the Commonwealth; hence her possible admission could 
undermine the ability of the democratic majority to assert its will. This helps explain Reid’s 
reluctance to accept the two-thirds provision, though the regional interests Queensland 
shared with New South Wales would somewhat mitigate against the cohesion of the 
smaller States. The deadlock provisions were not the only thing Carruthers argued made 
the Constitution democratic as he also pointed out that in spite of equal representation a 
Senate elected by universal manhood suffrage was still a vast improvement on the 
nominee Legislative Council. 
Apart from the defending the democratic nature of the Constitution, Carruthers 
also had to rebuff the charge that federation would destroy the free trade cause. He did this 
with a four point argument: 
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‘1. That the constitution gives us a guarantee for freetrade practically for nearly 
one-half of our total trade. 2. That our intercolonial export trade must and will 
increase with the removal of heavy border duties. 3. That for the remainder of our 
trade (about one half of the total) there will be either a revenue tariff or a 
protective tariff, according to the views of the majority in a House of 
Representatives in which New South Wales has the largest representation. 4. That 
with the abolition of border duties there will be less inducement for the farming 
districts in any colony to advocate a protection which will not benefit them’.40 
He also rejected the argument, common in free trade circles, that the Braddon 
clause would necessitate protection. This clause required that three quarters of federal 
customs revenue would have to be either returned to the States or used to pay off interest 
on debts taken over by the Commonwealth. Far from guaranteeing protection, Carruthers 
argued that this made customs duties such an inefficient way of raising revenue that 
Federal Governments might be persuaded to look elsewhere for money. 
The defensive nature of Carruthers’ arguments for a yes vote was a reflection of 
the strong opposition to federation and to the proposed constitution prevalent in New 
South Wales. Both Protectionist leader William Lyne and the Labor Party declared in 
favour of a no vote. The Reid Cabinet was given a largely free hand to campaign for either 
side. The Attorney-General John Want resigned his post to lead the no campaign, while 
Carruthers was debatably the only Minister to give his full backing to the yes campaign. 
Reid initially kept his cards close to his chest, but eventually he made a statement that 
would go down in history as the Yes-No speech. In it Reid examined both the good and 
bad aspects of the proposed constitution before equivocally endorsing a yes vote. The 
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negative aspects raised by Reid included the money-bills compromise (which stopped the 
Senate from amending taxation and annual appropriation bills, but left it free to amend 
other appropriation bills and block either, making it one of the most power upper houses 
in the Westminster responsible government tradition), the three-fifths majority rather than 
a simple majority in joint sittings, the Braddon clause and the ‘reasonable’ right to water. 
Many of Reid’s concerns were shared by Carruthers, but the latter was able to overlook 
them. It may be that a vestigial attachment to Parkes meant Carruthers was more willing 
to compromise to see his former hero’s dream fulfilled. 
For his honesty with the electors, Reid earned the eternal enmity of the federalist 
ultras. Wise was particularly vitriolic claiming that ‘Federalists, reading Mr. Reid’s 
unsparing condemnation of all the clauses in the Bill to which objections had been raised, 
and his half-hearted approbation of the few others, about which there was no difference of 
opinion, could conclude only that, under the specious guise of judicial fairness, he had 
marshalled nearly every argument which told against the Bill; and that his faint praise was 
intended to be more damning than the most acute criticism’.41 Though he too was a 
dedicated federalist, Carruthers’ opinion of the Yes-No speech could not have been more 
different. He felt Reid’s honesty was a principled action of self-sacrifice that earned the 
Premier no favours. Years later Carruthers recalled that ‘Reid was actuated by an undue 
sense of personal responsibility to act impartially and not as an advocate of the bill’.42 He 
maintained that were it not for the sacrifices Reid made to fulfil this personal responsibility 
and an unfortunate snoring incident during the Adelaide Convention, Reid would have 
been Australia’s first Prime Minister. 
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When the federal referendum was held in New South Wales the yes vote received 
a narrow majority but did not reach the 80, 000 votes required for the Bill to pass. This 
failure was probably due more to the public concerns underlying the Yes-No speech than 
the speech itself, as the division between the pro-federal Sydney Morning Herald and the 
anti-federal Daily Telegraph showed that Sydney’s opinion of the Bill was already very 
mixed before Reid even spoke. Despite this, many federalists were quick to blame Reid for 
the failure of the Bill. Carruthers defended the Premier, insisting that he had been 
consistent in his views throughout the conventions and beyond.43 The member for St 
George’s own electorate had voted against the Bill and he blamed the financial provisions, 
rather than Reid, for the failure to reach the quota.44 The anti-billites had argued that these 
financial provisions took away more revenue from the States than the Federal 
Government would take away in governing costs, hence a ‘net deficiency’ would be 
created that would undermine State finances.45 The simpler argument that federation 
would lead to an increase in the size of government that would necessitate higher taxation 
was also an important concern. 
Almost immediately after the failure of the referendum, Reid signposted 
negotiations with the other Premiers in the hope of achieving an ‘alteration in the terms of 
the bill that would make it more amenable to the people of New South Wales’.46 An 
election was looming in the Colony and the timing required that Reid win a new mandate 
before he was able to meet with his inter-colonial counterparts. Barton himself wanted the 
opportunity to lead the negotiations; hence he directed the Federal Association to set up an 
election committee, effectively turning it into a political party. Barton thus usurped a large 
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part of Lyne’s power, and the election, far from being a traditional fiscal fight, was turned 
into a contest between the federalist ultras and the Reid Government. Though Reid was 
fighting for a more ‘liberal’ constitution, the thrust of the election was a step away from 
the ideological conflicts of 1894 and 1895. Instead the poll was to be a question of 
leadership and loyalty to the federation cause, an echo of the personal battles of the 
factional era. 
Under the circumstances there was some idle newspaper speculation that 
Carruthers might follow Barton.47 This was never a real possibility. Carruthers relished the 
opportunity to further improve the Constitution Bill and was not about to make an 
alliance with Protectionists and the disloyal Free Traders Wise, McMillan and Bruce Smith 
only to weaken New South Wales’ hand at the negotiating table. Carruthers’ continuing 
support would prove vital for Reid, as it shored up his federalist credentials and prevented 
the unequivocal federalists from presenting a united front against the Premier. It also 
helped to stem the flow of federalist Free Traders into Barton’s camp. This latter point is 
seldom mentioned in the historiography surrounding federation, but it is of the utmost 
importance. It was not just the already ‘independent’ Free Traders like Wise who went 
over to Barton, but some genuine party-men as well. The most notable of these was 
Dugald Thomson, who would go on to become the federal Free Trade Party’s deputy 
leader and a Minister in the Reid-McLean Government.48 Had Carruthers, as the leading 
federalist Free Trader, made the same decision the Party would have been torn asunder. 
Despite the suggestion of disharmony between the federalism of Carruthers and his chief 
given by Deakin, it was this crucial show of loyalty that saved Reid and saved his Party.49 
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As the contest developed issues of personality quickly superseded those of policy. 
Both leaders wanted federation and even Barton admitted that some changes to the 
Constitutional Bill were necessary in order to win its acceptance in New South Wales, 
hence the question became whether Reid or Barton should be the one to negotiate those 
changes. Carruthers’ speeches thus focused on the respective qualities of each leader. 
Though he was careful not to be too hateful towards Barton, Carruthers described him as 
being ‘a little bit prone’ and ‘a little bit pliant’ to the representatives of the other Colonies.50 
Reid on the other hand he praised as the man who ‘since taking office…had brought 
federation from a thing in the clouds to a stern reality’.51 To overcome the financial 
problems Carruthers blamed for the Bill’s failure, he proposed cost saving exercises 
including reducing the size of State Parliaments, doing away with superfluous officers and 
pooling debts in order to be able to negotiate lower interest rates.52 
Throughout the campaign the Sydney Morning Herald continued to subtly help 
Barton’s ‘National Federal Party’, listing their candidates before those of ‘Liberal Federal 
Party’(which is what the Free Traders were calling themselves), even though the latter 
group was not only in Government but also came first alphabetically. In spite of the 
paper’s efforts, the Government held on to power, but only just. Reid personally defeated 
Barton in the King electorate. Wise succeeded in clawing his way back into Parliament but 
both McMillan and Bruce Smith’s National Federal campaigns ended in failure. Carruthers 
received almost 75% of the vote in St George and was carried through Rockdale on the 
shoulders of his enthusiastic supporters.53 Elsewhere the Free Traders fared less well. The 
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Government’s majority was reduced and three Ministers lost their seats. For the first time 

























C H A P T E R  S E V E N  
 
 
Personal and Political Tragedy 
 
The loss of three Ministers at the election necessitated a Cabinet reshuffle in order to fill 
the recently vacated spaces. It was widely reported that Carruthers had grown tired of his 
position as Minister for Lands and would ask the Premier to move him to a different office. 
For the moment however, Reid left him where he was and promoted Varney Parkes, 
James Hogue, and Charles Lee from the backbench. Later Carruthers’ name was 
frequently mentioned in relation to the vacant position of Agent-General for New South 
Wales in London. Carruthers declined to seek the position because his health was not 
amenable to English weather, but also because his new wife did not want to relocate.1 
Ignoring the turmoil of the Norton libel case, Joseph Carruthers had married Alice Burnett 
at the start of the year and had used the Melbourne Convention as a honeymoon. 
If the loss of three Ministers had left the Free Traders in a mess, then their 
Opposition was in disarray. Having lost the King contest, Barton was desperately seeking 
another seat in Parliament but was having a hard time convincing any of his colleagues to 
give way. Without Barton, the National Federalists were forced to leave Lyne as 
Opposition Leader even though his federalist credentials were far weaker than Reid’s. Lyne 
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had outwardly opposed the Federation Bill at the recent referendum and his leadership 
exposed the hypocrisy of the National Federalist ‘Free Traders’ who sat behind him, 
notably Bernhard Wise. 
In his first major speech of the session Carruthers made great use of the whole 
situation, quoting Barton’s previous denunciation of Lyne on federal grounds, much to the 
delight of the Ministerialists. He was also keen to point out that the person who had 
moved the amendment requiring a minimum number of yes votes for the referendum to 
succeed was sitting in the ranks of the Opposition. The whole speech was marked by 
frequent exchanges with Wise. A noticeably aggravated Carruthers suggested that his 
opponent’s ‘querulous criticism’ had more to do with an animosity towards Reid than any 
principle.2 
Carruthers delivered his speech on 23 August. The next day an incident occurred 
that shook the member for St George to his core. His son Jack was cycling home that night 
when he collided with a cart. The shaft of the vehicle struck him on the chest and he was 
thrown a considerable distance. Passengers in a passing tram stumbled upon the incident 
but help was slow in reaching him. Initial reports told that Jack had fractured a rib and was 
suffering from bruises and shock.3 It was expected that he would stay a while at his father’s 
house and would ultimately recover. These reports proved wrong however, and Jack 
passed away at St George Cottage Hospital on the morning of 26 August. He was almost 
fifteen. An inquest into the death was heard, but as some of Jack’s last words had intimated 
that the collision was his fault the incident was ruled accidental. 
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Joseph had been in Parliament the night of the accident and was distraught at the 
news. A funeral was organised and Reid and many other colleagues attended. The burial 
service was said to be one of the largest and most solemn events ever witnessed in St 
George, with at least 3000 people turning out.4 Jack was laid to rest beside his sister Elsie, 
whose death in 1886 had proved the catalyst for Joseph’s political career and whom the 
young boy would have barely known. Dozens of wreaths were laid to rest on Jack’s grave, 
but the most poignant was his father’s which was made of deep violets and shaped like a 
cradle. 
Jack’s death was reported in papers the length and breadth of Australia. Joseph 
received a huge quantity of condolence letters from all manner of political friends and 
adversaries. In spite of his overwhelming grief, Carruthers could take little time to mourn. 
The Government held only a tiny majority in the Assembly, and his voice as much as his 
vote was needed to fend off the various censure motions that would inevitably be coming 
Reid’s way. Carruthers had always been a family man, repeatedly willing to sacrifice his 
social life to spend time with his children. He felt a duty towards the public as well 
however, and in this case it took precedence over his emotional torment. 
By 6 September Carruthers was back in Parliament. By the 13th he was again 
berating Wise as the Government fought off a censure motion over the federation issue. 
Reid was seeking Parliamentary approval of a list of amendments to the proposed 
constitution which he was about to negotiate with the other Premiers over. The points 
included a simple majority in joint sittings or else a referendum to break deadlocks, 
removal of the Braddon clause, protection from the alteration of State boundaries without 
consent, that the capital be in New South Wales, a clearer safeguard for water conservation 
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and irrigation, that the Senate be prevented from amending all money bills and that Privy 
Council appeals be allowed in all cases or no cases.5 Apart from the Privy Council 
provision, Carruthers was largely in favour of all of these amendments. He could take 
heart from the capital point in particular, as this had been his pet issue. Though Reid had 
always thought it desirable to have the capital in the Mother Colony he had frequently 
given the issue a low priority. Carruthers’ arguments combined with the clear popular 
appeal of the issue eventually won the Premier over. 
In hindsight it is easy to dismiss the capital site issue as pure provincialism, but in 
the days when transport was slow and arduous it would vitally affect the nature of federal 
politics. Carruthers was ultimately unable or unwilling to enter federal politics because 
Melbourne became the temporary capital site and as federal Opposition Leader Reid’s 
efforts would be compromised by his inability to attend Parliament on a constant basis. In 
an age before national media the local papers of the capital were also likely to influence 
federal politicians, and many New South Welshmen would later blame David Syme’s The 
Age for the success of Protectionism.6 As the largest State and the State that would make 
the greatest financial sacrifices for federation, both Carruthers and Reid felt that New 
South Wales had a right to the capital and thus to have the largest population be 
unaffected by the tyranny of distance. In accepting that the temporary capital be in 
Melbourne in order that the permanent capital be in New South Wales, Reid would 
ultimately sacrifice his own career for the sake of future generations of New South 
Welshmen. 
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Lyne’s censure motion was directed at Reid’s list, which he complained placed 
conditions on the negotiations. In reality it was just an excuse to test the strength of the 
House, something that the Opposition had been delaying in the absence of Barton but had 
evidently decided they could delay no longer. The division was tight, with the 
Government holding on by only four votes. Though he argued strongly for the 
Government during the censure debate, Carruthers was unable to attend the actual 
division and would have been amply relieved when the Government scraped through. 
Two more censure motions would have to be overcome before the final federation 
negotiations could begin. The first involved a by-election campaign fought between Barton 
and defeated Minister Sydney Smith. The Opposition claimed that during the campaign the 
Secretary for Public Works J. H. Young had acted improperly by receiving a deputation on 
some local works while also canvassing for the candidate. The censure was defeated by six 
votes. A second censure involved the introduction of some small tariffs as a temporary 
revenue raising device. This was of course highly unpalatable for the Free Traders, but 
other measures to improve the Colony’s finances had been blocked by the Legislative 
Council hence Reid was left with little choice.7 The upcoming federation would almost 
inevitably result in a far more substantial tariff at least until the fiscal fight was fought out, 
so the Government could console itself that it was merely jumping the gun. Barton’s 
censure of the Government for bringing up the tariff while federation was yet to be settled 
failed by the large margin of twenty-three votes. 
In late January Reid finally met with the other Premiers to try to iron out the 
perceived problems in the Federal Bill. He was pleasantly surprised at their ameliorative 
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attitude. He wrote confidentially to Carruthers that the meeting had so far been a success 
and that he was having pieces of ‘butter’ crammed down his throat by the other Premiers: 
‘I am very sanguine that we will do some good at the conference. I will aim at 
imitating that quiet, thorough, practical way of working out things which is 
characteristic of you, and to which I am so often indebted for good advice’.8 
 The fact that Reid was keeping Carruthers informed while the secret negotiations 
took place in Melbourne is highly significant. There is a sense that Reid felt that the whole 
federal escapade was something that he had undertaken with the member for St George 
and that at this critical juncture it would have been wrong to leave him out of the loop. 
Through the entire federal campaign Reid had been isolated except for Carruthers. He was 
isolated in a Cabinet that shared even greater concerns about federation than he did. He 
was isolated as one of only three members of the Government in the New South Wales 
delegation. He was also isolated as one of the few delegates who fought hard for 
democratic principles with scant regard for their reputation as ‘federalists’. Carruthers and 
Reid had differed slightly over the referendum campaign, but even then Reid had still 
received the support of his friend. It was this support, along with Carruthers’ good advice 
that made Reid’s principled federal fight possible. It is a shame that we are not informed 
what the advice Carruthers had been giving Reid was, but Carruthers’ influence is clearly 
visible in the amendments that Reid fought for and ultimately in the document that 
became the Australian Constitution. 
 This influence can be seen in the results of the Premier’s Conference. The three-
fifths majority in joint sittings was changed to an absolute majority. Though he had 
defended it during the referendum campaign, the three-fifths principle had never been 
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something Carruthers was entirely satisfied with. His original proposal had included 
referendum provisions to overcome the democratic deficiencies of the three-fifths majority; 
hence the absolute majority was more faithful to the thrust of his amendment. This was 
reinforced by another change adopted by the Premier’s Conference that allowed a 
referendum on a constitutional amendment to be held if it was passed twice by one House 
but blocked by the other. The capital was to be in New South Wales, though 
disappointingly it was to be at least a hundred miles from Sydney. The Braddon Clause was 
limited to ten years while the boundaries of a State were protected against being altered 
without that State’s permission. This last amendment would have satisfied Carruthers’ 
belief in State autonomy. Unfortunately the inland rivers, money bills and judicial appeals 
clauses were left the same but for a pragmatist these were sacrifices worth making. 
 The amended Enabling Bill passed through the Legislative Assembly with relative 
ease, but encountered problems in the Legislative Council. It moved that there should be a 
minimum referendum vote required for adoption, that a minimum of three months should 
elapse between the passing of the Bill and the holding of the referendum and that New 
South Wales should not join the federation until Queensland had. A conference between 
the two Houses was organised to sort out these issues, and Carruthers was elected as one 
of the representatives of the Assembly. On the suggestion of Carruthers, Reid argued that 
instead of having a minimum vote the election should be held over several days to give 
people a greater opportunity to vote.9 The Council would not agree and the conference 
failed to resolve the deadlock. Instead Reid got the Governor to appoint twelve new 
members of the Council and that body eventually gave way. The only amendment it 
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carried was that there should be an eight week delay between the passing of the Bill and 
the referendum. 
 John Ward has suggested that Carruthers ‘was not prominent in the second 
referendum campaign’, but that was not the case.10 He was on the organising committee of 
the United Federal Executive, an amalgamation of the existing federal organisations that 
managed to briefly unite Reid and Barton. Carruthers gave a few prominent speeches in 
Sydney, but his most significant role was preaching the yes case in the countryside. He 
toured the South Coast and the Western districts, and also spoke at Newcastle and in the 
Southern Highlands. With the improvements to the Constitution and considerable 
bipartisan support, the second referendum succeeded in New South Wales and was soon 
successful in most of the other colonies. Parkes’ dream had been carried through by Reid, 
and Carruthers could be satisfied that, posthumous though it was, his two chiefs were 
finally in accord. 
 Carruthers had been balancing his time between the federal campaign and the 
Lands Office, and though the former often took precedence the latter could not be ignored. 
By 1899 there had been a devastating drought in New South Wales that had lasted four 
years. Many claimed that it was the most severe drought in the Colony’s history and its 
effects had been exacerbated by a rabbit plague which had swept through the West. In the 
circumstances many felt that some form of Government intervention was necessary lest 
the closer settlement scheme would fail. Carruthers’ generally small government instincts 
made him reluctant, and he controversially rejected a suggestion to give a blanket five year 
extension to all expiring Crown land leases.11 Eventually deteriorating circumstances 
forced the Minister’s hand, and he introduced a Bill ‘to authorise the raising of a loan for 
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the making of temporary advances to settlers and to provide for the making and 
repayment of such advances’.12 He justified the lending of taxpayer money to farmers 
whilst there were still unemployed in the city by pointing out that agriculture was at the 
heart of the New South Wales economy, and that its success was vital to the success of the 
Colony as a whole. It is important to point out that not only was this to be a loan not a 
hand-out but that it was to be lent out at an interest rate that would cover the rate of the 
initial loan and all costs incidental to the measure. Hence it was hoped that in the long run 
the State’s finances would not be disturbed and the taxpayer would not have to foot any 
bill. 
 Carruthers introduced the Bill hoping that it would be a non-party measure. The 
rurally based Protectionists could not be expected to reject relief for their constituents, 
while it was also not something that the Labor Party would likely abandon the 
Government over. He was surprised then, when the House erupted as he tried to suspend 
the standing orders to rush the urgent Bill through. An argument broke out between two 
National Federalists. The rural member James Carroll supported the Bill, while the city 
representative Henry Copeland came out against it. The argument quickly deteriorated 
into threats of physical violence and Copeland had to be physically restrained as he 
attempted to attack Carroll.13 
 In spite of Copeland’s agitation, the Bill was passed with an overwhelming majority. 
It was to be Carruthers’ last significant act as Minister for Lands. In late June a Cabinet 
reshuffle promoted him to the Treasury, while Reid took up the less arduous position of 
Attorney-General. McMinn argues that Reid forfeited the Treasury in order to give himself 
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more time for political management in an increasingly treacherous House.14 This is likely 
the case, but Carruthers’ promotion also suggests that with federation looming Reid may 
have been designating a successor. Reid’s own ascension had established the elective 
leadership premise within the Free Trade Party, but the support of Reid and experience as 
Treasurer could only help Carruthers’ chances in any internal ballot. 
 Despite the impression of a fresh start given by the Cabinet reshuffle, there were 
clearly troubled waters ahead for the Reid Ministry. The Government’s success meant they 
had exhausted the partisan liberal agenda of 1889 and the distraction of federation had 
encumbered the formulation of anything to replace it. Even if a new agenda could be 
found, it was difficult to imagine how the long serving Ministry could gain the momentum 
to push in another direction. Since the 1898 election, federation had all but assured Reid’s 
position since the democratic line he and Carruthers took on the Constitution had 
encouraged the support of the Labor Party. With that now off the table, interventionist 
National Federalists like Wise and Edward O’Sullivan could offer Labor far more 
concessions than the limited government liberalism of Reid and Carruthers could possibly 
countenance. The Free Traders did propose an Early Closing Bill, Navigation Amendment 
Bill and relief to the victims of mining accidents, but the mild nature of these reforms 
meant they were of little interest to Labor. With a fundamental respect for individual 
freedoms, Reid would not allow himself to be pushed beyond his own limits of 
government intervention. John Rickard has suggested that Reid ‘combined a strong 
advocacy of democratic principles with an orthodox view of political economy’.15 The Free 
Traders had built their alliance with Labor on the former while largely defining themselves 
by the latter. Now that the democratic battles over the land tax and federation had been 
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won and the fight over the Legislative Council had petered out, they found themselves 
with little in common with a Labor Party that was increasingly focused on issues like 
compulsory arbitration. Having lowered tariffs and balanced the budget, the economic 
liberalism of the Free Traders still had a lot to offer the electors in the form of good 
administration, relatively small government and continued economic recovery. The 
election had not been fought over these issues however, and now the Government’s fate 
lay in the hands of those who were least likely to buy such a sales pitch. 
 After a trip to Queensland to promote the adoption of the Federation Bill in the 
northern Colony, Carruthers returned to Sydney in time for the opening of the next 
session of Parliament. It became clear almost immediately how fractious the House had 
become. On 26 July he introduced a Bill seeking two months’ supply for the Government. 
The debate quickly deteriorated into an attempt by the Opposition to prove that the 
Government had been misleading the public over the state of the finances. Their argument 
was that despite frequent assertions of budget surpluses, the independent report of the 
Auditor-General suggested that the Colony was actually in debt. Carruthers was quick to 
point out that the Government’s claim that the budget had been balanced year to year was 
correct, but that some debt carried over from previous administrations still existed. He 
maintained that that debt was being paid off slowly, and that the Opposition were the ones 
who were misleading the public by suggesting that the deficit was a result of the current 
year’s finances.16 It was a baptism of fire for Carruthers’ Treasury credentials and with the 
judicious help of Reid he was able to survive it, showing expert knowledge of the numbers 
despite having only held the position for a month. 
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 Just two weeks later Carruthers delivered his first budget. Meticulously dissecting 
the Auditor-General’s report, he was able to show a surplus in the accounts for the year 
just gone and predict a surplus of twenty thousand pounds for the ensuing year.17 To 
further increase revenue, he proposed to increase probate duties but not to a level greater 
than that of Great Britain or any of her dependencies. He also proposed to force companies 
whose dividends were paid out of earnings from the soil of the Colony to register in the 
Colony so they could thus be taxed. Previously certain businesses registered in Victoria or 
elsewhere who operated in New South Wales only had to pay tax in the place where they 
were registered. These were minor changes that would not greatly increase the burdens of 
the people or hinder business. More radically, Carruthers flagged the creation of a State 
bank as a more permanent version of the Advances to Settlers Act. Though most certainly 
an interventionist creation, this bank was not aimed at competing with private banks but 
helping the nation-building project of closer settlement. 
 Though there was some continued wrangling over the Auditor-General’s report 
and the declared surplus, the bulk of Carruthers’ budget soon faded into the background as 
it was overshadowed by other events. The budget estimates had revealed that the member 
for Paddington J.C. Neild had been paid in advance of appropriation for a report on old age 
pension schemes he had written after conducting research in Europe. Though frowned 
upon, payments in advance of appropriation were not illegal and had been frequently 
resorted to by previous administrations. Members of Parliament receiving Government 
fees was also viewed in a negative light, but again it was something that many members of 
both sides of the House were guilty of. Carruthers, who though the payment had been 
made before he was appointed to his current position was at the heart of the controversy 
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because he was Treasurer, could show that Lyne, Barton and Wise had all received 
payments in the same manner in the past.18 Despite the hypocrisy of making criticisms 
given the situation, the Opposition were keen to use any opportunity they could to try to 
bring down the Government. Knowing that Neild was personally unpopular amongst 
Labor Members, the National Federalists launched an attack that led to a William Lyne 
censure motion which ultimately brought down Reid. 
 The censure motion was the culmination of weeks of scheming, at the heart of 
which was Bernhard Wise.19 Keen to bring down Reid by any means necessary, Wise had 
been pushing the claims of Barton amongst Labor Party Members. With memories of the 
Broken Hill strike that were still surprisingly fresh, Labor would not accept the aristocratic 
ultra-federalist as Premier. Wise eventually realised this and began to move that Barton be 
replaced with Lyne. As a Protectionist who had opposed both the land tax and the 
Federation Bill, Lyne had almost nothing to recommend himself to Wise except the fact 
that he was not George Reid. Given the member for Ashfield’s all-consuming hatred for 
the Premier, that was enough and Barton was convinced to step aside. He may have been 
promised a clear path to the Federal Prime Ministership as an incentive to go quietly.20 
With an intimation that the Opposition would not raise the fiscal issue once in office, Free 
Trade defector John Fegan was also roped into the plot. This ‘party of revenge’, as it was 
described by Carruthers, began lobbying for Labor support both in the debate in the 
Assembly and in the corridors of the House.21 Fegan moved a critical amendment to the 
censure ‘that the present Government does not possess the confidence of the House’, 
adding ‘and deserves censure for having made payments of public money to Mr. J.C. Neild, 
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member for Paddington, without asking Parliament, and contrary to assurances given by 
the right hon. Premier’.22 This amendment was designed to be very difficult for the Labor 
Party to vote against, and if they voted for it they would effectively be censuring the 
Government. 
 Though Wise and Fegan helped to lay the groundwork for Reid’s demise, it was 
the Labor Party that would decide the fate of the Government. Ironically it was the future 
Nationalist leaders William Hughes and William Holman who fought hardest against Reid. 
Hughes was able to gain an undertaking from Lyne that if made Premier he would 
introduce a number of measures that Labor desired, including an Early Closing Bill that 
went much further than Reid’s.23 Hughes took that information into caucus and fought 
hard to convince his colleagues to abandon their partner of five years. After a long debate, 
it allegedly took the threat of resignation by an anti-Reid group known as the ‘solid six’ to 
win the day for Lyne.24 The actions of the solid six are highly controversial. The account of 
their resignation threat comes from contemporary newspaper reports and Reid’s 
autobiography, and is also backed up by a speech from Holman in which he bragged about 
being a member of the solid six and helping to bring down Reid.25 Meanwhile Hughes’ 
account of events denies that a threat of resignation was made and his biographer L.F. 
Fitzhardinge concurs with him.26 Reid and Holman seem more reliable as not only do they 
back each other up but their testimonies were given far closer to the event than the one 
given by an aged Hughes more than forty years later. Nairn concludes that the ‘solid six’ 
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probably did threaten resignation, but that it was ultimately the legislative concessions 
offered by Lyne that proved the telling factor.27 Whatever the exact circumstances, Labor 
cut its ties with Reid and in the final division the Government lost by 75 to 41. 
 Regardless of whether or not it was the ‘solid six’ who really brought down the 
Government, Reid’s account reveals there was an impression amongst the Free Traders 
that a threat of resignation had been successfully used to manipulate caucus, and this 
would have affected their views of the Labor Party. Carruthers was fully aware of who was 
responsible for the Government’s fall. In his last utterance as a member of the Reid 
Ministry he discussed an earlier speech given by McGowen, who though bound by caucus 
to vote against Reid, had referred generously to the achievements of a Government he had 
helped support for five years. Carruthers described it as a ‘eulogy’, the likes of which no 
outgoing government had ever been afforded in such glowing terms.28 Despite this praise, 
he pointed out that McGowen ‘stands here as an opponent of the Government, voting as 
he intends to do to put us out of office’.29 His speech went on to attack Barton and Wise, 
but this hint at the hypocrisy forced upon members of the Labor Party by caucus solidarity 
is of lasting significance. The rumoured actions of the solid six in determining the will of 
caucus were already an open secret. Carruthers had been one of the first to turn against the 
Labor Party and he had always opposed the illiberal system of caucus solidarity that had 
seen the exit of his friend Joseph Cook. This perceived new precedent confirmed and 
exceeded his worst fears. Not only had men been openly forced to vote against their 
conscience, but apparently the controlling will of the Labor caucus had not even been the 
enforced will of the majority. Instead a mere six men had allegedly been able to strong arm 
a caucus fearful of yet another Labor split into adopting their views. From the Free Traders’ 
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perspective this was a tyranny of the minority, absolutely abhorrent to liberalism and even 
to the democratic principles for which Carruthers and Reid had been fighting side by side 
with Labor. The jarring incident would be a telling factor in Carruthers’ eventual decision 
never to work with the Labor Party again. 
 Carruthers was personally aggrieved at the loss of Government, but he was more 
concerned about the blow to his friend and chief. He sent Reid a heartfelt note, to which 
Reid replied ‘your note received yesterday afternoon gives me greater satisfaction than I 
can well express…hope that in the future we may fight together as staunchly and as 
successfully as in the past’.30 It was not long before the two men were fighting together as 
they were not about to let Wise’s ministerial by-election go uncontested. Wise had been 
made Attorney-General in a Lyne Government which had also rewarded Fegan with the 
position of Secretary for Mines and Agriculture. In the Ashfield by-election both Carruthers 
and Reid gave strong speeches in favour of the Free Trade candidate Thomas Bavister. 
Carruthers declared that, though he was generally against contesting ministerial by-
elections, Wise’s political inconsistency meant that the electors deserved another choice. 
Speaking of the amendment to the censure motion that had been crafted by Wise but 
delivered by Fegan, he also claimed that he ‘very much more admired the man who fired 
off that shot than the man who loaded a gun and stood behind the hedge watching the 
effects of the discharge’.31 In the end Wise narrowly avoided getting kicked out of 
Parliament for a third time, holding onto his seat by a mere 21 votes. 
 When Lyne formed his Ministry he appointed himself Colonial Treasurer and 
promptly tried to denounce the previous Government by claiming that the coffers were 
bare. Carruthers was quick to refute their claims, citing the signed statements of two 
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independent accountants to show that with trust funds and loan funds included there was 
£7,358,410 available in the Treasury when he left office, up from a deficit of £508,705 when 
Reid had entered it.32 For a short while this rebuttal put an end to the accusations, but by 
early December Lyne released a budget where he again tried to show that Reid and 
Carruthers had manipulated the figures. In his response Carruthers latched on to an 
assertion by the Premier that there was a £3,000,000 deficit. He was able to point to a 
statement signed by Treasury officials and even the current Treasurer himself which said 
that there was a surplus of £116,000 and also to a worst case reading of the Auditor-
General’s report that showed an overall deficit of only £781,000.33 The vast bulk of the debt 
present in that report, £696,000 worth, was from two obligations undertaken eleven years 
earlier which the Reid Government evidently had nothing to do with. The remainder of 
the discrepancy between the Treasury and the Auditor-General he put down to an 
anomaly in the bookkeeping of the Bank of England requiring a deposit of Government 
money to be in credit for 1 July. This money could be retrieved at a later date; hence it was 
not expenditure even though the Auditor-General took it as such. He thus asserted that the 
cash account system that Reid had brought in in 1895 had been working very successfully 
and suggested that the only way the £3,000,000 deficit could exist was if the Secretary for 
Works Edward O’Sullivan had spent the bulk of it since entering office.34 
 The debate over the public debt was to rage throughout Lyne’s short tenure as 
Premier, but in many ways Carruthers and Reid had already won the argument. Lyne 
commissioned a report by a number of bankers in the hope that they would prove his 
findings, but even they had to concede that the accounts showed a surplus if read 
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according to the Audit (Amendment) Act and the Treasury Bills Deficiency Act.35 The 
report did criticise the policy of using Treasury Bills to cover the deficit left over from 
previous Governments, but as Treasurer Carruthers had already shown that this debt was 
not being swept under the carpet but was being paid off in steady £150,000 increments. 
The Free Traders would be further vindicated when Lyne released his next budget and 
declared a substantial surplus. This they argued showed not only that the Treasury had 
never been significantly in debt in the first place, but also that the Free Trade tariff which 
had yet to be abolished was creating economic growth. Carruthers boasted that ‘the 
Colonial Treasurer has had to stand up here to-night and admit that without one line of 
alteration in the financial policy of his predecessors, without one line of alteration to the 
fiscal policy of the country, we stand in that splendid position that, facing drought, disaster, 
plague expenditure, and military expenditure, we have a booming revenue and a 
substantial surplus’.36 
 There was an inherent tension between the economic conservatism of the older 
members of the Protectionist Party that led Lyne to pursue budget surpluses and the 
economic radicalism of men like O’Sullivan. While the economy continued to grow this 
tension could be kept in check, as O’Sullivan’s increases in Public Works spending could be 
hidden behind a growing revenue stream, but once the economy soured differences would 
be exaggerated. Already the Government suffered from a fundamental lack of a coherent 
ideology. It was a Protectionist ministry that had promised not to raise the fiscal issue and a 
National Federalist ministry that no longer had the federation issue to hold it together. In 
these circumstances a minority of radicals who possessed a clear ideology were slowly able 
to gain the upper hand. In the short term this strengthened the Government’s alliance with 
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the Labor Party, but in the long term it hurt them at the ballot box. After all, those who 
wanted radical policies were still going to vote for Labor, while those who preferred a 
more limited style of government would be left with little choice but to vote for the Free 
Trade Liberals.  
Central to the Protectionist-Labor alliance were the commitments Lyne had made 
during the backroom negotiations which had brought him to power. It was not long 
before one of the more important of these commitments was fulfilled, as the Government 
introduced its Early-Closing Bill (No.2). This Bill introduced a strict six o’clock closing time 
for shops most days of the week, and even earlier closing on Saturdays. Carruthers 
objected to both the rigid nature of the Bill, and the fact that it would only affect the 
metropolitan and the Newcastle shopping district. He argued that if early closing were a 
good principle it should be good for the whole Colony and not just certain sections of it.37 
He did not highlight the fact that those areas to be affected were Labor districts, while the 
rural seats of many Protectionists were to be left alone, but he did suggest that early 
closing would be particularly problematic in suburban areas where people needed to shop 
after work. Throughout the committee stages, Reid and Carruthers repeatedly tried to 
water down the Bill to ensure that it was less detrimental to individual freedoms. Such 
efforts would be to no avail, but the fact that they attempted it in the face of frequent 
assertions that they were trying to kill the Bill shows that the two men had moved on from 
trying to win Labor support and were gravitating towards an ever more independent 
position. 
Soon after the introduction of the Early-Closing Bill, events in South Africa were to 
overshadow domestic politics. Earlier in the year a conflict had broken out between British 
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colonials and the Boer Republics. Though initially confident of a swift victory, the British 
had suffered a number of setbacks and their colonial possessions had thus been endangered. 
The deteriorating military situation prompted a decision by the New South Wales Premier 
to equip and dispatch a force to South Africa. Like most of his parliamentary colleagues, 
Carruthers came out firmly in favour of the motion. He argued that such a response was 
the result of cool headed thinking, not jingoistic hysteria. He reasoned that the joint 
security of the Empire, which Australia relied on for her own defence, was at stake and 
might crumble if the series of disasters the British had endured continued.38 He also 
pointed out that while Britain’s navy was her great strength, her land forces were not as 
well accomplished and since this was a land war Australia’s help was especially needed. 
 Though he supported the Boer war, the member for St George was not reflexively 
militaristic. In July the next year Lyne proposed to send a contingent of troops to China to 
help put down the Boxer rebellion. The rebellion threatened a British ‘sphere of influence’ 
rather than a Colony and Carruthers came out against it. He pointed out that no war had 
been declared, the Imperial Government had not asked for help and that the great powers 
of the world stood in line with Britain and hence there was no real danger. He went on to 
argue that ‘it is a very dangerous thing in these small and young countries to excite the 
warlike ardour of the people unless there is a great occasion for that stance to be taken’, a 
reference to the ugly side of jingoism that had revealed itself with the outbreak of the Boer 
war.39 An expedition would be wasteful both in terms of lives and money, to spend large 
sums of which ‘on un-called-for expeditions, is practically depriving the taxpayers of what 
they have a right to expect from the Parliament – a rigid protection of the revenues of the 
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colony’.40 Carruthers was isolated in his liberal stance and absented himself from the 
House as the question was resolved with an overwhelming majority. 
 The act of federation had not been completed with the success of the federal 
referendum in New South Wales and elsewhere. For that to be achieved the Constitution 
still needed to pass the Imperial Parliament. This would not be a simple task for the 
Imperial Government had already expressed a number of concerns in secret memoranda 
given to Reid during his 1897 visit to England.41 Pre-empting some difficulties, a Premiers’ 
conference held in early 1900 appointed a delegation to travel to the Mother Country and 
urge the passage of the Bill. Each Colony was given only one representative, and inevitably 
Edmund Barton was appointed as the New South Wales delegate. The limited number of 
delegates meant that the multiplicity of views which had been a defining part of the 
Constitutional Conventions would not be represented in England. This would be most 
evident in the fight over clause 74, which dealt with appeals to the Privy Council. 
 The delegation arrived in England determined to have the Bill passed as it currently 
stood. The Imperial Government, chiefly represented by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies Joseph Chamberlain, was equally determined to see some changes. The most 
controversial issue was clause 74, with the Crown Law Office determined to protect the 
Royal Prerogative to grant a special leave of appeal to Her Majesty in Council.42 This was 
substantially the same as the amendment Carruthers and Joseph Abbott had supported at 
the Melbourne Convention, and the Imperial Government justified it by arguing that a 
united Empire needed a single highest court of appeal and pointing to Canadian precedent. 
In rejecting this amendment the delegation spoke as if the whole of Australia opposed any 
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changes to the clause, ignoring the fact that the Convention had been highly divided over 
this issue. This prompted Carruthers, who had been closely following events in England, 
to weigh in on the debate. He sent a letter to The Times in London, which declared that 
rejection of clause 74 would not offend Australian sensibilities, nor would it delay the 
accomplishment of federation.43 Back at home he elaborated his position. He pointed to 
the fact that of the great many petitions the Federal Conventions had received not one had 
asked for removal of Privy Council appeals and that the convention itself had been 
contradictory on the issue, initially rejecting Privy Council appeals in all cases except 
interpretation of the Constitution and then entirely inverting its position. Beyond the 
constitutional interpretation issue, he argued that the Constitution as it currently stood left 
the Federal Parliament with the power to end Privy Council appeals altogether, something 
that could undermine the confidence of the British investors which Australia’s economy 
relied upon. He maintained that it was a ‘shallow argument’ that Australia should be able 
to interpret its own laws when the vast majority of its laws were British common law.44 He 
summed up by quoting Edmund Burke, ‘change is an ill-omen to happy ears’.45 
The Burke quote is highly revealing. Essentially Carruthers was contending that if 
the system was not broken it did not need fixing and that change for change’s sake was 
both illogical and dangerous. Such sentiment is a central part of the melding of liberalism 
and conservatism in Australian politics. Carruthers saw traditional British institutions, 
which through long struggles had evolved to become more liberal over time, as a 
safeguard of the individual freedoms which were essential to his ideological outlook. As a 
liberal he felt that these institutions would and should continue to evolve, but to throw 
them away entirely would be to unnecessarily discard a safety net. As a student of history 
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Carruthers also felt that freedom was not inevitable or innate, and rightly or wrongly he 
did not see the same level of liberty in countries which did not have the British institutions 
he was trying to protect. It is worth noting that Burke’s writings also justified the existence 
of political parties based on shared principles, and it appears they influenced Carruthers 
considerably. 
Carruthers’ intervention in the last stage of the federal battle would prove 
unsuccessful. In the end it was the Imperial Government and not the delegation which 
backed down. Despite creative suggestions of compromise such as introducing colonial 
members of the Privy Council, clause 74 was left as the Melbourne Convention had 
controversially shaped it. Barton won the day and would later receive his reward when he 
was elevated to the first bench of the High Court. With the last obstacle overcome, 
Federation finally received Royal Assent on 9 July. 
Preparations for the first federal election began before the Constitution had even 
passed the Imperial Parliament. Early in 1900 an attempt was made to create a national free 
trade association to coordinate the upcoming fiscal fight. This saw a reuniting of McMillan 
and Bruce Smith with the main body of the Free Traders, but Bernhard Wise stayed aloof. 
As a member of what was essentially a Protectionist Government, he concocted the 
argument that a fiscal fight might wreck the Constitution in its early years of operation and 
hence he advocated a fiscal truce.46 Though certainly no advocate of a fiscal truce, initially 
Reid also kept his distance from the attempt to create an extra-parliamentary organisation. 
It is likely that he did not want to appear to be presupposing a position of leadership in the 
national movement, and he was able to rely on Carruthers’ presence to steer the 
organisation down his desired path. After a preliminary meeting which received the 
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written support of the member for St George, an Australian Free Trade Conference was 
arranged to be held over several days in Sydney. Delegations from New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland and South Australia all attended, while Carruthers expressed regret at 
the absence of Tasmania. 
Carruthers would play a prominent role throughout the conference. He 
successfully stressed unity as the meeting threatened to tear itself apart over whether it 
should advocate a low tariff or no tariff at all. In such circumstances the fringe single taxers 
once again reared their heads, but they were unsuccessful and the conference left its 
definition of free trade vague enough to appeal to both moderates and hardliners. 
Carruthers’ most important action was to move a motion stating that the purpose of the 
organisation ‘shall be to ensure commercial freedom and the application of other liberal 
principles for the benefit of the people of the Australian Commonwealth’.47 The 
connection of commercial freedom to liberalism makes it clear that these ‘liberal principles’ 
were intended to connote limited government, rather than the interventionist 
interpretation of liberalism prevalent in some of the other Colonies.  
Carruthers’ insistence that the organisation propagate a broad liberal philosophy as 
well as a fiscal position led to it being called the Australian Free Trade and Liberal 
Association, a reference to the defunct experiment of 1889. Though the specifics of a 
program had yet to be defined, Carruthers was trying to connect free trade to a wider 
liberal agenda as had been achieved in New South Wales. The problem was that on the 
national stage the distillation of a crystallised ‘liberalism’ from loose theory would prove 
even more difficult than it had been in the Mother Colony. With regional and cultural 
differences further complicating what was already a controversial process, it would 
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ultimately take years for circumstance and negotiation to produce a unified and stable 
‘Liberal Party’ in the new Parliament. The AFTLA would be successful in setting up 
divisions in most States of the Commonwealth, but an attempt to unify them through a 
National Council ultimately came to nothing.48 
Under the auspices of the AFTLA, a large demonstration was held in December 
1900 which saw Carruthers, Reid, McMillan and Bruce Smith stand united on the same 
platform for the first time in years. Carruthers used the occasion to launch an attack on the 
notion that the fiscal fight would endanger the Constitution. He argued that the presence 
of the ultra-federalist McMillan proved these scare tactics false and assailed Wise ‘who won 
prominence on his espousal of free trade principles’ for his absence from the Free Trade 
camp.49 Led by the casual Protectionist Barton, the Protectionists had already begun 
downplaying their fiscal identity and had omitted any mention of it in the title of their 
Australian Liberal Association.50 
More than two months after the demonstration and with the federal election fast 
approaching Carruthers announced his intentions regarding the contest. Up until that point 
it had been almost universally assumed that he would stand for a federal seat. This logical 
assumption was based on the fact that he had been a federal delegate, a founder of the 
AFTLA and appeared to have already begun his electioneering. Newspapers initially had 
him down for the theoretical seat of Cronulla, but when that entity did not eventuate he 
was said to be a certainty for the seat of Lang which included his stronghold of Kogarah. It 
would prove to be a very safe Free Trade seat which would not fall into Labor hands until 
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1928. Despite being assured of victory, Carruthers shocked the Australian political world 
by deciding not to stand. 
This was one of the most important decisions of Carruthers’ life and understanding 
the reasons why he made it is critical since it would forever change Australian and New 
South Wales political history. The explanation Carruthers gave reporters was that his 
private business commitments demanded too much of his attention to allow his taking part 
in political matters.51 He had been able to juggle business and politics when it came to 
Colonial Parliament, so it was the capital site which New South Welshmen had 
temporarily sacrificed which forced this decision. Business was likely only part of the 
reason why Carruthers gave up his federal aspirations. After all, Reid was in a similar 
financial predicament and he was able to balance his commitments and head to Melbourne, 
even if these commitments did jeopardise his ultimate political success. There is some 
suggestion that Carruthers had his eye on the Premiership. This is certainly plausible. As 
someone who had fought hard for the autonomy of the States he would have been well 
aware that theoretically State Parliaments still had at least as many powers and 
responsibilities as their federal counterpart. With Reid, Lyne and Barton exiting the stage 
Carruthers could be confident that his political acumen could bring him to the top of 
Parliamentary ladder. On the other hand he would have known that the federal leadership 
would inevitably come with more prestige and since he was more than a decade younger 
than Reid he could afford to wait it out behind his talented chief. Beverley Earnshaw has 
suggested that it was Carruthers’ poor health and young wife that informed his decision.52 
Once again this is a likely scenario as Alice may have already persuaded him not to become 
Agent-General because of a disinclination to move. The death of Jack would have also 
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heightened his desire to spend as much time as possible with his family, something that 
long trips south would have surely hindered. It is intriguing how late Carruthers left the 
decision, making his announcement a little over a month out from the ballot after the 
election campaign had well and truly begun. In December a noticeably torn Carruthers 
had told Barton of his ‘hope’ to be in the Federal Parliament but warned him that it may 
not be possible.53 He clearly did not find the decision to be an easy one. 
As with most important historical events it is likely that a number of factors, some 
of which we will never know, combined to determine Carruthers’ choice. In many ways it 
was a choice which confined him to the historical footnotes, as though his important role 
had yet to reach its crescendo, the regional setting of the rest of his story has largely 
obscured it from academic view. This is in spite of the fact that the rest of his career would 
have a greater impact on national politics than those of many federal ministers. In the short 
to medium term the person who would be most affected by Carruthers’ absence from 
federal politics was George Reid. The value of Reid’s first lieutenant in paving the way for 
the success of his Premiership is difficult to exaggerate. Though Reid was certainly the 
senior figure in the relationship, the two men had been partners in public and private 
politics since Parkes’ exit in 1891. Their colleague A.B. Piddington once wrote: 
‘Reid was a man with hundreds of friends but no friendship. When it came to any 
crisis involving a profound choice, I doubt whether there was anyone to whom 
Reid would instinctively turn as a man does to an intimate friend for counsel. Yet 
no man needed intimate friendship more, because the singular thing about him 
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was that, when isolated from immediate contact with affairs, he was apt to make 
egregious errors in judgment’.54 
If Reid ever experienced true friendship he experienced it with Carruthers. 
Unfortunately for the historian, the friends’ relationship was so close that little formal 
correspondence between them survives for they generally spoke in person, over the 
telephone or through handwritten notes. A few of these notes survive and they are enough 
to glimpse the fact that Carruthers was Reid’s counsel of the type Piddington described. 
Distance and busy lives meant that after federation they would steadily drift apart and the 
‘egregious errors in judgment’ notably absent for much of Reid’s Premiership would 
increase. It would take Reid years to find a federal political deputy who could come close 
to filling Carruthers’ shoes. In 1906 he would settle on Joseph Cook but by that time the 
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T  
 
 
The Political Wilderness 
 
Carruthers’ role in the first federal election campaign did not end with his decision to 
remain in State politics. He continued to campaign hard in the seat of Lang, though now 
he advocated the election of the Free Trade candidate Francis McLean rather than himself. 
McLean was the State member for Marrickville who after Carruthers’ withdrawal had 
seized upon the chance to represent his local constituency in Federal Parliament. Whether 
Carruthers’ decision had been at all influenced by his colleague’s desire to stand for Lang is 
difficult to tell, though it is certain that if the member for St George wanted the seat it 
would have been his. Carruthers’ campaigning was not limited to his locality as he also 
delivered a speech at a mass rally the night before the election. In New South Wales the 
poll saw a great victory for the Free Traders, particularly in the Senate where they won 
five of the six seats on offer. Elsewhere, weak Free Trade organisations found it impossible 
to overcome the advantages given to the Protectionists by their unelected incumbency and 
Barton held on to the Prime Ministership which had originally been given to him by the 
Governor-General. 
The election devastated the ranks of the New South Wales Parliament. Eighteen 
members ascended to the federal chambers, as all three major parties lost many of their 




leading men. The list included Barton, Reid, Lyne, Hughes, Watson, Cook and Dugald 
Thomson, to name just some of those whose absence would be noticeable. Not all who 
tried succeeded in moving up however. Two important failures were Labor leader James 
McGowen and Bernhard Wise. McGowen narrowly lost to the Free Trade candidate in 
South Sydney. Meanwhile, despite his prominence, Wise once again proved he was not 
personally popular amongst electors by comfortably losing the seat of Canobolas to the 
Labor candidate. Not only had the ranks of the New South Wales Parliament been thinned, 
but that body’s role had fundamentally changed. It lost the power to make laws on tariffs 
and defence, but it also had to contend with its new position ‘below’ the national 
Parliament. Though it retained residual powers greater than its new counterpart, the State 
Parliament had undeniably lost some of its autonomy and prestige. The extent of these 
losses and how they would affect the nature of politics remained to be seen. Many 
departments and properties such as the post office had to be handed over, and the State 
Government was left with the expectation it would contract in size to reflect its newly 
reduced role. Despite some clear expectations much remained murky and a palpable sense 
of confusion gripped those whose actions would determine the practical workings of a 
bare-boned Constitution. 
When Lyne left the Premiership he was replaced by John See in what was a 
relatively painless transfer of power. See was a long-time friend of Carruthers and despite 
their fiscal differences the two men had much in common both personally and politically. 
The son of a poor farm labourer, See was a self-made man of the type Carruthers admired. 
Such was the respect in which Carruthers held the new Premier that See’s biographer, 
Keith Henry, decided to introduce his subject with a quote from the member for St 




George.1 The two men shared a rejection of class based politics and a belief that business 
was generally best left unregulated. Where they differed was over See’s belief in ‘material 
progress’, something that he felt could be achieved through Government spending for 
national development purposes. Henry suggests that this belief was the defining principle 
of See’s politics, and that See was willing to increase both debt and taxation in order to 
achieve it.2 Carruthers also believed in material progress as evidenced by his untiring 
support for closer settlement, but he also believed that debt and high taxation threatened 
rather than helped that progress. As Premier See would fail to exercise much control over 
his Ministers, and this meant that while spending would prove a hallmark of his 
Government, those principles which he shared with Carruthers would have little impact 
on Ministerial policy. 
See became Premier at a time when the fiscal issue had theoretically been removed 
from State politics and parliamentary talent had been greatly thinned. With these facts in 
mind, he came up with the idea of forming a coalition Ministry out of the best men from 
each of the Parties on the basis of an abstract principle of good government. The New 
South Wales Free Trade Party had yet to replace Reid as leader, so instead of broaching the 
idea with the Leader of the Opposition he instead approached individual Free Trade 
members. McGowen was also contacted, but due to the rules of his Party he was never any 
chance of his accepting a portfolio.  
One of the first people to be approached was Carruthers who was open to the idea 
of a coalition. He spoke to Reid about it, but the two men met in a crowded public place 
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and the loud noise led to a fundamental misunderstanding.3 When Carruthers told Reid 
that he had been approached from the other side, Reid took it that he had been approached 
about the Leadership of the Opposition not a coalition, hence he did not advise Carruthers 
to reject the overtures. Assuming he had his leader’s tacit support, Carruthers began to 
negotiate with See over the Easter long weekend. When he sought further advice, Reid 
was out of town and could not be reached. Carruthers then spoke to several Free Trade 
members including James Ashton and John Garland, all of whom intimated that a coalition 
was a good idea and worth pursuing.4 Carruthers finally heard from Reid on Easter 
Saturday, receiving a wire which said ‘prefer not to advise. Suggest consulting party, all 
leading members thereof’.5 It was later revealed that Reid was firmly against a coalition 
and it is likely that he only decided not to advise breaking off the negotiations since, due to 
the earlier misunderstanding, they had already progressed too far for him to directly 
intervene. After all he was now a federal member who theoretically should not have been 
in control of the State Party and was thus wary of being seen as pulling the strings. Reid 
had been backed into a corner by circumstance and at this critical moment he let his friend 
down. Carruthers would later lament the ambivalent response since Reid had ‘frequently 
in times of stress and trial sought my advice and got it freely’.6 
Having received Reid’s reply Carruthers, who had already consulted all the leading 
Free Traders he could get hold of, continued his discussions with See and was able to get 
an agreement that four Free Trade members would be included in the Cabinet. One of the 
Free Traders proposed was Brunker, who caught a train into Sydney and held discussions 
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with Carruthers, Reid and Charles Lee. 7 Reid showed consistency by not advising Brunker 
either way, and the latter made up his own mind and informed See that he could not 
accept a portfolio.8 Brunker’s decision wrecked the project and negotiations were broken 
off. Throughout the discussions the Daily Telegraph, Sydney Morning Herald and Evening 
News had all come out against the coalition which they argued would unjustifiably prop 
up the existing Ministry and hurt the Federal Free Trade Party. When the scheme fell 
through the press and aggravated Free Traders made Carruthers the scapegoat for the fact 
that it was attempted in the first place. He was forced to justify painstakingly his actions 
through the series of speeches and newspaper interviews which inform the account of 
events just given. 
The public account is corroborated by a frantic telegram and letter from Reid 
which survive in Carruthers’ papers. In these the misunderstanding is discussed, and it is 
clear that both men are aware that the recent events have gravely impacted on Carruthers’ 
chances of inheriting the leadership. A regretful Reid wrote that he considered Carruthers 
‘the most capable leader that the party could elect’.9 The debacle made it clear that the 
Free Trade Party needed to elect a new leader as soon as possible, but Reid made sure that 
his official retirement from the leadership and the subsequent election took place at 
separate meetings in order to give Carruthers a chance to regroup his position. The 
damage had already been done however, and Carruthers had no real hope of re-
establishing himself in time. The leadership election took place on 16 April. According to 
one account Carruthers was nominated by Thomas Jessop but knowing that he could not 
succeed refused to stand.10 Ashton and Brunker also refused their nominations, and in the 
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end Charles Lee, who had been one of the firmest opponents of the coalition, was elected 
unopposed. 
Though See could hardly have planned the results, the abortive coalition could not 
have been more beneficial to the Protectionists or more detrimental to the Free Traders. 
The Free Trade Party had been torn asunder, with deep divisions exposed to the voting 
public. Worse still, Reid’s logical replacement and one of the most talented politicians in 
the State Parliament had been barred from the leadership. Instead a mundane roads-and-
bridges member had been elected in his place, a man so uninspiring that the Freeman’s 
Journal was left to speculate that Carruthers’ supporters had elected Lee as a deliberate 
stop gap knowing that he would fail.11 Carruthers would later recall that while he and Lee 
were ‘strong personal friends’, his new leader was ‘not a fighter’.12 The Ministry’s position, 
which should have been extremely tentative given the success of the State’s Free Traders 
in the federal election, was thus consolidated. 
While the consequences of the attempt to form a coalition are relatively clear, one 
question is far more difficult to answer. That is why, regardless of Reid’s advice, did 
Carruthers want to pursue a coalition? Any answer must be largely speculative as the man 
himself provides us with few clues. Certainly the abstract notion of good government 
which motivated See also helped to convince Carruthers. See was his friend, as was fellow 
Protectionist Thomas Waddell. Carruthers may have thought that with four Free Traders 
in Cabinet the Protectionists could be steered down a limited government path and that 
their interventionist instincts could be curbed. Indeed, he may have hoped that in such a 
combination the undesirable elements of the Labor Party could be marginalised as could 
the big government and conservative wings of both fiscal parties, resulting in a more 
                                                          
11 ‘The Political Situation’, Freeman’s Journal, Saturday 20/4/1901, p.13. 
12 Joseph Carruthers, A Lifetime in Conservative Politics, p.160. 




liberal Parliament than that which existed before the coalition. John Haynes and William 
Mahony later suggested that the coalition was intended to ‘dish’ both Labor and O’Sullivan, 
though their accounts are controversial and Carruthers denied them.13 John Rickard has 
asserted that McMillan’s support for the proposed coalition suggests that it was intended to 
be anti-Labor, but his support could easily be attributed to his position as a former 
National Federalist Free Trader.14 It is likely that Carruthers’ business commitments which 
had so recently kept him out of federal politics also informed his decision, since he would 
have to spend less time in a coalition House provided that coalition continued to pursue 
his liberal goals. What is clear is that, despite the fact that he would be a convinced Free 
Trader his entire life, Carruthers did not buy into the argument that the fiscal issue should 
arbitrarily be kept alive in State politics so that the Legislative Assembly could be a training 
ground for federal Free Trade politicians. For someone who believed in the continued 
importance of the States, the New South Wales Government still had far too many 
responsibilities to allow that distraction to get in the way of meaningful legislation. 
If the abortive coalition was not intended to be anti-Labor, then it potentially 
represented the last gasp of the factional era. That era had been characterised by shifting 
alliances and broad coalitions of the kind a coming together of Carruthers and See would 
have represented. Throughout the negotiations it appears that Carruthers viewed himself 
primarily as an individual member with political friendships and alliances, rather than the 
committed representative of a Party. This viewpoint was largely the product of the 
temporary death of his Party’s central premise, but it echoed the approach of an earlier pre-
fiscal and pre-party age. As has already been discussed, Carruthers saw significant problems 
with the functioning of the three-party system during the 1890s and the grand coalition 
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may have been intended to overcome these issues by overcoming the party system itself. 
There were some major problems with this idea. Firstly the members of the Labor Party 
could not be expected to adhere to the liberal-individualist ideals of an earlier age, while 
socialist proposals also suggested the necessity of unified opposition. Secondly, the 
negative reaction of the press and the broader public to the coalition proposals showed that 
partisanship had progressed to a stage where broad concord would no longer be accepted 
by the electorate. For these reasons Carruthers’ flirtation with the idea of a grand coalition 
was fleeting and he soon re-embraced partisanship and party which had otherwise been 
central to his political career. 
When See’s elaborate plans fell through he was forced to construct a Ministry out 
of his existing Protectionist supporters. In essence it would be a continuation of the Lyne 
Government, with the notable inclusion of Thomas Waddell as State Treasurer. A 
pastoralist with a keen interest in the business side of his enterprise, Waddell had long been 
friends with Carruthers and generally sympathised with his small-government outlook. 
Apart from the Premier and Treasurer the two most conspicuous members of the Ministry 
would be the Minister for Lands Paddy Crick and the Secretary for Public Works Edward 
O’Sullivan.  The former was a notorious drunkard and gambler who, partly because of 
these traits, proved to be one of the most boisterous members to ever haunt the Macquarie 
Street bear garden. Slightly more tactful but nevertheless powerful, O’Sullivan had long 
occupied the leftward fringe of the Protectionist Party. During the Reid years that group 
had suffered from their Party’s association with the conservative Legislative Council, but 
the alliance with Labor had helped to re-energize them.  
Given a Ministry by Lyne partly because of his affinity with the Labor Party, 
O’Sullivan had begun a controversial spending program that would accelerate under See in 




the face of drought and unemployment. The motivation for the program was proto-
Keynesian, as O’Sullivan believed that public works day-labour could ‘promote economic 
activity and create employment’.15 Carruthers would take the opposite view that the 
effects of the debt involved in such a program, and the concerns it raised amongst private 
investors, harmed rather than helped the New South Wales economy. While Carruthers 
did not oppose putting the unemployed to productive work for humanitarian reasons 
temporarily, he believed that the continuous use of such a system would degrade people 
by making them entirely reliant on the Government. Hence, as a threat to individualism, 
Carruthers had an ideological and to some extent moral objection to the program that 
went hand in hand with his financial objections.16 Over time the budgetary and economic 
consequences of the public works program would become one of the central issues of State 
politics and, because O’Sullivan was seen as a ‘Labor’ influence within the Government, 
this debate would help to accelerate a Liberal-Labor political realignment. 
The House had not sat since early December, and the former and current Premiers 
were facing severe criticism for allegedly running the Government as their own personal 
dictatorship free from parliamentary responsibility. In the face of these attacks See flagged 
a June election for a July sitting, excusing the continued delay on account of a visit by the 
Duke of York to Sydney. The big question both fiscal Parties would have to face before the 
election was how were they going to restyle themselves now that their defining policy had 
been removed from State control. Pushed on by the desire of the press not to let the fiscal 
issue die, Lee avoided a whole scale reconstruction of the Free Trade Party. He did pick up 
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the liberal ideology that had long been attached to his side of politics and renamed the 
Opposition the Liberal Party, but he lacked a clear vision as to how to turn liberalism into 
the raison d'être for a political party. Carruthers was noticeably less faithful to his new 
leader than he had been to his old and part of the reason for this may have been Lee’s 
failure to produce a crystallised liberal agenda. Reid himself had found it difficult to re-
energise liberalism following his tremendous successes and New South Wales politics was 
in a bit of a holding pattern following federation, so it was perhaps the magnitude of the 
task rather than a personal failing of Lee which produced this stagnation. Nevertheless, 
there is a sense that Carruthers felt that he knew how to adapt liberalism into a convincing 
electoral position and wanted to be in charge at this pivotal juncture. 
The Liberals were not the only party undergoing an existential crisis. The 
Protectionists also needed to create a post-fiscal identity. They decided to restyle 
themselves as the Progressives with the establishment of the Political Progressive 
Association. While the concept of liberalism was certainly open to interpretation, 
progressivism was almost entirely free of inherent ideological meaning. What was progress 
was entirely subjective, and See’s ‘material progress’ did not necessarily correlate with 
what O’Sullivan, who largely ran the PPA, meant by the word. 
Though he had failed to capture the leadership, Carruthers was not prepared to 
take a back seat whilst Lee’s free trade Liberals tried to reimagine themselves. A little over 
a week after the leadership contest the member for St George took the initiative and 
delivered his own personal program as to what the Liberal Party should become. In a 
controversial speech at Rockdale he rejected the idea of using the fiscal issue to coast 
towards an easy election victory. Instead he proposed a fresh liberal agenda consisting of 
sound public finance, a comprehensive system of local government, Upper House reform, 




water conservation, the establishment of a State bank, the extension of technical education 
and the creation of mining schools.17 He paid tribute to the way the Lyne-See Government 
had handled the Boer war and had instituted old age pensions, but he differentiated himself 
from them by attacking their extravagant spending. He argued that the revenue had been 
artificially inflated through the rents created by the resumption of Darling Harbour, while 
the interest due to those whose properties had been resumed had yet to be paid; hence the 
State was in a far worse financial situation than it initially appeared. He also questioned the 
creation of honorary Ministers without Parliamentary approval, suggesting that it was 
unconstitutional. 
While Carruthers was expected to make such attacks on the Government, he also 
called his own leader into question by suggesting that he was not committed to the 
reduction of State members. This was a popular issue which, following on from cost saving 
suggestions Carruthers had made during the federation campaign, sought a reduction in 
the members of the Legislative Assembly based on the fact  that it now held fewer 
responsibilities. Carruthers was keen to use this opportunity for electoral reform to 
decrease the discrepancy between the number of electors in rural and city seats, but Lee, 
who represented a rural constituency, had made some statements defending the existing 
imbalance to which the former drew attention. Carruthers also questioned what he saw as 
Lee’s condemnation of a seven shillings a day minimum wage on public works, a system 
which had been introduced by Reid Minister J.H. Young and extended by O’Sullivan. This 
was something that Carruthers supported, provided that it was ensured that each man 
receiving it did a full day’s work and provided that the work was necessary and did not 
draw labourers required in the country into the city.  
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In response to the Rockdale speech Lee defended himself in the Sydney Morning 
Herald and suggested that ‘candid critics are generally admitted to be doubtful friends’.18 
Many followed his lead and began to call Carruthers’ loyalty into question. Rather than 
commit an act of simple disloyalty, it is likely that Carruthers was trying to make the tail 
wag the dog and control the direction his Party was travelling from its rear ranks. For the 
moment he was not about to make the mistake of following Wise and McMillan’s path of 
outright independence and he soon reconciled himself with his leader. 
If Carruthers’ intention was to shape the Liberal Party’s platform then he largely 
succeeded in his goal. When Lee later delivered his election manifesto he committed 
himself to ending wasteful expenditure, reducing the number of members, municipal 
reform, the extension of technical education and water conservation.19 While Lee’s 
program resembled Carruthers’, it was also almost identical to that delivered by See. With 
the fiscal issue gone both fiscal Parties continued to search almost blindly for a unique 
agenda and while the financial issue that would be central to the next election was already 
there, it had not yet reached such a dire point as to allow Lee to define himself by it in the 
way that Carruthers later would. The similarities between ‘tweedle-See’ and ‘tweedle-Lee’ 
were exaggerated by the fact that they were both rural members, hence even the old city-
country divide that had underpinned much of the fiscal division largely faded into the 
background.20 Many of those manifesto points which Lee had not borrowed from 
Carruthers focused on rural interests such as the appointment of a Minister for Agriculture. 
While the votes of the powerful Farmers’ and Settlers’ Association were important, there 
was no underlying ideology that could connect these reforms to an overall ‘philosophy of 
Government’ to be conveyed to the electors. 
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In spite of their public spat, Carruthers was too important to Lee’s election chances 
to be left out of the campaign. When a Liberal Executive Committee was formed to help 
select candidates, arbitrate disputes and preach the liberal message, Carruthers was given 
an important position on it. Reflecting the desire of the press and others to keep the fiscal 
issue alive in State politics, the LEC was directly tied to the AFTLA. The problems of 
preselection which had always proved a great difficulty for the Party would be particularly 
acute in 1901. This was because of the great divisions amongst its supporters, including 
splits over the attempted coalition, the importance of the fiscal issue and the return of a 
number of anti-Reid Free Traders into the Party fold. In these circumstances Lee simply 
did not command the respect required to enforce unity and despite the efforts of senior 
members like Carruthers, vote splitting would cost the Liberals more seats than ever 
before. 
The organisational failings of the Liberals contrasted strongly with the Progressives 
who fought what was arguably their best run campaign. Bruce Mansfield has argued that it 
was the organisational brilliance of O’Sullivan that won the Progressives the election in the 
face of fierce press opposition.21 While O’Sullivan’s role was important, the key to the 
election result was Lee’s failure to inspire people enough to unseat incumbents. The 
Liberals lost a number of seats to vote splitting in the city, but it was their failure to make 
significant inroads in the country despite Lee’s rural focus that ultimately cost them the 
election. Even Mansfield admits that O’Sullivan’s quasi-socialist spending failed to win 
many votes in the city, so once again it was the over represented country seats that gave 
the Progressives their foothold.22 The Progressives did not have it all their own way in the 
country as many disillusioned Protectionists ended up voting for independents or Labor, 
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but as long as these protest votes did not fall to the Liberals they were not going to affect 
the balance of power. ‘Tweedle-See’ proved to be just as unimpressive as ‘tweedle-Lee’, for 
despite holding onto Government the Progressive vote was significantly down on the 
National Federal vote of 1898. 
The big winners from the election were the Labor Party who had capitalised on 
their opponents’ lack of direction and poor leadership. Labor effectively won 24 seats, the 
Progressives 41 and the Liberals 37.23 The weakness of the former fiscal Parties also led to a 
large number of independents being elected. Despite holding fewer seats, the Liberals 
received 33.32% of the popular vote to the Progressives 22.08%, which to men like 
Carruthers was a clear indication of the need for further electoral reform. In St George, 
Carruthers once again received almost 70% of the vote. Significantly, for the first time in 
years his local opponent was not a Progressive candidate but a Labor Party man. This was 
a glimpse at the fact that in the city at least, elections were already on the road to 
becoming a Liberal-Labor contest. 
In the election post-mortem some thought that the Liberals should have pushed 
Free Trade harder in order to achieve a victory. The Evening News held this opinion, and 
criticised Carruthers’ role in the ‘sinking’ the fiscal issue.24 Others thought the opposite, 
and suggested that Lee’s Free Trade fight had failed proving that the fiscal issue was now 
dead in State politics. Carruthers himself was not about to fall back from his position, and 
immediately after the election he pointed to a new non-fiscal path by launching an attack 
on the disproportionate influence of the Labor Party who continued to hold the balance of 
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power. Criticising the Ministerialists for allegedly letting Labor direct their agenda while 
most of them were philosophically closer to the Liberals, he insisted that the Parties: 
‘must fairly represent the opinions of the people according to well-defined lines of 
cleavage, because they will then ensure that all public questions shall be decided on 
the broad principles that underlie them, and not on the question of placating a 
minority in or out of Parliament…I believe in Party Government. I believe it is the 
true safeguard of the Constitution and of the liberties of the people, and the sooner 
we get back to a true system of Party Government the better for its future’.25 
In this important statement Carruthers was heralding the dawn of the fourth stage 
of the development of the Australian party system. First there had been factional politics 
based on personality more than ideology, then there had been the fiscal parties whose 
unifying principles had been limited to a specific area, and then there had been the birth of 
the FTLA and the Labor Party, both of which claimed to represent a broad ideology but 
had not yet managed to make an ideological gap the central dividing line in New South 
Wales or Australian politics. Now Carruthers was suggesting that the centrality of that 
ideological divide was essential to making parliamentary government work. In doing so he 
was breaking with the nineteenth century idea which held that party government was the 
antithesis of individual liberty for it restricted the independence of members of Parliament. 
Instead he was arguing that an ideologically divided Party system was the only way to 
ensure liberty for it was the only way to ensure the electors knew for what they were 
voting. The binary nature of the clear lines of cleavage would help to make a two-party 
system, ending the three-party turmoil that had hindered parliament and given 
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disproportionate and therefore undemocratic influence to those holding the balance of 
power.  
At the time Carruthers still envisaged this line of cleavage as that between liberals 
and conservatives to the exclusion of Labor, who he felt had no right to claim a monopoly 
over progressive legislation. This soon changed however, as the place of traditional 
conservatives in Carruthers’ formulation was taken by an increasingly ‘socialist’ Labor 
Party. This perceived socialism came first in support for extensive interventionist policies 
including those of O’Sullivan, and would culminate in a debate over nationalisation and a 
decision to place the ‘extension of the industrial and economic functions of the state’ on 
the Labor platform.26 Once liberals began to feel that the most significant threat to 
individual liberty and enterprise came from the left and not the right, politicians were able 
to rhetorically position their liberal beliefs in opposition to socialism and the modern 
Australian political divide was born. Acceptance of the notion that liberalism once again 
had a clear enemy would be the final step in the process by which the ideology was 
adapted from a pervasive culture into a partisan agenda. Labor’s foreignness to the 
preceding culture was perhaps the main impetus behind this transformation, but 
Carruthers would play a central role in facilitating and justifying the change. 
Under Carruthers’ ‘well-defined’ lines of cleavage important questions like private 
enterprise or nationalisation, small government or big government, low-taxation or high 
spending and individualism or collectivism could be made the central choice at the ballot 
box in a Liberal-Labor party system. In practice other issues have inevitably dominated 
particular elections and even particular electorates, but over time these fundamental 
questions have continually reasserted themselves. The relative ‘philosophical positions’ 
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presented by the Parties have been held flexibly rather than dogmatically, but a two-party 
system requires pragmatism in order to prevent the fracturing of the respective sides, and 
this was something that Carruthers himself showed. It could be argued that this flexibility 
has meant that at times the lines of cleavage have not been ‘well-defined’, but the 
differences between Liberal and Labor have almost always been clearer than those 
between Liberal and Progressive in 1901. At times the Liberals have supported big 
government and regulation, while at the other end Labor has occasionally supported 
privatisation and deregulation, but though the political climate has constantly readjusted 
where the centre of politics sits, Liberals have almost always sat on the individualist and 
capitalist right of that centre while Labor have sat on the collectivist and interventionist left 
of it. The rest of Carruthers’ career in the Legislative Assembly would be dedicated to 
establishing these lines of cleavage and reaping the legislative benefits of stable 
government. 
Though Carruthers had already begun to set the agenda of realignment that would 
dominate the next decade of Australian politics, he still nominally owed allegiance to Lee. 
As Parliament prepared to sit on 23 July there were rumours that Carruthers and Ashton 
were preparing to abandon their leader and form a new Party with a number of 
independents. The member for St George did little to scotch these rumours by sitting on 
the crossbenches, but it was soon revealed that his new found independence did not stretch 
to the point of creating a separate Party. In the debate over the address in reply he declared 
that until the new lines of cleavage revealed themselves, he preferred ‘to remain with the 
old friends with whom I have worked in harmony for so many years’.27 While this implied 
a tacit support for the official Opposition, it was also quite a literal statement for 
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Carruthers would be joined in his semi-independent stance by James Brunker. This left Lee, 
already outnumbered and outclassed in Parliament, without the help of his two most 
important colleagues. 
Throughout the session Carruthers continually tried to capture the political 
initiative. He pushed hard for a royal commission into education to assess the viability of 
the reforms such as more rigorous teacher training and the reorganisation and extension of 
industrial education. The former Minister for Public Instruction even organised public 
meetings to press the Government on the issue, speaking side by side with McGowen at 
Town Hall.28 He also fought for the construction of inner-city railways, a project that had 
stagnated despite the Government’s inflated public works budget. Carruthers’ most 
important act was the introduction of his State Labour Selection Bill. This sought to end 
political patronage in the administration of day-labour by removing the responsibility of 
giving of contracts from the office of the Secretary for Public Works and placing it in the 
hands of an independent board. In introducing the Bill for its second reading Carruthers 
intimated that he hoped to end the evil: 
‘which tends to make working-men mere political hangers-on, in order to get a job, 
rather than independent men who obtain employment by reason of their skill and 
ability to do the work they have to perform…the moment you commence to sap 
the independence of the working-classes and make them political creatures, 
beholden for a day’s work to the favour of some politician or Minister, that 
moment you degrade labour more than anything else could possibly do, and in 
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connection with our system of government, introduce a corrupt system which may 
be just as fruitful of evil results as the worst case of the contract system’.29 
This statement clearly shows how Carruthers saw the day-labour system as a 
potential threat to the individualism he held dear. Though he insisted that he was not 
actuated by any ill-feelings towards the Secretary for Public Works, the Bill was part of his 
ongoing conflict with O’Sullivan. It was O’Sullivan who had greatly increased the system 
of day-labour with his proto-Keynesian public works program. For Carruthers, the fact that 
the Secretary himself was handing out jobs left, right and centre had more than a hint of 
corruption about it and though his Bill would not stop the continued expansion of day-
labour it could hopefully make it not only more independent but also more efficient by 
ensuring employees were chosen based on their skill rather than their political motives. 
The Bill was initially met with the hostility to be expected of something that hinted 
at Government corruption. Carruthers himself thought that it would fail. The reasoned 
argument underpinning the Bill made it difficult for the Government to ignore however, 
and in the end O’Sullivan acquiesced. The State Labour Board began working in January 
1902 and while it did not completely remove the influence of the Trades Hall in deciding 
contracts it was still a considerable improvement on the previous system.30 It was a 
remarkable achievement for Carruthers. Very few people succeed in changing the law 
while out of Government, let alone changing a law that affected one of the Ministry’s 
signature policies. The contrast was stark between the political skill of the member for St 
George and the Leader of the Opposition, with the latter’s censure attempts continuing to 
fail miserably. 
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One the most significant Acts of the 1901 parliamentary session was the passing of 
Bernhard Wise’s Industrial Arbitration Bill. This had initially been introduced in the 
previous year under Lyne. The main difference between it and previous Arbitration Bills 
was that it introduced compulsory arbitration, something that Carruthers had previously 
opposed. When it was first introduced Carruthers made little comment. It is likely that he 
was weighing up whether he should support the Bill his name had been associated with 
since the Parkes Ministry or reject it since compulsory arbitration removed what he had 
seen as the fundamental right of freedom of contract. The premise was that a free adult 
had the right to enter into any contract they wished and that the Government had no right 
to take that freedom away from them. In the end Carruthers sensed the way the winds 
were blowing and reluctantly accepted the compulsory nature of the Bill.  
In the House he felt compelled to justify this position by giving a whole series of 
precedents as to where some form of ‘interference’ in business had proved necessary and 
successful, the elaborate detail of which suggests that he may have been trying to convince 
himself as much as anyone else. In many ways the speech was the least small-government 
Carruthers ever gave in his career, for it argued that ‘our system of government, and our 
very system of civilisation exists for the very purpose of controlling the brute forces of our 
nature, and in regulating them in the common interests of society’.31 Such a statement 
went beyond the pragmatism and flexibility normally associated with his generally small-
government liberalism, and could be used to discount many of the principles for which he 
had been fighting throughout his career. There is a sense that at times like this Carruthers 
could get caught up in the rhetoric of his argument and lose sight of his real beliefs. This 
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explains but does not excuse his political inconsistency and in time he would back away 
from his support for compulsory arbitration and resume his usual stance. 
While he accepted the Bill’s central premise, this did not mean that Carruthers was 
prepared to swallow the Bill in its entirety. He opposed the provision that allowed the 
Arbitration Court to give unionists a preference over non-unionists, insisting that if 
compulsory unionism was to be imposed it should be done through Parliament and not 
through the back ally of the courts. Later he also condemned its provisions for forcing 
people into unions by insisting that only unions and not individual employees could appear 
before the Arbitration Court. In his memoirs Carruthers recalled that he had implored 
Wise to remove this requirement for it would remove an individual’s freedom and ‘create 
a system of industrial slavery in which the union would be the slave-owner and the slave-
driver’.32 This testimony is difficult to corroborate. Nothing about it survives in Wise’s 
papers, though these are not extensive and it is likely that if Carruthers did say something 
he would have done it in a private conversation rather than in writing. It is likely that 
Carruthers was speaking in hindsight for in later years he would come to reject much of 
what is now known as the ‘Australian Settlement’.33 
Another important Bill introduced in this session was the Women’s Franchise Bill. 
Carruthers took an extremely conservative attitude towards this reform. Though he 
admitted that women were as good, courageous and intelligent as men he argued that the 
granting of suffrage was a revolutionary step, hence the burden of proof was on those who 
advocated it to prove that it was necessary. He maintained that the case for it had yet to be 
proven and that the majority of women were not asking for the vote. He also suggested 
that to give a woman the franchise would degrade her by bringing ‘her down to the level 
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of the ballot box’.34 Carruthers’ illiberal line was undoubtedly out of step with his long 
support for equal and universal franchise for men, though he did argue that if women were 
to be given the franchise they must be given voting rights entirely equal to those of men 
and that they must also be granted the right to sit in Parliament. Rejecting See’s suggestion 
that the right to sit in Parliament would eventually be granted through natural evolution, 
he insisted that:  
‘of all the high grounds that have ever been put forward for enfranchising women, 
there is the superlative ground for giving women the right to come in here and be 
the law-makers that for over sixty years the great lawmaker of our empire has been, 
the noblest woman probably that we have any record of…Queen Victoria’.35  
Carruthers was at least consistent in his argument, as when experience did prove 
the case for women’s suffrage he repudiated his previous opposition to it. This was not 
mere political opportunism, for when out of Parliament in 1908 he would actively help the 
British suffragette movement by giving a statement on the positive effects of women’s 
suffrage in Australia for the paper of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies.36 
Carruthers’ illiberal floundering over compulsory arbitration and women’s suffrage 
had taken away most of the leverage he could have got out of the State Labour Selection 
Bill. It would take the resurrection of the fiscal issue to click him back into gear. While the 
tariff was now a federal issue, what to do with the tariff revenue New South Wales 
received under the Braddon clause was undoubtedly a State concern. When it was revealed 
that the See Government was spending that revenue in advance of receiving it and that 
there would be no remission of State taxation to make up for the increased burden of 
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Barton’s new tariff, Carruthers rose up in anger. He was soon engaged in an extended 
debate with Wise conducted through a series of statements to the Sydney Morning 
Herald.37 His main argument was that New South Wales only accepted the tariffs 
associated with federation under the impression that other taxes would be lowered and 
that both Progressives and Protectionists had broken their earlier promises on the cost of 
federation. During the federation campaign Wise had famously claimed that federation 
would cost each person no more than the price of registering a dog, but now that assertion 
proved to be false. Excluding service charges and rents which still made up the bulk of the 
State’s revenue, the new tariff would mean a proportionately huge rise in the burden of 
taxation in New South Wales. Carruthers estimated that a sixth of the average worker’s 
wage would go to duties on essentials like sugar; hence a labourer would not start earning 
money until the Tuesday of the working week.38 
Apart from debating Wise, Carruthers also spoke at a mass rally at the Sydney 
Town Hall with Reid and Lee and held his own rallies in conjunction with Ashton. At first 
glance it may appear that the revival of the tariff issue in State politics was a step 
backwards, but the arguments Carruthers used against it were a glimpse into the future of 
Australian liberalism. He based his opposition on a rejection of high taxation, excessive 
spending and a belief in sound finances, all of which would form the core economic values 
of the Liberal Party. Many of these were old liberal beliefs, but in an age of expanding 
government they would be made a new partisan agenda. Carruthers pointed out that New 
South Wales expenditure was now £2,400,000 higher than in the final year of the Reid 
Government, but argued that the State had little to show for this excess.39 He conceded 
that the small proportion of that money which had been spent on old age pensions had 
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been well allocated, but insisted that the vast majority of it had been frittered away 
through extravagance and small grants of no consequence. 
In many ways the tariff proved the first step in the inexorable growth of 
government under federation. It did not affect the other States nearly as much for most of 
them already had a tariff based system of taxation, but the New South Wales precedent 
had shown how reluctant Governments would be to forgo any opportunity to expand. 
This was in spite of the fact that the majority of public opinion appeared to favour a 
reduction in the size of State Government post federation, not its expansion.40 Carruthers 
gained considerable traction out of the campaign against the tariff, more so than Lee who 
used most of the same arguments to less effect. Part of the reason for this was the gravitas 
Carruthers held as a member of the Constitutional Conventions which allowed him 
greater use of the cry that federation had gone awry. Adding to this was his consistency, 
for throughout the federation campaign he had repeatedly opposed anything that 
threatened to increase the burdens of the people. His claim that Australia was now ‘the 
most over-governed and over-taxed country in the world’ rang more true now than when 
he had uttered a similar phrase some years earlier, but his hope that the Braddon clause 
would dissuade Federal Governments from the use of tariffs had proven incredibly naïve 
and was quickly forgotten.41 
1902 would be a year marked by severe drought, economic depression and high 
unemployment.42 The drought, which had now lasted since the Reid administration, was a 
large factor in the economic woes but it was not the only factor. The new tariff likely also 
played its part in the retraction of business, as did a number of small scale industrial 
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troubles caused by those who wanted to see what they could get out of the new 
Arbitration Court. A shrinking economy meant a shrinking stream of Government 
revenue, a great problem for a Ministry that was committed to large scale spending. Were 
it not for this spending See should have been in a good place to deal with the problems he 
now faced. After all, federation had meant a decrease in the responsibilities of the State 
Government and an increase in its revenue via the tariff. Under normal circumstances this 
should have left a substantial kitty available to deal with both the drought and the 
decreasing revenue, but any extra money the Government received had vanished faster 
than it had appeared, and soon they would be relying on extensive borrowing to keep the 
ship afloat. 
In these circumstances the economic acumen of Carruthers would come to the 
fore. He spent the long parliamentary recess focusing mainly on his private business, but 
he never left politics alone for too long. He took an active part in a public meeting calling 
for the reform of parliament and reduction of expenditure, though his desire to make such 
issues a Party question was opposed, leading to the creation of a People’s Reform League 
that like its Kyabram Victorian equivalent was separate from the Liberal Party.43 He also 
led a campaign to have the federal capital site question resolved as soon as possible. With 
regards to the drought, he urged the Federal Government to remove the duties on fodder 
and grain for the relief of those affected. These pleas fell on deaf ears, but they did put the 
still essentially Protectionist State Government in an awkward position. At one prominent 
meeting the Minister for Lands Paddy Crick was left completely isolated as Carruthers 
successfully moved a motion forming a committee to lobby the Minister for Customs.44 
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He followed up these efforts with a gloomy show of foresight during the debate 
over the address in reply. After pushing for a number of forms of drought relief, Carruthers 
predicted that: 
‘So surely as the large industries of this country will be affected by this drought so 
will the state finances be affected, and so surely will the time come when our 
revenue will be diminished and we shall be called upon for an expenditure, not for 
carrying on any scheme of public works, but for the purpose of helping our settlers 
tide over the difficult time that will come. It is necessary, if there is any 
extravagance being carried on of any kind, that it should be stopped, not so as to 
extend and increase the destitution, but to put our finances in such order that when 
the time of trouble comes we shall be able to weather the storm with as little 
disaster and confusion as possible’.45 
He went on to show how the Government had increased the loan obligations of 
the State by £11,723,098 since coming into office, and argued that regardless of what 
proportion of that money had been wisely invested, the sheer liability left the State in a 
precarious position to deal with what was coming. His solution was to call on the 
members of the House to fulfil the promises most of them had made with regards to 
retrenchment, economy and the diminution of taxation. He felt that the former would 
help the Government weather the coming storm, while the latter would relieve the people 
who were left to face it. These cuts in spending and taxation would have to be made 
carefully so as not to exacerbate the situation, but if done correctly Carruthers felt the 
problems the State faced could be mitigated. The speech stole the show in the debate. Not 
only did Carruthers demonstrate a considerable grasp of the financial situation, arguably 
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greater than that of either the Government or the official Opposition, but he also showed 
his reasonableness for on a number of counts he actually defended the policy of the 
Ministry against those who would condemn it in its entirety.  
Carruthers’ speech left an immediate impression on the press, the Parliament and 
the public, which would be surpassed in time as many of his less dire warnings came true. 
For the moment it placed even greater pressure on Lee who had been completely 
overshadowed. Still the member for Tenterfield refused to budge, even though his 
replacement seemed inevitable. He held onto his position tenaciously until September 
when fate intervened. Lee was struck down by an extended illness, and though he was still 
reluctant to go, his health forced him to resign from the leadership of the Liberal Party and 
thus the Opposition. The transfer of power would be remarkably smooth, a stark contrast 
to the drama that surrounded the election of both Reid and Lee. It was widely presumed 
that Carruthers’ ascension was inevitable, though the names of Ashton, Brunker and 
former Evening News editor James Hogue were also mentioned. Before the Party even 
met Ashton and Hogue came out in favour of Carruthers. Ashton said that though private 
business prevented him from standing it mattered little because Carruthers was a better 
candidate anyway.46 In the meeting a motion was passed regretting the retirement of Lee 
before Brunker took it upon himself to nominate Carruthers. No other names were even 
suggested, and he was thus elected unanimously. Upon emerging Brunker declared that it 
was the ‘most enthusiastic’ caucus meeting he had attended in his 22 years in Parliament.47 
Carruthers received a number of letters congratulations upon his election. 
Interestingly one of them was from Wise who attacked the ‘petty intriguers’ who had 
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denied his former colleague the position the year before.48 The person who was most 
pleased with the Party’s choice was George Reid, for the damage he had inadvertently 
done his friend had now been erased. He wrote that ‘my best wishes for your success will 
always go with you, and they are nourished by personal friendship as well as political 
appreciation’.49 Though Carruthers had found his way out of the political wilderness, still 
greater challenges lay ahead. When Lee announced his retirement he hoped that it would 
‘have the effect of binding the Party closer together’.50 In many ways that was what 
Carruthers’ leadership would have to do in order to succeed. Though the days of the 
factional era had long passed, the Liberal Party still suffered from a messiah complex, a 
hangover from the titanic leadership of Parkes and Reid. The Party still needed a strong 
leader to define its identity, unite it behind that definition and lead it to success. Carruthers 
would provide not only that but he would provide more, for the direction he led the Party 
down proved to be more permanent than the fiscal path. As he had predicted, the age of 
realignment was coming and Carruthers would help to shape that realignment not only in 
New South Wales but in Australia as a whole. The anti-socialist campaign, the federal 
fusion and ultimately the Liberal Party of Australia would all be directly impacted by 
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C H A P T E R  N I N E  
 
 
The Art of Opposition 
 
Carruthers’ ascension to the Liberal Party leadership was narrowly preceded by the rise of 
the ‘Kyabram movement’ in Victoria and the two events should be seen as part of a wider 
push for the ‘retrenchment and reform’ of government post federation. The thrust of this 
‘reform’ movement was the reduction or at least the containment of the size and thus the 
burden of government. It emerged as a reaction to the increase in government caused by 
federation, and also the spending policies of a number of Labor supported State ministries 
who were in power at the time. The reform movement was thus a product of political 
circumstances, but it had deep ideological roots. The phrase ‘retrenchment and reform’ 
recalled an earlier British Liberal slogan of ‘peace, retrenchment and reform’ and it had 
clear Gladstonian undertones. Gladstone had a broad ideology that had greatly influenced 
Australian liberalism, but the reform movement had a narrower focus which largely 
confined itself to financial issues. According to economist Joseph Schumpeter, Gladstone 
had three financial principles: the retrenchment and rationalisation of state expenditure, a 
system of taxation that would interfere as little as possible with industrial and commercial 
operations, and the production of balanced budgets with surpluses to allow for fiscal 




reforms and the reduction of national debt.1 While the laissez-faire implications of this 
analysis have been questioned, the fact remains that the patriarch of British liberalism 
generally supported low taxation, low spending and low debt. The underlying belief was 
that large Government spending increased the economic burden on the people and 
hindered commerce, hence the distribution as well as the level of taxation was important.2 
While economic arguments were important, this push for small government also tapped 
into a belief that wherever possible people should be left free to follow their own pursuits 
unmolested by the state, and this included financially. 
As is clear from this description Gladstonian liberalism had little in common with 
the interventionist ‘new liberalism’ of Bernard Wise or Alfred Deakin. By British standards 
Gladstonian liberalism was in fact old and their Liberal Party was already on the path that 
would lead it to the ‘people’s budget’ of 1909.3 Australia was acting as a time capsule of an 
older classical liberalism and its small government beliefs, and this was embodied in the 
reform movement. Over the next decade ‘new liberals’ would secure many victories, but 
enough of this older element would survive to ensure that Australian liberalism would sit 
to the right of its British counterpart, a result that was no doubt partly facilitated by the 
lack of a British-style Conservative Party in Australia. 
As has already been shown in the federation debates, Carruthers was one of the 
earliest heralds of the reform movement, though his delay in obtaining the leadership 
contributed to the fact that events in Victoria proceeded more rapidly. The ‘Kyabram 
movement’ was a political agitation that began in late 1901 in the rural Victorian township 
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from whence it got its name. Its main aims were the reduction of expenditure, debt and the 
number of members in State Parliament. After an initial meeting in the town, its 
supporters set up a committee which sent circulars throughout the State asking people to 
join their movement, which was subsequently formalised as the National Citizens’ Reform 
League. According to the movement’s chronicler, it was received with ‘spontaneous 
sympathy and active assistance’ of the people.4 This sympathy included the sympathy of 
the press whose support was crucial in the rapid expansion of the movement. The NCRL 
soon boasted membership in the thousands, and was able to place tremendous pressure on 
the Labor supported Peacock Government. After the Premier was defeated in a no-
confidence motion forcing the dissolution of Parliament, the NCRL helped William Irvine 
achieve a landslide election victory in September 1902. Irvine went on to carry out 
retrenchment and the reduction of members, with the latter increasing the power of the 
rural vote.5 
 Irvine’s victory had much in common with what Carruthers was about to achieve 
in New South Wales, and both have been extensively compared by John Rickard. There 
were however some important differences. Kyabram was a movement that emerged from 
the countryside and retained an element of rural populism that the city Liberal Reformers 
lacked. Federation had impacted on both States very differently, and while the shift from 
previously low tariffs meant that the Braddon clause increased revenue and the burden of 
taxation in New South Wales, in Victoria the fourth of tariff revenue that went to the 
Commonwealth represented a significant drop in the State’s funds that added impetus to 
calls for retrenchment. The actions of the Melbourne based Protectionist Federal 
Government were inevitably less controversial in Victoria than they were to her near 
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North; therefore they played a less significant role in her State politics. In many ways the 
New South Wales reform movement was also more Gladstonian, for Carruthers’ ideology 
was more broadly ‘liberal’ and his idea of lower House reform involved an equalisation of 
electorates that was reminiscent of Gladstone’s electoral reforms.6 
While these were mainly differences in context, the main difference in practice 
between Irvine and Carruthers was that the NCRL remained largely ‘independent’ of party 
while the soon to be established Liberal and Reform Association embraced it. Rickard 
dismisses as a myth the idea that Kyabram had been a non-party movement of measures 
not men, but once the romanticism of Kyabram’s non-party status is stripped away it is 
clear that there was still a fundamental philosophical and tactical difference between the 
NCRL and the LRA.7 The latter was thoroughly integrated with a parliamentary party 
while the former retained a fundamental distrust of politicians which made it deliberately 
keep its distance from its parliamentary backers. The PRL did try to follow the NCRL’s 
example in New South Wales, but it would prove unsuccessful and ultimately had to take a 
backseat to its party counterpart. Led by Carruthers, the New South Wales Liberal Party 
would try and to a large extent succeed in taking ownership of the reform movement in 
the State. This gave the Party the clear partisan agenda it had lost with the fiscal issue and 
would help facilitate the emergence of the clear lines of division. 
 The story of the Kyabram movement is more widely known than the story of 
Carruthers and the formation of the LRA. This is evidenced by the fact that when 
Carruthers is discussed Kyabram is generally brought up but when the latter is discussed 
the former is rarely mentioned. Even Rickard seems to analyse Carruthers in the context of 
Irvine, rather than the other way around.  Obviously the chronology is a large reason for 
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this, but since Carruthers’ calls for post-federation economy date back to the Federal 
Conventions it could certainly be argued that he helped to shape the political context into 
which Kyabram was born. Part of the reason Kyabram is remembered and Carruthers 
forgotten is that Kyabram was more ideologically pure and therefore easier to romanticise 
for those who believe in the reduction of Government. Rickard lays great emphasis on the 
fact that Carruthers was softer on retrenchment than Irvine, though he concludes that both 
were just as devoted ‘to the cause of anti-Labor’.8  
What Rickard and indeed the wider historiography on the emergence of the 
Australian party system fail to realise is that it was this soft but deft touch combined with 
the acceptance of the necessity of party that allowed Carruthers to have a more significant 
legacy than his Victorian counterpart. By interpreting reform through a pragmatic rather 
than doctrinaire lens, connecting it with an older liberal tradition and a pre-existing party 
and then playing it off against ideological opponents, Carruthers would be able to weave a 
web of lasting success that would influence developments at a national level. Meanwhile 
Kyabram would fail to bring about a genuine realignment in Victorian politics. Paul 
Strangio has argued that Kyabram and Irvine in particular began the process of creating a 
Labor versus anti-Labor divide in the State but admits that that process eventually 
stagnated.9 Unlike New South Wales which precipitated the federal realignment, Victoria 
would remain a political aberration and would not truly fall into line with the national 
Liberal/Country-Labor party system until the 1950s.10 
 In September 1902 Carruthers’ main concern was finding his feet as Opposition 
Leader. Perhaps fittingly, one of his first actions in the role was to launch an attack on 
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Bernhard Wise. Wise had been moved to the Legislative Council to pilot his Arbitration 
Bill through that House and after his humiliation at the federal election he had decided to 
stay there. Despite sitting in the un-elected chamber, Wise was still serving as the 
Government’s Attorney-General and it was in that capacity that he became involved in the 
‘Friedman Case’. A jury had unanimously found Moss Morris Friedman guilty of a number 
of charges brought against him by the Crown, but the judge had been unhappy with their 
verdict prompting Wise to intervene and use his Ministerial position to let the man off. 
While there were a number of issues with Wise’s actions, including the fact that the man 
was freed even before the Governor’s approval had been received, Carruthers latched on 
to what he saw as a breach of the long established principle of trial by jury.11 On 1 October 
the Opposition Leader moved a motion of censure against the Government, launching into 
a detailed history of the rights and liberties of the people from the signing of the Magna 
Carta onwards and arguing that Wise had trodden on those rights by abusing his 
prerogative. While Carruthers used all his legalistic skill to try to prove his constitutional 
case, the motion would still be voted on according to party lines. It was rumoured that the 
Labor Party was deeply divided over the issue and that it took the vote of a sick member 
who was absent from caucus to determine the Party’s internal majority, but in the end 
they decided to support the Government.12 The fledgling Country Party, which had 
temporarily united a number of rural independents, came to the same decision after its 
own amendment to the motion was ruled out of order and thus the vote revealed that 
Carruthers’ ascension had done little to disturb the balance of power.  
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 While the censure motion failed, Carruthers claimed that it had been a ‘moral 
victory’ for the Opposition.13 He was able to get considerable political leverage out of the 
affair, for the Friedman Case formed an excellent example for his wider argument that 
Government Ministers were abusing their positions and that ‘responsible government’ 
needed to be restored. ‘Responsible government’ was a catchcry frequently used during 
this time period. It no longer had a clear definition like in the 1850s, but instead connoted a 
critique of numerous alleged failings of electoral responsibility including but not limited to 
minority government, financial disarray and abuses of prerogative. For Carruthers 
‘responsibility’ meant not only economic responsibility but responsibility to a Lower 
House based upon fewer electorates which were more equal in terms of population. It 
required an end to patronage, something that the continued lack of local government and 
increased public works spending was allegedly allowing to thrive. Responsible government 
also implied an attack on Labor, who were said to exercise power without responsibility 
via their balance of power position. Supposed ‘sectional’ abuse was also lamented, as it was 
alleged that particular groups were reaping the benefits of Ministerial money and power at 
the expense of the community as a whole. All these insinuations were difficult to either 
prove or disprove, but a palpable sense of disillusion with the working of the political 
system was there for Carruthers and the Liberals to exploit.  
By mid-October Carruthers was claiming that the lines of cleavage had finally 
revealed themselves, and that the division would be between the Liberals who proposed to 
govern for all people, and the Government and Labor who tried to represent particular 
sections and classes.14 This was a double-edged attack that aimed to discredit both parties 
by virtue of their connection to the other. The discursive positioning of the Ministry as 
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irrevocably attached to Labor was an important move in the deprecation of an 
independent Progressive ideology which would pay dividends at the next election. 
Allegations that a Ministry had been too generous in giving concessions to Labor had been 
frequently made before, including against the Reid Government. By arguing that the 
Progressives’ connection to large rural landowners represented a sectional outlook 
comparable with Labor’s profession to represent the working class, Carruthers was going 
beyond such charges and positioning the Progressives on the opposite side of the clear lines 
of cleavage. Such a position made them irrelevant as the very nature of the lines required 
that there only be one major party on either side. Though most of the Progressives 
rejected such a positioning, they would increasingly find themselves bystanders to a 
Liberal-Labor political debate that marginalised their centre position and made them seem 
less of a real ‘choice’ to electors. Conversely, by connecting Labor’s working class and 
union outlook with older landed interests in Parliament, Carruthers was trying to portray 
them as the new conservatives and link the upcoming anti-socialist battle with earlier 
liberal fights against the squattocracy. Liberalism valued individualism so highly that the 
representation of a particular group in Parliament was viewed as inherently insidious 
regardless of that group’s place in society. 
In defining his ‘liberal’ position Carruthers quoted William Gladstone’s statement 
that liberalism was the principle of ‘trusting the people only relieved by prudence’ as 
opposed to ‘trusting the people only relieved by fear’.15 This quote eloquently sums up 
Carruthers’ generally small government beliefs, for he tried to leave the people to their 
own devices except in rare circumstances where he thought it prudent to intervene. It is 
noteworthy that Carruthers was equally at home quoting Gladstone and Burke. As a man 
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who was playing a central role in the development of Australian liberalism, he was already 
engaged in the balancing of liberal and conservative principles which has continued to play 
out on the non-Labor side of politics. Much of his electoral success as leader would be built 
on his ability to keep moderate conservatives, who were naturally drawn to reform and 
anti-socialism, onside while still projecting a liberal image to the electorate.  
It is important to note that Carruthers’ liberalism had an element of conservatism 
to it, for though he had been actively involved in the revolution of party-liberalism many 
of his beliefs still harked back to an earlier age. This was a ‘new’ conservatism, for it was 
based on the fact that the old conservatism had been so resoundingly defeated that 
liberalism had become the mainstream and therefore something that needed conservation 
as much as expansion. When Carruthers used the term conservative he clearly referred to 
the older version, but with hindsight we can see how the political traditions of the 
Australian right were beginning to intertwine. Though a self-described liberal who should 
be viewed as such, Carruthers was most comfortable when his liberal and conservative 
beliefs were in accord, such as in the fight for Privy Council appeals or for low taxation and 
spending. When he went out on a limb to the left or the right, such as with industrial 
arbitration and women’s suffrage, his arguments became more laboured and he was less 
able to win electoral popularity. 
Balancing where to sit on the political spectrum was made more difficult by the 
agitations of the PRL and the Taxpayers’ Union. Both of these organisations took a hard 
line on retrenchment and reform and were quick to latch on to anything Carruthers said 
which suggested he would take a softer position. He initially tried to distance himself from 
these groups, arguing that if extravagance were halted wholescale retrenchments could be 
avoided though if it continued retrenchment in public and private life would be inevitable. 




This position drew significant newspaper criticism from those like the Sydney Morning 
Herald who urged Carruthers to remember Kyabram.16 His colleagues were forced to 
jump to the defence of their leader’s reform credentials, reminding the public of his actions 
during federation and the fact that he had attended the meeting which led to the 
establishment of the PRL. Those who thought Carruthers was soft on reform were 
misguided. His frequent speeches made it clear that he was entirely committed to reducing 
Government expenditure. The spending he opposed however was not that spent on the 
civil servants whose service had proved valuable when he was a Minister and whose 
numbers had not greatly increased, but that which was spent on areas where the budget 
had expanded rapidly, such as public works and the use of highly paid boards for 
administration. Carruthers had no qualms about the size of Government under Reid, 
which after all had been relatively small, and provided reductions were made for the 
introduction of Federal Government he did not support arbitrarily firing those 
Government employees who performed necessary services. 
The PRL and TU were proving to be a thorn in the right side of the Liberals just as 
the Single Taxers had been a thorn in the left side of the Free Traders. Still Carruthers 
largely avoided attacking them. Instead he stressed the need for unity, and in the face of 
attacks from those who insisted that reform must be non-party, began to set in motion the 
establishment of a new extra-parliamentary party organisation. The anti-party dimension 
of the reform movement is an important phenomenon. It was an extension of an older 
colonial liberal idea that rejected parties for trampling on the independence of members 
but it also tapped into a wider hatred of politicians in general. It was the politicians who 
had created the financial situation which the reform movement objected to and, with 
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regard to the reduction of members, the politicians could not be trusted to retrench 
themselves.17 There was an inherent tension between this sentiment and the fact that the 
reform movement needed to work through politicians to achieve its aims. This was clearly 
represented in the structure of the PRL, which retained the right to preselect candidates 
but then required those candidates to resign from the non-party League.18 Such a system 
was anachronistic before it was even introduced and offered little hope of establishing an 
effective and lasting political force. 
The Liberal and Reform Association was formed on 19 December 1902, barely two 
months after Carruthers obtained the leadership. He chaired the meeting and left it to 
Ashton to move the motion establishing and naming the LRA. The organisation was 
intended to be permanent, for Carruthers declared that ‘party warfare required party 
organisation’.19 The name represented the blending of colonial and Gladstonian liberalism 
with the post federation reform agenda, the latter having evolved from the former. 
Michael Hogan has suggested that ‘reform’ partly denoted Protestant moralism, but while 
the LRA had a clear Protestant tinge even a cursory glance at newspapers from this time 
period reveals that it was intended to suggest parliamentary reform along with a reduction 
of government expenditure, debt and taxation.20 Carruthers was trying to take ownership 
of reform and, more importantly, consolidate his Party’s hold on the title ‘liberal’, a claim 
that stretched back to the LPA. It was claimed that the organisation would espouse a 
liberal philosophy of government based on ‘trusting the people’, and that all of its policies 
would be tied to this underlying principle.21 Though he was unable to attend the meeting, 
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Reid gave the LRA his full support by publishing a letter he wrote to Carruthers wishing 
him luck and reiterating the need for drastic economy.22 
The process of forming a workable organisation out of this initial meeting was 
something that would take several months and committees were soon formed to draft the 
Association’s platform and rules. The LRA’s structure as it emerged had many similarities 
to that of the defunct FTLA. Local branches were to control preselections through 
plebiscites, though the executive was to have the power to deal with disputes and veto 
selections when absolutely necessary. Each branch would have the right to elect delegates 
to a central conference and that conference would be able to change the platform. That 
platform would not be binding on politicians however, a recognition of the fact that 
Liberals still envisaged themselves as more free and independent than caucus Labor. Above 
the conference would be a central council to deal with executive matters. This was made 
up of 24 members of Parliament and 24 extra-parliamentary members, soon to be joined by 
24 members of the pre-existing Women’s Liberal League.23 Despite this equal 
representation the Parliamentary Party retained the right to elect the Parliamentary Leader, 
who in practice became the Leader of the Party as a whole. In this way individual members 
were given enough power to encourage involvement while the politicians maintained 
enough control to prevent chaos. Membership required a financial contribution so that the 
organisation would have a fighting fund, though this was quite low beginning at 3 pennies 
per quarter.24 
It is important to note that the LRA was the culmination of a long process which 
began with the 1887 election. Carruthers’ career had spanned that process. He had been 
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involved from the very beginning when the Liberal Political Association first tried to create 
a far reaching platform and organisational structure. He had been an essential part of 
political campaigns for both Parkes and Reid and he brought that experience to bear upon 
the LRA. As Loveday, Martin and Weller have acknowledged, the LRA was not a new 
concept but what it did was ‘make better use of the political resources available to it by 
coordinating procedures which already existed, without openly challenging principles of 
representation and party action by which non-Labor politicians insisted upon 
distinguishing themselves from Labor’.25  
One of the main reasons why the LRA would succeed where its predecessors had 
failed was that Carruthers invested time, effort and skill into his organisation. The new 
entity was run with an efficiency that only experience could bring, and he took care to 
ensure that pamphlets, speaking tours and preselections were all carefully considered and 
coordinated. As leader of the Liberal Parliamentary Party, Carruthers embraced the LRA 
and fully integrated it with his following. This gave it an immediate advantage over the 
FTLA and FTRC, which had both been run by rivals to the Free Trade Party leadership 
and had thus been kept at a distance. Carruthers’ long and occasionally vicious fight for 
Party unity had also helped to curb the excesses of independence that had characterised the 
preceding century, giving the LRA a level of cohesion while still maintaining the nominal 
freedom of thought that the liberal ideology required. One of the consequences of all these 
advantages was that the LRA was not only more successful than its New South Wales 
predecessors but also its interstate counterparts. In Victoria in particular anti-party and 
non-party groups continued to dominate non-Labor politics, and while these existed in the 
Mother State, the LRA would prove far more powerful than them. While Kyabram had 
                                                          
25 Ibid., p.227. 




predated the PRL, the LRA predated anything of its scope, success and permanence 
amongst the non-Labor Parties in Australia. It was Carruthers who would make the LRA a 
success, and in doing so he would set the organisational agenda for the rest of the country. 
The establishment of the LRA is often considered to be Carruthers’ crowning 
achievement.26 In his history of the New South Wales division of the Liberal Party Ian 
Hancock has shown that the LRA created a ‘structure which would survive the changing 
brand names and remain in place, albeit in a more complicated form, at the end of the 20th 
century’.27 The formation of the LRA is essentially the establishment of the New South 
Wales Liberal Party, for its core structure and ideological justification endures in the 
modern entity. It was an organisation intended to pursue liberal goals, but it was also 
designed to fight the partisan battles of the new lines of cleavage. These, as Carruthers had 
already begun to outline, were to be between the Liberals and Labor. The LRA would thus 
institutionalise an idea of liberalism which positioned itself as being fundamentally 
opposed to Labor’s alleged anti-individualism, sectionalism and socialism.28 This was a 
pragmatic and to some extent logical adaptation of long standing liberal beliefs to the 
political concerns of the day. Liberalism, or at least classical liberalism, was by its very 
individualist nature anti-socialist but by placing this concern front and centre Carruthers 
was able to give a modern relevance to beliefs that were as old as democracy in New South 
Wales. 
Since the LRA would rhetorically define its liberal identity in opposition to Labor, 
part of its partisan role was to keep its ideological opponents out of power. While arguably 
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necessary for a two-party system, this defensive role could be construed as reactionary. On 
its own it may have been, but when combined with a positive Gladstonian liberal platform 
the duality of the offence and defence worked perfectly within the ‘us or them’ nature of 
the lines of cleavage. In a two-party system if you were not in power your philosophical 
enemy would be, and this helped to foster unity in a Party that despite Wise’s absence 
continued to contain a ‘broad church’ of ideas. The unity of antagonism would only go so 
far without a purpose however and this is what the platform and the older liberal ideology 
more broadly provided.  
While it may seem as though the LRA’s defensive role complements W.K. 
Hancock’s famous description of non-Labor as the ‘party of resistance’ as opposed to the 
Labor ‘party of progress’, this is in fact not the case.29 The LRA was seeking its own version 
of progress through the reduction of members, extension of local government and the 
continued implementation of closer settlement. Some of these policies were openly 
‘resisted’ by their Labor opponents. Rather than representing an inclination to resist 
progress, the LRA’s defensive role symbolised an acceptance of the binary nature of an 
emerging two-party system. This was something which was perhaps easier for the Labor 
Party who could simply paint their opponents as class enemies or representatives of the 
rich. For the Liberals it required defining what made their opponents ‘illiberal’, a task 
which took and has continued to take considerably more contemplation to achieve. 
Carruthers’ clearest formulation of the difference between himself and his opponents 
would not come until late in the 1904 election campaign, but at this early stage the LRA 
already encapsulated the duality of party warfare. The dual role had existed to some extent 
in the FTLA’s opposition to the Protectionists, but with a deeper philosophical objection to 
                                                          
29 W.K. Hancock, Australia (London: Ernest Benn, 1930) pp.197-238. 




its opponents the LRA was able to harness it in a new and innovative way. The incessant 
nature of the lines of cleavage helped to make the new entity permanent, for the perpetual 
political battle would both require and support continued organisation.  
In order to be a source of unity rather than division amongst its supporters, the 
LRA’s platform would need to embody a broad rather than doctrinaire interpretation of 
liberalism. This was a task to which our pragmatic subject was particularly suited. He was 
the primary author of the document which reflected his individualist beliefs and the 
Liberals’ positive offensive purpose. The platform’s points were as follows: 
1. The principles of responsible government are to be re-established in their 
integrity. 
2. General legislation to be based upon sound, liberal and humane principles 
tending to the common good, and not upon class interests. 
3. Ministerial administration to be just, firm and impartial. 
4. Reduction of Parliament to an 84 member Legislative Assembly and a 42 
member representative Legislative Council.30 
5. Economy, restricted loan expenditure, establishment of a sinking fund for the 
redemption of public debt. 
6. Freeze public service appointments unless absolutely necessary, end patronage, 
sound civil service and police superannuation. 
7. Local Government. 
8. Prudent public works with special consideration for water conservation. 
9. Simplified land and mining laws. 
10. Closer settlement. 
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11. Education reform.31 
Supplementing these points was a fighting platform including responsible 
government, restoration of State finances and the reduction of members. While this 
platform clearly encapsulated a reform agenda, the fact that it did not call for retrenchment 
and had planks covering a wide range of issues shows that Carruthers was looking beyond 
Kyabram and trying to establish a broader following while retaining his core ideology. The 
council of the LRA moved two amendments to Carruthers’ platform. One allowed reform 
of the Legislative Council to be pursued down ‘the lines of least resistance’.32 The other 
called for the reform of the liquor traffic. This was the only part of the platform that could 
be considered inherently Protestant, and the fact that it was not even an original plank 
suggests that the sectarian element within the LRA was not overwhelming. Carruthers was 
a long-time supporter of the so-called ‘local option’ and agreed to the amendment with 
little fuss. Local option was a scheme which would give voters from a particular electorate 
or municipality control over the number of liquor licenses issued in that area. It tapped 
into Carruthers’ belief in decentralisation and local autonomy, even if the prospect of local 
prohibition loomed as an effrontery to individual liberty. This compromise reflected the 
priorities of the time, and since John Carruthers had been heavily involved in temperance 
leagues, Joseph had been brought up to think that liberalism could bend on this issue. 
One of the main aims behind the establishment of the LRA was that it would help 
prevent vote splitting, and that function would be put to an early test in a by-election in 
Tamworth. The Progressive R. J. Walsh had been forced to resign his seat after declaring 
bankruptcy and in an age before polls the election was seen as a test of the Government’s 
popularity halfway through its term. In these circumstances it was important for the 
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Opposition that their candidate fared well, but the local PRL branch threatened to 
undermine the opportunity. No LRA branch had yet been established in Tamworth, so the 
preselection fell to the PRL. That body rejected the LRA-backed John Garland, and instead 
chose the local mayor, a Mr. Nankervis, as their candidate. The fiscal issue may have 
played a part in this decision, for the former Free Trader Garland was rejected in favour of 
a Protectionist. Nankervis refused to commit himself to the LRA platform, prompting the 
LRA to threaten to send in its own candidate. Carruthers was able to mount considerable 
pressure on Nankervis, forcing him to withdraw for ‘private reasons’ and Garland, who 
had not intended to oppose the selected candidate, was chosen in his place.33 A split was 
avoided and Garland went onto win the seat, though debate over whether he had been 
elected as a representative of the Liberals or the PRL continued to rage. The episode had 
shown the necessity of establishing local LRA branches as soon as possible and a campaign 
to do just that was intensified. 
With the establishment of the LRA and increasingly fierce battles over spending 
policies, New South Wales politics was quickly becoming more partisan. Despite this, the 
Government and the Opposition had been able to come together to enact some measures 
of drought relief. This cause for unity would soon evaporate as in 1903 the drought finally 
began to break. While a relief to farmers, the rains offered little immediate relief to the 
State budget as it became increasingly difficult for the Government to borrow money. In 
January O’Sullivan boasted that his spending had helped to save the State in hard times and 
that it should be continued.34 Carruthers took the opposite view, and suggested that 
O’Sullivan had made the situation worse. He argued that the more the Secretary for Public 
works: 
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‘attempts to use the State as a means of providing employment for the people, and 
for wet-nursing them, the more he destroys the avenues of ordinary employment 
by private enterprise, and the longer this state of affairs continues the greater will 
be the injury to private employment and enterprise, and the greater corresponding 
demand upon the State to go on in a progressive scale with the public 
expenditure’.35  
To back this up he pointed to figures showing that emigration had exceeded 
immigration by 8,000 people in the last year and suggested that this exodus proved that the 
spending had failed to improve things for working people. He also argued that despite the 
reduced population employment levels were no higher than under Reid who had also 
endured drought and depression but who had managed to maintain a balanced budget. He 
cited artesian bore works as an example of where State competition was allegedly killing 
private companies, and suggested that reducing Government fees would be a far more 
effective way of producing employment. 
Regardless of whether proto-Keynesianism was helping or hurting the New South 
Wales economy, the funds to support such a policy would soon run out. During this time 
period State governments were incredibly reliant on London financiers who provided most 
of the capital for public works spending and other required borrowing. This outward flow 
of capital fuelled the development of Britain’s settler colonies, while providing investment 
returns and new markets for London’s capitalists. This interdependence was one of the 
defining characteristics of the ‘British World’ in which Carruthers lived and which he 
admired. Nevertheless, it also meant that colonial governments were open to the dictates 
of those they were borrowing from. As Andrew Dilley has demonstrated, London’s 
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financiers had their own culture which was inherently conservative and which formed 
assumptions aimed at minimising investment risk.36 The community was particularly 
concerned that Governments followed the Gladstonian budgetary model of controlled 
spending and low debt, while avoiding any public work which offered little hope of 
remuneration. Failure to follow these guidelines made lenders question whether a 
Government would be able to pay back what they borrowed. 
The See Government’s exceptionally high borrowing and heavy use of relief works 
for the unemployed inevitably raised alarm bells in the financial community, and British 
Banks became less and less willing to lend the Government money. Mansfield largely 
blames the negativity of the London press for this development, condemning ‘that 
hectoring tone with which the City of London could then afford to address the rest of the 
world’.37 The press played an important role in shaping the opinions of London’s financial 
community, but in this case it appears that it was simply reflecting back a wide-spread view 
of the perceived pitfalls of excessive borrowing. The fact that Barton, who could still be 
expected to defend his former National Federalist colleagues, was soon making a polite 
attack on the borrowing policies of State Governments and warning that they could harm 
Australian credit, suggests that the problem ran deeper than a few acts of editorial bias.38 
In the midst of this worsening situation the Treasurer dropped a bombshell while 
delivering a speech at Cowra. Blaming the drought and financial turmoil in Britain, 
Waddell confessed that spending and borrowing must be reduced or else the Government 
risked defaults and a deterioration of its credit.39 In order to combat this he flagged 
retrenchment in the civil service, and even proposed putting a limit on the old age pension 
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scheme which had been the Government’s signature policy. Despite protesting that the 
level of debt and spending had been exaggerated, he had effectively admitted that many of 
the claims of the Liberals and the wider reform movement were correct. That movement 
met his speech with incredulity. The Sydney Morning Herald suggested that Waddell’s 
profession that Government was ‘a question of finance from beginning to end’ was a 
truism and should have been realised earlier.40 Carruthers was sceptical of the Treasurer’s 
commitment, and argued that apart from old age pensions, new spending introduced by 
the Government should be eliminated before any civil servants were laid off. The reaction 
people were most interested in was that of the Premier, but he remained silent and refused 
to either defend or castigate his Treasurer. He justified his stance on the grounds that he 
did not want to give fuel to the press, but in effect he did the opposite for the latter took it 
as proof of a divided Cabinet. 
 Further divisions were revealed when O’Sullivan came out in support of striking 
Victorian railway workers, an interjection which prompted some of his Cabinet colleagues 
to try to force his resignation.41 The strike was caused by both pay cuts and the 
introduction of separate Parliamentary representation for railway workers and public 
servants. These separate seats isolated the political influence of their constituents, 
strengthening the position of Irvine’s supporters. Up until this point Carruthers had 
generally supported the moves of the Irvine Government and he was still under pressure 
to do so, but sectional suffrage was not something that he could countenance. He made it 
clear that his Liberals would not be following suit, for the move involved dividing people 
into classes in a manner completely contradictory to his definition of liberalism as non-
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classist and non-sectional.42 For the same reasons he rejected suggestions of a tax on 
absentee landlords, for he felt that was a tax on a class of people rather than on the land 
itself.43 Rickard lays great emphasis on the middle class support behind Irvine and 
Carruthers, but he gives little acknowledgement that in these instances at least, the New 
South Welshman was living up to his classless rhetoric.44 The difference between the two 
leaders is significant, for the belief in classless politics has become one of the defining 
principles of Australian liberalism, far easier to pin down than economic beliefs which have 
been subject to the sway of historical trends.45 Carruthers was not necessarily the first to 
propagate this belief but he was drawing an important line in the sand for the limits of 
conservatism within post-federation liberalism.  
Parliament resumed in June amidst threats from See to introduce press regulation 
in response to frequent attacks from the Sydney papers. Blaming the press for the 
Government’s misfortune was a common theme amongst Cabinet members. O’Sullivan’s 
unpublished memoirs seldom discuss Carruthers but frequently rail against the ‘foul 
treatment’ of the ‘party newspapers’.46 While it is true that the major newspapers generally 
supported the Opposition, O’Sullivan’s own Freemans’ Journal was equally subjective as 
was The Worker and the pro-PRL Sunday Times. Carruthers was more than happy to take 
up the opportunity given by See to style himself as the defender of a free press, and was 
soon indulgently quoting Thomas Jefferson and even Byron; ‘freedom’s battle, once begun, 
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though baffled oft, is ever won’.47 See’s threats ultimately came to nothing, though he was 
tempted to turn the Government Gazette into a State owned newspaper.48 
The traditional censure over the address in reply revealed that the months of 
turmoil had damaged the Government. There were several defections to the Opposition, 
though the solidarity of the Labor Party ensured that See’s position remained safe. Further 
censure motions also failed. One was over an inquiry which had found O’Sullivan guilty of 
political interference in the administration of the Fitzroy Dock at Cockatoo Island. 
Mansfield goes to great lengths to exonerate his subject of any significant wrongdoing in 
this matter, but the finding was grist to the mill for those who felt the Secretary for Works 
had been engaging in patronage all along.49 Another censure involved the leasing of 
premises for a Government Savings Bank from the Citizens’ Life Assurance Society. 
Though See had a vested interest in this Society, Carruthers focused his censure on the fact 
that the lease involved an expenditure of at least £20,000 which had not received 
Parliamentary approval. The Government retorted with its own accusation that 
Carruthers had been involved in a Building Society with land at Port Hacking that had its 
value increased by the State building a wharf in 1889, but when it was revealed that the 
vast majority of that land had been sold in 1885 the ‘stinkpot’ blew up in See’s face.50 
Due partly to the censure motions and partly to the fact that the Government was 
running out of steam, the session would prove to be highly unproductive. One of the few 
significant achievements was the passing of a Crown Lands Amendment Act which 
received bipartisan support and built on Carruthers’ earlier Act by reducing interest and 
adding further flexibility to the system. The other significant act was the passing of a Bill 
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submitting a referendum to the people on the reduction of members. While the reduction 
of members was a central pillar of the reform agenda, it was also something that several 
members of the Government had pledged themselves to before the last election. The 
referendum was an option that allowed Ministerialists to fulfil these pledges without 
antagonising Labor who opposed the reduction. Carruthers was sceptical of the 
referendum partly because of the Labor influence and also because the time taken 
threatened to ensure that the reduction might not take place before the next election. His 
fears were partially realised when a Labor amendment removing the 80 member lowest 
option from the referendum was carried with the help of Government supporters. The 
member for St George was exasperated that the Government would vote to amend its 
own Bill and tried to get it recommitted to re-insert the excluded option, but the gag 
provisions were eventually used and the Bill passed as it stood.51 
Ever the pragmatist Carruthers set about leading the campaign for a 90 vote, which 
was now the lowest option. With the session over he gave a number of speeches preaching 
his case and even published a signed plea to the electors in several issues of the Sydney 
Morning Herald.52 For cost saving purposes the referendum was held on the same day as 
the federal election. It is difficult to determine if either event affected the other result. 
Certainly there was still a significant crossover between reform supporters and Free 
Traders, and the 90 option received an overwhelming majority in the poll. One might 
expect that the Government’s direct involvement in the reduction of members may have 
taken the wind out of the sails of the reform movement, but it had quite the opposite effect. 
The circumstances of the referendum meant that the Progressives received little credit for 
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its success while simultaneously the reformers could argue that it was their agitation that 
forced the Government’s hand. 
Success in the referendum was both preceded and succeeded by by-election 
victories. The large number of by-elections between the 1901 and 1904 election is quite 
astounding and most showed a significant drift away from the Government. Garland’s 
election in Tamworth was followed by Liberal successes in Willoughby, Glen Innes, 
Armidale, Moree and the Illawarra. The Newcastle based seat of Waratah was retained by 
Labor while an independent Liberal won Ryde, but elsewhere the LRA either retained or 
gained power in every election during which the organisation had existed. An interesting 
trend was that the earlier by-elections were contested by Progressives, while the later ones 
were contested almost exclusively by the Labor Party. The incumbents had a large part to 
do with this, but as it became clear that the political tide was receding against the 
Government, only Labor had the organisational fortitude to put up candidates in seats 
where their Party had little chance of winning. 
It was this organisational fortitude that the LRA wanted to exceed for its goal was 
to do what Labor had not and win power in its own right. Its program of expansion had 
proceeded rapidly so that by March 1904 it could claim 15,000 members.53 In May the 
previous year it was misreported that Carruthers claimed the organisation had 70,000 
members. This figure has sometimes been quoted as some sort of gross exaggeration but in 
context it was clearly just an editorial mistake for in the same speech he said that the LRA 
had 70 branches with an average membership of 100 people, and later estimates showed a 
steady increase from a starting point of about 7,000 members.54 The Association continued 
to grow rapidly from March, so by the time of the election in August more plausible claims 
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of membership near or above 70,000 could be made.55 Referring to the May citation 
Hancock describes the large figure as ‘credible, if unverifiable’ when compared with the 
high participation rates for preselections and it is certainly more credible when the rise 
necessary to match the claim is less meteoric.56 What is clear is that the LRA was able to 
appeal to a similar section of the population as the Kyabram movement, but unlike that 
movement it was bringing its members into something with a greater integration with the 
Parliamentary Party and which went beyond a simple protest over the political system. 
Ultimately it was bringing them into something more permanent than the already waning 
Kyabram movement, for when the reform was over the Liberal Party and its well-
developed organisation could remain, free to find a fresh liberal agenda. 
That future required success at the upcoming election so that the LRA could 
imprint itself on the political map in a way that the FTLA never had. All energies were 
focused on that goal as the organising, literary and finance committees of the Association 
prepared to cover all bases. Carruthers was mainly involved in the former and it was in 
that capacity that he oversaw the appointment of Archdale Parkhill as general organiser of 
the LRA. Parkhill was a figure plucked from obscurity who would go on to become the 
‘doyen of Australian political organisers and makers of politicians’.57 Considering his later 
importance it is remarkable how little has been written about him. What has been written 
amounts to a few honourable mentions and a short Australian Dictionary of Biography 
entry. Prior to his appointment his only real political experience was as the honourable 
secretary of the Waverley branch of the APDA and as a nominee for the local council. It is 
difficult to know why Carruthers chose him, the militant Protestantism of the APDA was 
still something the Opposition leader was trying to keep at a distance, but Parkhill soon 
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became his protégé and one to whom he imparted all his organisational and political 
experience and skill. Such was their relationship that in 1927 Parkhill could write to his 
aged mentor that ‘I have been in public life since I started with you in 1904, and the lines 
you suggested have been the lines that I have followed and intend to follow’.58 It was 
through Parkhill that much of Carruthers’ lasting historical importance would be emitted. 
Not only did Parkhill make the LRA a success and keep it alive after his mentor’s 
retirement, but he would take its structure and modus operandi and introduce it to the 
federal sphere. 
Parkhill’s appointment took place in March, the same month as the Premier’s wife 
died. Understandably See was thrown into a state of intense mourning and temporarily 
withdrew from the political sphere. In his absence Wise was made acting Premier. After a 
very short session in January which had given effect to the result of the referendum, 
Parliament would not sit for a number of months if it sat at all before the election, hence 
Wise’s position was largely ceremonial. Nevertheless, he was quick to jump at the 
opportunity of leadership. Taking a page from the Opposition book, he began to preach 
the need for borrowing to end and for the introduction of local government, though he 
simultaneously maintained that the Opposition was exaggerating the financial situation 
and that the economy was on the rise. Borrowing and spending were controversial issues 
within the Government. Mansfield argues that a considerable amount of retrenchment had 
been forced upon the public works department since Waddell’s Cowra speech, though the 
Liberals did not think it very noticeable.59 Up until this point the split over economy had 
mainly been between Waddell and O’Sullivan, but now Wise was clearly making a claim 
to be in the reduction camp. Perhaps he sensed that that was what was popular amongst 
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the majority of Ministerialists whom he would need to appease as he would soon make a 
bid for the leadership. 
Wise’s enemies took his new position as an about face typical of a man with his 
reputation for political inconsistency. Carruthers claimed that Wise was stealing the 
Liberal Party’s clothes and that his local government scheme was as ‘cumbersome’ and 
‘burdensome’ as those which had failed before it.60 His main complaint was that the 
scheme was not sufficiently simple for use in underdeveloped country areas while in the 
city it proposed a degree of centralisation that he felt would be deeply unpopular. It was 
these country areas to which he now turned his attention. The LRA had not emerged from 
the country in the way that Kyabram had, and while its city base had certain benefits it 
meant that the organisation had more work to do in order to win rural seats. The by-
elections had shown that the rural vote was not as solidly Progressive as it once had been 
and in May Carruthers embarked on an extended tour to capitalise on this dissatisfaction. 
The tour inevitably involved a large number of propagandistic speeches, but more 
importantly it allowed Carruthers to directly oversee preselections and try to ensure each 
seat had a Liberal candidate. He left Parkhill behind to maintain operations in Sydney, but 
he kept in close contact with his young protégé. Little of Parkhill’s papers survive today, 
but of the handful of letters which remain two come from this tour. They reveal much 
about the methods of campaigning at the time and how Carruthers used every technique 
available to him to win votes. In the letters Carruthers’ main theme was the failings of the 
literary committee, who led him to say in exasperation that ‘I’d give the man who would 
do this work [writing and distributing political pamphlets] well the pick of any seat in the 
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Ministry so much do I think of its value’.61 He was insistent that copies of speeches and 
other literature be sent along with money in order to hire a man to distribute them.62 He 
maintained that this was a far more effective way of spending money than hiring halls and 
that candidates, rather than the LRA, should be made to pay for their own meetings. He 
also requested copies of diagrams comparing land settlement under Reid to the present 
administration. A less scrupulous technique was revealed when Carruthers requested that 
an upcoming public meeting in Redfern be stacked to ensure a positive crowd. 
Carruthers was ‘dead dog tired with hard travelling’ but his hands on approach was 
effective in mobilising the resources of the LRA and would pay considerable dividends at 
the election.63 The last major threat to the electoral chances of the LRA was vote splitting 
with the PRL. Several attempts had been made to come to a preselection agreement with 
the League but they had fallen down on Carruthers’ insistence that he maintain the final 
say. In the end the successful expansion of the LRA forced the PRL to back down. An 
agreement was reached whereby preselection disputes would be resolved by an executive 
panel consisting of representatives of the Parliamentary Opposition, LRA, PRL, Women’s 
Liberal League and other kindred associations.64 Carruthers, Want and the PRL-affiliated 
McMillan also had their own separate seats on this panel. The fact that the Opposition and 
LRA were represented separately gave them a numerical advantage over the PRL and left 
Carruthers in charge. This arrangement did not solve all of the problems of vote splitting 
but it would prove effective in containing the disruption. 
The other groups that disturbed LRA preselections were sectarian and temperance 
organisations. Much has been made of their role in the election, particularly by J.D. Bollen 
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who views it as a key moment in the firming of Protestant ties to the Liberal Party.65 In 
many ways Henry Parkes’ ‘Kiama ghost’ was the natural political inheritance of the LRA.66 
For a number of historical and cultural reasons Protestants had long been attracted to the 
Party and in an age of sectarianism the fringe elements of the LRA’s membership dissuaded 
many Catholics from joining. Sectarian and temperance groups were able to infiltrate a 
number of branches of the LRA, an inevitable downside of a participatory Party that 
encouraged membership. Carruthers’ attachment to local option helped to exaggerate this 
pre-existing Protestant-Liberal connection but at the same time that connection was never 
universal and it would be wrong to accuse him of openly courting the sectarian vote. 
Perhaps his position meant that he could take Protestant support for granted, nevertheless 
Carruthers’ overwhelming focus was on financial and political issues. Richard Broome has 
claimed that Carruthers utilised Protestant support to keep his fragmenting anti-Labor 
group together.67 While this view at least acknowledges that it was political ideology 
rather than Protestantism which was key to the Liberal’s identity, Broome offers little 
specific evidence of Carruthers embracing religious issues. The closest Broome comes to 
this is a later citation of the fact that Carruthers attended a single meeting of the Liquor 
Alliance in 1904.68 This little publicised attendance of a meeting in support of one of his 
policies does not supersede the fact that temperance was not on his fighting platform and 
was rarely mentioned in his speeches. In the end Carruthers blamed unwanted sectarian 
endorsements for costing the Liberal Party seats and though Bollen and Broome suggest 
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Protestant support was beneficial, it is clear from the public account that the Liberal 
Leader wanted to fight the election on economic and ideological issues.69 
See returned in late May only to announce his retirement in early June on account 
of ill health. When See’s impending retirement became known Wise sent him a letter 
insisting that only he had the qualifications to take the leadership and threatening that he 
would not serve under anyone else.70 Sir Harry Rawson suggested to See that Wise would 
be unsuitable on account of his being unreliable, and that See’s first choice Paddy Crick had 
been ‘drinking to excess’ at Executive Council meetings.71 Hence the outgoing Premier 
advised the Governor that Waddell should be sent for.72 It is testament to how 
undeveloped the Progressive Party was that the leadership was still decided in this manner 
rather than by an election. Such a method had been unthinkable within the Liberal Party 
since Reid’s election in 1891 and in 1894 that Party had even taken the step of nominally re-
electing their leader before he assumed the Premiership. Wise and Crick refused to serve 
under Waddell; hence he was forced into making a considerable Cabinet reshuffle. 
O’Sullivan was shifted to Minister for Lands, allowing the Premier to pursue a policy of 
economy and retrenchment largely unmolested. 
With high levels of debt and continued difficulty borrowing, economy was the 
main cry of the rapidly approaching election. Even the Labor Party’s fighting platform 
placed ‘economic government’ in second position.73 The gathering consensus on all sides 
of politics that something must be done to reduce expenditure served only to strengthen 
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Carruthers’ position, for he had been beating that drum the longest and the loudest. 
Despite the fact that the Government was co-opting a number of his policies, Carruthers 
was succeeding in making the election about economic issues, a situation that ever since 
has tended to favour the Liberals. He broadened the appeal of his anti-debt rhetoric by 
focusing on the amount of potential jobs that were being destroyed by the outflow of 
capital towards debt repayments. Jobs had been temporarily boomed by unsustainable 
spending, but in the process shackles were being placed on the future of the labour 
market.74 The appeal of this line of attack was inherently strengthened by the Progressives’ 
withdrawal from public works spending; an action which proved, to their opponents at 
least, the fact their programs had always been a financial liability. 
With reduction of members achieved, the LRA produced an updated fighting 
platform which elevated local government and closer settlement to new prominence.75 
These issues also appeared on the Progressive and Labor platforms, but as an eternal 
advocate of local government and author of a successful Crown Lands Act, it was easy for 
Carruthers to claim that he was more sincere than those who had allegedly failed to do 
something about them after five years in office. 
As the election campaign wore on it became increasingly clear that the 
Progressives were crumbling. With See, Wise and Crick either retired or detached, the 
Party had lost three of its main voices. Waddell and O’Sullivan were the only prominent 
members who remained and the two men stood aloof both personally and ideologically. 
What little was left of the PPA, which had functioned so successfully in 1901, did little to 
defend a Premier who was in near constant disagreement with that organisation’s founder. 
Torn between selling Waddell’s retrenchments and defending their record, the 
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Progressives lacked fundamental ideological cohesion. Without it they were virtually 
unelectable, as voters were left confused about who or what the Party stood for. 
In these circumstances Carruthers shrewdly continued to shift his attention 
towards the Labor Party, creating an election issue out of his clear lines of cleavage. This 
would serve to exacerbate the Government’s increasing irrelevancy, as nothing highlighted 
the Progressives’ lack of set ideology and cohesion more clearly than an ideological battle 
in which politicians were called to take sides. The fighting platforms of the Liberal and 
Labor Parties were still quite similar, so Carruthers focused on differences in the 
philosophical positions they claimed to represent. His main argument was that the Labor 
Party were the new Tories, the former fighting for union privileges as the latter fought for 
aristocratic privileges, and also attacking free parliament through use of the caucus 
solidarity.76 He lambasted his opponents for claiming to have improved things for working 
people when under their watch unemployment and the cost of living had both risen. Early-
closing and old age pensions were ‘skin-deep’ improvements as long as the jobs created by 
private enterprise were being sacrificed to Government avarice.77 The lines of cleavage 
were being refined, and in Carruthers’ eyes they were liberalism and private enterprise 
against socialism, class prejudice and subjection to the State: 
‘You will have to make a choice between a policy of extreme socialism, based on 
class prejudice, fomented by extremists, or the policy of liberalism, which appeals 
to the higher and nobler instincts of humanity. The issue is also for encouragement 
to honest endeavour in all classes, for individual enterprise, and for bedrock 
reforms uplifting the people, and directing their energies and their capital to the 
work of developing our resources, and building up a true national prosperity. The 
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issue is against the State persisting in its endeavours to reduce the people to the 
condition of an army of State employees, dependent upon political patronage for 
work, and upon foreign money-lenders for loans to pay the wages’.78  
Here is the rhetorical philosophic stance of the modern Liberal Party, articulated 
by the LRA leader before either Reid or Deakin had done so either as coherently or with 
the express idea that liberalism was essentially opposed to the Labor Party for ideological 
reasons that ran deeper than caucus solidarity. Others may have done so, but if so they 
generally did it from a more reactionary perspective and they certainly did not do so from 
a position of comparable leadership. With the members of Parliament reduced and 
retrenchment underway, Carruthers could see that the reform movement would 
eventually run out of steam. In its place he was trying to construct a liberal stance for the 
20th century, still based on the common assumptions of colonial and Gladstonian liberalism, 
but with a new outlook and a new enemy. He was not doing so in a bubble of State politics 
isolated from the rest of the country, but as the leader of one of the most organised and 
largest (in terms of extra-parliamentary membership) parties in Australia, hence his actions 
would have lasting resonance particularly in the upcoming federal anti-socialist campaign. 
Much of the ‘socialism’ he was specifically condemning was actually the Labor supported 
policies of O’Sullivan, but at the same time he was pre-empting the position of his 
opponents which would be given more concrete policy expression over the coming years.  
While offering a cause and a ‘philosophy of government’, Carruthers was 
deliberately occupying broad ideological ground that would allow him to attract support 
from a wide range of liberals and conservatives. His liberal anti-socialism was not laissez 
faire and allowed room for ‘reforms uplifting the people’, though there was a general if 
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flexible belief in individualism and freedom that required the State stay limited in scope. 
This echoes Menzies’ belief that the Liberals ‘were determined to be a progressive party, 
willing to make experiments, in no sense reactionary, but believing in the individual, his 
rights, and his enterprise, and rejecting the socialist panacea’.79 The latter clearly had a 
greater emphasis on Government intervention than the former, but views on how much 
intervention is tolerable to freedom and individualism are something that have always 
varied among Australian Liberals. Like Menzies, Carruthers was trying to present himself 
as a unifying figure, while still staying true to the liberal (in Carruthers’ case classical liberal) 
convictions that had underpinned his career. 
Carruthers’ focus on the Labor Party was a double-edged sword. As Michael 
Hogan has pointed out it succeeded in marginalising the Progressives but also helped to 
give Labor the increased prominence that would eventually lead to its governing in its own 
right.80 Carruthers likely accepted this risk in order that in future there could be a straight 
out fight of the kind he had yearned for when tweedle-See and tweedle-Lee were in charge. 
It was not something he needed to do to achieve victory; all indications are that he could 
have coasted in on the reform issue alone. Nevertheless, in Carruthers’ view it was 
something that was necessary, not only for the enduring relevance of the Liberal Party, but 
also for the functioning of a democracy freed from the blight of minority government and 
legislative paralysis, and where electors knew what they were voting for. 
The emerging Liberal-Labor divide was solidified by O’Sullivan’s efforts to make 
an electoral deal with Labor, cementing in many people’s minds the idea that a vote for the 
Progressives was essentially the same as a vote for Labor. In the end the Ministerialists 
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were squeezed out of the election. They held on to just 16 seats and worse still they only 
managed to contest half of the 90 electorates.81 Several of the Progressives who did hold on 
had accepted a large part of the reform agenda and would soon gravitate towards the 
Liberal benches. The Liberals effectively won 45 seats while there was also an independent 
Liberal, 3 independents and 25 Labor supporters. Carruthers had a clear majority and for 
the first time the New South Wales Labor Party would be in outright and official 
Opposition. It was the dawning of a new era, the era of the modern party system that 
despite Liberal reformations, Labor splits and the emergence of the Country/National 
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C H A P T E R  T E N  
 
 
The Clarity of Cleavage 
 
Until the new Parliament met and it was revealed where the independents would sit and 
whether the Progressive rump would stay together, there was still some concern that the 
Liberal majority would be unworkably small. For this reason a number of people began to 
advocate that the abortive Liberal-Progressive coalition should be revived. Among these 
advocates were many, like the Sydney Morning Herald, who had been fiercely against a 
coalition just three years before.1 The impetus behind this backflip was not only that the 
Liberals would now dominate any such coalition, but also a growing distaste for the three-
party system particularly now that Labor had a realistic possibility of achieving power. The 
prospect of terms between the two old parties was scuttled by Waddell’s refusal to resign 
the Premiership immediately. Though he tacitly admitted that he lacked a majority, he 
justified his stance on account of the urgent need to pass a temporary Supply Bill. This was 
required because the long gap since Parliament last sat meant that the previous ordinary 
Supply Bill threatened to expire if proceedings were delayed by the Ministerial by-elections 
which would follow a change of Government.2 There was also a constitutional issue for 
the Governor had taken an ill-timed trip and the Lieutenant-Governor had not been left 
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with the power to commission Governments. Though initially aggrieved at the Premier’s 
obstinacy, Carruthers eventually agreed to help with the passage of supply. 
With this object in view Parliament sat in late August.  Though Carruthers was still 
technically the leader of the Opposition, he gave his support to the address in reply in 
order to bring swiftness to proceedings.  McGowen objected that the ameliorative attitude 
went against both the role of an official Opposition and the integral notion that a 
government needed to have a majority.  Soon to be leader of the Opposition himself, his 
objections seem to have been aimed at taking up that role early, for rather than attacking 
the Government he took aim at Carruthers for failing to fulfil his constitutional duty. 
Carruthers dismissed McGowen’s critique on account of the ‘extremely novel’ 
circumstances, and Waddell quickly achieved his aim in the face of an attempted Labor 
amendment.3 Labor’s decision to oppose the expedient actions of the outgoing 
Government alienated it from some Progressives and may have hurt its ability to call on 
their votes in later censure motions. Despite the urging of some within Cabinet to test the 
strength of the House, Waddell resigned of his own accord and Carruthers was sent for.  
In forming his Cabinet Carruthers repudiated a coalition, declaring that the 
Progressives must pick sides between the forces of Liberalism and the Labor socialists. He 
placed himself at the head of the Treasury where, he insisted, ‘the Premier always should 
be, with his fingers of the pulse of the country’.4 The first person he asked to join him was 
Ashton who was given the second most important post of Minister for Lands. The Ministry 
was rounded out with James Hogue as Colonial Secretary, Charles Lee as Secretary for 
Public Works, Charles Wade as Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Broughton 
O’Connor as Minister for Public Instruction, Labour and Industry, Samuel Moore as 
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Secretary for Mines and Agriculture and John Hughes as Vice President of the Executive 
Council. In contrast to his immediate predecessors Carruthers limited himself to one 
Honorary Minister, William Dick. This Ministry was to be the first in New South Wales 
history in which all the members had been born in Australia and in his late forties the 
Premier was one of the youngest since the enactment of Responsible Government.5 
After a delay caused by the by-elections, Parliament resumed in mid-September. 
Waddell and his rump took their seats on the Opposition crossbenches, though he and 
some of his more moderate followers had assured Carruthers of their general support.6 
Labor assumed the Opposition benches, but not without Crick raising a point of order 
declaring that precedent suggested that the outgoing Premier was still the official leader of 
the Opposition.7 Crick’s grievance ignored the political reality of the lines of cleavage as 
they had emerged at the last election and the Speaker was able to find a precedent to justify 
the logical move. It was that political reality that Carruthers was now preparing to take 
advantage of. A large part of the justification for the lines of division was that a 
parliamentary democracy needed a clear two-party system in order to build stable 
Government majorities capable of passing difficult legislation. Having achieved his desired 
realignment, the Premier now had to prove that the benefits would be tangible. 
The first test of how stable the lines of cleavage were in the new Parliament would 
not be legislative but financial. Waddell’s Supply Bill had only temporarily postponed the 
pressing issue of the budget and as the novelty of Labor’s position wore off in the House, 
Carruthers began frantically preparing his financial statement. After his repeated attacks on 
the financial administration of the See-Waddell Government, Carruthers’ entered the 
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Treasury with great expectations that he would balance the budget and reduce the debt. 
He made early moves to fulfil that expectation, declaring that he would say ‘no, no, no’ to 
those requesting Government funds and putting an immediate freeze on public service 
appointments for twelve months.8 
The Financial Statement delivered on 5 October was preceded by a disclaimer 
reminding the House of the limited time Carruthers had had to find savings and get to 
grips with the situation. His main problem was the large public debt his predecessors had 
left him. Though budget deficits had plagued the Lyne-See era, the vast majority of this 
debt was from public works spending. Most of this was treated separately from regular 
expenditure and paid for by loans, the majority of which were obtained from the Bank of 
England. In theory these loans paid for works that were meant to function as remunerative 
investments, but in practice many returned little of that investment. This problem had 
allegedly grown worse under O’Sullivan’s program of deliberate government employment, 
so that in many cases the returns needed to pay off the loans stagnated at 1899 levels 
despite the large subsequent increase in borrowing.9 Meanwhile the debt continued to 
accrue interest of up to £3,000,000 a year, a staggering figure considering that ordinary 
revenue amounted to just £11,435,010.10  
In order to combat this Carruthers proposed to not only to reduce public works 
spending on top of major reductions already effected by Waddell, but also to create a 
sinking fund to pay off the debt, with two-thirds of the revenue from Crown Land Sales to 
go into the fund. Loan expenditure would thus be reduced to less than half of its average 
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from the previous three years, from £4,103,000 to £1,926,000.11 With regard to the budget 
itself, the Treasurer proceeded to outline a number of planned economies. Savings would 
be made by abolishing the position of Agent General, fitting civil servants into existing 
publicly-owned buildings and ending the practice of renting CBD office space at 
considerable expense, reducing the costs of the position of the Governor and removing 
publicly-funded telephones from the homes of Ministers and civil servants. No civil 
servants were to be fired or have their salaries reduced, but a new system controlling pay 
rises was to be introduced to add to the savings made by the hiring freeze. Using these 
methods the ordinary expenditure would be reduced by approximately £109,000 on the 
three-yearly average.12 The yearly budget would thus be balanced, and by June 1905 a 
surplus of nearly £200,000 had been achieved with the help of improving seasons.13 
Carruthers’ statement was met with a torrid backlash from both sides of politics. 
Those on the right of him argued that the cuts did not go nearly as deep as should be 
expected from a reform Government, while some on the left bemoaned the treatment of 
civil servants in spite of Carruthers’ careful insistence that none were to be fired. 
McGowen accused the Premier of limiting himself to ‘cheeseparing’ and avoiding the 
difficult decision to increase taxation that the financial situation necessitated.14 The person 
who may have been happiest with the statement was Waddell, who took its mild reforms 
as a vindication of the financial measures he had undertaken. Many drew the comparison 
with Waddell, though Ashton was quick to point out that Waddell had been forced into 
economies by circumstances which prevented further borrowing while Carruthers had 
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freely chosen to be prudent with the public money.15 Carruthers complained that those 
expecting the expenditure to be reduced more drastically had not read his campaign 
speeches and were imposing the unrealistic promises of others upon his head.16 
The main problem with the perception of the Treasurer’s budget was that, apart 
from the continued pressures caused by the lack of a comprehensive system of local 
government, which Carruthers was planning to deal with, and the large interest 
accumulating debt, which the sinking fund and sustainable budget surpluses would bring 
under control, most of the problems with the finances were not structural but due to the 
‘extravagant’ style of the previous government. Considerable savings could be made by 
simply not instituting as many new public works projects as those that were reaching 
completion and by being more discerning in the giving out of endowments, which were 
budgetary gifts frequently given to organisations as diverse as shires, hospitals, universities 
and fire brigades.17 Such savings were not as visible as a ‘Black Wednesday’ of mass 
government lay-offs but they were perhaps more effective in achieving Carruthers’ 
financial goals.18  
Most of the attacks on the budget argued that Carruthers was not doing enough to 
reduce spending, but his attempt to do something with regard to tax imposition met with 
an even more negative reaction. Both of these changes were relatively minor. The first 
involved imposing wharfage fees on New South Welshmen. Formerly these had just been 
levied on people from interstate, but the Federal Constitution made such differentiation 
illegal and Carruthers was left with the choice of either imposing them on his countrymen 
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or giving up an important source of revenue when he was already having difficulty 
balancing the budget. The other involved amending the Stamp Duties Act in order to 
increase the penalty for not paying and reduce an exemption in probate duties from 
£50,000 to £30,000. Carruthers regarded this as a ‘closing of leakages’ rather than a true 
increase in taxation.19 These Bills almost provoked a constitutional crisis. In the Legislative 
Council the Harbour Rates Bill was amended to remove a clause allowing wharfage 
charges to be levied on goods unloaded at private wharves while the Stamp Duties Bill was 
also heavily amended before being ruled a money bill by the Speaker. This incited a 
standoff, for the Westminster tradition implied that a nominee Upper Chamber should not 
have the power to amend money bills. This implication was controversial and there were 
many in the Legislative Council who refused to cede their rights over money bills, much as 
they had in the stormy days of the early Reid Ministry. 
In the end a compromise was reached and a new Stamp Duties Bill was passed by 
the Legislative Council. Clune and Griffith note that after these initial skirmishes the 
Council was ‘less confrontational’ and generally got on well with both the Carruthers and 
Wade Governments.20 While the fact that the Council had backed down over the money 
bills issue was one reason it may have been somewhat sheepish for the remainder of the 
Government’s life, another reason for the change in attitude was a strengthening of 
leadership. John Hughes represented the Government in the Upper Chamber in 1904 and 
while he had done an admirable job in difficult circumstances he would soon be 
supplemented by the presence of James Brunker as a member of the Executive Council 
without portfolio. Brunker’s experience and loyalty would once again prove invaluable for 
Carruthers, as having the Government’s position clearly and authoritatively articulated led 
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to far fewer outright defeats. Once the Council was subdued any talk of its constitutional 
reform faded away. Its ameliorative attitude made such reform less urgent, especially since 
career defining local government legislation was still to pass, but even after this had been 
achieved the issue was left alone. Perhaps Carruthers found it difficult to come up with a 
sound alternative to the nominee system, particularly as the Federal Senate was revealing 
problems of its own or maybe he saw it as a brake on extremism in an age where socialism 
was becoming an ever more real question of political debate. No clear explanation was 
ever given for the change of heart and the issue was allowed to become one of Carruthers’ 
very few unfulfilled electoral promises. 
1905 would be marked by a return to economic prosperity and a subsequent 
lessening of press criticisms of the government.21 Nevertheless it would not be free of 
controversy. One of the most ideological debates of the year was to wage over the 
manufacture of locomotives. The debate revolved around whether these should be 
constructed at home or overseas and whether they should be made by the government or 
private enterprise. It was the Railway Commissioners, in particular John Oliver, who found 
that it would be cheaper to produce the locomotives overseas. Due to the independent 
nature of the Commission, most of its members’ actions were free from Ministerial 
oversight but due to a quirk in the Act introduced by Henry Parkes Ministerial approval 
was required to send these contracts abroad. Carruthers was hesitant to do so, arguing that 
the local economic benefits would offset the discrepancy in contract costs provided that 
discrepancy was not overwhelming. When the media got wind of these negotiations both 
the Labor and Progressive Parties came out against foreign manufacture no matter what 
the cost.  
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This coalescence of protectionist and socialist interests threatened to unite the 
Opposition and the cross-bench, but Carruthers largely ignored this threat and pursued his 
own liberal economic goals. Though he publicly pushed the benefits of local manufacture, 
he refused to commit to it at any price and held his nerve to bring forward cheaper offers 
from home.22 Once these were produced the Labor Party continued to argue that the 
locomotives should be built in State railway workshops, but with the protectionist issue 
now gone there was little hope of forcing the Government’s hand. The tender went to 
Clyde Engineering with iron and steel to be supplied by William Standford. The latter was 
a hard-line Protectionist who had privately debated Carruthers on the merits of socialism.23 
His success in winning an important contract strongly suggests that the Treasurer avoided 
using his office as a means for political patronage. 
The row over the locomotives contract serves as a good microcosm for the relative 
attitudes of each of the Parties towards the role of the State. In this instance the Liberals 
could fiercely support private enterprise and to some extent even foreign enterprise 
without questioning the government’s role in paying for the locomotives in the first place. 
Meanwhile the difference between Liberals and the fragmented Progressives is shown by 
the former’s belief in budgetary prudence and a reverence for the money of the taxpayer, 
while the latter would have been willing to spend more to achieve their own philosophical 
and economic goals. For some Waddellite instincts towards balanced budgets and private 
enterprise tempered this desire for spending, while others continued to sympathise with 
Labor even after the foreign manufacture issue was settled, hence after the initial 
protectionist furore the Progressives continued to drift towards their relative sides of the 
emerging political divide. The episode demonstrates how the new lines of division were to 
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a large extent clear (and becoming clearer), even without the presence of a dogmatic 
laissez-faire position.  
The fact that Carruthers was willing to act so nonchalantly when faced with the 
threat of a Labor-Progressive combination also shows the confidence he had in the political 
division and in his Party’s solidarity. There was good reason for this faith, as despite intense 
press criticisms of his financial policy the Liberals had been largely united in Parliament. 
This situation would continue, as in contrast to Parkes and even Reid, Carruthers was 
highly successful at keeping his troops in line even without the caucus pledge that his 
ideology denied him. This success is partly attributable to a hang-over from his battles for 
Party discipline as Reid’s attack dog and also to the fact that federation had thinned out the 
ranks of talented State parliamentarians. Perhaps it was the sight of the Labor Party 
occupying the Opposition benches that kept the Liberals from bickering, for the upshot of 
an emerging two-party system was the knowledge that if they were not in government 
their ideological opponents would be. The dual-role previously discussed was thus a source 
of unity inside Parliament as well as out of it. Something had certainly changed since 
Carruthers had entered Parliament, and whatever subtle forces were acting upon them, 
liberals seem to have lost some of their voting independence by this point. It is noteworthy 
how many times Carruthers gave a free vote to his backbenchers, and while this may seem 
quite liberal, the fact that such freedom was now the ‘gift’ of the Premier hints at firmer 
discipline.24 This restrained freedom was a pragmatic compromise between individualism 
and consistency which typifies Carruthers’ long struggle to create a party that was solid 
whilst still being ‘liberal’. 
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Party unity would prove even more important as the Carruthers Government 
faced the biggest controversy of its tenure, the land scandals. The corruption at the heart of 
these scandals took place during the life of the previous Government, when people had 
allegedly paid money to the Minister for Lands Paddy Crick and his close friend and fellow 
MP W.N. Willis for the consideration of leases, and frequently the reclassification of 
existing leases as improvement leases. These improvement leases were meant to be given 
out on land that was not yet suitable for closer settlement and under the clauses of 
Carruthers’ 1895 Land Act they gave more generous terms than their closer settlement 
equivalents. Because of these terms, which included being able to acquire far more land 
under a 28-year lease and then be rewarded with permanent ownership for having 
improved it, people wanted to have their land reclassified no matter how suitable for closer 
settlement it already was and this is where the incentive for corruption came in. The 
scandal broke when a Mr. R.S. Sims was unsuccessful in his attempt to have his land 
reclassified and thus tried to recover the money that through an intermediary had been 
given to Willis.25 Initially the Government was somewhat unresponsive to the allegations 
that were revealed during Sims’ court case, but after a sustained press agitation a Royal 
Commission into the administration of the Lands Department was set up. This 
subsequently revealed cases where payments had been made for the consideration of leases, 
something that Crick defended as the equivalent of a barrister’s fee.26 
Though the incidents occurred when he was in Opposition, Carruthers was 
dragged into the land scandals for several reasons. Firstly, he had been the Minister for 
Lands under Reid and any allegations of institutional corruption thus reflected badly on 
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him. Secondly, his law firm had the misfortune of having acted for Willis in some of his 
legal proceedings and once this was revealed Carruthers retired from practising law until 
he was out of office. On both accounts he was exonerated. He appeared freely before the 
Commission, gave it all of his books and in the end the Commissioner, though he was not 
directly investigating the Premier, felt compelled to state that the evidence had shown no 
wrongdoing by Carruthers.27 Even Labor historian H.V. Evatt, who was no fan of the 
Premier, having looked closely at this period of history found that ‘there was no substance 
in the innuendoes against Carruthers’.28 The third reason Carruthers was dragged in 
however was the one he could not escape, and that was the Government’s apparent lack of 
urgency in dealing with the scandals. People could point to the delay in appointing the 
Commission and then in extending its powers, the fact that Willis was allowed to escape to 
South Africa and the delay in retrieving him, and also the botched prosecutions that 
ensured most of the guilty parties got off, all to suggest that Carruthers did not want the 
matter sorted out and then insert their own scurrilous reason as to why. 
In his biography of Labor member William Holman, one of the fiercest critics of 
the Government during the time of the scandals, Evatt seems to accept from his subject 
that something untoward must have gone on, but fails to give a clear reason as to why. 
What he does give is the subtle implication that Carruthers was trying to protect members 
of the former See-Waddell group who were drifting towards the Liberal benches.29 He 
even goes so far as to assert that Norton, who attacked Holman in the Assembly and 
forced him into a distracting by-election, was trying to protect both Crick and Carruthers 
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from Holman’s critiques.30 Such assertions cannot be sustained against the weight of 
evidence from actions which we know far more about. As has been shown earlier, 
Carruthers and Norton held each other in such contempt from their previous libel battle 
that it is difficult to imagine them combining no matter what the circumstances. Rather 
than easing with the passing of time, the evidence actually suggests that their ill-feelings 
were as strong as ever, for after Carruthers retired for health reasons it was Norton who 
would suggest that he had done so to flee the indignity of the scandals.31  
As for Carruthers’ needing to protect the former See-Waddell group in order to 
shore up his position in the Assembly, the Premier needed only some of the votes of that 
extremely fractured group to hold power. These votes were specifically those of Waddell 
and his immediate followers. Waddell and Crick had a strained relationship; the latter had 
refused to serve under the former and while that was about pride as much as anything else 
Crick had later attacked Waddell during the 1904 election campaign.32 Since Crick had 
been part of the See but not the Waddell Government, he could easily be thrown under 
the bus and that is what Carruthers eventually did, kicking him out of Parliament and 
using him as a stick with which to beat Labor who had kept him in power. As any 
Opposition may be expected to do with anything, Labor tried to use the handling of the 
scandals to attack the Government but their censure motions failed. The simplest 
explanation for Carruthers’ apparent lack of urgency and his attempts to gag debate on the 
scandals is that he did not want distractions while he attempted to push his signature pieces 
of legislation, the Local Government Bills, through the House. 
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The first of these, the Local Government (Shires) Bill was introduced in June 1905. 
Its aim was to incorporate compulsorily all rural areas of the State into Shires, with the 
exclusion of the far Western areas which did not yet have the population to support such 
administration. It was shortly followed by the introduction of the Local Government 
(Extension) Bill which dealt with the Municipalities of more urbanised areas. The main 
difference between the two was the number of responsibilities each required the local 
government body to undertake. Both Shires and Municipalities would need to care for 
roads, bridges, wharves, regulation of traffic, lights at crossroads, bushfires, floods, kerbing, 
guttering, tree-planting, street lighting and management of public watering places.33 A 
Municipality would also be required to provide a sanitary service, deal with garbage, 
provide drains, sewers, simple water supplies, regulate and license public vehicles and 
hawkers, care for and manage parks, reserves and commons not under trustees, while a 
Shire could choose to undertake these responsibilities. Further responsibilities could also 
be undertaken by application to the Local Government Commissioners. The State retained 
the right to declare any important work a national one and thereby assume responsibility 
over it. While arguably a necessary clause, if abused this left the door open for the 
continued presence of the ‘roads and bridges’ member. It was hoped that the degree of 
flexibility present in the Bills would allow for the vast range of developmental stages 
present across New South Wales. 
Determined that the new level of government should not result in a great increase 
in the overall burden of taxation as Federation had, Carruthers gave local governments an 
endowment based on the number of responsibilities they had accepted and effectively 
handed over the land tax so that large new imposts were not required to fund them. This 
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land tax now took the form of council rates of 1d in the £ on the unimproved value of land, 
which could be increased according to requirements. The average rate levied by Shires 
immediately following the passing of the Act was 1.08d and while the average for 
Municipalities was higher their constituents had previously been paying both rates and the 
land tax.34 At this level the rate was a tax hike only to the extent that the new rates lacked 
the exemptions of the old land tax and that crown land leases would now become rateable. 
Carruthers justified this by arguing that the inefficiencies and abuses of the existing system 
were increasing the public debt and thus pushing up taxation.35 On top of these general 
rates, special rates could be levied on the improved or unimproved value of land but only 
by Municipalities and only if approved by a poll.   
While almost all the provisions of the two Bills were hotly debated, it was the 
proposed franchise that caused the most controversy. Though plural voting in any single 
Council was to be abolished, the Bills gave the vote only to those who paid rates, either 
directly or indirectly through rent, and allowed a ratepayer to vote in more than one 
Council.36 In this manner the franchise was much wider than that of the older 
Municipalities Act, but the Labor Party still objected to this provision as undemocratic. 
Carruthers brushed off their concerns, insisting that those who did not even contribute half 
a penny to the Municipal coffers should not vote in elections that would ultimately 
determine how that money was spent.37 Though he likely believed in this ideological 
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justification, it is probable that like Reid, Carruthers also felt that a compromise on the 
franchise would help to get the Bills through the Legislative Council.38 
Reid’s Local Government Bill had been killed off by Labor concerns over the 
franchise, but Carruthers was now in a position to ignore them. In many ways the passing 
of the Local Government Bills was the legislative upshot of Carruthers’ clear lines of 
cleavage. Beyond defining issues that helped to shape Government majorities, previous 
Parliaments had often been able to overcome party divides and the staunch individuality of 
members to pass much through what amounted to consensus. Compulsory arbitration is 
an example of this, as despite loud critics on the fringes many in the three major Parties 
came together to pass what, for different reasons, they thought to be a beneficial Act. 
There were however limits to this consensus. Once a reform became too complex and too 
wide sweeping the cumulative adversaries of its individual clauses would ultimately defeat 
it. Local government had been the perennial victim of this.39 Despite near universal 
support, a failure to reach a consensus on details had meant that it had frequently been 
passed over. Meanwhile legislation on more divisive issues like the tariff had passed 
because its backers succeeded in making it a yes-no question. Now in an increasingly 
divided House with parties representing broad ideological positions rather than single-
issues, numerous questions became a matter of yes or no, for the clear lines of cleavage 
made every question that had a degree of importance a choice between Liberal and Labor. 
This in turn firmed up majorities meaning that ironically partisanship was able to break a 
deadlock which was more than a decade old. A number of amendments were made to the 
Local Government Bills before they were passed, and Liberals were given a largely free 
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hand in the discussion of provisions but once it became a question of whether the Bills 
would succeed or fail the Liberal majority was enough to see them through. 
Though in basic principle they had near universal approval, Carruthers’ Local 
Government Bills were coloured by the ideological prism that defined his side of the 
political divide. In advocating the Shires Bill Carruthers pointed to the tiny proportion of 
the State that had been incorporated and argued that the lack of local government created 
an over-reliance on the State Government. He felt this centralisation had ‘destroyed the 
spirit of self-reliance in the people’, dragged public servants away from the country and 
into the city and placed a great strain on the public purse.40 Carruthers argued that without 
local government people had been more willing to push for greater local spending because 
the costs of that spending would be dissipated across the State, but with more direct 
responsibility they could be taught that government spending was ‘putting a burden on 
their own backs’.41 To reinforce this he even put in a provision that required a municipality 
to gain the approval of the Local Government Commissioners and then its ratepayers at a 
poll before it could engage in any borrowing.42 Local government had long been thought 
of as a remedy to the insidious influence of the so-called ‘roads and bridges’ member 
whose sole purpose was to secure spending for their area, but now Carruthers’ liberal 
viewpoint had led him to the theory that decentralisation could be used to actively reduce 
the size of government. 
One may question whether this theory has proven naïve. Voter apathy towards the 
lowest tier of government has arguably meant that electors pay less rather than more 
attention to spending at that level. Equally local government has not killed off the impulse 
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that saw ‘roads and bridges’ members seek spending on their electorates in the hope of 
being rewarded at the ballot-box. Even so, the fact that pieces of legislation that were not 
inherently ideological were becoming so offers a glimpse into the new political reality that 
was emerging at this time. The Local Government Bills, amalgamated as the Local 
Government Act 1906, were perhaps more successful in their simpler aims of giving people 
greater representation at a local level and facilitating the smooth administration of the 
State. Twenty years after Carruthers first sought election his promise on Local 
Government had been fulfilled and his Act would remain in place with little amendment 
for nearly 85 years.43 
The other major piece of legislation introduced in 1905 was the Liquor 
(Amendment) Bill. Moved by Wade as a non-Party measure, this instituted a number of 
regulations for the liquor industry, including restrictions on the sale of liquor to children, 
on Sundays and on election days. Its central and most controversial clause however was 
local option, which gave each electorate the ability to choose between continuing the sale 
of liquor at present levels, reducing the number of liquor licenses or eliminating them 
entirely, based on a poll of its electors. As originally introduced a 50% participation rate 
and two-thirds majority would be required to completely eliminate licenses but 
temperance lobbying saw this reduced to 30% participation and a three-fifths majority.44 
Almost as controversial as local option itself was the issue of whether or not the hoteliers 
who were robbed of their business by a vote should be entitled to compensation. 
Carruthers voted against compensation but suggested that hoteliers be given ‘reasonable’ 
notice before being required to terminate their business.45 This was a difficult position to 
maintain as in essence a property right was being unilaterally taken away by the 
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Government without paying any respect to its value, a precedent that the business 
community and many ideological liberals did not want set. It had more than a modicum of 
socialism about it and for those without a deep seeded hatred of the industry could only be 
justified on budgetary grounds. Even for a Government dedicated to reducing the debt 
these grounds were thin and the whole affair demonstrated that economically liberal goals 
did not necessarily suit socially conservative legislation. 
There was another ideological tension inherent in the Liquor Bill, for the complete 
abolition of the liquor trade by vote was a ‘tyranny of the majority’ that restricted the 
freedom of both individuals and businesses and was therefore arguably illiberal.46 One 
could contend that since each electorate could make up its own mind, State wide 
prohibition was extremely unlikely to eventuate and therefore the tyranny would be 
lessened, but Carruthers’ long-standing position on this issue was still somewhat 
incongruous to his other beliefs. The incongruity can be attributed to Carruthers’ 
pragmatism and flexibility that made him a classical liberal rather than a libertarian, and 
this thesis has already suggested that his father’s relationship with alcohol affected Joseph’s 
attitude towards this issue. Don Harwin has suggested that while Carruthers was ‘more 
than just a cynical exploiter of the temperance lobby for political purposes’ he may have 
had an eye on working class Protestant votes.47 This view may have merit, and if this was 
the case Carruthers may have felt that moderate temperance legislation was a way to 
appease these voters without sacrificing too many principles or engaging in sectarianism. It 
is important to remember however that evidence of secret motivations eludes historians at 
the best of times, and after the passing of a century even more so. Publicly Carruthers 
would complain that temperance got in the way of a clear choice between liberalism and 
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socialism, and the evidence suggests that he continued to view the lines of cleavage as his 
main vote winner.48 Later in life Carruthers would admit that license restriction polls only 
succeeded in those electorates where there was the least need for them, but he never 
intimated that the legislation should have therefore gone further in the way of 
prohibition.49 
Similar to the Liquor Bill and maintaining some of its paternalism was the 
gambling legislation introduced in 1906. This restricted betting outside licensed race-
courses. Some suggested that this was unfair as only the wealthy were able to attend race 
courses while the poor did their gambling in hotels and in the streets. It was soon amended 
so as to permit trots at agricultural shows. These were reasonably pervasive so that all but 
the most metropolitan poor could access some gambling throughout the year. There was 
some suggestion that this amendment may have been made as a sop to O’Sullivan, who 
had been uniting opposition to the Bill under the New South Wales Sporting League, but 
its main aim was undoubtedly to appease the rural voters who would be so vital come 
election time.50 The motivation behind the legislation itself seems to be more nuanced 
than the simpler wowserism behind local option. After all, gambling was still to be legally 
available and its restriction off-course could be justified on the grounds that it was 
impossible to regulate away from the track. The gambling legislation is perhaps best 
understood as a reaction to new technology, for it was the developments of the electronic 
age that had made off-track betting possible and it was the novelty of this possibility that 
helped to fuel an exaggerated fear of its social consequences. 
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This fear inevitably centred in conservative Protestant groups and though most of 
these wanted the Government to take a far firmer stance on betting, on the whole the 
gambling legislation helped to strengthen the sectarian affiliations of the two major parties. 
Interestingly Labor leader McGowen, who was not a Catholic, actually supported both the 
Liquor and Gaming Bills, though he was not very bellicose about it and like the Liberals his 
Party was given a free hand to vote on the issues. With the two Bills the Protestant-Liberal 
alliance, if it had ever consciously existed, had reached its peak and subtly both sides began 
to drift apart. Rydon and Spann suggest at the next election Protestant groups were less 
visibly active, while Bollen argues that ‘Protestantism after 1907 set about recovering a 
middle position’ that would allow it some influence over Labor.51 For their part the 
Liberals were concerned that they might seem too Protestant and thereby alienate a 
significant part of the electorate. Carruthers received a warning from one of his Cabinet 
colleagues that the APDA needed to be kept at arm’s length for the good of the Party, and 
though the Liquor and Gaming Bills were hailed as reform achievements the Premier 
proposed no new wowser legislation at the next election.52 
It was not this wowser legislation which met with the worst reaction from Catholic 
newspapers, but Carruthers’ decision to use some of his accumulated surplus to make 
public schooling completely free by abolishing the residual threepence a week fee that was 
presently being charged for tuition. The Catholic Press vehemently denounced the fee 
abolition as a tax on Catholics who would be forced to pay even more for a public 
education system which they objected to using.53 The Labor Party supported the Bill 
however, as did most of the Progressive rump, leaving Catholics nowhere to express 
electorally their indignation. The introduction of free education was part of a wider 
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program to reform education and increase spending on it now that the seasons had 
improved. Other aspects included increasing teachers’ wages and spending on public 
school buildings, while a new syllabus was laid down with a greater emphasis on science 
than ever before. Teacher training was improved with the establishment of the Teachers 
College at the University of Sydney, while money was also set aside for the founding of 
both a veterinary and an agricultural school there.  
Of particular concern to the historically minded Premier was the building of a 
library near Parliament to house the collection of important documents and artefacts from 
the Colony’s early history bequeathed to the State by David Scott Mitchell. This was built 
in conspicuously grand style, especially considering that Carruthers had criticised the 
spending his predecessors had heaped on the even more ostentatious Central Station. He 
justified this extravagance by the value of Mitchell’s collection, without which he claimed 
‘the history of New South Wales could not be written’ and also on Mitchell’s insistence 
that his bequest was conditional on the collection being well housed.54  A plaque 
commemorating the laying of a foundation stone by the Premier still emblazons the 
magnificent building which now holds his own papers. While Carruthers had taken great 
pains to stabilise the public works budget he did not put a halt to infrastructure building 
and the construction of a north coast railway was also begun during his Premiership. 
The creation of a unified State Bank was one of the most controversial planks of 
Liberal’s 1904 election platform. Towards the end of that year Carruthers had managed to 
get it passed by the Legislative Assembly, but it was promptly rejected by the Council as 
one of several Bills that prompted the Government’s early standoff with that chamber. 
One of the Council’s main objections was that the Bill would allow the new bank to 
                                                          
54 ‘Mitchell Library’, Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 12/9/1906, p.9. 




subsume the existing Barrack Street Savings Bank without its depositors’ permission. In 
1906 the Savings Bank Bill was reintroduced with a new clause that required the approval 
of a poll of these depositors before their savings could be absorbed into the new entity. 
Labor was largely dissatisfied with this concession but it appeased the now more 
ameliorative Upper House and this time they allowed the Bill’s passage. 
Though it was widely condemned as a foray into socialism, the Savings Bank Act 
did not introduce the concept of a State Bank into New South Wales, but amalgamated 
existing State Banks including the old Savings Bank, the Post Office Savings Bank and the 
Advances to Settlers Board, and transferred control of the new entity into the hands of 
three Commissioners. Its aim was to carry on the business of these establishments more 
efficiently. The new government bank possessed few powers not held by its predecessors, 
was still restricted to holding savings and giving advances to settlers, and could not 
undertake most of the business of an ordinary bank and thus compete with private 
institutions. Despite all these conditions its right-wing critics feared that centralisation 
would make the bank more powerful and they worried that a single bank would be easier 
for the Labor Party to use for socialistic ends. They took Labor objections to the Barrack 
Street poll as proof of disguised intentions that would not have been approved by 
depositors, and until that clause was introduced they had claimed that Carruthers’ Bill was 
aimed at trying to cosy up to the Labor Party.55 The fact that Carruthers was able to ignore 
their fears shows the security of his position within the lines of cleavage. He was able to 
accept the look of ideological inconsistency in order to improve the State’s finances, which 
were partially reliant on the savings contained within the Bank and would thus reap the 
benefits of increased efficiency, safe in the knowledge that the Liberal-Labor dichotomy 
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would help prevent the leaking of votes to the right for fear of putting his opponents into 
power. 
One of the cost-saving exercises Carruthers had proposed at the beginning of his 
Premiership was the abolition of the position of Agent-General in London, a post which 
might soon be superseded by the appointment of a federal High Commissioner. He soon 
realised however that as long as the States continued to negotiate British loans individually 
separate Agent-Generals would be required. To this end he had Timothy Coghlan perform 
the role of acting Agent-General before being given the official title, at a level of pay lower 
than his predecessor, in 1906. Coghlan was a long serving public servant with considerable 
financial acumen and free trade sympathies. He had been offered the position of federal 
statistician by Deakin but had refused it under obscure circumstances. There is some 
suggestion that the New South Wales Government had to threaten his pension in order to 
corral him into the decision.56 Showing no signs of ill-feeling, Coghlan fought vigorously 
for the interests of New South Wales and her Government. By successfully selling 
Carruthers’ economic reliability in contrast with his predecessors, Coghlin was able to float 
new loans at lower interest rates to pay off existing debts. In the process of doing so he 
controversially overlooked the Bank of England to pursue better terms from the London 
County and Westminster Bank.57 State Governments had traditionally chosen between 
these two institutions when procuring loans, but prior to this New South Wales had paid 
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extra for the more prestigious option.58 Carruthers also directed Coghlan to invest part of 
the budget surplus in England, where it could continue to grow for future use.59 
It was this growing surplus that was proving to be an intractable political problem 
for the Treasurer. With controlled spending and a booming economy this was growing 
rapidly each year. In 1905 the excess of ordinary revenue over expenditure was 
approximately £200,000, in 1906 it was £900,000 and in 1907 it was £600,000.60 This was a 
considerable proportion of the revenue when ordinary expenditure fluctuated between 
approximately £11,000,000 and £12,500,000. While much of this went to paying off 
inherited debt and funding public works that would have otherwise required new loans, 
people began complaining that the surpluses demonstrated that taxation was clearly too 
high. This discontent was reflected in the Daily Telegraph and in particular the Sydney 
Morning Herald, which began to turn on Carruthers. The latter demanded that the income 
tax be abolished since it had been introduced to fund free trade which no longer existed 
and since it was inquisitorial and unnecessarily probed into people’s private affairs.61 The 
Herald also warned that even if Carruthers was investing the surplus wisely the temptation 
it offered Governments would eventually breed extravagance.62 Their warning was not 
unfounded, for Carruthers’ papers reveal that some of his own supporters had begun to 
lobby him for increased spending.63 
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When reflecting on his financial administration in his memoirs Carruthers said that 
he followed the Gladstonian principle that the best way to restore the public finances and 
to fix unemployment was to leave money to ‘fructify’ in people’s pockets: 
‘I made the chief aim of my policy…to strengthen the position of individual 
members of the community to earn more money to improve their financial 
position, to assure them more prosperity, more of the good things of life, feeling 
satisfied that if I succeeded in that purpose the unemployment problem would be 
solved and with it the problem of our financial difficulties’.64 
While it is true that the Treasurer avoided the temptation of trying to tax his way 
back into surplus, up until 1906 he had been more cautious than this bold statement 
implies. In that year his budget finally attempted to reduce the burden of Government 
along his ideological lines. Even this was done in a more limited and calculated way than 
his critics would have liked. To encourage commerce railway rates were lowered and tolls 
on punts and ferries were abolished. Carruthers claimed that this succeeded in its aim to 
the extent that despite lower rates railway profits greatly rose through increased use, 
though he admitted that the luck of good seasons also helped.65 These reductions in 
indirect taxation were followed by a promise to abolish income tax on farmers who paid 
land tax, adding fuel to the agricultural boom that had followed the end of the drought. 
This was not enough for those that once again began to cry that ‘reform’ had not 
been carried into fruition. These hard-line reformers, many of whom continued to make 
their home in the PRL, were also concerned that Carruthers had not done anything about 
the Industrial Arbitration Act. Considering the number of labour deputations he saw who 
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claimed that it was essentially broken and needed to be strengthened, this inaction was at 
least a position of neutrality rather than of sympathising with the Opposition but it was still 
a sticking point for many. Further adding to the Premier’s difficulties was another scandal, 
this time more limited in scope, which involved the Railway Commissioners. An inquiry 
into their affairs found that they had mishandled the tendering of coal contracts and while 
by law the Commissioners had acted independently of the Government there was much 
handwringing over their replacement. Things became so bad that there were rumours of a 
secret caucus condemning the Premier’s handling of the land scandals and of McMillan 
being brought in to Parliament and then the Liberal leadership to deliver a more hard line 
approach.66 This was the only avenue open to critics to the right of Carruthers to whom a 
Labor Government was unthinkable, but party loyalty held and no coup eventuated. 
Carruthers was the face of the land scandals and the finances so this negativity 
focused on him, but many of his Ministers were personally popular. Most surprisingly, this 
included Ashton, who though he was Minister for Lands seemed to stand above much of 
the ruckus. Before the scandals broke he had passed a Land Bill strengthening his office’s 
powers to resume large estates by arrangement or if needed by compulsion with due 
oversight by a Closer Settlement Board of local and court representatives. This land would 
then be parcelled out as freehold, much to the ire of Labor who generally approved 
resumption but opposed the subsequent alienation of the land.67 Once the Bill was passed 
Ashton quietly went about utilising these powers so that by 1907 Carruthers could claim 
that a vast quantity of land had been made available and 5652 new settlers had been placed 
upon it.68 Ashton was also involved in the setting up of a large and innovative irrigation 
scheme with the erection of the Barren Jack (now Burrinjuck) reservoir. When the scandal 
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hit he proposed to place the administration of the Lands Department in the hands of 
independent Commissioners to prevent further abuses, but a Bill on the matter was 
allowed to lapse. Sick of politics and frustrated by a number of accusations which had been 
hurled against him, he announced that he would not be standing at the next election. 
Ashton was not the only one, for he would be joined by fellow Cabinet members 
Broughton O’Conor and William Dick. All three would soon be nominated for the 
Legislative Council where they would continue to serve the Liberal cause, but for the 
moment their exodus left a huge hole in the Ministry. To plug that hole, one final attempt 
was made to bring the Progressives into the Liberal ranks. When writing two decades later 
Carruthers would justify this by saying ‘the line of cleavage was distinct enough to warrant 
the action I took’.69 Clearly he felt that liberal anti-socialism would have ultimately 
consumed the identity of the rudderless Progressives. The LRA gave Carruthers a free 
hand to negotiate, and meetings of both Parliamentary Parties agreed in principle to a 
coalition. What they could not agree on was the details of a union. The Liberals were 
prepared to offer a Cabinet position to Waddell immediately and after the election to 
reconsider offices based on merit rather than party affiliation.70 Despite their numerical 
inferiority, many Progressives resented this attempt to absorb their following and 
demanded a greater guarantee of representation in a more equal coalition. This demand 
was not ceded and in May 1907 a meeting of the Progressives voted against joining the 
Government by 7 votes to 5.71 At this result Waddell, who had led the ‘yes’ vote, resigned 
from the Party and took up the post of Colonial Secretary. His decision shattered the rump 
and whatever semblance of a Progressive ‘Party’ which remained soon evaporated. Several 
of its members followed Waddell’s lead and became fully fledged Liberals, while others 
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styled themselves as independents. O’Sullivan, who himself had led the ‘no’ vote, set up a 
Democratic Party which adopted almost the entire Labor platform but rejected the pledge. 
It would not meet with electoral success.  
When Waddell joined the Liberal Cabinet he did not have to undertake a 
ministerial by-election because the Government had passed an Electoral Act finally 
removing this archaic necessity. The main aim of the Act was to bring the State’s electoral 
laws into line with those of the Commonwealth. Most of its clauses were uncontroversial, 
but some fuss was stirred up over the decision to abolish electors’ rights and to reintroduce 
candidates’ deposits. The former was a form of documentation required to vote, which in 
theory was meant to prevent voter fraud. In practice many believed it had encouraged 
fraud, for the rights were allegedly collected and used to assume people’s votes. In a time 
before compulsory voting the necessity to obtain such documentation also likely 
discouraged people from voting, an impediment for the Liberals who despite the LRA still 
felt themselves less able to mobilise their supporters than their unionised opponents. The 
candidates’ deposit was an old requirement that demanded those who decided to stand for 
election hand over a sum of money which would only be returned to them if they obtained 
a certain percentage of the vote. It was meant to discourage a multiplicity of candidates 
who had no hope of winning but could serve to complicate the electoral process. Thought 
undemocratic by some, the deposit requirement had been removed by a previous Act but 
the Electoral Bill Hogue brought before Parliament proposed to reintroduce it at a lower 
sum. Both clauses were met with Labor objections, but the latter attracted far more 
opposition and it was dropped amidst newspaper howls that Carruthers was once again 
giving in to the socialists.72 
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For months Carruthers had to put up with relentless criticisms that he was letting 
the LRA fall behind in its organising efforts and that he had failed to articulate a new policy 
for the rapidly impending elections. When negotiations with the Progressives came to an 
end the Premier was finally free to articulate a fresh liberal agenda, safe in the knowledge 
that he would not have to appease a coalition partner. In an address to his constituents in 
Kogarah the Premier declared that through a combination of good seasons, reduced 
spending (which he claimed had gone down per head of population despite complaints that 
it was still too high), and good management, it was finally possible to reduce taxation 
greatly.73 He promised to abolish the income tax on all incomes derived from personal 
exertion, and instead of leaving in place the expensive machinery of that taxation just to 
levy incomes derived from interest and investment he proposed to introduce a small 
automatic dividend duty which would entail none of the inquisitorial evils of the present 
system. His differentiation between money a man earned ‘by the sweat of his hands and 
brain’ and money ‘earned for him while he slept’ echoed the logic behind the old free trade 
belief in taxing only the unimproved value of land.74 To go with the abolition of the 
income tax, the Premier also proposed to remove the stamp duty on receipts which 
discouraged business activity and to further reduce railway rates. All told there was to be 
£720,000 less taxation while still leaving a surplus for leaner years. Other policy proposals 
included removing the Conciliation and Arbitration Act and replacing it with wages boards 
which he claimed promoted harmony not hostility and had been far more successful in 
Victoria. There was to be a Workmen’s Compensation Bill, the size of Parliament would 
be further reduced to 60 members and a greater Sydney body would be given control over 
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those local government responsibilities in which centralisation was utterly necessary for 
cost effectiveness.  
The policy outlined in the speech was one of the most radical and economically 
liberal ever put forward by an Australian Liberal leader and it suggests that Carruthers’ 
earlier obstinacy towards his critics resulted not from ideological disagreement but from 
this shrewd and practical politician’s desire to wait until both the economic and political 
situation was ripe. The distinguished historian Ronald Syme once wrote that ‘no statement 
of unrealised intentions is a safe guide to history, for it is unverifiable and therefore the 
most attractive form of misrepresentation’.75 It would seem that this sound piece of 
historiographical theory has been misused on Carruthers. Historians have repeatedly 
related how he did not live up to his reform agenda and that he was not as economically 
liberal as some of his followers, all the while largely ignoring the policy promises made in 
the lead up to the 1907 election.76 Though he never got the opportunity to fulfil these it 
would be wrong to throw them away. After all, excepting Legislative Council reform 
Carruthers had a good track record of making good on those policy promises which he had 
given clear articulation, and most of his promises would be carried through by his 
immediate successor Charles Wade. These included the establishment of wages boards, 
the abolition of most forms of stamp duty and the abolition of income tax for earnings 
under £1000. The latter was a controversial compromise that eliminated the need for a 
dividend duty. The fact that Wade, a man not known for his political acumen, was able to 
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achieve such radical reforms is further testament to the legislative effects of the clear lines 
of division. 
To ignore the proposals of 1907 is to misunderstand Carruthers and inevitably 
place him further left on the political spectrum than he by rights should be. In many ways 
his Premiership proved to be the archetype of Liberal rule in the age of the lines of 
cleavage. The first term focused on conservative economic management, clearing up the 
mess Carruthers felt his predecessors had left him while also enacting the main policies 
that had helped to propel him to power. By the time of the next election the economic 
situation had improved to the point where the Liberals could offer tax reductions without 
increasing the debt or making drastic cuts to spending. Carruthers was setting a precedent 
that many Liberals, including at the federal level, would come to follow even if they would 
not be conscious of doing so. Meanwhile the precedents of three-party chaos in the federal 
sphere, and of hard line and reactive ‘reform’ in Victoria, which were being set 
simultaneously, would not be followed in the same way. Establishing historical causation 
to the point of saying that post-war governments were directly influenced by Carruthers’ 
example is difficult, but it is reasonable to say that as the Premier of the fledgling 
Commonwealth’s largest State his actions helped to shape, to some extent, the political 
climate of the nation from which these future governments would emerge. 
Carruthers’ new small-government policy was met with a joyous reaction from the 
same pressmen who had often been baying for his political blood. The PRL-sympathising 
Sunday Times discussed the proposals under the heading ‘progress and prosperity’ and 
admitted that the Government had ‘so far shown a disposition to carry out its pledges’.77 
The Sydney Morning Herald was also reasonably happy, though it criticised the dividend 
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duty as a tax on industry that would discourage investment.78 Labor papers were inevitably 
suspicious of the wages boards, but it looked as though Carruthers could be assured of the 
general support of much of the press during an election fought on these lines. These 
proposals would soon fall into the background however, as issues with the Federal 
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C H A P T E R  E L E V E N  
 
 
On the National Stage 
 
When Carruthers ascended to the Premiership in 1904 he received numerous 
congratulatory letters from across the State and indeed the Country. Free Trade Senator 
Edward Millen warned the Premier that ‘it is no light task to wean the constituency from 
the lavish expenditure to which they have grown accustomed’ but that ‘its successful 
accomplishment must lend to the permanent wellbeing of the State’.1 One supporter 
buoyed by the success of the election urged Carruthers to enter federal politics, to which 
the exhausted campaigner replied ‘I shall reach no higher sphere of work until I get 
wings’.2 Bernhard Wise sent his old colleague a rather self-aggrandising letter emphasising 
the similarity between them and hinting, ever so slightly, that he felt it should have been 
him occupying the top job.3 The most important letter however was that sent by George 
Reid, who beamed to his long-time friend that: 
‘to vanquish the Ministerial and Labor parties combined was a task of great 
magnitude, and that you have succeeded in doing that points to good leadership, 
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good organisation, devoted services and an unmistakable rally to the cause of good 
government by the electors generally’.4 
 Carruthers’ time as Premier corresponded almost entirely with Reid’s famed anti-
socialist campaign and neither event can be fully understood without the other. That 
campaign lasted from late 1904 until the 1906 federal election and its aim was partly to 
bring an end to the three-party turmoil in federal politics, in the same way that Carruthers 
had largely ended it in New South Wales politics, by making the central political question a 
choice between Reid’s liberal anti-socialism and what he argued was Labor’s socialism. In 
the lead up to the 1904 State election the mere existence of the short-lived Watson Federal 
Labor Government, arguably the spark behind Reid’s campaign, helped to substantiate 
Carruthers’ anti-socialist rhetoric and began to confirm that his prophesied new lines of 
cleavage were emerging. At the same time it was Carruthers’ electoral success that helped 
to convince Reid that anti-socialism could be used as a tool to subdue not only Labor, but 
by making the fiscal issue redundant as it had become in New South Wales, the 
Protectionists as well.  
As McMinn has argued, Reid ‘saw in an anti-socialist crusade the best, indeed the 
only means, of bringing about a realignment’ which was necessary for ‘responsible 
government’ based on stable majorities.5 This was the exact same reasoning that 
Carruthers had elaborated in his lines of cleavage statement in 1901. The emphasis Reid’s 
letter places on the ‘magnitude’ of Carruthers’ successful task highlights the extent to 
which he was impressed by the achievement of a stable majority and along with 
similarities in rhetoric, strategy and organisation, strongly suggests that the anti-socialist 
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campaign was at least partly inspired by Carruthers’ efforts.6 At one point in the campaign 
Reid even used the term ‘line of cleavage’ when elaborating on the difference between 
democracy and socialism.7 This is a crucial historical point, for the campaign would play a 
key role in setting up the lines of division in federal politics in a manner which mirrored 
the situation in New South Wales and not in the only other State of similar influence, 
Victoria, which continued to lack a State Labor Party strong enough to bring about a 
genuine realignment. 
 Before discussing Carruthers’ role in the anti-socialist campaign it is necessary to 
offer a brief background as to what was happening in federal politics. As in New South 
Wales in the 1890s, early federal politics was dominated by a battle between Free Traders, 
Protectionists and the Labor Party. Unlike the 1890s however, the Labor Party was no 
longer a minor player and by 1903 it held representation roughly equal to its fiscal rivals. 
This equality and the inability of any two of the three parties to form a stable coalition led 
to political instability which saw members from all three parties achieve the Prime 
Ministership in the second Parliament, only to be subsequently deposed. It was Labor’s 
turn at the top of this political ruckus which caused an important break, for despite its 
brevity it sufficiently scared the anti-Labor elements of the two federal fiscal parties into a 
coalition, and in 1904 Reid formed a Government from a combination of his Free Traders 
(rapidly being restyled as the Anti-Socialist Party) and a number of Protectionists. With the 
coalition necessitating a retirement of the fiscal issue, the new government needed a 
reason for its existence and found one readily in rallying round the anti-socialist flag. While 
that flag had not been entirely created by Carruthers, he had come up with the idea of 
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using it to bring about a political realignment, and now it was being picked up by Reid 
with the hope off doing the same.  
Anti-socialism centred on a rejection of some of the big government aspects of 
Labor ideology. While not laissez-faire and allowing for an important role for the state, it 
objected to how big some in the Labor Party wanted that role to be and generally 
supported private enterprise against those who wanted to see it partially or wholly usurped. 
It opposed proposals for union privileges, as exemplified by the ‘union label’ proposals that 
aimed to give a special position to manufacturers who employed only union labour, as 
both detrimental to freedom and sinisterly class-based.8 Most of all it opposed what was 
known as the socialist objective in the Labor platform. Initially this had just proposed the 
nationalisation of monopolies, something that a significant number of liberals could agree 
to, but in 1905 there was a movement to expand this objective to include the 
‘nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange’.9 While successful 
in Queensland, nationally and in New South Wales this movement succeeded only in 
obtaining a plank for the ‘collective ownership of monopolies, and the extension of the 
industrial and economic functions of the State and Municipality’.10 Even this milder goal 
was objectionable to Carruthers, who not only supported the pervading capitalist system 
but also held to the old liberal view that too large a government could be despotic and 
detrimental to freedom.11 The fact that the more extreme objective almost succeeded in 
making its way onto the platform also alarmed many in the Mother State. 
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Perhaps at an earlier time the socialist objective would not have caused such 
uproar, for as long as Labor remained a small Party winning legislative concessions from its 
bigger cousins it could not hope to achieve such a goal. In the early federal period the 
growing prospect of a Labor Government, both nationally and in New South Wales, 
brought the objective to a new prominence for it began to seem like a genuine possibility. 
While both Reid and Carruthers had allied themselves with a small and therefore ‘harmless’ 
Labor Party in colonial politics, the latter had been one of the first to see that fundamental 
questions about the role of the state would become the dividing line in the post-fiscal 
political landscape. Part of the reason for Carruthers’ foresight was that his position in State 
politics meant he encountered the post-fiscal world earlier than his friend, but by the same 
token he had also been one of the earliest State politicians to let go of the fiscal issue fully. 
Spurred both by circumstance and a genuine ideological conviction, Reid too would be 
one of the earlier non-Labor federal politicians to let go of the fiscal issue but this decision 
would not be without consequence. Many Free Traders criticised Reid for what they 
considered to be an abandonment of their core principle, while his Protectionist 
counterpart Alfred Deakin was unwilling to join Reid in letting sleeping dogs lie.12 
Though Carruthers would remain a committed Free Trader his entire life, he had 
decided earlier than Reid that socialism and the new lines of cleavage required a sinking of 
the fiscal issue even at the federal level. In 1904, shortly after Labor’s Chris Watson became 
Prime Minister, Carruthers penned a letter to Deakin impressing upon him the urgent 
need to unite with Reid. He insisted that although he was a follower of Reid and a Free 
Trade sympathiser he had been extremely disappointed by Deakin’s fall and urged an anti-
                                                          
12 For free trade criticism of anti-socialism see ‘Freetrade and Antisocialism’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
Wednesday 7/2/1906, p.7. 




Labor coalition under either leader.13 He also related that he had written to Reid about the 
coalition and that the Free Trade leader had expressed his willingness to combine provided 
Deakin reciprocated. How important Carruthers’ behind the scenes involvement was in 
the formation of the anti-socialist coalition is difficult to tell. It is doubtful whether Deakin 
would have paid much attention to the opinions of the ‘little man’ from Sydney, but the 
letter does reveal that Carruthers had been discussing political strategy with Reid who was 
far more likely to heed his views.14 The letter to Deakin was sent on 1 May, hence the prior 
discussion with Reid must have been held in late April, concurrently with Watson’s 
ascension to the Prime Ministership. Thus Carruthers was one of Reid’s earlier consultants 
on the political situation. The absence of sources makes it difficult to draw too deep a 
conclusion, but the evidence of early and important strategic discussion reinforces the 
likelihood that the anti-socialist campaign was partly inspired by Carruthers. Whatever role 
the New South Wales Premier played in the formation of the federal coalition, he would 
certainly have been aggrieved when it was hamstrung by Deakin who refused to take a 
place in Reid’s Cabinet. 
In late 1904 Reid’s coalition did one better than Watson by managing to face 
Parliament and survive. The political situation was far from settled however and in the 
Parliamentary recess of 1905 it began to look like the coalition could collapse. Carruthers 
once again took it upon himself to intervene and wrote to Deakin desperately urging him 
to end his aloofness from the Government. Denouncing Labor proposals for union 
preference he claimed that ‘socialism – so called – is too good a term for the Labor 
Platform, which aims at nothing more nor less than to grip with dirty hands men who in 
industrial life have succeeded by honest effort and pull them down in the hopes that by 
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artificial legislation Unionists, bound hip and thigh by union rules and tradition, may work 
the system of Government for their seeming advantage.’15 In his next letter he argued that 
since New South Wales had sacrificed Free Trade for federation the least the Protectionists 
could do was to sacrifice even higher tariffs in order to combat the Labor-Socialists. He 
also insisted that he was not working in Reid’s interest but that: 
‘If you were Premier I should urge Reid and others to support you and I may say 
that at present I am keeping back our State Liberal Party, which consists of Free 
Traders and Protectionists alike, from joining in with the Federal Liberal Party 
until I see what you do. If you fall into line, not with Reid, but with the fight for a 
Liberal policy versus a Labor-Socialist Policy, then our State Party will go with the 
Federal Party too.’16 
 Peter Loveday uses this letter to imply that there was some sort of tension between 
Carruthers and Reid, but such a reading seems misguided.17 Carruthers’ insistence that he 
was not working in Reid’s interest should not be taken at face value. This sort of assurance 
would have been necessary to get Deakin onside and while it is clear that Carruthers 
genuinely believed that a strong federal coalition would be desirable that does not 
proscribe the possibility that he discussed his letter with Reid in advance in a manner that 
has not survived to us. As for falling in line ‘not with Reid’ that was also about tempering 
Deakin, and ultimately his argument was that while either one of them could have been 
Prime Minister now that Reid was Deakin should support him. The holding back of the 
State Liberal Party was more likely to have been about not aggravating the Progressives 
than waiting for Deakin’s direction, and it did not preclude Carruthers from lending Reid 
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his most valuable political weapon in the form of Archdale Parkhill, as will be discussed 
below. The greatest tell-tale sign that Carruthers actually agreed with most of what Reid 
was doing was the fact that he described the anti-socialists as the Federal Liberal Party, a 
clear indication that he believed Reid’s anti-socialism to be a correct interpretation of 
liberalism. 
Deakin ignored Carruthers’ pleas for unity, and two weeks later delivered a speech 
at Ballarat in which he dismissed the logic that anti-socialism needed to be put ahead of the 
fiscal issue.18 That speech let off a chain reaction that quickly led to the fall of Reid and the 
emergence of a Deakin Government based on Labor support. Awash with anger, 
frustration and dismay Carruthers penned one more letter to the new Prime Minister: 
‘I am so disappointed at the turn of events that I cannot really express any opinion 
of them…You federal people don’t understand the problem [of the Labor Party] 
because you have no financial trouble, but we in the State Government know that 
in our financing we discover the real opinion of Australia and the causes which 
continue to hold her back. The Labor Party is a “bete noir” to the forces that 
control our affairs outside the States and although you and others may affect to 
have a good opinion of Watson and his clan God help us when the forces that have 
made them get the domination of Australia.’19 
 This passage reveals that along with an ideological opposition to the socialist 
objective and union preference, Carruthers’ anti-socialism was based on a fear of the 
practical financial consequences of Labor rule. The hint is that in his negotiations with 
London banks the Treasurer had discovered that the See Government’s inability to borrow 
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money towards the end of its life was based not only on its extravagance but on the 
perception in England that it was the unreliable Labor-Socialists who were dictating that 
extravagance. Carruthers held the fear that the double whammy of the negative economic 
impact of socialist policies combined with a withdrawal of British capital could bring 
Australia to its knees. It was this practical fear that gave urgency to Carruthers’ deep-seated 
ideological opposition to socialism, and given that Carruthers almost undoubtedly related 
these concerns to Reid, may also explain the haste and passion of the federal anti-socialist 
leader. 
 That passion was expressed in the form of a national speaking tour, begun while 
Reid was Prime Minister and continued afterwards even to the detriment of the 
Opposition Leader’s parliamentary attendance.20 Reid showed particular concern to ensure 
that his tour reached not only the smaller States but also regional centres, much like 
Carruthers’ emphasis on speaking to country voters. This similarity was hardly surprising, 
as much of the anti-socialist touring was organised by Archdale Parkhill, who as Secretary 
of the Australian Liberal League was performing a similar role for Reid as he had for 
Carruthers. Inspired by the LRA, this new league was federal in structure and was to be 
based on extensive local branches ‘to be combined and coordinated at the State level by a 
central executive consisting of branch delegates, democratically selected’.21 Once the 
coalition fell apart the League was superseded by the Australian Democratic Union, which 
unlike its predecessor was outwardly affiliated with the LRA. The fact that Carruthers 
allowed this affiliation suggests both that he was punishing Deakin for failing to ‘fall into 
line’ and that he had accepted that for the moment a union between the federal fiscal 
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Parties was impossible. Parkhill was central to both organisations, and set up a Pitt Street 
office with its own telephone and stationery to facilitate the running of affairs.22  
Though more successful than its Protectionist counterparts the ADU would fail to 
become the permanent federal party organisation its leaders had hoped for. Post fusion it 
would be succeeded in New South Wales by the Federal Liberal League. Many of the 
branches of the FLL were made up of those of the LRA, and the new organisation 
borrowed its method of branch preselection and endorsement by a central council.23 
Parkhill was once again central to the FLL, and also played an important role as the 
‘national political organiser’ of what was an otherwise federally divided Commonwealth 
Liberal Party.24 In that role Carruthers’ protégé would go on to provide a strong LRA 
influence in the organisational structure of federal non-Labor. Crucially he would later take 
the only national position in the extra-parliamentary organisation of the Nationalist Party, 
the first federal non-Labor Party to last more than a decade and the first to start to develop 
the sort of organisational size and permanence its predecessors had desired.25 Because of 
Parkhill’s unrivalled position in the Nationalist Party it may be argued that the 
organisational structure of federal non-Labor, which would eventually evolve into that of 
the United Australia Party and then the modern Liberal Party, grew more out of the LRA 
than any other single source. 
 Reid’s anti-socialist campaign came to an end with the election on 12 December 
1906. The day before, the Daily Telegraph printed a letter written by the Premier ‘to the 
federal electors of New South Wales’. In it Carruthers urged people to vote for Reid as the 
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State’s most powerful friend, before embarking on one last rhetorical tirade against 
socialism: 
‘The State’s prosperity today is not owing to the laws of Parliament, but to the 
enterprise of the people…As a native-born Australian, and the son of a working 
man, and as one who has risen from the lowest rung of the ladder to almost the 
highest position in the land, I feel that the incentive to the exercise of ability and 
industry lies in the encouragement of individual merit under liberalism, rather than 
in the levelling down of men under socialism’.26 
 Carruthers’ letter reads as though it was written by a modern free-market liberal 
yet by the same token it makes an appeal to the same romanticised notion of the self-made 
man that he had expounded as Minister for Public Instruction. This shows that for men like 
Carruthers and Reid their position in the new lines of cleavage was a natural adaptation of 
their colonial liberalism. Politics had evolved greatly since Carruthers had entered 
Parliament in 1887 and he had been at the forefront of that evolution, yet the tales of 
Gladstone and Parkes that had inspired an earlier generation of Young Turks to enter 
politics were still informing the opinions of the men who were heralding a new political 
age in which their achievements would no longer be met with the same reverence. It was 
individualism that was the uniting factor. Carruthers had a view of history as the product 
of the cumulative actions of great men and, given his thoughts on Queen Victoria, women 
as well. To him ideologies and structures, like socialism and the bound caucus, which 
restricted or discouraged the individual actions of people threatened not only freedom but 
the course of human progress. It was not so much that greed was good, but that ambition, 
incentive and inspiration were irreplaceable. The allegation that socialism ‘levelled down’ 
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men is particularly interesting for it dismisses one of socialism’s fundamental attributes; 
equality. Carruthers believed that equality of outcomes could only be achieved by 
restricting people to the lowest common denominator in a manner that bound humanity 
by removing opportunity. 
The 1906 election would prove to be the beginning of a new age at the federal 
level.27 Reid failed to achieve his goal of emulating Carruthers’ success in winning a 
majority, yet he came remarkably close to doing so. Senate results show that despite only 
picking up a couple of Lower House seats, the Anti-Socialists came closer than any party 
had before to achieving a full 50% of the vote.28 Moreover the vote of the Protectionists 
had been crippled to the benefit of both Labor and the Anti-Socialists, pointing to the fact 
that the New South Wales lines of cleavage were beginning to emerge at a federal level. 
Ironically the Protectionist Party was left with just 16 fully-committed Lower House 
members, the exact same number as the Progressive rump had emerged with in 1904. The 
Protectionists had actually received a lower proportion of the vote than the Progressives 
had, but electoral boundaries conspired to give them a greater share of the 75 member 
House of Representatives.29  Despite the electoral battering, Labor support allowed Deakin 
and the Protectionists to hold on to power tentatively in a humiliating situation that 
Carruthers suggested the Prime Minister could only accept on account of having not ‘any 
grit left in him’.30  
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Circumstances, including Deakin’s stubbornness and the tariff, conspired so that 
the full effects of the election result would not be felt for a number of years, but by the 
time the federal writs were next issued the Anti-Socialists and Protectionists had ‘fallen into 
line’ as the new Commonwealth Liberal Party. The Carruthers-inspired anti-socialist 
campaign had belatedly succeeded in transporting the lines of cleavage into the federal 
sphere, and the CLP was set up to occupy the same rhetorical philosophic stance as the 
LRA. Because the CLP was created partly to kick out the Fisher Government it embodied 
the dual defensive and offensive role that had been important to the LRA’s success and like 
that organisation the CLP firmly embraced the idea of permanent political lines.31 Joseph 
Cook played a central role in the formation of the fusion party and its only election victory, 
and it is reasonable to assume that as a New South Welshman and Carruthers’ old friend, 
he like Reid partly borrowed his anti-socialist emphasis from Carruthers.  
Constrained by the environment created by the anti-socialist campaign, a reluctant 
Deakin also played a central part in the fusion. Judith Brett has argued that he did so not 
because of any economic opposition to Labor’s ‘socialism’ but because of a rejection of the 
caucus pledge.32 Echoing Brett but from a different perspective, Gregory Melleuish has 
maintained that for six decades after the fusion Australian liberalism combined Deakinite 
statism, populism and conservatism to the virtual exclusion of classical liberalism.33 Both 
are right about Deakin’s big government emphasis, but it would be wrong to assume that 
this completely overwhelmed the liberal anti-socialist element within the CLP. After all, 
Deakin failed miserably at the 1910 election and it was only once Cook took up liberal anti-
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socialism and embraced the lines of cleavage he inherited from Carruthers and Reid that 
the Party met with success, however briefly. Though the economic aspect of the liberal 
side of the lines has been broadly interpreted, non-Labor has still consistently defined itself 
as having a greater belief in enterprise than its opponent. This has been one of the crucial 
aspects dividing Australian politics, and even during its most protectionist and Keynesian 
phase the Liberal Party still believed that business was necessary and generally good.34 As 
leader of the CLP Deakin did cite a belief in ‘private enterprise’ and ‘independent initiative’ 
but his repeated downplaying of that belief throughout his career suggests that its 
continual centrality in the non-Labor tradition is due to the influence of others, including 
Carruthers and his original definition of the philosophical differences between the Parties.35 
Combined with the individualism that saw even Deakin reject the caucus pledge, these 
economic and personal beliefs, however broad and inconsistent, have been perhaps the 
only permanent parts of Australian liberalism and it is no coincidence that Carruthers had 
constructed his Party’s ideological position around them. 
 Despite achieving a considerable swing, at the time Reid’s election campaign was 
viewed by the media and the general public as a failure. The most disappointing aspect of 
the result was the fact that a number of New South Wales seats had been lost to Labor, 
losses which ate into impressive gains achieved elsewhere. This led to a great deal of finger 
pointing which took aim at the LRA for not lifting enough weight. Though Carruthers’ 
letter to the electors had received considerable coverage and the Premier had attended a 
rally in support of his local Anti-Socialist candidate, the fact that New South Wales 
Parliament was sitting during the latter stages of the campaign impeded many prominent 
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State members from helping out.36 Tensions between State and Federal Liberals remained 
subdued until Carruthers made a rather unfortunate choice of words at a public meeting. 
At this meeting Carruthers claimed that the State Liberals were not ‘anti-anything’, a 
statement that was interpreted as a swipe at Reid.37 The latter responded by pointing to his 
15 to 20 planks of positive policy, which he argued was the maximum amount the limited 
scope of federal politics would allow, and by saying that at the next State election the ADU 
would not ‘wait to be asked’ to help out.38 One may add that Carruthers’ own 1904 
campaign was at least as against debt and extravagance as it was pro anything else and that 
positive and negative are both entirely matters of perspective. 
Carruthers claimed that his statement had been misconstrued as a sneer and after a 
series of angry letters the situation died down. It is likely that this public spat has informed 
the general historical view that Carruthers did not strongly support the anti-socialist 
campaign, but as has been shown he supported it publicly, privately and organisationally, 
efforts which should not be discounted because of ugly scenes born out of 
disappointment.39 The spat proved to be an even greater sour note as it was one of the last 
significant public interactions between two friends whose political fortunes had been so 
intertwined. Reid would give up the leadership of the Anti-Socialists to make way for 
fusion and eventually take up the post of High Commissioner in London. Though the 
occasional surviving card attests that they remained friends until the end, Carruthers 
would see little of Reid from 1910 until his death in 1918, at which point he would lead the 
public mourning for Australia’s fourth Prime Minister.40 
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Though in hindsight a sombre event, the spat did have one positive effect for it 
sparked a flurry of activity which tried to unite the Federal and State Liberal Parties.41 It is 
now taken for granted that Federal and State Parties should mirror each other, but given 
that the Constitution separates their responsibilities the benefits of such a connection are 
not necessarily apparent. After all an unpopular and/or divisive federal policy might 
unnecessarily encumber a State Party and Carruthers had shown himself somewhat 
reluctant to attach himself too readily to his federal counterpart for fear of the fiscal issue. 
It was the lesson of the 1906 poll, that all resources must be mustered in order to win an 
election, which convinced numerous important Liberals that the benefits of amalgamating 
State and Federal Parties outweighed the negatives. Despite considerable negotiation this 
combination would not eventuate until the creation of the Commonwealth Liberal Party, 
and even then imperfectly, but it was the talks between Reid and Carruthers that set the 
ball rolling. Joseph Cook, who was also involved in these negotiations, would reap the 
benefits of this in 1913 when he was propelled to power on the back of a number of gains 
in a united and well organised New South Wales.42 
The organisational, rhetorical and tactical precedents set in 1904 and followed 
through by Reid in the anti-socialist campaign are arguably Carruthers’ most important 
national legacy, yet they are not his most remembered. If Carruthers is remembered today 
it is generally as one of the earliest and most ardent ‘State rights’ Premiers, and in this G. E. 
Sherington has argued, he set a precedent that future State leaders would continually 
follow in pursuit of easy votes.43 ‘State rights’ is a term that should be ascribed to 
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Carruthers with caution. During the time of the Federal Conventions it was a term used to 
describe those delegates who favoured strengthening the powers of the States’ House, 
something that the future New South Wales Premier ardently opposed.44 It was only after 
federation had been enacted that this term became synonymous with State autonomy, a 
cause that retrospectively Carruthers had always supported. This had been evident not 
only in his fight to keep the scope of the Federal Government limited and over the Murray 
waters question, but also in the ideology that led him to pursue local government 
vigorously. In many ways ‘State rights’ was a natural fit for the Liberal side of the lines of 
cleavage, as it had already expressed its opposition to big and centralised government. This 
connection was to some extent an anathema to Deakinite liberalism and it was only 
brought in to the wider Australian liberal tradition by people like Carruthers. Since his 
time Liberals and non-Labor in general have, while still exhibiting centralising tendencies, 
frequently shown more reverence for the role of the States under the Constitution than 
their opposition.45 
Carruthers’ role in the birth of this ‘State rights’ liberal tradition is unique. Not only 
did he lead the largest State in to near rebellion against the Federal Government in its 
earliest years, but he did so as a former active federal delegate. This gave him some license 
to cry that the Constitution was being misused, long before the more significant distortions 
of its intentions.  Circumstances would conspire to ensure that his belief in State autonomy 
became more vehement over time, but years later he could still express regret that he had 
been forced to ‘engage in a controversy little to my liking as one of the framers of the 
Constitution and as an ardent advocate of its acceptance by the people of the State’.46 The 
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centrepiece of that controversy was the fight over the capital question, but it also involved 
the role of the States within the new Commonwealth and the financial relationship 
between the State and the Commonwealth.  
Before embarking on a discussion of Carruthers’ relationship with the 
Commonwealth Government some important background information is required to 
contextualise the issues involved. The most important contextual point is that the power 
relationship between the Federal Government and the States was entirely different to that 
of today. In its earliest years the Commonwealth’s powers were kept almost entirely 
within the bounds of the Constitution, and while there were already those who hoped to 
extend those bounds, Reid could still justify only having 15-20 planks of policy on account 
of the Federal Government’s only having that many responsibilities. Meanwhile the well-
established State Governments, who had built up a considerable role in their near 50 years 
of existence, were left all the responsibilities that were not explicitly taken from them. Such 
was the discrepancy in roles that in 1904-5 Commonwealth expenditure was approximately 
£4,300,000 while New South Wales expended approximately £11,200,000.47 Thus the New 
South Wales Premier could think of himself as occupying, while not the most prestigious 
position in the country, perhaps still the most powerful. The relative importance of the 
tiers of government was also reflected in newspaper coverage, where far more attention 
was payed to State politics than has since been the case. In 1907 at the height of the New 
South Wales election and the battles over State rights Carruthers would even come to 
dominate the pages of The Bulletin, the ‘national’ newspaper of the day.48 
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The confidence Carruthers had in the strength of his position is clearly seen in his 
relationship with the two Prime Ministers he had to deal with during his Premiership; Reid 
and Deakin. It is necessary to treat his relationship with each separately in order to gauge 
how personality clashes affected his dealings with the Commonwealth. Carruthers’ friend 
held the top office for the early stages of his Premiership and though this period saw some 
conflict between the two, relative cordiality held the day. This was seen in negotiations 
over Dawes Point, a militarily important site which the Commonwealth was induced to 
relinquish its claim over in exchange for land at Darling Island.49 More remarkable was that 
the two were able to keep the peace whilst Carruthers tried to subvert the 
Commonwealth’s control over foreign relations in a dispute over horses. 
Reid’s short stint in the top job corresponded with a short conflict to Australia’s 
North. This was the Russo-Japanese war fought over conflicting interests in Manchuria. 
Britain had a treaty of alliance with Japan, but decided to adopt a position of outward 
neutrality towards the conflict that Australia, and therefore Reid, was bound to follow. 
Meanwhile Carruthers had been pursuing trade opportunities with Japan and Asia more 
generally through his ‘Commercial Agent in the East’ J.B. Suttor. Based on the amount of 
correspondence that survives with Suttor, Carruthers saw Asia and Japan in particular as an 
area of economic interest for New South Wales second only to Britain herself.50 Through 
his contacts Suttor was able to push contracts for the export of wool, frozen meat and 
wood. The war gave he and Carruthers a new opportunity to export horses, and it was 
arranged that 12,000 would be sent to Japan.51 
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The question was whether the horses represented a violation of British neutrality. 
After discussions with the Governor of New South Wales Sir Harry Rawson, who beyond 
his official position was something of an expert on foreign relations, Carruthers came to 
the conclusion that it was not. According to his reasoning not only were horses not 
necessarily a war good, but since the transaction was not between the New South Wales 
and Japanese Governments but between two private companies the Commonwealth had 
no right to intercede. Reid disagreed and the two men had a rather heated private 
discussion on the matter which was only ended when Carruthers threatened to make the 
dispute public, forcing Reid to give in to his friend. This did not prove to be the end of the 
matter for in extraordinary circumstances Russian agents were sent up from Melbourne to 
try to sabotage the attempt to transport the horses from Sydney Harbour.52 Their plot was 
discovered however and their train was stopped at Moss Vale where they were arrested. 
The Japanese Government offered Carruthers the Order of the Rising Sun (First Class) in 
gratitude for his role in foiling the plot, but he declined for he would need direct 
permission from the King to receive the foreign decoration. 
The event was remarkable for several reasons. Firstly, Carruthers had an interest in 
engaging in Australia’s ‘near north’ that was decades before its time and while it does 
appear that other State Governments had agents in the ‘East’ none were as active as Suttor 
and none seem to have been as willing to risk jeopardizing Australian foreign policy in 
pursuit of their trade goals. Outside of the war Carruthers even hosted Japanese military 
officials and came away with an impression of ‘a very fine race of people, most honourable 
in carrying out their negotiations’.53 As remarkable is the fact that Carruthers would not 
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only try but succeed in dictating his will to the Federal Government on such an important 
foreign relations issue. One wonders how much this was a case of Carruthers being able to 
manipulate his friend, but nevertheless it still shows that the Commonwealth was weak 
and that the New South Wales leader was staking a claim to autonomy of action even in 
those areas where the Constitution gave the Commonwealth a clear prerogative. 
 The resolution to the incident contrasts strongly with a more minor one, again 
involving Suttor, which took place a few months later under Deakin. New South 
Welshman A.R. Weigall had been travelling through Korea with a survey party when the 
group were molested by a group of Japanese soldiers.54 Weigall appealed to the British 
ambassador in Japan, but upon receiving an unsatisfactory response approached Suttor to 
do something about it. Suttor referred the case to the State Government who got the 
Governor to send it directly to the British Colonial Office without reference to the 
Commonwealth. The incident formed part of a wider dispute between the States and the 
Commonwealth about how independently the former could deal with the British 
Government, and when Deakin heard about the ‘interception’ of an appeal to the 
‘Australian Government’ he quickly descended into a long and bitter argument with the 
New South Wales Premier.55 
These arguments were frequent and numerous, partly because Carruthers was 
keen to do whatever he could to defend the autonomy that he felt had been built into a 
limited Constitution but also because the relationship between the two men had become 
utterly toxic. At one point they even bickered over an effort to send flour to relieve a 
famine in Japan, an effort that the Prime Minister felt was unconstitutional.56 D.I. Wright 
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once described Carruthers as ‘perhaps the only Premier who could make Deakin really 
angry’.57 On one occasion after receiving a particularly acrimonious letter, Deakin’s 
secretary asked him what response to give, to which the normally affable Alfred replied 
‘tell him to go to hell – three pages’.58 In order to understand this visceral dislike it is 
important to remember a few things. First and most importantly, Deakin was a federalist-
ultra who was willing to expand the role of what he saw as the higher level of Government 
and therefore he approached each dispute from a completely different perspective to 
Carruthers. Another seldom mentioned issue however was the fact that Deakin re-
ascended to the Prime Ministership in 1905 on the back of what was perceived to be a 
betrayal of Carruthers’ friend and the anti-socialist cause. This poisoned their working 
relationship from the very beginning. In 1905 Deakin not only believed in Protection, 
which was taking the more interventionist form of New Protection in an even greater 
contrast to Carruthers’ small-government beliefs, but he also rejected the notion of State 
rights and the necessity of the clear lines of cleavage. Carruthers would potentially have 
had more in common with a Labor Prime Minister at this point for at least they could be 
expected to accept the latter point; hence he and Deakin were simply not on the same page. 
Carruthers foreshadowed a cooling in their relationship, for in the same letter in 
which he expressed his disappointment at the fall of Reid the New South Wales leader 
warned his new federal counterpart that ‘NSW is warm on subjects that naturally the 
federal government is cool upon and without any desire to embarrass you – we are bound 
to conflict soon on such questions’.59 One of these questions was the financial question. 
The Federal Conventions had entangled State and Federal finances not only through the 
                                                          
57 D. I. Wright, Shadow of Dispute, p.27. 
58 While it is not clear who the ‘tell them to go to hell’ line was written about, it appears to be about 
Carruthers: J. A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A Biography (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965) 
p.273. 
59 Carruthers toDeakin, 18/7/1905, Deakin Papers, NLA MS 1540, 15/416. 




Braddon clause but also through a provision allowing the Commonwealth to make grants 
to the States with attached conditions.60 The reliance of most States on tariff revenue 
meant that this entanglement was to some extent inevitable, and Carruthers had not been 
one of those people who ‘advocated that there should be no mixing up of the States and 
Commonwealth in any revenue collected by the latter’.61 Nevertheless, the provisions left 
the States ‘financially bound to the chariot wheels of the central Government’ in a manner 
completely contrary to Carruthers’ belief in autonomy that would become ever more 
apparent after he left office.62  
For the length of his Premiership the main financial issues between the tiers of 
Government would be the transfer of State debts and the extension or replacement of the 
Braddon clause which was due to expire after ten years. The two parties could not come to 
an agreement, largely because the Federal Government wanted to expand its role through 
greater defence spending and old age pensions and was therefore unwilling to agree to give 
the States as much of the future tariff revenue as they desired. The transfer of State debts 
should have been easier to resolve, but since it was likely to decrease the amount of 
interest the States would have to pay, it was held over as a bartering chip to get the States 
to agree to a lower percentage of tariff revenue. Carruthers, who had been quite successful 
in negotiating low interest in London, had grown dismissive of the idea that the Federal 
Government would automatically be able to do better and proposed that an adequate fixed 
sum be returned to the States after the expiry of the clause. This scheme initially had some 
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support but it was eventually rejected as it would not allow for any growth in the revenue 
returnable to the States.63 
The issues would not be resolved until after Carruthers had retired and he would 
later regret that the Braddon clause had not just been made permanent in the first place.64 
After all, the State’s negotiating position deteriorated as time went on and the 1927 
agreement reached around the time Carruthers was writing his memoirs left the States in a 
far weaker position than they had been in 1901. Arguably the States had always been in a 
weak position when negotiating with the Federal Government, but this was a fact that 
Carruthers essentially ignored in all his high-handed arguments with the Commonwealth. 
Partly this was because of his naivety and equally bravado, but the New South Wales 
Premier had an ace up his sleeve in the form of secession. Secession had been explicitly 
outlawed by the Constitution, but in the event that the majority of States agreed to 
dissolution it was difficult to imagine that this would prove much of a lion in the path.65 
The fierce debates over the financial agreements, fears of socialism and various individual 
grievances meant that in the early years of the Commonwealth such a majority seemed 
possible. Famously the West Australian Government passed a resolution on secession in 
1906, while more privately Carruthers and Queensland Premier Arthur Morgan discussed 
secession as a real possibility.66 If Tasmania could be convinced, there was little Victoria or 
South Australia could do. 
The reason Carruthers was seriously considering secession, if only as a very distant 
possibility, was that the capital site issue remained unresolved. Though the Constitution 
                                                          
63 D.I. Wright, ‘The Politics of Federal Finance’, p.465. 
64 Joseph Carruthers, ‘Random reflections and reminiscences’, p.59. 
65 Carruthers had briefly raised the question of allowing secession at the Adelaide convention where it 
had been promptly rejected: ‘Federal convention’, Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 26/3/1897, p.5. 
66 Morgan to Carruthers, 29/3/1906, Carruthers Papers, ML MSS 1638/55, pp.155-9. & Carruthers to 
Morgan, 16/11/1905, Carruthers Papers, ML MSS 1638/55, pp.161-5. 




specified that the capital must be within New South Wales, a gentlemen’s agreement kept 
the temporary capital in Melbourne and therefore kept the Parliament supposedly under 
the sway of Melbourne’s newspapers and Protectionist culture. To many New South 
Welshmen, and particularly Carruthers who had been the architect of the provision 
keeping the capital site in New South Wales and had kept out of federal politics because of 
the tyranny of distance, this situation was intolerable. Though according to some legal 
opinion the position of Melbourne as the capital even temporarily was unconstitutional, 
the only real solution to the issue was to pick a permanent site. It was a question that many 
Victorians were happy to see go unresolved, and there was some talk of a deliberate 
delaying strategy whereby Victorian members in the Lower House voted for a different 
site to their Upper House counterparts in order to create a deadlock arbitrarily.67 Despite 
these obstacles, the deadlock was eventually resolved and during Watson’s brief Prime 
Ministership Dalgety was chosen as the site. 
As the newly elected Premier Carruthers was unhappy with this choice. Dalgety 
had a questionable climate, was so distant from any major centre that connecting it by rail 
would be exceedingly expensive and the Commonwealth Government was asking for 
more of New South Wales land than Carruthers was ready to give. Most importantly, 
Dalgety was well over the 100 mile minimum distance from Sydney stipulated by the 
Constitution and would offer the ‘Mother Colony’ none of the advantages that having the 
capital site within its borders implied. Carruthers later claimed that he had been privately 
told that people voted for Dalgety because it was so unsuitable that it would keep the 
capital in Melbourne by default.68 He may have been forced to accept the Dalgety decision, 
were it not for the wording of the Constitution which said that the capital ‘shall be within 
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the territory which shall have been granted to or acquired by the Commonwealth’.69 
Carruthers took this as meaning that the Federal Parliament had the right to choose the 
capital site within the territory granted by New South Wales, but that it was up to New 
South Wales to choose what territory it granted. If the State did not want the capital to be 
in Dalgety it would simply not grant any territory in the Dalgety area. Many people 
disagreed with Carruthers’ interpretation but because the Federal Government never 
forced the issue by driving a survey peg into the ground, the matter was never heard by 
the High Court. 
Instead Carruthers was left free to take the matter to the New South Wales 
Parliament which explicitly rejected Dalgety but left the options of Tumut, Lyndhurst and 
Yass. As Prime Minister, Reid was sent a resolution listing these three sites and also saying 
that New South Wales would be willing to offer 100-200 square miles rather than the 900 
requested for Dalgety.70 Keen not to look too parochial as he prepared for a national 
election, Reid rejected this proposal and delegated the issue to Dugald Thomson. The 
latter proceeded to launch into a public debate with Carruthers, which may have been one 
of the reasons the New South Wales Anti-Socialist vote suffered at the next election. 
Despite this bad blood, there may still have been room for Carruthers to come to an 
agreement with his friend as he had so many times before. Any such hope was 
extinguished with the reaccession of Deakin, who repeatedly refused to accept the 
prerogative of the New South Wales Parliament to exclude Dalgety, leading to a stalemate 
which was to last the length of Carruthers’ Premiership. It was in an exasperated attempt 
to end that stalemate that Carruthers openly threatened secession, and in his 1907 policy 
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speech in which he revealed his plans to abolish income tax the Premier also proposed a 
referendum on the capital site issue.71 
Though the furore and threats of secession garnered the most press attention, the 
New South Wales Government also took more practical steps towards securing a more 
favourable capital site. Federal politicians were shown around the various sites at the 
State’s expense, while data and survey analyses were carried out both of which would 
contribute to the eventual selection of Canberra as the capital site.72 That selection would 
take place during the term of Carruthers’ successor Wade, who along with the unlikely 
partnership of Chris Watson and William Irvine, helped secure Canberra’s success in the 
face of continued opposition from the Deakin Government. The importance of Carruthers’ 
role in the eventual selection of Canberra has been controversial. David Headon has 
suggested that he was ‘arguably the most influential participant in the capital site story’, 
while both G.E. Sherington and D.I. Wright have argued that the selection of Canberra 
represented a compromise that was only really possible once Carruthers had gone.73 
Sherington cites Wade’s acceptance of handing over 900 square miles of land and a sea port, 
both of which Carruthers had initially rejected, as evidence of this. What such a view fails 
to acknowledge is that while Carruthers was partial to bluffing his opponents with a hard 
line stance and even flights of Ciceronian rhetoric, when ground was given in an effort to 
compromise he was generally more than willing to reciprocate. This had been the case 
with the Federal Constitution, which Carruthers had been more willing to accept in its 
original form than Reid. It was an alliance of elements of the Labor Party with Anti-
Socialists and the simultaneously protectionist and anti-socialist ‘Corner’ which won the 
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day for Canberra, and ironically the latter group was the product of the gradual 
transportation of Carruthers’ lines of cleavage into federal politics.74 
If one believes that Dalgety was not as utterly unsuitable as Carruthers made out 
then it is possible to accuse him of hypocrisy for refusing to accept it while simultaneously 
attacking the perceived delaying tactics of his Victorian opponents. By the same token it is 
impossible to deny that without Carruthers’ stubbornness Canberra would likely not have 
been chosen, and the capital site would likely have been further from Sydney. A quarter of 
a century passed between the beginning of the Commonwealth and the relocation of 
Parliament. In that time a large Protectionist tariff was settled on in Melbourne and the 
invention of air travel began killing off the tyranny of distance. In a Canberra newspaper an 
aged Carruthers could claim his satisfaction at seeing one of his preferred capital sites 
chosen and express hope in ‘the best modern city of the future’, but in his memoirs he 
bemoaned the capital as a ‘costly experiment that has yet to justify itself’.75 In his mind the 
greatest compromise was the fact that the capital was not Sydney. 
Carruthers’ intractability over the capital site issue and open use of threats of 
secession are two of the main reasons he is remembered as perhaps the fiercest of the early 
State rights leaders, but they are not the only ones. Of even greater remark at the time was 
an incident known as the wire netting affair. This was the result of a clash of interests 
between the Federal Government, who despite their near defeat in the 1906 election 
pushed through an even higher tariff schedule in order to facilitate the full implementation 
of ‘new protection’, and the New South Wales Government who were having trouble 
dealing with a rabbit plague. The rabbit plague had emerged not long after the breaking of 
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the drought, and the agricultural destruction it wrought threatened to derail the State’s 
economic recovery. Such was the State Government’s concern that it led them to support 
controversial experiments on the use of a deliberately introduced disease for rabbit 
destruction.  These were being conducted in the isolated environment of Broughton Island 
by French scientist Dr Jean Danysz, though fear of possible consequences meant there was 
considerable hesitation about the idea of introducing the microbe to the mainland.76 Even 
without these concerns the experiment would take time, so for the moment the only 
practicable solution was to attempt to fence the rabbits out. The issue was that the wire 
netting needed for such fencing had been added to the protective tariff schedule, at a rate 
of 30% for foreign manufacture and 25% for British manufacture.77 
Carruthers was indignant at this move. He pointed out that there were no 
significant Australian private businesses producing wire netting, and that in fact the major 
manufacturer was the Victorian prison system.78 To preference gaols over farmers was, in 
his opinion, quite absurd, particularly in a time of such crisis. The New South Wales 
Government had already been planning to import wire netting, but now with the rise in 
duties it was decided to use that direct importation in combination with section 114 of the 
Constitution, which prevented the Commonwealth Government from taxing the property 
of the States, to bypass the tariff. There was some controversy over whether this clause 
applied to goods imported by the States, but a 1903 New South Wales Supreme Court 
ruling had held that it was and though the Federal Government had lodged an appeal to 
the Privy Council the matter had been allowed to lapse by the appellant.79 Confident of his 
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constitutional position, when in August 1907 Commonwealth officials tried to levy duties 
on a State shipment of wire netting, Carruthers got his own officials to seize the cargo 
forcibly. After receiving approval from the Executive Council a group of policemen were 
sent down to the Pyrmont Docks where, despite the attempts of customs officers to stop 
them, they were able to retrieve much of the netting. 
The incident provoked a storm the likes of which has seldom been seen in 
Australian politics. Members of the Federal Labor Party called for Carruthers’ arrest, while 
Minister for Customs William Lyne sent the New South Wales Premier a provocative 
telegram.80 The press was almost universally critical of the Premier’s actions. The Sydney 
Morning Herald and Daily Telegraph, who normally supported Carruthers on State rights 
issues, made denunciations of what the latter described as the actions of a ‘militant 
protestor’.81 The Bulletin claimed that the Premier’s actions ‘might have been the 
beginning of civil war’, while Hop drew Carruthers setting fire to the Federal Parliament.82 
The Sunday Times was practically alone when it rejoiced that the ‘tea’ had been thrown 
‘overboard’ and that independence would surely follow.83 A few Federal Free Traders even 
joined in the chorus of criticism, so that the greatest support Reid was able to give his 
friend was to say nothing at all. At the end of a speech to his supporters given a couple of 
days after the incident Reid joked that he had ‘forgotten’ to say anything about it.84 Still 
Carruthers received numerous personal letters of support, the appreciation he felt for 
which is shown by the fact that he kept them all. 
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The motivations behind Carruthers’ actions are controversial. Sherington dismisses 
the idea that the Constitutional issue was central and suggests that it was ‘obvious’ that the 
affair was ‘purely political’ and designed to win country votes in the upcoming election.85 
Carruthers was a skilled politician who inevitably paid some attention to how the seizure 
would play to the electorate, but that does not mean his actions were as opportunistic as 
Sherington suggests. After all the seizure was a risky political move which put him offside 
with the influential Sydney papers. This was dangerous for the political trenches of the 
new lines of cleavage would be in the urban areas. The demise of the Progressives gave the 
Liberals a relatively open field in the country, and though it was important to consolidate 
these votes it was equally important to minimise the loss of Sydney seats. Sherington 
seems to think that a throw of the dice was necessary for the Government to win the 
upcoming election given the negative impact of the land scandals, but it appears that by 
this time Carruthers had largely shaken off that setback and was reinvigorating the Party 
with his promise of income tax abolition backed up by sound economic management. By 
engaging in the stunt over wire netting he was jeopardising that political recovery by 
detracting from his central message and also risking aggravating Protectionist sympathies 
amongst his erstwhile Progressive supporters. Carruthers did not run away from these 
political dangers and he did make federal issues central to his 1907 election campaign, but 
given the way that the wire netting affair captured the imagination of the press, to do 
otherwise would have been to push against an irresistible tide. 
If one accepts that the Liberals stood to lose possibly as many votes as they gained 
through the wire netting affair, then it becomes clear that Carruthers was acting out of 
some sort of principle. Even if that principle was purely securing the best interests of New 
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South Wales, then he was at least fulfilling his duty as Premier and Treasurer. Beyond this 
Carruthers was seeking to secure the autonomy of the States to pursue their goals without 
unnecessary hindrance from the Federal Government. For a man who had fought to keep 
the majority of Constitutional responsibilities in the hands of the States, this autonomy was 
necessary to the successful running of a federal system. Just because Carruthers believed in 
what he was doing does not mean the wire netting affair was not a stunt. On the contrary, 
it was a deliberate stunt designed to bring a constitutional issue to a head. This was exactly 
what he had been urging the Federal Government to do with regards to planting a survey 
peg in the Dalgety site, except this time the power was in his hands. It has been pointed 
out that the Premier had paid tariff duty on the less politically charged importation of 
railway material, but the very nature of a constitutional test case such as this required that 
one issue be picked out, and it made sense that it would be the one which was most 
controversial.86 
The wire netting affair succeeded in bringing about that test case, but it would not 
be heard in the Privy Council where the original appeal had been lodged. Instead it was 
heard in a High Court dominated by the ultra-federalist and former Cabinet colleague of 
Deakin and Lyne, Edmund Barton. The Court found against the State Government, a 
decision Carruthers held with such enduring bitterness that it shows how deeply he cared 
about the issue: 
‘As to the decision of the High Court which was in favour of the Federal 
Government, one has to accept it as the final law. That does not prevent me from 
saying that there still lies in the archives of the Privy Council an appeal on the same 
matter by the Federal Government – an appeal which from fear of an adverse 
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decision to this day has been unprosecuted by the appellant, the Federal 
Government…The High Court and the Privy Council do not see quite eye to eye 
with each other in regard to the interpretation of the State and Federal 
Constitutions’.87 
 The defeat in the High Court was representative of Carruthers’ general defeat on 
State rights matters. His only real victory over Deakin was on the capital site issue, and the 
delays and the passing of the protectionist tariff made that victory somewhat hollow. His 
belief that the smaller State Parliaments were inevitably more representative and flexible 
lost out to those that believed the highest tier of government had a special prerogative and 
that centralisation created efficiency. Just because Carruthers lost these battles however, 
does not mean they were not important. In the first decade of the Commonwealth the 
political situation and the operation of the Constitution were in a state of flux. Carruthers 
did more than any other Premier to have those questions left over by the conventions 
settled. Though they were not settled in the States’ favour, Carruthers’ actions helped to 
ensure that by the end of the decade many of the fundamental questions had been resolved 
and the turmoil had died down. That does not mean that the relationship between the 
States and the Commonwealth has not subsequently been difficult, but arguably it has not 
been as difficult as in those early years. Despite all his grievances, Carruthers never pulled 
the trigger on his secession threats. To do so may have destroyed the legacy of Parkes, 
Reid and ultimately himself. After Carruthers’ time the threat of a secession backed by the 
majority of the States died out and provincial governments, though frequently remaining 
disgruntled, have become comparatively more passive. The victory of the ultra-federalists, 
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particularly once Isaac Isaacs took his place on the High Court benches, was near total and 
for better or worse the chariot wheels have dragged the States along. 
 The wire netting affair cast a shadow over the 1907 election for it superseded much 
of the debate about the Government’s record. The campaign still saw some highlights, 
including an innovative motorcar tour of northern New South Wales by the Premier. 
Banjo Paterson wrote the Liberals a campaign song, ‘the good old liberal flag’, which 
emphasised the ideological link between Carruthers and some of the legends of New South 
Wales politics: Parkes, Wentworth and Dunmore Lang.88 To the strains of that tune, Reid 
led a large rally of Liberals at the Sydney Town Hall the night before the election. There he 
declared that he was whole-heartedly committed to ‘any fight which involved either 
political or commercial freedom in Australia’ and gave a resounding endorsement to his 
old friend.89 
The mixed appeal of the wire netting issue was reflected in the election results, for 
the Government lost ground in Sydney but gained ground in the country.90 Those results 
are difficult to interpret, for though there were more ‘Liberals’ elected in 1907 than 1904 
the destruction of the Progressives meant that there were also more Labor members, and 
the Government’s working majority was thus reduced. How to classify the candidates is 
also difficult, as modern analysis lists 8 independent Liberals who generally supported 
Carruthers but whose connections to the LRA is suspect. If these are counted then the 
Liberals had a comfortable majority of 53 out of 90 with 4 true independents.91 If all the 
‘independents’ of any stripe are dismissed then the Liberals still had a solid lead of 45 seats 
to Labor’s 32. 
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 Carruthers boasted of a great victory, and vindication for all he had been pushing 
particularly in regards to the Federal Government. The election was definitely viewed as 
having federal consequences, and how it was perceived interstate varied according to that 
State’s view of federation. The Brisbane Courier boasted of ‘Mr. Carruthers’ triumph’, 
while in Adelaide The Advertiser focused on the ‘heavy government losses’ suffered in the 
inner city.92 Michael Hogan has argued that ‘without the collapse of the Progressives’ 
whose rural seats were generally picked up by the Government, the Liberals would have 
had ‘little to rejoice about’.93 The consequences of realignment were a two-way street 
however, and the collapse of the Progressives helped to consolidate the anti-Government 
vote in the city, partly facilitating the Liberal losses. Admittedly most of the seats the 
Liberals lost in 1907 had not had Progressive candidates in 1904, but voter turnout was up 
from 59.31% to 66.72% suggesting that a two-party system had ended voter confusion and, 
given Carruthers’ clashes with Deakin, it is likely that much of that upswing was 
Progressive/Protectionist voters coming out to vote for Labor in the city.94 
 To assess whether the 1907 election victory was indeed a triumph, the 
achievement needs to be contextualised with a view to the political instability of the New 
South Wales Parliament up until this point. At a little over five years, George Reid had 
served as Premier for the longest continuous period in the Colony’s history. His 
Premiership had started with a short term culminating in a snap election designed to 
pressure the Legislative Council. He then served one full term before being rewarded with 
a hung Parliament which soon brought him down. Reid was succeeded by a 
Protectionist/Progressive Government that went through three Premiers and won just 
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one full term with little opposition from Charles Lee. In serving a full term and then 
winning a stable majority that would go on to serve another, Carruthers and the Liberals 
achieved something that was then unequalled in New South Wales political history. This 
was evidence of the tangible benefit the lines of cleavage had on the stability of the 
Legislative Assembly, a precedent that like so many others would soon be repeated in the 
House of Representatives. 
 The evasive second term had been won through Carruthers’ policies, organisation 
and the popular appeal of his ideological position, which, as always, had been sold with 
considerable rhetorical skill, but he would not get the opportunity to break Reid’s record. 
Not long after the election the Premier was forced to retire for health reasons. For years 
rumours circulated that this was a cover, that the indignity of the lands scandals and the 
difficulty of forming a Ministry with the new former-Progressive Liberals forced his hand.95 
Both suggestions were difficult to believe. Carruthers had been practically exonerated by 
the commission into the lands scandals and the task of forming a Ministry cannot have 
been that difficult considering his less adept successor Charles Wade accomplished the task 
with little fuss. Finally Beverley Earnshaw found proof that Carruthers’ story of ill-health 
had indeed been true, for his papers reveal evidence of a heart attack that cut his career 
short.96 The sickliness that had seen him sent to Goulburn as a boy had finally caught up 
with him and combined with the excesses of a campaign that saw the stresses of the wire 
netting affair and an exhaustive regional tour, it had all proved too much for the ‘little’ 
man’s body. 
 At around fifty years of age Carruthers retired conspicuously, and some would say 
tragically, early. His heart would soon recover allowing him to take up a less stressful 
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position in the Legislative Council that did not require the vigorous campaigning that had 
been such a pivotal part of his electoral success. From this vantage point Carruthers would 
see his lines of cleavage distorted by the First World War, the rise of the Country Party and 
other less remarkable events. Still the flexibility of those lines ensured they never truly 
disappeared. By the end of his life they were already making a comeback, with Joseph 
Lyons’ campaign against debt echoing his cries from an earlier age. Lyons and the United 
Australia Party owed much to Carruthers’ successful demonising of debt in the public’s 
mind. After the Second World War the lines would re-emerge, with nationalisation and 
communism giving a sharp relief to underlying political disputes which were decades old. 
As peace brought stability to the political arena, Australian politics would stabilise around 
the idea that despite their internal disputes ‘Liberals’ were intrinsically different to ‘Labor’ 
and vice versa. The lines of cleavage, or as one contemporary politician has described them 
the ‘battlelines’, continue to inform the political debate and function as a small dose of 

















Joseph Carruthers was a rare breed; a truly successful politician. By the end of his career 
there were very few of his policy priorities he had not succeeded in enacting. He achieved 
or helped to achieve education reform, land reform, direct taxation, free trade (at least 
temporarily), federation, the reduction in the number of members, local government, 
balanced budgets, liquor reform and tax reduction. In an age when Ministers frequently 
lost their seats, Carruthers never lost an election either personally or as the head of his 
Party. Until he met Alfred Deakin almost every political setback he experienced proved to 
be a delay rather than an outright defeat. At the heart of this remarkable success lay good 
political instincts, firm yet pragmatic beliefs and a knack for political organisation. 
This thesis has shown that these traits, while partly innate, were largely the 
product of a long career of learned experience. As a student and budding lawyer, 
Carruthers acted as a Liberal Party partisan before parties ever truly existed. As a young 
politician elected at a political watershed, he quickly learned lessons about solidarity and 
organisation before exceeding his teachers in their implementation. Sensing the time was 
ripe for a changing of the guard, Carruthers jumped ship to Reid in a manner that 
propelled him ahead of his Young Turk colleagues. He then went about subduing these 
friends in the name of loyalty and stability. Receiving his reward in the shape of a Ministry, 
Carruthers shielded his leader through the arduous federation campaign. Having made the 




difficult decision to stay in State Parliament, he made an uncharacteristic misstep in his 
dealings with John See. Utilising the political breathing space afforded him by his mistake, 
Carruthers formulated the idea of combining his lessons on political stability and party 
loyalty with his liberal beliefs, and began advocating realignment based on clear lines of 
cleavage. When the usurper ahead of him fell on his sword, Carruthers took up this 
theoretical framework and created a political organisation that combined liberalism with 
the economic concerns of the day. He then led this to victory, positioning it in opposition 
to its collectivist philosophical opponents and reaping the legislative rewards therefrom. 
The origins of the New South Wales Liberal Party, arguably the first modern non-
Labor Party in the Australian party system, can now be understood in the light of this story. 
Throughout Carruthers’ career the pervasive liberal culture of the factional era was 
adapted into a partisan stance and policies which described a contrastable and sellable 
‘philosophy of government’. Carruthers took a central part in that transformation. Along 
with McMillan he wrote the platform of the LPA, a revolutionary step in the creation and 
espousal of a clear liberal agenda. That platform may have been lost with the failure of the 
FTLA, but its essence was picked up for the 1894 election. Through the early part of the 
Reid government liberalism or at least the Free Trader’s liberal agenda became truly 
partisan, culminating in the fierce 1895 election. Tremendous legislative successes and the 
distraction of federation then took the wind out of the sails of party-liberalism. Lee’s failure 
to construct a captivating program or achieve electoral success represented the exhaustion 
of the movement in New South Wales. It took Carruthers to construct a new agenda and 
breathe life into party-liberalism. He did this first with the campaign for reform and then 
with the crystallisation of liberalism around anti-socialism. As long as the existence of the 
Labor Party continued to act as a perceived threat to individualism and enterprise a large 




part of the liberal agenda was set, and this could then be combined with sound financial 
management and a broad liberal interpretation of the concerns of the day to produce 
continually a flexible yet convincing platform. 
Partisan liberalism was enshrined with the creation of the successful and 
permanent LRA, an organisation set up based on Carruthers’ experience. It incorporated 
what had been successful in previous free trade and liberal organisations that its founder 
had been a part of and then build on this base. It took the branch structure and popular 
participation of older models and combined this with stability and salesmanship to achieve 
membership numbers that were previously unheard of. It was then able to use these troops 
to ensure that on election day the Liberal presence throughout the State was as ubiquitous 
as it had long been in St George. The LRA took the method of local branch preselection 
that helped to invest people in their organisation and combined it with the flexibility to use 
the support base of the PRL when necessary. It assumed the ability to veto preselections 
that previous organisations found necessary, but used the clear lines of division to ensure it 
had fewer issues than its predecessors. To give members a feeling of ownership over their 
Party it allowed a democratic Council to dictate the platform, while still keeping effective 
control in the hands of the leader of the Parliamentary Party. The LRA combined all these 
improved methods with some genuine innovations. The organisation got a head office and 
a permanent and paid secretary. It had a literary committee, and allocated as much of its 
funds as possible to the printed propagation of its message. All of these priorities were 
based on the needs that Carruthers had identified while running campaigns for Parkes and 
Reid and they arguably facilitated the Party’s success. 
While Carruthers founded the Liberal Party’s organisation, he also revolutionised 
the Parliamentary Party, turning a remnant group of Free Traders into the cohesive 




warriors of the lines of cleavage. This thesis has taken great lengths to rediscover 
Carruthers’ role in internal Party politics and its revelations have been significant. Under 
Reid he was the main instigator of solidarity. His attacks on Parkes, Wise and McMillan 
helped not only to defend the Government but also to establish a liberal alternative to the 
bound caucus. He taught backbenchers that while they might not be expelled for crossing 
the floor, if they did so rashly they could be shunned and humiliated to the point where 
their career within the Party was at an end. It might be an ugly compromise considering 
the value liberals placed on individual freedom, but for Carruthers it was a compromise 
necessary for stable government. Under Lee, Carruthers ignored his own rules, but once 
he took the leadership the reins were tightened. Throughout his Premiership Liberal 
members were frequently given a free hand to vote on various pieces of legislation, but the 
fact that such freedom was now a gift of the leader revealed that the independence of the 
previous century was now at an end. 
The LRA was not just an organisation set up to expound liberal beliefs and policy, 
as the FTLA had, but also to defend liberty and enterprise against the perceived Labor 
threat within the context of the lines of cleavage. This dual role lay at the heart of its 
success and it would soon be copied elsewhere. The key advantage of the defensive role 
was that it helped to foster unity, for liberals were less likely to argue amongst themselves 
about what constituted liberalism when they felt that that which existed was being 
threatened. The defensive aspect of the LRA thus pragmatically downplayed internal 
ideological debates and opened up the Party to a ‘broad church’ in a manner suiting 
Carruthers’ attempts to court like-minded Progressives. It has been shown frequently 
throughout this thesis that Carruthers held strong liberal beliefs, but his greatest skill lay in 
adapting these to political circumstances. Keen to establish a two-party system that would 




facilitate stable majorities, he pragmatically decided to occupy an ideological position that 
left room for a broad range of followers. That is why the rhetoric espoused by the LRA 
was able to influence a wide variety of liberals and conservatives, provided they accepted 
some level of importance for individualism and enterprise. The breadth and flexibility of 
the liberal position does not mean that, on some level at least, ideology was not central to 
the LRA. On the contrary, the very objections to Labor that were used to justify unity all 
stemmed from a colonial liberal ideology for which a rejection of class representation, 
caucus solidarity and socialism was a logical outgrowth of its stress on individualism. The 
only ambiguity lay in how much government intervention constituted socialism, for too 
narrow a definition could alienate potential supporters. 
While the defensive role was an important part of the success of the New South 
Wales Liberal Party, it was the manner in which positive and negative were combined that 
was truly innovative. More reactionary organisations had already argued that the Labor 
Party constituted a threat, but because they had little positive to hang their hat on they 
rarely met with success. These protest organisations like the PRL and the NCRL could gain 
support for a while, but once in power not only were their doctrinaire followers frequently 
frustrated by the limits of reality, but their whole raison d'être evaporated. This temporary 
nature was exacerbated by the fact that they were not integrated with a parliamentary 
party, but arguably they could not be because the latter required a positive legislative 
program in order to function. When Carruthers and the LRA faced the electors their 
argument was not just that they would keep the Labor Party out of office, but that while 
doing so they would pursue liberal legislation and sound financial management. This is 
what Carruthers meant when he claimed that the LRA was not ‘anti-anything’. He was not 
having a go at Reid, who himself had tried to make a liberal ideological stance a key 




element of his anti-socialist campaign; he was distancing himself from the more 
reactionary elements who had attached themselves to that campaign. It was a fine line to 
tread when the whole reorientation of liberalism for the two-party system required the 
defensive aspect, but once the lines of cleavage were established the dichotomy would 
mean that their Labor opponents would by definition be as ‘negative’, just from a different 
perspective. 
This thesis has shown that those lines of cleavage were established in New South 
Wales under Carruthers; hence he helped to change the whole party system as well as just 
his own following. During the 1904 election campaign Carruthers deliberately tried to 
make the Progressives irrelevant by focusing his attention on the difference between 
Liberals and Labor. Though other factors were also at play, this tactic worked and what 
had become to some extent the ‘middle’ party was electorally smashed. Over the course of 
his term in office Carruthers then managed to convince the leader of the Progressive rump 
to join him and thereby destroyed what was left of that group. This left behind an effective 
two-party system of the type Carruthers had long been advocating. The Labor Party also 
played a role in the creation of the lines of cleavage in New South Wales, not only by 
seeking government in its own right but also by joining Carruthers in virtually ignoring the 
Progressives in favour of a Liberal-Labor debate. This was a rhetorical victory for the 
Liberal leader and its impact can still be seen in the delineation between the major parties 
today. It can also be seen in the subsequent great improvement in political stability and 
legislative output, for Carruthers’ practical justification for a two-party system arguably 
proved correct. 
This thesis has also argued that while helping to establish the lines of cleavage for 
New South Wales politics and setting up the organisational structure and ideological 




outlook of that State’s Liberal Party, Carruthers influenced the development of the party 
system and liberalism on a national level. The anti-socialist campaign, which he took an 
active part in, was at least partly inspired by events in New South Wales. At one point in 
that campaign Reid even used the phrase ‘line of cleavage’, and it is clear that the whole 
campaign was designed to bring about a realignment in federal politics like the one that 
had been achieved in Reid’s home State. The anti-socialist campaign did not achieve that 
realignment immediately, but it set the wheels in motion that would ultimately lead to the 
federal fusion. That fusion created the Commonwealth Liberal Party, which like the LRA 
seven years before was set up with the dual objective of spreading liberalism and defending 
against socialism. Though the clarity of the lines of cleavage was partly compromised by 
an acceptance of new protection, the CLP and its successors agreed that their main 
differences with their opponents lay in beliefs in both enterprise and individualism, a direct 
echo of Carruthers’ definition of the political divide. The intrinsic anti-Labor aspect of 
Australian liberalism is one of its defining traits, and while it would be misleading to 
attribute this to Carruthers alone, it appears that through his influence on Reid, Cook and 
the political discourse more broadly, he played a central role in the adaptation of colonial 
liberalism into a modern and pragmatic political movement. 
While Carruthers helped to shape the outlook of liberalism, he also guided the 
organisational development of Australian non-Labor parties. This thesis has shown the 
mentor-protégé relationship that existed between Carruthers and the ‘doyen of Australian 
political organisers’ Archdale Parkhill. While previous historians have acknowledged the 
connection between the LRA and the Federal Liberal League, this thesis has used the 
Parkhill relationship to suggest that the LRA’s influence on organisational structures ran 
far deeper. Parkhill learnt about Party organisation through the LRA and Carruthers, and 




brought that knowledge to his roles as the central organiser for both the Commonwealth 
Liberal Party and the Nationalist Party. Both these organisations showed structural traits 
that, while somewhat common to non-Labor organisations, had been perfected by the 
LRA and there is little doubt of the connection. Moreover, this thesis has shown that even 
in the 1920s Parkhill was still getting advice from Carruthers; hence the latter had both a 
direct and indirect involvement in the development of the national party organisation. 
The revelations just described change our historical understanding of Carruthers, 
the party system and Australian liberalism. For the first time some of the major gaps in 
Carruthers’ autobiography have been filled. We are now able to see him as a central 
participant in the Reid Government, not only legislatively but in terms of leadership as 
well. Our comprehension of that government is improved by our knowledge of the 
internal struggles that it faced. ‘Yes-No’ Reid’s complicated relationship with the federation 
campaign can be seen not only as a battle against federalist ultras but also as a battle to 
keep his party together. We can now see how Carruthers developed his ideas during the 
early federal period, so we can therefore understand his Premiership in a clearer light. That 
Premiership has been reappraised in the light of the lines of cleavage and its legislative 
achievements can be viewed as the productive consequence of realignment. Not only have 
some of the gaps in the autobiography been filled, but a few of the failings of the aged 
mind that wrote it have also been rectified. Using contemporary sources and corroborative 
accounts, the thesis has re-examined Carruthers’ relationship with Henry Parkes and 
discovered that not only was it difficult, but that the young Parkesite played a key role in 
shunting the aged statesmen. Though it may be controversial, the latter conclusion should 
be considered by all who subsequently study the ‘father of federation’. 




Though this is certainly positive progress there is still more to be done. It is a 
shame that the limitations of the thesis did not allow for an examination of Carruthers’ 
time in the Legislative Council. This is important; for despite the significance of the 
defining era we have covered political developments do not stop at arbitrary dates. The 
lines of cleavage would continue to evolve after 1907, and though the Nationalist-Labor 
divide was not a true realignment, it still forced a reappraisal of what Carruthers had 
helped to set up. This study cannot claim to be a full political biography until this gap is 
filled and so the task now is to supplement its findings with further research. 
There has been far more written about the development of the Australian party 
system than there has been on Carruthers, hence the impact of this thesis on that area of 
historiography will inevitably be less profound. Nevertheless, our understanding of that 
crucial process has still been improved. We now know that the development of the two-
party system was a far more conscious process than has generally been presumed. The 
change was advocated not only because of a perceived ‘socialist’ peril, but also because an 
effective two-party system was the only way for a parliamentary democracy to function 
smoothly. In another pondered piece of political theory, Carruthers successfully advocated 
that not only must there be two parties but that the difference between them needed to be 
clearly defined in order to give electors an informed choice. Whether the Australian party 
system does give electors a real choice is up for debate, but it is still worth acknowledging 
that for one of its main architects this is what it was meant to do, while still avoiding the 
extremes that would get in the way of stable government. 
The other way in which the existing historiography has been reappraised is that it 
should now pay more attention to the influence of State developments. This thesis has 
firmly argued that you cannot understand federal developments without knowledge of 




what was happening in the second tier of government. Federal politics were a mess in the 
early years of the Commonwealth and it was inevitable that federal politicians would look 
for outside examples of how to achieve stability. The evidence uncovered in this thesis 
strongly suggests that events in New South Wales had the greatest impact on the national 
stage, but the piece still points the way for others to assess State influence. As is always the 
case with history but particularly Australian provincial history, there is still much more to 
be uncovered. 
Finally, this thesis encourages future histories of Australian liberalism to look 
beyond stereotyped images of Reid and Deakin and trace ideological roots back to the 
colonial period. That is the only way that the peculiarities of how that political philosophy 
has been practised in Australia can be truly understood. There certainly have been histories 
that have tried to do this but they have been far too uncommon and frequently too brief. It 
is positive progress that fewer and fewer general histories of liberalism or even the Liberal 
Party start in the 1940s, but to start at 1901 is just as arbitrary and almost as misleading. 
Part of the problem is that Australian liberal historians need to be more aware that a 
person’s historical importance cannot be judged by whether they reached the prime 
ministership. It is a common trap for many historians to fall into, but the scarcity of liberal 
history has only served to exacerbate its effect. Hopefully this study of Carruthers can help 
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